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Abstract 
This thesis applies insights from Historical (HI) and Discursive Institutionalism (DI) to analyse 
the evolution of Europe’s financial stability agenda from the signing of the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) to the completion of Banking Union (BU) (2014). It aims to discover when and under 
what circumstances ideas have enabled and constrained important policy shifts within the 
Eurosystem, and to what extent structural rigidities have prevented change.  
 
The thesis fills three gaps in the literature: i) no previous research has attempted to analyse 
the importance of ideas and structures on the development of financial stability policy 
within the Eurosystem. ii) it provides an ideational explanation for the growing 
supranationalisation of financial policy within the European Union (EU). In line with 
monetarist ideas, financial integration was promoted by the EU Commission and ECB as a 
means of harmonising financial conditions and improving monetary policy transmission 
within an increasingly ‘market-based’ financial environment. Yet as a result of this enhanced 
interconnection, it soon became clear that the ECB would need to become concerned not 
only with the delivery of price stability, but of financial stability too; iii) at the national level, 
little research has been produced on the relationship between national economic ideas, the 
regulation of domestic financial sectors, and how member-states prepared for EMU. This 
thesis shows why Spanish and German banks managed market-based financial trends 
dissimilarly, why the financial crisis affected the two countries differently, and why they 
subsequently expressed different policy preferences at the EU-level.  
 
‘Process tracing’ is used as the overarching methodological framework, attributing causation 
to specific events and trends. Using this framework, the thesis adopts a comparative 
analysis of the Spanish and German financial systems. In total, 19 qualitative interviews 
were conducted with Spanish, German and European policymakers to gain a deeper 
understanding of the ideational and structural issues at play within each jurisdiction, as well 
as a thorough analysis of important speeches and policy documents drafted by national and 
European central bankers. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was then used in conjunction 
with process tracing to examine text and data and to scrutinise policy-makers justifications 
for action or inaction.  
 
The thesis uncovers clear examples of where ideas have acted both as enablers and 
constrainers of change, and where structures have dominated outcomes. One of the most 
important findings is that ideational contradictions or failures can lead to substantial 
institutional change. This occurred most notably during the 2010-12 sovereign debt crisis 
which revealed the inherent contradictions of the Maastricht framework. As the crisis 
intensified, the ECB realised that if price stability was to be maintained, interventionist 
financial policies would become necessary, leading to considerable conceptual stretching 
over what should constitute ECB monetary policy. 
 
Ideas were also shown to have influenced the structure of the German and Spanish financial 
systems and the way they were impacted by the crash. In Germany, Deutsche Bundesbank 
(DB) non-interventionist policy ideas allowed financial institutions to accumulate asset-side 
risk, resulting in the crisis hitting Germany early in 2007. However, the liberalisation of 
German debt markets in the 1990s meant German sovereign bonds became viewed as ‘safe 
assets’ during the downturn, allowing the German state to borrow to bail-out its financial 
sector. 
 
In Spain meanwhile, BdE interventionist financial policy ideas facilitated important 
countercyclical practices which cushioned the initial crisis. But because Spanish banks relied 
on the production of Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) rather than inter-bank ‘repo’ markets for 
funding, Spanish bonds were not considered to have the same pedigree as German debt. 
Consequently, once the sovereign debt crisis took hold, Spain was forced to turn to Europe 
for support. Different financial ideas and regulatory practices within the DB and BdE thus 
had a considerable influence on the severity and timing of the crisis in each country. 
 
This research also reveals that ideas acted as powerful constraints. From the ‘institutional 
formation’ of EMU at Maastricht which established price stability as the raison d'être for the 
existence of the ECB, the banks legitimacy and credibility became entwined with the 
successful implementation of monetarist policies. This restricted the scope of policy ideas 
aimed at improving financial stability, particularly before 2012.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
This research seeks to understand why financial stability evolved from being a secondary 
consideration to having an equal status with price stability within central banking circles 
(Bernanke 2011). Within Europe, the Treaty establishing Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) provided the European Central bank (ECB) with no direct responsibility for financial 
stability (Papademos 2006) and many legal provisions were enacted to try to prevent the 
bank straying from its original price stability mandate (TEU1 1992, Art.105). The task of 
delivering financial stability remained the duty of national financial supervisors and 
regulators within their respective jurisdictions (Duisenberg 2000[b]). Yet over the duration 
of EMU, the European Union (EU) and ECB became increasingly involved in financial stability 
initiatives and responsibility for its maintenance began to migrate away from member-
states towards the supranational level. This research aims to track this process of change 
from 1999-2014 and to explain how important ideas and structures were in:  
 
i) pushing the ECB to think more about and openly discuss financial stability 
ii) advancing and justifying institutional change at the EU and national levels in 
relation to financial stability 
iii) acting as restraints on institutional change at the EU and national levels  
 
 
                                                          
1
 Treaty on the European Union, also known as the Maastricht Treaty. 
The main research question is: 
To what degree can changing ideas and intuitional structures 
explain the evolution of Europe’s financial stability agenda?  
 
For the purposes of this research, the term ‘financial stability’ is defined and understood by 
the ECB as both the avoidance of financial instability, and the creation of a context within 
which financial markets are capable of performing healthily, with credit efficiently allocated 
to solvent firms and households (ECB 2005[b], p.131). Policies aimed at maintaining or 
establishing financial stability may comprise of: altering or implementing prudential 
regulations2; financial supervision, and; crisis management initiatives which may include 
central banks assuming a ‘lender of last resort’ (LOLR) capacity for banks, and/or a ‘market-
maker of last resort’ function by conducting asset purchases to ease financing conditions by 
producing more liquid capital markets (Gabor 2016; Howarth and Quaglia 2016, p.26; Le 
Maux 2017; Mehrling 2016). 
 
The research adopts an institutionalist theoretical framework to explain why the 
Eurosystem’s financial stability agenda evolved between the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992) and the onset of Banking Union (BU) in 2014, and why different EMU 
member-states responded differently to market-based financial developments. It 
appropriates insights from both Historical (HI) and Discursive Institutionalism (DI) to 
understand how important ideas and institutional structures were in shaping the Eurozone’s 
financial system through time.  
 
                                                          
2
 Financial regulation that requires financial institutions to control risk by amending financial accounting 
practices and capital buffers. 
One of the central claims of HI is that institutions3 are important because they help 
determine collective behaviour by structuring choices independently of actor preferences 
(Blyth et al. 2016, p.147, Hall and Taylor 1996, p.937). Institutions, which are assumed to be 
ridged or ‘sticky’, play a central role in shaping peoples goals and objectives by restricting 
behaviour deemed inappropriate or outmoded (Katznelson and Weingast 2005; March and 
Olsen 2004).  HI therefore places a great deal of emphasis on the importance of history and 
structure in determining institutional continuity. The HI concept of ‘path-dependence’ posits 
that institutions tend to exhibit a great deal of permanence through time (Bulmer 2009, 
p.308), making institutional and policy change more difficult to explain.   
 
DI meanwhile places greater emphasis on the role of ideas and their ability to engender 
institutional change (Blyth 2002; Schmidt 2010, p.4). Although DI accepts institutions help 
determine the social context within which actors operate, institutions themselves are 
ultimately constructed and sustained by foundational ideas. As a result, individuals are 
always capable of alternative thought processes and hence able to enact institutional 
change endogenously (Schmidt 2010, p.10). DI therefore tends to focus more on 
institutional transformation and the extent to which ideas and discourse help provoke 
societal adaptation.  
 
Both approaches are excellent at helping frame explanations of continuity and change 
respectively. Yet each also contain weaknesses.  The HI approach consistently views ideas as 
subservient to structures and, as a consequence, struggles to explain institutional change 
                                                          
3
 ‘Institutions’ are understood within this research as prevailing social rules and practices, political and 
economic structures, as well as ideas and assumptions that are used to help decision-makers form policy 
judgements (Béland 2009, p.702; Steinmo 2008, p.128; Hall and Taylor 1996, p.938). 
(Blyth et al. 2016, p.148, Schmidt 2011, p.48). But because DI suggests people’s ideational 
abilities are always capable of breaking free from societal constrictions (Schmidt 2010, 
p.10), it often fails to explain institutional continuity, particularly when that continuity is 
maintained in the face of ideational shifts.  
 
Although no theoretical perspective is without pitfalls, by using insights from both 
approaches concurrently, this research seeks to establish a more comprehensive 
understanding of institutional evolution and to present a fuller explanation of when ideas 
and structures help determine political and economic outcomes at both the national and 
supranational levels. 
 
Before the 2008 crisis, the ECB was said to have functioned according to a one objective 
(price stability), one instrument (short-term interest rate) policy framework (Blanchard et al. 
2010; Gabor 2012, p.5), with scant consideration given to financial stability. There is broad 
agreement within HI and DI literature that the monetarist approach to economic policy – 
which had grown to prominence following the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed 
exchange-rate system – bore significant influence over the design and structure of this 
framework (Quaglia 2008; Howarth and Loedel 2005; McNamara 1998).  The monetarist 
‘price stability’ agenda was geared solely towards the preservation of low inflation.  Inflation 
was viewed as a symptom of excessive borrowing and government spending, but by raising 
interest rates when price level increases breached the two percent threshold, an effective 
break could be applied to reduce unwarranted lending (Rogoff 2003, p.45). 
 
The ECB mandate for price stability was inscribed explicitly in Article 105 of the Maastricht 
Treaty (TEU 1992, Art.105). There was also instituted a strict separation of fiscal, monetary 
and financial authority, and a high degree of statutory independence issued to the ECB 
(Tognato 2012, p.25). These characteristics (predicated on monetarist ideas) intended to 
ensure the bank remained focused solely on the preservation of price stability (Howarth and 
Loedel 2005, p.53; Kaelberer 2003, p.370; Quaglia 2008, p.110). By separating the various 
strands of economic policy and preventing the ECB from monetary financing4 and bailing-
out member-states5, it was thought price stability could be enhanced further by promoting 
market discipline in the sovereign bond markets and discouraging fiscal expansionism 
(Bibow 2015; Yiangou et al. 2013, p.227).  
 
Importantly, this approach was thought not only to produce stable prices, but also 
contribute to the maintenance of financial stability. By anchoring inflation expectations, it 
was argued the efficiency of price information within financial markets became more 
accurate, reducing market volatility (Duisenberg 2000[a]). It was also assumed significant 
intervention by central banks beyond this narrow mandate could only generate suboptimal 
outcomes (Greenspan 2002; Issing 2008, p.65; Weber 2006). Responsibility for regulation 
and supervision was therefore retained at the national level through the principle of ‘home 
country control’ (Scheller 2006, p.111; Scherf 2014, p.64). 
 
Yet even before the crisis, largely due to the contradictions within EMUs monetarist 
framework, things soon began to change. As European financial markets became more 
                                                          
4
 Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
5
 Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
‘market-based’, with financial institutions coming to rely more heavily on securitisation6 and 
wholesale financing (Gabor and Ban 2016; Hardie et al. 2013, p.700), measures taken to 
strengthen monetarist ideas and institutional continuity began to provoke institutional 
alteration. Financial integration was advanced as a means of promoting price stability by 
improving Europe’s interest rate transmission mechanism (Gabor and Ban 2016, p.618; 
Issing 2008, p.214; Tumpel-Gugerell 2005). Yet this integration weakened the Maastricht 
framework by reducing market discipline in the sovereign bond markets7 and gradually led 
the ECB to become increasingly anxious about the possibility of financial contagion. 
Consequently, the bank started to view financial stability as an objective in its own right 
(Papademos 2006; Padoa-Schioppa 2003; Trichet 2003). 
 
This weakening of the Maastricht settlement prior to the 2007-8 crisis is conspicuously 
under-researched as it helped set the direction of future policy initiatives. The secondary 
sovereign debt crisis (2010-12) built on these trends and catalysed further institutional 
change. It placed EMU in an ‘existential emergency’ (Jones et al. 2016, p.1011; Schmidt 
2014, p.189; van Rompuy 2011) which required the ECB and wider EU8 to instigate more 
radical policy initiatives and hence represented a ‘critical juncture’ in the evolution of 
Europe’s financial stability agenda (Jones et al. 2016). Although the ECBs commitment to 
low inflation is generally acknowledged to have been maintained, the ‘extraordinary’ 
policies adopted by the bank in the wake of the 2010-12 crisis extended its reach into areas 
of fiscal policy and financial supervision (Högenauer and Howarth 2016; Weidmann 2016[a]; 
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 The re-packaging of loans into tradable assets. 
7
 Leading to significant increases in public and private sector borrowing in Southern Europe. 
8
 Including the EU Commission, Council of the EU, and the creation of new EU institutions such as the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) and Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). 
Whelan 2015), which had been expressly forbidden by EMUs creators (Duisenberg 2003; 
Hämäläinen 2002; Noyer 1999[a]). 
 
The drive towards BU, which saw supervisory power migrate away from member-states 
through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was a further noteworthy development 
(Beck 2015; Howarth and Quaglia 2013; Véron 2015). The ECB now directly supervises 130 
of Europe’s most significant financial institutions and has also gained authority over macro-
prudential regulation (MPR) designed to counter market inefficiencies that were previously 
thought not to exist. 
 
Nevertheless, despite these important changes, the ECB was also subject to post-crisis 
factors which constrained institutional and policy change. The ECB was slower to react to 
the crisis and far less radical than many other major central banks (Bibow 2015; Farrell and 
Finnemore 2016, p.585). It remains discursively committed to price stability (Draghi 2014[c]; 
Cœuré 2013[a]; Trichet 2011), and often sought to revert back to traditional monetary 
policy instruments at the earliest opportunity9 (Economist 2012[a]; Howarth and Quaglia 
2015, p.463).  
 
Because the ECB was founded upon monetarist ideas, deviation from such concepts created 
both legal10 and credibility problems for the bank (Bayoumi et al. 2014, p.25). Previous 
research has therefore sought to highlight the path-dependence of ECB policy (Salines et al. 
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 Examples of this include the raising of interest rates in 2011, and the ‘sterilisation’ of ECB purchased debt 
securities. 
10
 A group of 35,000 German citizens challenged one ECB policy (the Outright Monetary Transactions [OMT] 
program) in Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). Although the result was that 
the German Court fell into line with an earlier European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling. 
2011; Yiangou et al. 2013) and to show how monetarist ideas exerted a restraining influence 
on its actions (Blyth 2013[b]; Farrell and Finnemore, 2016). One original contribution of this 
thesis is to show that while the bank was indeed subject to such factors, traditional 
monetarist ‘programmatic ideas’ also became progressively weakened, allowing financial 
stability ‘policy ideas’ to emerge. 
 
Additionally, EMU obliged member-states to abandon their own national currencies, cede 
sovereignty over monetary policy to the ECB, and provided a catalyst for increased Eurozone 
financial and economic integration. Yet despite this, national economic, political and 
financial distinctiveness continues (Cohen-Setton 2011; Gros 2017; Pelagidis 2009).  NCBs, 
particularly before the crisis, retained substantial authority over financial regulation and 
banking supervision and continue to exert a significant influence over national and 
Eurosystem policy (Quaglia 2008, p.3; Scherf 2014, p.64; Scheller 2006, p.111). As well as 
examining the Eurosystem at the supranational level therefore, this thesis also includes 
comparative analysis at the national level. 
 
Spain and Germany were chosen for this analysis on the basis of a ‘most similar’ structural 
comparison (Anckar 2008; Esser and Vliegenthart 2017, p.6). Before the crisis both countries 
maintained structural similarities and were categorised within the literature as ‘bank-based’ 
financial systems (Deeg and Posner 2016, p.441; Royo 2013[a], p.632; Vitols 2005, p.386). 
Their financial environments comprised of large private banks, smaller cooperative sectors 
and large ‘politicised’ public banking segments that maintained close relationships with local 
and regional politicians (IMF 2003, p.3; Johnson 1998, p.45; Royo 2013[c], p.25). Despite 
both countries central banks calling for a liberalisation of their public banking sectors 
(Caruana 2001; DB 2003[b], p.45-6; Martín 2000), the only significant pre-crisis legislative 
changes targeting state-owned banks emanated from EU competition policy11. 
 
Notwithstanding these parallels, both systems were impacted differently both during and 
after the financial crisis. While previous research has explained how these difference 
manifested themselves, with German banks exposed on the asset-side and Spanish banks on 
the liabilities-side of their balance sheets (Hardie and Howarth 2013[a], p.104; Royo 
2013[a], p.154), this research explains how ideas facilitated these differences and why 
Spanish and German banks reacted distinctly to the advent of ‘market-based’ banking.  
 
While both nations NCBs gave voice to monetarist principles and extolled the virtues of 
fiscal restraint (Castro 2003, p.7; Commission 2004, p.19; Howarth and Rommerskirchen 
2013, p.766), their versions of monetarism differed. The Deutsche Bundesbank (DB) 
subscribed to an orthodox version of monetarism informed by its ordo-liberal 
(Ordnungspolitik) ideology which opposed state intervention beyond the setting of a strong 
legal framework and the manipulation of interest rates (Bibow 2017; Brunnermeier et al. 
2016, p.61; Bulmer 2014, p.1246). It also remained sceptical of short-term finance which it 
believed could hamper its ability to control monetary aggregates (Covil 1996; Gabor 2016, 
p.977). The Banco de España (BdE) meanwhile preferred to target inflation and therefore 
considered functioning short-term debt markets as conducive to an effective interest rate 
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 In the case of Germany, the EU Commission ruled in 2001 that state obligations for large German state 
owned banks (Landesbanken) be phased out by 2005 (Commission 2002; Lütz 2005, p.143;). In 2004, the 
Commission also ordered the German state to recover €3 billion it had loaned to Landesbanken via federal 
state deposits at below market rates (Commission 2005; DB 2005[b], p.72). In the case of Spain, prior to 2002, 
public figures accounted for more than half of the representatives on Spanish public banks (cajas) corporate 
boards. This risked the banks becoming defined as public institutions under EU law, resulting in corporate 
loans granted by cajas becoming classified as state aid, in violation of the EU’s competition regime. The 
Spanish law on financial market reform (Ley Financiera, 44/2002) was passed to cap the number of 
representatives from public authorities at 50 percent to prevent breaching EU regulations. 
transmission channel (Pellicer 1995, p.39). It also understood the value of countercyclical 
policies to help stabilise the business cycle (Ban 2016, p.46; Malo de Molina 2012, p.192) 
and implemented regulations to prevent widespread use of complex securities.  
 
These divergent preferences gave rise to distinct ‘policy ideas’ (Schmidt 2014) in relation to 
financial stability which influenced the supervisory structure of each system. This resulted in 
different ‘market-based’ practices becoming adopted in each state. While the DB 
maintained a non-interventionist ‘bottom up’ approach to supervision and reluctantly 
liberalised capital markets to ensure the country became the de facto issuer of European 
‘safe assets’ (Gabor 2016), the BdE undertook a more active role in supervising Spanish 
banks by discouraging ‘shadow banking’12 activity and introducing countercyclical financial 
policies (BdE 2001, p.70-76; Deeg 2001, p.17; Lütz 2004, p.173; 2005, p.142; Pérez 1997[b], 
p.161).  
 
These policy penchants, resulting from idiosyncratic financial ideas, had a direct bearing on 
the manner in which German and Spanish banks operated. Another original contribution of 
this research is to demonstrate that it was these ideational divergences which ultimately 
explain why German banks were affected more severely by the opening stages of the 
crisis13, and why despite overcoming the initial crash, Spain was ultimately forced to disband 
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 Financial institutions that act in the same way as traditional banks - as financial intermediaries that conduct 
maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation - but without explicit access to central bank liquidity, public 
sector credit guarantees, or regulatory oversight (Claessens and Ratbovski 2014; Pozsar et al. 2013, p.1; Hardie 
et al. 2013, p.714). 
13
 DB ‘self-regulation’ permitted German banks to amass huge amounts of asset-side risk (Cases 1996, p.180; 
Deeg 2001, p.17; Hassan 2014; Lütz 2004, p.173; 2005, p.142). Spanish regulation meanwhile discouraged the 
accumulation of asset-side risk through ‘consolidated regulation’ and macro-prudential intervention 
(Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-Herrero 2009; Jiménez et al. 2012). 
its public banking sector and seek EU assistance in 201214 (Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016, p.32; 
MoU 2012). 
 
This research therefore fills three important gaps in contemporary literature on European 
financial stability. Firstly, by combining DI and HI, it attains a more nuanced comprehension 
of the forces which enabled and constrained the development of financial stability policy 
within the Eurosystem. No previous research has attempted to analyse the importance of 
both ideas and structures on this evolution. Scholars have so-far either attempted to 
provide structural (Salines et al. 2011; Yiangou et al. 2013) or ideational (Farrell and 
Finnemore, 2016; Blyth 2013[b]) explanations for continuity. The few studies that have 
engaged with the role of ideas in explaining evolutionary institutional change (Röper 2017; 
Schmidt 2016) failed to also account for the striking institutional permanence of many 
aspects of the Eurosystem’s financial system, or to examine the national and supranational 
levels of EMUs financial framework.  
 
Secondly, it provides an ideational explanation for the growing supranationalisation of 
financial policy within the EU.  It shows how as Europe’s financial environment became 
increasingly ‘market-based’, the original structure of EMU15 became at odds with traditional 
monetarist ideas (Gabor 2016).  The need for integrated financial markets to transmit 
monetary policy aimed at controlling inflation meant that market discipline in the sovereign 
bond markets reduced and the risk of financial contagion became more pronounced. In this 
environment, maintaining a functioning interest rate transmission mechanism (in line with 
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 The BdE did not take steps to ensure Spanish debt became sought-after in the capital markets. Spain 
therefore did not experience the ‘exorbitant privilege’ of the ‘flight to safety’ which took place in relation to 
German debt during the crisis (Gabor and Vestergaard 2016). 
15
 Which sought to delineate monetary, financial and fiscal policies (Bibow 2015). 
monetarist programmatic ideas) increasingly required the ECB to engage with financial 
policy ideas aimed at quelling financial instability. While European institutions initially called 
only for greater monitoring and coordination at the EU-level (Jones et al. 2016, p.1019; 
Trichet 2004[a]; 2005[a]; 2005[b]; Vipond 1991), this evolved into demands for supervisory 
authority to migrate to the supranational level as problems intensified post-2007 (Barroso 
2010; de Larosière 2009; van Rumpuy 2011).  
 
Finally, at the national level, while ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik) has been found by 
scholars to have influenced Germany’s reaction to the crisis (Brunnermeier et al. 2016; 
Matthijs 2016; Nedergaard and Snaith 2015), with some notable exceptions (Lütz 2004; 
Zimmerman 2014), little research has been produced on the relationship between German 
economic ideas, the regulation of its financial sector, and the manner in which it prepared 
for EMU (Röper 2017). This lack of analysis is even more omnipresent in the case of Spain, 
where far less research has been focused. By investigating how these two countries NCBs 
viewed and addressed financial stability prior to the crisis, this research uncovers why 
Spanish and German banks managed the onset of ‘market-based’ financing and 
preparations for EMU differently. This in turn explains why banks within the two countries 
accumulated different balance sheet risks (Hardie and Howarth 2013[a], p.104; Royo 
2013[a], p.154), why the financial crisis affected the two countries differently, and why they 
both expressed different policy preferences at the EU-level post-2007.  
 
In terms of methodology, the ‘process tracing’ technique16 was used to frame the research 
(Berman 2011, p.124; Gerring 2006; Steinmo and Thelen 1992, p.9). Comparative analysis of 
Spain and Germany was adopted to ensure each level of EMU was examined thoroughly, 
and a huge amount of secondary data was collated and set into a timeline from which key 
events and trends were identified. Data triangulation was also used to ensure information 
was garnered from (a wide and extensive) variety of primary and secondary sources17 
(Decrop 1999, p.159). From these sources it was possible to track ideational and structural 
changes that occurred within the Eurozone since its inception (Claeys et al. 2014, p.7). 
 
Once particular issues and time periods had been identified as important, 19 in-depth 
qualitative interviews with relevant participants were conducted to drill down into specific 
areas (Vromen 2010, p.258). Respondents included members of the ECB, European 
Commission, DB, BdE and the Finance and Economics Ministries of Spain and Germany. This 
allowed specific events and ideas to be examined in greater depth and for the structural and 
ideational factors determining institutional change to be teased out (Parsons 2011, p.135).   
 
Although some of the information needed for this research may have been obtained 
through the analysis of secondary sources alone, elite interviewing added an important 
additional layer to the data (Lilleker 2003, p.208). It also provided greater context and 
improved understanding of decision-makers motivations and the dominant ideas and 
practices within their organisations (Schonhardt-Bailey 2013, p.450).  Despite some of the 
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 A method which entails a careful examination of history in order to focus more concisely upon specific time 
periods in order to establish causality. 
17
 Secondary sources included: existing academic literature, ECB, DB and BdE board member speeches and 
interviews; official central bank documentation; interviews and speeches by German and Spanish Finance 
Ministers; and speeches by European Commissioners. 
methodological and practical issues surrounding elite interviewing, it is often the most 
effective way to determine how subjective factors influence political and economic decision-
making, and for understanding the incentives and preferences of actors (Berry 2002, P.682; 
Rathbun 2008, p.686-90).  
 
Finally, the transcripts of primary interviews and secondary sources were analysed using 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Wood and Kroger 2000, p.72). CDA allows for abductive 
research, with a constant movement from theory to the data and back. Alongside process 
tracing, it was used to examine data whilst incorporating historical context into the analysis 
of text and discourse (Wodak 2001[b]). The CDA concept of ‘interdiscursivity’ was used to 
discover instances in which two sets of ideas are expressed within one discursive event, 
allowing the evolution of ideas to be traced more effectively (Fairclough 2010, p.95; Wodak 
2001[b]). CDA helped to detect the points at which one hegemonic idea became challenged 
or began to be replaced by another, helping to trace the evolution of financial ideas through 
time. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:  
 
Chapter two reviews the theoretical literature and critically examines the two theoretical 
approaches adopted for this research. It highlights examples of where DI and HI have been 
used previously to examine financial topics within the EU and where ‘gaps’ in contemporary 
research are currently located. It provides instances in which insights from HI and ideational 
research have been used together previously, and explains why utilising both approaches 
presents a more holistic and rigorous way to research the importance of ideas and 
structures in European political economy18.  
 
Chapter three outlines the research methodology. After describing the specific research 
questions this thesis answers, it recounts the methods DI and HI scholars have used to 
conduct investigations. It then explains in more detail why Spain and Germany were chosen 
as the ‘strategic comparison’, describes the process through which the research was 
conducted, and details the explicit methods that were used to both generate and analyse 
data in later chapters. 
 
Chapter four examines the structure and ideational contexts of the German and Spanish 
financial systems before the 2007-8 crisis. It begins by looking at each system prior to EMU 
during the period of financial market liberalisation, before examining the two nations from 
1999-2007. It explains how financial ideas influenced the specific regulatory and supervisory 
practices adopted by each NCB and shows how these differences influenced the way 
financial institutions adapted to the introduction of ‘market-based’ finance. It also reveals 
that although concerns were raised by both NCBs about the politicisation of public banks 
(Ayadi et al. 2009, p.41; Caruana 2003; 2001; Hardie and Howarth 2009, p.1020; Martín 
2000), substantial institutional change was avoided. To explore this in greater detail, a 
‘critical case study’ of two public banks, Bayerische Landesbank (BayernLB, Germany) and 
Caja de Ahorros del Mediterráneo (CAM, Spain), is included in the appendix. 
 
                                                          
18
 Specifically, it sets out how this research draws on these two approaches by incorporating the HI intuitions 
of ‘path-dependence’, ‘sunk costs’, ‘vested interests’ and ‘critical junctures’ (Bulmer 2009; Capoccia and 
Kelemen 2007; North 1987; Posner 2007), and the DI insights of ‘coordinative’ and ‘communicative’ discourse, 
and the ranking of ideas into ‘philosophical’, ‘programmatic’ and ‘policy’ ideas (Schmidt 2014). 
Chapter five looks at the ECB before the 2007-8 crisis. It begins by exploring the institutional 
and ideational foundations of EMU, before describing the early history of the euro from 
1999-2007. It demonstrates that although price stability was the ECBs overriding objective 
during this period, financial stability concerns were far from absent (Padoa-Schioppa 2003; 
Papademos 2006; Trichet 2005). It discloses how EMUs monetarist framework contained 
inherent contradictions, meaning measures taken to strengthen institutional continuity 
provoked institutional change. It subsequently tracks how financial policy ideas became 
promoted throughout the pre-crisis history of the euro as European finance became 
progressively interconnected and market-based.  
 
Chapter six explores the impact of the 2007-8 financial crisis on Spain and Germany 
between 2007-2014 and how each country dealt with the fallout. It reveals the importance 
of ideas and structures in helping to determine why these two countries were impacted 
differently by the crash and why post-crisis EU and ECB policies aimed at moderating the 
turmoil were received differently in the two countries (Restoy 2015; Schäuble 2011[a]). A 
‘critical case study’ of the biggest bank bailouts in Germany and Spain, Hypo Real Estate 
(HRE – Germany) and Bankia (Spain), illustrate how the crisis affected financial institutions 
in the two countries. The chapter also shows how pre-EMU reforms in Germany placed 
German debt in a privileged position on the bond markets and why despite having a more 
conservative fiscal track-record, Spanish government debt was not as highly regarded as 
German sovereign bonds. 
 
Chapter seven focuses attention on the aftermath of the crisis at the EU-level. It shows that 
whilst there has been significant structural and ideational change post-crisis, monetarist 
ideas continue to exert a strong influence and have been important in limiting more robust 
action. The chapter argues that while the ECB and EU Commission have often managed to 
overcome structural rigidities aimed at preventing intervention in financial markets 
(particularly after the ‘critical juncture’ of the sovereign debt crisis [Jones et al. 2016]), they 
struggled to cast aside ideational factors exerting a similar influence. It was these ideational 
constraints, rather than any structural restrictions, which proved most significant in slowing 
the pace of institutional change. 
 
Chapter eight concludes the research by offering a concise response to the main research 
question and highlighting instances where ideas, structural factors, and ‘critical junctures’ 
proved significant to the evolution of Europe’s financial stability agenda. This thesis 
strengthens existing theoretical approaches by demonstrating how and under what 
circumstances ideas and structures are best able to influence institutional change and 
continuity through time.  It also includes reflections on how various aspects of the research 
may have been conducted differently and suggests opportunities for further study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Theoretical Literature Review 
 
Why have Historical and Discursive Institutionalist Approaches been used as the 
theoretical foundation for this research?  
 
 
This research strives to understand the importance of both ideas and institutional structures 
in explaining continuity and change in relation to financial stability in the Eurozone, insights 
from both Historical (HI) and Discursive Institutionalism (DI) are used throughout this thesis. 
HI places a great deal of emphasis on the importance of historical and institutional 
structures in determining social outcomes and engineering institutional continuity (Bulmer 
2009; Katznelson and Weingast 2005; Steinmo 2008). DI meanwhile places greater stress on 
the importance of ideas and their ability to manufacture institutional change (Blyth and 
Matthijs 2016; Schmidt 2010; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004).  
 
Institutions are subject to pressures which seek to reform and to conserve their historical 
integrity. Occasionally, the capacity of institutions to exhibit ideational and structural path-
dependency (Cox 2004) prevents new ideas from taking root and institutional change from 
emerging. At other times, new ideas are able to gain traction and institutions become 
capable of altering their pre-existing dynamics. By using insights from HI and DI together, 
this chapter argues a more comprehensive understanding of institutional evolution may be 
achieved, and a clearer indication provided of when and how ideas and structures ‘win out’ 
over each another.  
This chapter sets out how an HI-DI analytical framework may be achieved in practice. It 
begins by critically examining both approaches before arguing that by combining insights 
from both approaches, the weaknesses of each may be mitigated and a more accurate 
comprehension of institutional evolution achieved. The second and third sections discuss 
examples of where HI and DI have been used previously in the literature on European 
finance, and highlights where gaps in contemporary research are currently located. The 
fourth section provides examples of previous studies where insights from HI and ideas 
research have been used concurrently. The fifth segment explores the literature 
surrounding dominant philosophical economic ideas (Schmidt 2014) within Germany and 
Spain (the two countries used for comparative analysis in this study) to facilitate discussion 
in the following chapters. The chapter then concludes by summarising the justifications for 
using insights from DI and HI together and outlines how this thesis addresses gaps in current 
literature by improving our understanding of when and how ideas and structures matter in 
explaining institutional continuity and change.  
 
2.1 Historical and Discursive Institutionalism 
The HI and DI institutionalist perspectives were developed in response to the behavioural 
studies of the 1960s and 1970s and the new institutionalist approaches of the 1980s and 
1990s which sought to account for how and why institutions have meaning in political 
economy (March and Olsen 1989; Pollack 2009). These ‘institutionalisms’ are neither 
overarching theories, nor a specific method or set of methods, but rather conceptual 
approaches to the study social phenomena (Steinmo 2008, p.118).  
 
Paul Pierson, one of the earliest scholars to use HI within the context of the European Union 
(EU), argues the approach is historical because it sees political and economic development 
as a temporal process, and institutionalist because it recognises temporal developments are 
wedded to institutions; be they understood as formal rules, policy structures, norms or 
values (Hall and Taylor 1996, p.937; Pierson 2000, p. 264-5).  Within HI, the meaning of the 
term ‘institution’ is contested, but it is generally no longer understood as a simple surrogate 
for political organisation. The term now embodies a range of additional conditions including, 
according to one HI author, concepts as broad as ‘stable, recurring pattern[s] of behaviour’ 
(Lowndes 2010, p.61).  
 
One oft-cited interpretation of the term is Hall (1986), who claims institutions may be 
understood as sets of formal rules, standard procedures that structure individual 
relationships, or as organised units used to arrange political and economic practices (Hall 
1986, p.19). Streeck and Thelen (2005) meanwhile argue institutions should be understood 
more broadly as ‘regimes’: sets of ‘collectively enforced expectations’ which demand an 
expected conduct and ‘rule-out’ other forms of behaviour, helping to determine social 
outcomes19 (Streeck and Thelen 2005, p.11-16). Nevertheless, there is broad agreement 
among HI scholars that institutions should be regarded as rules (be they formal or informal), 
that impose condition on human behaviour (Hall and Taylor 1996, p.938; Steinmo 2008, 
p.128). 
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 In their paper The Logic of Appropriateness, March and Olsen (2004) argue human activity within institutions 
is driven by rules governing appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. Rules are followed within an 
institutional setting because they are seen as respectful and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfil the obligations 
inherent to a specific institutional role or identity which tends to mitigate human conduct and set limits on the 
extent of behavioural divergence (March and Olsen 2004). 
For DI and ideational theorists meanwhile, institutions are viewed in a slightly more complex 
manner. Whilst they accept institutions can provide coercing contexts within which agents 
conduct themselves, they also see them as contingent upon the thoughts, words, and deeds 
of individuals both internal and external to the institution itself (Schmidt 2010, p.4; 2008, 
p.314). In essence, institutions are seen as constituted by ideas which are, by their nature, 
adaptable to circumstance. This definition of institution, whilst making the term broader 
and downplaying their constrictive properties, does allow the relationship between 
structure and agency to be viewed more fluidly. Seen in this way, although institutions can 
impose constraints and conditions on human action, individuals are contemporaneously 
able to alter institutions through ideational and discursive practices (Béland 2009, p.702).  
 
While imperfect, this research understands institutions as political and economic structures, 
dominant social rules and normative practices, but also as prevailing ideas that take the 
form of economic and political assumptions20. Although there may be many such ‘dominant 
logics’ within a society that coexist, and may even be contradictory to one another (Streek 
and Thelen 2009, p.116), they nevertheless act inherently to legitimise, constrain or alter 
existing organisational strategies and procedures. Failure to properly investigate the 
assumptions of decision-makers who use them to formulate policy proposals makes it 
harder to understand both institutional continuity and policy change (Béland 2009, p.705). 
This definition of institution enables this thesis to examine more extensively when and how 
ideas have been important in shaping the European financial system, and when and under 
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 Within the body of this thesis, the word ‘institution’ is generally used to denote organisational structures, 
e.g. the Deutsche Bundesbank (DB) and Banco de España (BdE), rather than the philosophical interpretation of 
‘institution’. 
what circumstances structures have rendered them less significant, maintaining institutional 
congruence. 
 
One of the central claims of HI is that institutions matter because they are the principle 
organisational determinant of collective behaviour and can structure choices independently 
of agent preferences (Blyth et al. 2016, p.147; Hall and Taylor 1996, p.937). Institutions are 
therefore viewed as an intrinsic part of the way in which we form our preferences, express 
our interests and pursue our goals (Katznelson and Weingast 2005).  Many objectives, it is 
claimed, only make sense within a specific institutional setting, or even affect whether 
certain interests come to be expressed at all (Immertgut and Anderson 2008, p.348). This 
assumption is criticised by rational theorists who, while recognising that human motivation 
is complex, contend that individuals are inherently self-interested and have a priori goals 
and preferences which are not determined by institutions. Instead, institutions provide 
actors with additional information and certainty which they are then able use to their 
advantage (Hall and Taylor 1996, p.939). Here, individuals are assumed to have the cognitive 
capacity, time and emotional detachment necessary to pursue independent objective 
interests, which are rationally, rather than structurally given (Ward 2002, p.68).  
 
Some, including Steinmo (2008) have reacted to these criticisms by claiming that HI can 
accommodate both the assumption that human beings are norm and rule followers, as well 
as self-interested rational actors. How one acts, he argues, depends on both the individuals’ 
rationality and on institutional context (Steinmo 2008, p.130)21. In an attempt to unite the 
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 In this tradition, Tsebelis (1990), differentiates between ‘efficiency institutions’; institutions that improve the 
efficiency and well-being of all, and ‘redistributive institutions’; which seek to preserve the interests of a 
two schools of thought, Katznelson and Weingast (2005) went as far as to claim that 
differences between HI and rational theory diminish or even ‘disappear’ when they examine 
how institutions help constitute and shape individual preferences, judgments, choices and 
outcomes (Katznelson and Weingast 2005).  
 
Yet this leaves HI open to a further criticism. If agents are assumed to have predetermined 
objectively defined goals and intentions, and their interests are further constrained and 
channelled by the deterministic nature of institutions, it should be easy to predict human 
behaviour. Moreover, such ideational and structural constraints would make it extremely 
difficult for individuals to adapt to changing circumstances and engender institutional 
change.  Yet as we have seen throughout the financial crisis, the future remains incredibly 
hard to predict (Haldane 2012) and institutions (however defined), capable of quite 
fundamental alteration (De Rynck 2014; Stein 2011). 
 
In light of this, DI gives considerable weight to the role of ideas and discourse in explaining 
institutional and social change.  Schmidt (2011; 2010) terms her DI as an umbrella concept 
for the vast range of works that underscore the substantive role of ideas and the 
collaborative process of discourse that generates and communicates those ideas to a wider 
audience (Schmidt 2011, p.47; 2010, p.3).  According to Béland and Cox (2011), ‘ideas’ in 
social science research can be defined as ‘causal beliefs’ which serve as the connection 
between our minds and the material world through which we interpret our surroundings 
(Béland and Cox 2011, p.3). They provide guides for action and help us to address the many 
problems and challenges we face while living out our lives.  For DI scholars, ideas are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
specific group (Tsebelis 1990, p.104). Both such institutions may arise as a consequence of the economic 
rationality of dominant actors, but then subsequently help distort future economic and political outcomes. 
therefore much more than just mechanisms through which we cognitively process our pre-
determined interests, but are subjective and intrinsic modes which we use to conduct and 
monitor our actions and behaviour (Béland and Cox 2011, p.3-4).  
 
Whilst DI accepts institutions can be constraining, it also claims they can deliver an enabling 
function by providing meaning and context to human action (Schmidt 2010, p.4). Institutions 
therefore become more than restraining exogenous structures, but are internalised within 
individuals themselves (Schmidt 2008, p.322). Although it could be suggested that such 
internalisation may strengthen institutional continuity, by considering it possible for people 
to preserve independent human agency, DI claims to better account for future uncertainty 
and institutional change (Schmidt 2010, p.13). Just as structures can frame and define the 
limits of appropriate actions, ideas and the iterative power of discourse are understood to 
have the power to change and mould institutions (Blyth 2002). Conceiving of ideas in this 
manner lifts them above structures in any explanation of social development. What 
becomes important are the ideas expressed, particularly during moments of uncertainty, 
rather than the institutional rules and norms themselves (Blyth et al. 2014, p.12). 
 
Schmidt (2014) argues ideas may be categorised into three types (see table 2.1 below). 
‘Philosophical ideas’ constitute ‘webs of belief’ and represent the deepest level of 
generalisation: worldviews, ideologies, philosophical principles, public philosophies and 
normative values. These modes establish the core understandings of individuals and 
societies regarding how the world works and what actions are subsequently deemed 
appropriate. Because of the intrinsic nature of these ideas, they are often the slowest to 
change, with any alteration or replacement taking place gradually (Schmidt 2014, p.194).  
‘Programmatic ideas’ meanwhile (recognised as ‘policy paradigms’ within HI discourse 
[Braun 2015; Immergut and Anderson 2008, p.358]) are composed of an entire set of policy 
prescriptions, instruments and goals which constitute a broad conceptual approach to an 
area of policy (Schmidt 2014, p.196)22. Finally, ‘policy ideas’ are recognised as the most 
immediate ideational level and embody specific policies, norms, values, and political 
discourses applied to particular situations or circumstances (Schmidt 2014, p.196). 
 
Table 2.1: DI ideational categories  
Type of Idea Strength of Idea Description 
Philosophical idea Culturally ingrained and 
very resistant to change 
Webs of belief, worldviews, 
ideologies 
Programmatic idea Resistant to change, but 
may be challenged during 
‘policy windows’ or critical 
junctures 
policy paradigms with sets of 
policy prescriptions which 
constitute a broad area of policy 
policy idea Most adaptable to change. 
May be used to challenge 
or strengthen 
philosophical and/or 
programmatic ideas 
Specific policies or programs 
designed to address particular 
deficiencies in existing policy 
 
Source: Adapted from Schmidt (2014) 
 
This thesis builds on the work of Schmidt (2014) by showing that whilst these policy ideas 
are the least durable of the three categories, they are also the most dynamic as new policy 
ideas are frequently floated within political discourse and may be used to strengthen or 
undermine dominant philosophical and/or programmatic ideas. 
                                                          
22 Kingdon (1995) argues such paradigms may be challenged during ‘policy windows’. These windows, he 
maintains, are fleeting moments (frequently repelled) in which traditional institutional practices become 
challenged by alternatives (Kingdon 1995, p.166). Similarly, HI scholars contend that such paradigmatic 
dislocations may only take place within ‘critical junctures’: periods of crisis which create windows of 
opportunity for old paradigms to be replaced by new ones (Braun 2015; Donnelly and Hogan 2012; Yim and 
Kim 2015). 
Schmidt (2014) also argues these ideas are transmitted using two different types of 
discourse. ‘Coordinative discourses’ are used by individuals within institutions to 
communicate with one another. At the EU-level, this discourse is conducted during EU 
Summits and Council meetings as leaders debate and negotiate agreements behind closed 
doors. ‘Communicative discourse’ meanwhile is used by EU institutions to communicate to 
markets and EU citizens as they seek to instil external actors with confidence in their ability 
to deal with any issues which may arise (Schmidt 2014, p.189). Within central banking 
circles, this type of discourse has become increasingly important in recent years and has 
been used as a way to create and maintain institutional legitimacy and credibility (Hughes 
and Kesting 2014, p.329; Schonhardt-Bailey 2013, p.100). These insights from Schmidt 
(2014) in relation to the categorisation of ideas and discourses are also adapted by this 
thesis as they represent useful conceptual frames for understanding the strength and 
purpose of various concepts and dialogues. 
 
Nonetheless, whilst DI’s focus on ideas can make it theoretically much easier to explain 
institutional change, cognitive processes alone cannot adequately capture all institutional 
evolution. This is particularly true when exploring the policy implementation process. Often 
despite changes in ideas, wider social attitudes and ‘dominant logics’, institutions can 
remain firmly resistant to modification (Dorey 2005, ch.7), or alternatively, may change in 
ways that were unintended (Pierson 1996, p.158; Thelen 1999, p.384). Even many ideational 
scholars accept institutions can ordain significant constraints on human behaviour and be 
very difficult to transform (Lieberman 2002, p.698; Schmidt 2008, p.4).  A seemingly 
unanswered question in the literature therefore appears to be precisely when structures are 
dominant in determining policy outcomes, and when and under what circumstances ideas 
and human agency are capable of breaking free from these constraints and engendering 
institutional change. 
 
A key aim of this thesis is to help answer this question. Table 2.2 combines insights from DI 
and HI and identifies scenarios in which ideas and structures ‘win out’ over one another. The 
table is referenced and expanded upon throughout the thesis. 
 
Table 2.2: Ideational versus structural matrix 
A) ideas trump structures    ->  institutional change 
B) structures trump ideas    ->  institutional continuity 
 
C) new ideas in old institutions   ->  accelerate policy change 
D) established ideas in new institutions  ->  hinder policy change 
 
E) new ideas in new institutions   ->  rapid policy change 
F) established ideas in old institutions  ->  sluggish policy change 
 
G) ideational contradictions or failures -> gradual policy / institutional change 
H) critical juncture    -> rapid policy / institutional change 
 
I) ridged legal structure   -> hinders policy / institutional change 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
This innovation helps to more accurately account for how outcomes in European political 
economy are dictated. In A, C and E, ideational advances help induce institutional change, 
whilst in G, ideational failings and paradoxes help provide space for new ideas to emerge. In 
D and F, ideas act as agents for path-dependence, while in B, H and I, structures override 
ideas in determining institutional evolution.  
 
A further core feature of HI is the contention that history, as well as institutions, matter for 
the conditioning of social behaviour. For HI, the functioning of institutions themselves are 
often imperfect and characterised by legacies of historic interactions (Pierson 1996, p.132). 
This means that nations, for example, are not viewed as functional homogeneous entities 
pursuing an established set of interests, but rather as collectives of historically wedded 
institutions all pursuing their own self-defined goals (Streek 2009, p.107). This has led to 
criticisms of the approach from Functionalist and Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) scholars who 
suggest distinctive national systems are the result of ‘institutional complementaries’, 
whereby national institutions align with one another to give countries an ‘institutional 
comparative advantage’ in the production of certain goods and services (Hall and Soskice 
2001, p.18). 
 
HI scholars retort that history shows institutions are frequently conceived as the result of 
political struggle and originally designed for purposes that may differ from their eventual 
utility (Pierson 1996, p.158; Thelen 1999, p.384). Furthermore, once an institutional policy 
direction has been established, the HI approach maintains that it becomes very difficult to 
change course. The core HI concept of path-dependency is used to explain why patterns of 
institutional evolution often tend to be slow-moving and incremental (Bulmer 2009, p.308). 
Path trajectories may be reinforced by ‘positive feedbacks’ which create increasing returns 
for continuity, ‘sunk costs’ which may be lost in the event of change, and entrenched 
‘vested interests’ which may push for a continuity of the status quo (Bulmer 2009, p.310; 
Posner 2007, p.145).  The concept of ‘transaction costs’ (North 1987; Williamson 1981) is 
also used to help exhibit the costs associated with institutional change and imperfect 
contracting. Path-dependency therefore establishes that early developments in the history 
of an institution can change the environment within it so drastically that subsequent 
developments will create different effects depending on past events (Hall 2003, p.385).  
 
This thesis combines these concepts with notions gleaned from DI to show how ideas may 
be used both to strengthen and weaken institutional path-dependence through time. Tables 
2.3 and 2.4 below advance the analytical matrix shown in table 2.1 above and provide 
further indication of how this research will combine insights from both approaches.  
 
Table 2.3: How new ideas engender change in old institutions 
C) new ideas in old institutions 
i) new philosophical ideas Strongest structural resistance  Rejected by existing 
institutional structure 
(path-dependence), or; 
 Very gradually adopted 
over a long period of time 
or crisis 
ii) new programmatic ideas Strong structural resistance  Only adopted gradually 
through time, or; 
 During critical junctures 
 Can act to weaken existing 
structures 
iii) new policy ideas Least structural resistance  Can strengthen existing 
structures and/or dominant 
ideas, or; 
 Undermine them, leading 
to gradual change which 
may be ‘catalysed’ during 
critical junctures 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
Table 2.3 illustrates that whilst new philosophical and programmatic ideas are often met 
with opposition within established institutions, new policy ideas generate the least 
structural resistance and may be used to either strengthen or weaken existing institutional 
customs. Table 2.4 shows that dominant philosophical ideas are the hardest to replace 
within new institutions, often because such institutions derive their credibility from 
established ideas. Policy ideas meanwhile (which again may weaken or strengthen 
conventional practices) face the least institutional resistance as they are the least 
fundamental to institutional identity. 
 
Table 2.4: How established ideas hinder change in new institutions 
D) established ideas in new institutions  
i) established philosophical 
ideas 
Strongest structural resistance  Rarely replaced (path-
dependence) and only ever 
during critical junctures 
 Strengthen institutional 
structures 
ii) established programmatic 
ideas 
Strong structural resistance  May be weakened 
gradually through time, 
and/or;  
 Replaced during critical 
junctures after a period of 
gradual weakening by new 
policy ideas 
 Strengthen existing 
structures 
iii) established policy ideas Least structural resistance  May be weakened by new 
policy ideas that undermine 
established ideas and 
structures 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
One of the main criticisms of HI is that due to its reliance on concepts like path-dependence 
which emphasise continuity, the approach struggles to account for institutional change. One 
way HI researchers have tried to mitigate this critique is through the notion of critical 
junctures (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p.346).  Such junctures denote acute instances 
which set institutions along specific developmental pathways. They are often conflictual 
encounters between various actors vying for control within an institutional setting and are 
frequently caused by ‘exogenous shocks’ to which institutions are forced to respond (Thelen 
1999, p.388).  
 
These critical junctures are understood to be particularly important during institutional 
formation (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p.342). Once the trajectory of an institution is 
established, it becomes very difficult to change tack. Additional junctures which radically 
alter established institutional modus operandi are said to remain limited to scarce and 
diminutive periods where the range of plausible choices available to decision-makers 
expand and the consequences of decisions become more acute (Capoccia and Kelemen 
2007, p.343). Krasner (1988) describes this view as a ‘punctuated equilibrium’: a state of 
permanence interposed with short periods of flux.  
 
Although Streeck and Thelen (2005) attempted to explain institutional change through the 
prism of HI by using means other than the notion of critical junctures23, ultimately, while 
recognising subliminally that ideas can play a role in institutional change through 
displacement and conversion, this remains implicit and the approach still struggles to explain 
endogenous institutional change (Schmidt 2011, p.50).  By recognising the power of ideas 
and human agency, and by conducting interviews with individuals working within European 
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 Streeck and Thelen (2005) suggested that the following processes could help HI theorists formulate 
descriptions of evolutional institutional transformation: Displacement; one ‘dominant logic’ or ‘paradigm’ in 
society coming to replace another, supplanting pre-existing institutions. Layering; the creation of parallel 
institutions which do similar jobs to the first. Drift; a slow transition caused by ‘shifting contextual conditions’. 
Conversion; an institution given a new raison d'être by rules becoming reinterpreted or enacted in new ways 
Coran and Thelen 2016, p.65). Exhaustion; a ‘gradual collapse’ caused by the institution becoming surplus to 
requirements (Streeck and Thelen 2009, p.116-124). 
organisations, this research hopes to attain a more nuanced understanding of the 
evolutionary institutional change that can take place between critical junctures.  
 
Posner (2007) also tried to address what he sees as the over reliance on critical junctures in 
HI by looking at the integration of European financial markets. He concluded that a 
traditional application of HI could not satisfactorily account for the pick-up in financial 
integration during the late 1990s. He therefore argued that critical junctures act as 
‘catalysts’ rather than causes of institutional change because although path-dependence 
can slow the pace of evolution, it cannot typically prevent it altogether (Posner 2007, 
p.145). What he suggests happens in reality is that small incremental adjustments 
throughout history are the real cause of institutional transformation, while critical junctures 
simply create an environment within which change already under way can occur more 
rapidly (Posner 2007, p.144). By looking more deeply at institutional evolution and analysing 
events which take place off the main policy path, Posner (2007) suggests further advances in 
our understanding of rapid periods of institutional change could be detected (Posner 2007, 
p.155). 
 
These are valuable insights that will be incorporated into this research, yet akin to Streeck 
and Thelen (2005), Posner (2007) also fails to give a prominent enough role to ideas and 
human agency in explaining institutional change. Although he recognises financial 
integration during the late 1990s was a product both of history and the pulling together of 
‘legislative ideas that had been circulating for decades’ (Posner 2007, p.150), he fails to 
expand on this intuition and explore how these ideas may have facilitated the incremental 
changes his paper discusses. 
By bringing ideas into analysis and looking more closely at actor preferences, it may become 
clearer why HI notions like path-dependence may be shown to inhibit institutional change, 
but not preclude it altogether (Posner 2007, p.145, Streek and Thelen 2009, p.103). 
Continual incremental changes brought about by actor preferences and policy ideas may 
make existing arrangements more vulnerable to sudden shocks. By combining HI and DI 
concepts in this way, this research aims to provide new insights into the process of 
evolutional institutional change. 
 
Indeed, some HI scholars have already taken the step of incorporating ideas into their work. 
policy paradigms within HI are understood to constitute a set of cognitive processes which 
provide actors with the tools they need to interpret specific events and help shape the 
range of policy options deemed legitimate (Braun 2015; Immergut and Anderson 2008, 
p.358).  Such authors contend that even in times of crisis, policy change tends to have roots 
in previous thought structures (Immergut and Anderson 2008, p.349) and that any 
alterations frequently continue to be justified by drawing on predominant institutional 
assumptions (Cour-Thimann and Winkler 2013; Drudi et al. 2012, p.13). Any subsequent 
policy changes therefore tend to be rooted to historical thought structures and only 
introduced incrementally (Streek and Thelen 2005, p.4).  
 
This illustrates the dichotomy between HI and DI. The difficulty with the HI approach is that 
the default position is always to stress continuity over change. Even when ideas are 
considered, policy paradigms suggest a further stifling of individual autonomy and a 
strengthening of path-dependency (Braun 2015; Immergut and Anderson 2008, p.358). 
Ultimately, HI consistently views ideas as subservient to structures and as a consequence 
struggles to explain institutional change. This contrasts with the DI approach which 
maintains that whilst institutions (including dominant political and economic assumptions), 
certainly help frame individual choices, in the end, agents ideational abilities are always 
capable of escaping societal constrictions and implementing substantial institutional 
refinement endogenously (Schmidt 2010, p.10).  
 
This can result in DI struggling to explain institutional continuity. If institutions are 
constituted by ideas which are continually subject to change: why are institutions often so 
resilient, despite changing societal attitudes and policymakers efforts at reform? Moreover, 
as Schmidt (2010) freely admits, ideas and discourse cannot explain all institutional change 
as events outside of peoples control may occur, material conditions may change, and 
actions often have unintended consequences which were not the anticipated result of 
ideational processes (Schmidt 2010, p.12). 
Given these flaws, although combining insights from HI and DI may mitigate some of the 
drawbacks of each, research incorporating both is still likely to suffer certain weaknesses, 
particularly when investigating material factors which may be better understood using a 
rationalist framework (Campbell and Pedersen 2001, p.9). Nevertheless, as this thesis aims 
to discover precisely when structures dominate the determination of policy outcomes and 
when and under what circumstances ideas are able to trump structural constraints and 
engender institutional change, using discernments from HI and DI is epistemologically 
coherent and offers the prospect of new and exciting insights becoming realised. 
2.2 Historical Institutionalism and EMU 
The European Central Bank (ECB) – along with the Deutsche Bundesbank (DB) and Banco de 
España (BdE) – together form the main focus of this research. A handful of scholars using an 
HI perspective have previously examined the ECB and its activities. This section critically 
analyses this existing literature whilst highlighting some of the gaps in contemporary 
research this thesis addresses. 
 
Howarth and Loedel’s 2005 book, The European Central Bank: The New European 
Leviathan? analyses the ECBs first seven years (1998-2005). Building on the work of 
McNamara’s (1998) more ideationally focused work entitled The Currency of Ideas, Howarth 
and Loedel (2005) argue that EMU was founded on a neo-liberal consensus which focused 
on sound money or price stability24, liberal economic reforms and an independent central 
bank (Howarth and Loedel 2005, p.15). This consensus, they argue, placed monetarism25 
and price stability at the core of ECB policy.  
 
It was widely assumed prior to the 2007-8 crisis that in a ‘divine coincidence’ (Blanchard and 
Galí 2007, p.36) maintaining low inflation would not only lead to higher economic growth 
and lower unemployment over the medium-term, but also that monetary policy directed at 
maintaining price stability would reduce the incidence and severity of financial instability 
(Schwartz 1988, p. 53). Central banks therefore only tended to concern themselves with 
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 The desire for low and stable inflation facilitated by an independent central bank and conservative policies. 
25
 The economic idea that increasing the supply of money can only ever lead to inflation over the medium-
term. Central banks should therefore try to control the money supply by manipulating interest rates (Friedman 
2002, ch.3). 
financial stability in so far as insuring they maintained price stability and a functioning 
interest rate transmission mechanism (Bernanke and Gertler 2000, p.46; Noyer 1999[b]).  
 
Whilst Howarth and Loedel (2005) were correct to assert that this (neo)liberal-monetarist 
policy paradigm exerted significant path-dependent pressure on the ECB during the pre-
crisis period, and that these policies largely resulted as a legacy from the relative success of 
DB policies in Germany (Howarth and Loedel 2005, p.53), they also missed other important 
trends. Two key requirements of a monetarist policy framework are an even transmission of 
monetary policy to ensure interest rate adjustments are felt uniformly across a monetary 
area, and a commitment from governments to conservative fiscal policies to help restrict 
money growth. Yet measures taken by the ECB and European Commission to try to improve 
the functioning of monetary policy between 1999-2002 by encouraging financial 
integration26 (Gabor and Ban 2016, p.618; Issing 2008, p.214; Tumpel-Gugerell 2005) began 
to expose contradictions in ECB policy. Whilst this integration improved the transmission of 
monetary policy, it also allowed Southern European states to borrow much more cheaply, 
creating an explosion of credit in peripheral nations (Blyth 2013[a], p.78; Schnabl and 
Freitag 2011; Lynn 2011, p.61). This led the ECB to become much more concerned with 
policy ideas concerning financial stability and to a weakening of its original monetarist 
framework. Such underlying ideational trends may be lost using an HI only approach to 
research, but become more easily discernible when both HI and DI are incorporated into 
analysis. 
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 Such as the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP, 1999) and the Financial Collateral Directive (FCD, 2002). 
Verdun (1999) and Kaelberer (2003) looked specifically at individuals working within the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), with Kaelberer (2003) asserting that European 
central bankers have similar educations, adopt similar doctrines and conduct research and 
data management in similar ways; concluding (along with others, see McNamara [1998]) 
that since the mid-1980s, the European central banking community held a neoliberal 
consensus in the operation of monetary policy that conditioned the behaviour and policy 
objectives of EMU central banks (Kaelberer 2003, p.368).  
 
Nevertheless, although Kaelberer (2003) emphasised the importance of this consensus, he 
also acknowledged its weaknesses. While central bankers have much in common, states and 
national central banks (NCBs) frequently disagree on policy and initiate different responses 
to similar stimuli (Kaelberer 2003, p.372). Such an overarching international consensus 
might therefore be weaker than localised ideas and structures within member-states and 
individual institutions in conditioning organisational behaviour and dictating policy 
outcomes (Lombardi and Moschella 2016, p.853). By exploring both the national and 
supranational levels of the Eurozone and conducting a strategic comparison of Spain and 
Germany, this thesis intends to shed further light on Kaelberer’s (2003) analysis by 
discovering the extent to which ideas and structures at each level of the Euroarea have 
influenced policy decisions over the course of EMU history. 
 
The second extensive piece written about the ECB using an HI perspective is Quaglia (2008) 
Central Banking Governance in the European Union. Like Howarth and Loedel (2005), 
Quaglia (2008) overlooked changes to ECB policy ideas in relation to financial stability and 
observed that the monetarist policy paradigm had remained unchanged at the bank since its 
inception (Quaglia 2008, p.135). She also claims there appears to be no consensus on any 
alternative economic paradigm, other than the one provided by the price stability 
framework (Quaglia 2008, p.110). 
 
Yet unlike Howarth and Loedel (2005), Quaglia (2008) also focused on the national level of 
the Eurosystem, arguing NCBs have remained significant players within the ESCB and 
exercise considerable influence over EMU policy (Quaglia 2008, p.3). She devotes a great 
deal of attention to the DB in particular, whose ideas and policies she claims became 
diffused throughout much of Europe and the wider world through the formation of EMU 
(Quaglia 2008, p.47-74). The fact that the primary goal of the ECB outlined in the treaties is 
to maintain price stability – with economic and financial considerations coming secondarily 
(Cour-Thimann and Winkler 2013) – is due in large part, she suggests, to the successful 
implementation of DB policies at the EU- level.  
 
Furthermore, she claims NCBs have resisted international and EU pressure towards greater 
convergence because national ‘normative social orders’ and ‘polity ideas’ which are ‘sticky’ 
resist changes to the status quo (Quaglia 2008, p.151). Specifically, Quaglia (2008) argues 
that aside from the DB losing overall control of monetary policy, it remained largely 
unchanged from 1998-2008 (Quaglia 2008, p.52). However, by using a longer historical lens 
and focusing more closely on ideas, it is possible to trace significant changes within ESCB 
NCBs27.  
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 Including changes at the DB. 
In Spain, BdE policy ideas implemented from 1998-200328 had a considerable impact on the 
activity of Spanish banks, the way they were affected by the growth of market-based 
finance, and the extent to which they were impacted by the initial stages of the 2007-8 crisis 
(Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-Herrero 2009, p.7; Saurina 2009[a]). With respect to the DB, 
the bank traditionally exhibited hostility towards short-term market-based finance (Gabor 
2016, p.978; Trampusch 2015, p.122). Yet throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, it became 
much less concerned about market-based practices29. This had a profound effect on the 
activity of German financial institutions under EMU, with German banks amassing huge 
liabilities on the asset-side of their balance sheets (Detzer et al. 2017, p.68; Hardie and 
Howarth, 2013[b], p.104).  
 
Indeed, the lack of attention paid to the growth of market-based financial activity within HI 
literature is striking. During EMU, European banks turned progressively towards 
securitisation and securities trading to help raise capital and provide liquidity (Gabor and 
Ban 2016; Hardie et al. 2013, p.700).  There was also a rise in the number of non-bank 
financial institutions such as hedge, equity and money market funds that provided firms 
with alternative lending options. Yet there remains very little within HI literature that 
addresses these phenomena. Further, scholars traditionally associated with HI tend to use 
other conceptual approaches such as ‘Varieties of Capitalism’30 (VoC) or financial system 
typologies within Comparative Political Economy (CPE) to contextualise their work on 
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 Such as the Asset-Backed Securities (Law 926/1998); implementation of ‘dynamic provisions’ for Spanish 
banks (2000), and; the strengthening of Spanish ‘Consolidated Regulation’ (Law 19/2003). 
29
 For example, in 1991 it softened its hostility to the production of Asset Back Commercial Paper (ABCP) [the 
trading of short-term unsecured promissory notes issued by companies]; in 1998 it dropped its opposition the 
creation of short-term treasury bills, and; in 1996 it abandoned its reserve requirements for banks conducting 
interbank lending in the ‘repo’ markets [Interbank repurchase lending where liquidity is provided in exchange 
for collateral] (Covil 1996; Deeg 1999; Röper 2017). 
30
 See: Hall, P., and Soskice, D., 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press). 
European and international finance (Deeg 2010; Hardie and Howarth 2013; Hardie et al. 
2013; Mulé and Walzenbach 2017; Culpepper 2005). 
 
Where HI has been used to explore international financial trends, it has tended to stress the 
resilience of domestic systems and the likelihood of national divergence in the 
interpretation of international financial codes (Mosley 2010). It has also highlighted the 
power of the state in shaping international regulatory regimes towards their own 
preferences, rather than looking at the significance of market-based developments that 
have taken place since the 1980s (Farrell and Newman 2010; Fioretos 2010). The failure of 
HI to incorporate transnational financial trends and EU specific financial regulation and 
supervision leaves a large gap in the literature that this research helps to fill (Deeg and 
Posner 2016, p.445). 
 
More recently, Salines et al. (2011) looked at EMU between 1999-2010 using an HI 
perspective and argued that any change in the institutional governance framework of EMU 
during this period occurred through a ‘layering’ and ‘redirection’ (See Streeck and Thelen 
[2005]) of existing institutional structures (Salines et al. 2011, p.11). They claim that since 
the Maastricht Treaty (TEU 1992), EMU has remained broadly path-dependent and any 
post-1992 changes have been orientated around principles laid down in the Treaty (see also 
Verdun 2007).  By downplaying the significance of some of the ECBs more radical post-crisis 
monetary policies31, they conclude that throughout their period of investigation, even when 
subjected to the 2007-8 crisis, EMU appears to have followed the same path-dependent 
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 For example, prior to publication of Salines et al. (2011): The Enhanced Credit Support Program (ECSP, 2008) 
and the Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP, 2009). 
trajectory, despite challenging internal and external circumstances (Salines et al. 2011, 
p.31). 
 
Likewise, Yiangou et al. (2013) examined some areas of post-crisis ECB policy using an HI 
framework, focusing on the implications for further integration. In line with Salines et al. 
(2011) and Verdun (2007), they contend that the post-crisis policy positions of the ECB stem 
from EMUs institutional formation (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p.342; Yiangou et al. 2013, 
p.230). They also controversially suggest that the contentious Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) program32 remains fully consistent with Maastricht principles. They 
argue although purchasing government debt necessarily eases financing conditions for 
governments, because OMT support is contingent upon the implementation of macro-
economic adjustment programs33, it was specifically designed to avoid monetary financing 
and therefore conforms to the monetarist principles outlined in the treaties (Yiangou et al. 
2013, p.234).  
 
Salines et al. (2011) Verdun (2007) and Yiangou et al. (2013) each make the mistake of 
downplaying significant post-crisis policy developments. The claim of Yiangou et al. (2013), 
for example, that OMT is consistent with pre-crisis ideas and EMU treaties, is vociferously 
denied by, among others, the current DB President, Jens Weidmann (Weidmann 2016[c]; 
Kahn 2016). Their research fails to recognise that prior to 2010 the ECB would never have 
countenanced purchasing the sovereign debt of member-states (Issing 2002[b]; Noyer 
1999[b]). Therefore whilst HI studies uncover aspects of ECB policy which have remained 
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 Which allowed the ECB to purchase Eurozone government bonds on the secondary market. 
33
 Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs). 
path-dependent, they miss important ideational developments and downplay structural 
change in order to conform to HI presuppositions.  
 
Furthermore, whilst the ECBs monetary policy became increasingly expansionary to address 
financial instability post-2007, the EU also created additional organisational structures to 
help ease the financial and fiscal problems of peripheral nations. One such structure was the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), a sovereign bailout fund designed to assist 
member-states facing fiscal difficulties. Gocaj and Meunier (2013) argue that the creation of 
this fund established path-dependency in the European crisis management apparatus by 
narrowing future policy options. They maintain that the EFSF enshrined 
intergovernmentalism in the crisis framework which was later reinforced by the formation 
of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).  
 
Similarly, Verdun (2015) suggests that another category of ‘copying’ could be added to 
Streeck and Thelen’s (2009) analysis of institutional change as significant parallels could be 
drawn between the transition of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) into the ECB, and of 
the EFSF into the ESM. She also claims that fiscal initiatives such as the so-called ‘Six-Pack’, 
‘Two-Pack’, and ‘Fiscal Compact’ could be seen as a layering of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP, 1997), in line with Streeck and Thelen’s (2009) hypothesis.  
 
This analysis, however, fails to explore the role of ideas in the creation of these institutions. 
Ordo- and neo-liberal ideas which sought to promote fiscal conservativism and limit ‘moral 
hazard’34 were crucial in helping shape ESM (Barroso 2011; ECB 2011[c], p.71-2). Any 
support emanating from ESM was made contingent upon Troika35 enforced Memorandums 
of Understanding (MoUs) which govern recipient states fiscal policy. Moreover, ESM was 
only permitted to become a fiscal backstop for national financial systems once member-
states had agreed to the creation of Banking Union (BU) which established a harmonised 
supervisory structure (Finnish and German Finance Ministries 2012). Failure to incorporate 
ideas into this analysis can therefore only ever provide a partial explanation of events during 
this period. 
 
Jones et al. (2016) used HI to explain what they saw as the path-dependent nature of 
European integration. Incorporating the EU integrationist theories of Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism36 and Neo-Functionalism37, they argue that during critical junctures, 
member-states see the endurance of EMU as vital to their economic and geostrategic 
interests. As the consequence of a process they describe as ‘falling forward’, member-states 
then become prepared to submit to closer integration to guarantee the survival of the euro. 
However, because integrationist policies are often unpopular domestically, states are only 
prepared to go as far as is absolutely necessary to preserve EMU. Integration therefore 
follows a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach (Jones et al. 2016, p.1027).  
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 Understood as an incentive to take on risk where one is protected from its consequences. 
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 ECB, European Commission and International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
36
 Broadly that European integration occurs as a result of intergovernmental bargains between member states 
which see the pursuit of further integration as within their national interests (see Moravcsik 1993). 
37
 A theory which suggests that as countries integrate, ‘spillovers’ are created which encourage closer 
cooperation and integration in other areas (see Haas 1965). 
Jones et al. (2016) also looked at BU and found that during each phase of financial 
integration38, calls were made for a supranationalisation of financial supervision. But these 
calls were consistently rejected in favour of closer cooperation (Jones et al. 2016, p.1019). 
These are important findings which help reveal the reluctance of EU states to move towards 
a comprehensive EMU framework. Nevertheless, the research lacks analysis of national 
contexts and fails to explain why some nations seem more prepared to cede sovereignty 
than others39. Through comparative analysis, this research examines the importance of 
ideas and institutional structures in Spain and Germany to uncover why such national 
differences manifested themselves, and why each state adopted divergent attitudes 
towards greater supranationalisation of post-crisis financial policy. 
 
Where all these HI studies exhibit weaknesses is in their tendency to downplay change in an 
attempt to highlight path-dependence. This leads to very significant structural trends and 
policy modifications which contradict the path-dependent narrative: such as the growth in 
market-based finance; the 2002 Financial Collateral Directive; the ECBs 2005 ‘mission 
statement’ on financial stability (Trichet 2005[a]); the 2008 Enhanced Credit Support 
Programme (ECSP); Securities and Markets Program (SMP, 2010), and; OMT (2012), all being 
given insufficient weight in analysis (see Salines et al. 2011, p.31; Yiangou et al. 2013, p.234).  
 
Not only that, but post-crisis ECB policies and the expansion of the banks’ mandate to 
include financial stability and banking supervision required significant ideational shifts from 
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 For example, the Second Banking Directive (1989), Lamfalussy Process (2001), de Larosière Report (2009), 
etc. 
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 This is closely related to the debates within the broader fields of Political Science and International Relations 
(IR) - specifically within Comparative Political Economy (CPE) and International Political Economy (IPE) - which 
seek to understand the connections between national and EU systems in relation to EMU (see Mulé and 
Walzenbach 2017). 
previous neo-liberal, monetarist thinking. Whereas it was formerly assumed that the best 
thing the ECB could do to help preserve financial stability was to maintain price stability 
(Duisenberg 2003; Noyer 1999[b]), it has since acknowledged the need to target asset prices 
to facilitate the smooth conduct of monetary policy (ECB 2010[b], p.24; 2011[d], p.100). The 
ECB has also become responsible for implementing macro-prudential regulations (MPR), 
which also entailed important normative consequences (Baker 2012)40. By trumpeting path-
dependence and giving insufficient weight to post-crisis ideational, structural and policy 
change, these HI informed studies miss important underlying trends – such as the growth of 
financial stability policy ideas and the weakening of monetarist programmatic ideas at the 
EU-level – which may help explain institutional change. 
 
2.3 Discursive Institutionalism and EMU 
There has been some significant engagement with both EMU and the EU integration process 
within ideational scholarship. The central principle of DI, that institutions are founded upon 
ideas, has found voice in a number of important works in relation to EMU, the EUs Single 
Market, and European integration more broadly (Brunnermeier et al. 2016; Blyth and 
Matthijs 2016; Jabko 2006). 
 
Before the crisis, McNamara (1998; 2006) argued that actors rely on conceptual frameworks 
to help them understand the world around them, and their position in it (McNamara 2006, 
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 Macro-Prudential Regulations (MPR) oblige public authorities like central banks to intervene in markets (for 
example by increasing or reducing banks’ capital requirements) in order to counter ‘efficiency’ problems that 
were previously thought not to exist (Baker 2012).  Such is the ideational shift that MPR required of the ECB, 
the banks own Macro-Prudential Research Network report spoke of a ‘new paradigm’ for MPR (ECB 2014[a], 
p.13). 
p.820). The broad ideational positions national elites hold with regards to the nature of their 
domestic economies and the goals and instruments they assume monetary policy should 
manipulate, she contends, directly informed their positions on EMU prior to the euro 
(McNamara 1998, p.56-7). She maintains that the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed 
exchange-rate system, the failure of post-Bretton Keynesianism and the relative success of 
German monetarism, all fed into the enhanced receptiveness of economic and political 
leaders to a new economic paradigm (McNamara 1998, p.157). What she termed the ‘neo-
liberal consensus’ centred on the achievement of price stability above all other policy goals. 
Any deviation from price stable policies, such as embarking upon expansionary monetary or 
fiscal policy, was said not to produce higher demand and employment, but rather inflation, 
which drives down the exchange-rate, creating further inflation and balance of payments 
problems (McNamara 1998, p.62). 
 
She argues these ideas became diffused throughout the European Community41 (EC) and 
that monetarism and the ‘neoliberal consensus’ underpinned EMU from its creation. She 
even suggests that the Single European Act (SEA, 1986)42 and single currency may never 
have materialised without this consensus (McNamara 1998, p.175). For McNamara (1998), 
EMU may even have been devised as a way to ‘lock in’ price stable, austere fiscal and liberal 
financial ideas (McNamara 1998, p.171) and are therefore integral to what the Euroarea is43. 
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 Principally through elite engagement within the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) and the 
Committee of Central Bank Governors, which prior to EMU was the main forum through which EC central 
bankers consulted and communicated with one another (McNamara 1998, p.158). 
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 The SEA removed barriers to trade and increased labour mobility and capital flows. 
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 Indeed, as we have witnessed since the financial crisis, in a monetary union designed without fiscal transfers 
and with restrictions placed on government borrowing, ‘austerity’ and internal devaluations are demanded of 
Eurozone nations that have experienced competitiveness and/or fiscal problems (Blyth 2013[a,c]). 
McNamara (1998) demonstrates effectively how ideas can not only become incorporated 
into institutions and political-economic organisations, but are foundational to them. 
Engagement with monetarist, price stable policies is intrinsic to a proper understanding of 
what the euro is and how the ECB has operated since its inception. However, McNamara 
fails to explain why (given the broad ‘policy consensus’ she claims existed at Maastricht) 
French and German preferences in particular differed so radically (Brunnermeier et al. 2016, 
ch3-4; Sadeh and Verdun 2009, p.291). Whilst the German government pressed for an 
independent central bank focused solely on the delivery of price stability, the French sought 
to incorporate an ‘economic government’ into the European architecture as a direct 
counterweight to monetarist ideas. Whilst the French ultimately backed down and accepted 
a monetarist EMU framework, there is little evidence to suggest traditional French state-
centric dirigiste ideas were fundamentally altered by the creation of the euro (Dyson 2000, 
p.13; Howarth 2002, p.172; Jabko 2006, p.163; Schmidt 2007, p.6). This suggests a closer 
examination of national economic ideas may be needed to fully understand the evolution of 
EMU. 
 
She also fails to pay close enough attention to history and path-dependency at the 
European level. The Werner Plan – which anticipated member-states moving in a three 
stage process towards an integrated monetary union – was first propagated in 1970, before 
the last attempt to preserve the Bretton Woods system in December 197144 (Garber 1993, 
p.463). Therefore although monetarist ideas may have been integral to the EMU established 
at Maastricht, plans to create a single currency were made before monetarist ideas had 
taken hold in Europe. Indeed, there has been a striking continuity in the basic concept of 
                                                          
44
 The ‘Smithsonian Agreement’. 
EMU – of transferring monetary sovereignty without fiscal policy – throughout the history of 
the European project. The path-dependent content of the Werner Plan (1970) and Delors 
Report (1989) is remarkable and not given sufficient weight in McNamara’s work (Verdun 
2007, p.208).  
 
Dyson (2002[a]) likewise tries to explain European integration through the commitment of 
EMUs architects to policies dedicated to price stability. In line with McNamara (1998), Dyson 
(2002[a]) argues neo-liberal ideas became internalised within the EMU framework (Dyson 
2002[a], p.14), providing the ideational context within which European elites became 
embedded. This context then altered the configuration of constraints and opportunities 
available to actors and privileged certain interests and courses of action over others (Dyson 
2002[a], p.2-4).  
 
Underhill (2002) builds on these assumptions and claims the internalisation of these 
imperatives within EMU constituted a ‘stability culture’ which now permeates large tracts of 
European thinking: including financial, fiscal and monetary policy (Underhill 2002, p.42). He 
suggests the root of this stability culture can be traced to Maastricht and the primacy given 
to price stability over employment and growth. This stability orientated thinking, he argues, 
has since seeped into other policy fields. This initially occurred through the SGP (1997) – 
which set limits on net government borrowing and deficits – closer financial market 
integration through the Single Market Program, and financial market liberalisation 
(Underhill 2002, p.44).  
 
Neither Dyson (2002[a]) nor Underhill (2002) however fully explore the extent to which 
these European imperatives were transmitted to the national level. Although many consider 
Germany, for example, to have a ‘stability culture’ (Bibow 2013, p.615; Howarth and 
Rommerskirchen 2013; Mertes 1994), it is difficult to argue such a culture has been 
conveyed to many of Europe’s Mediterranean countries (Lynn 2011, ch.6). Although Radaelli 
(2002) accepts a stability culture had not transmitted entirely into the Italian political and 
economic system at his time of writing, the imposition of an independent ECB, SGP, and the 
role of EMU as a ‘Stabilisation State’, he argued, would ultimately ensure the principles of 
‘European stability culture’ would permeate into the Italian state (Radaelli 2002, p.213). 
Given Italy’s national debt currently stands at over 130 per cent of GDP and the nation has 
the fourth largest debt market in the world, the extent to which such a culture has pervaded 
the country in the years hence it is debatable. 
 
By paying insufficient attention to national level continuity, these authors lack a 
comprehensive understanding not only of how ideas are transmitted through international 
fora, but also of the resilience of national political and economic systems. Indeed, despite 
free capital movement since the 1980s, closer financial market interdependence generated 
by the growth of market-based finance and attempts to integrate interbank lending markets 
(Gabor and Ban 2016, p.618; Jabko 2006), domestic financial systems have remained 
remarkably distinct (Jones 2005, p.54; Mulé and Walzenbach 2017). National path-
dependence therefore remains essential to fully understand how the Eurosystem operates. 
 
Jabko (2006) meanwhile adopted a ‘strategic constructivist’ approach45 to claim that the EU 
Commission advanced EMU by tailoring different messages to different groups. Under the 
EMS, the French believed the power of the market had become too constraining. Moreover, 
as the EMS became anchored by the Deutsch Mark, the Banque de France had already lost 
significant sovereignty over monetary policy. The Commission therefore sold EMU to the 
French a way of reasserting some semblance of monetary authority over the markets 
(Garrett 1993; Howarth 2001). Although Germany was initially opposed to the single 
currency, the Commission ultimately persuaded the country to join EMU by describing it as 
a way of entrenching price stability and fiscal discipline in Europe. Contrary to other 
ideational theorist, Jabko (2006) therefore claims it was not a convergence of ideas that 
made EMU possible, but rather that the Commission was able to sell the project by making 
different arguments to different audiences (Jabko 2006, p.147).  
 
Jabko (2006) introduces some good theoretical insights, particularly in relation to different 
justifications being used to achieve specific policy objectives. This research builds on this by 
examining the extent to which the ECB has continued to justify post-crisis policies in terms 
of maintaining price stability, whilst simultaneously becoming increasingly concerned with 
financial stability objectives. That said, while HI tends to overplay the role of policy 
paradigms as constraints on action, Jabko (2006) fails to pay sufficient attention to them. 
Although ideas and broad theoretical frames can contain contradictions and leave scope for 
interpretation and institutional change (Jabko 2006, p.8), they can also set broad 
parameters for acceptable policy and restrain institutional alteration (Streeck and Thelen 
2005, p.11-16).  The ECB was slower to embrace ‘extraordinary’ monetary policies than 
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 In which identifies the politics of ideas, rather than the ideas themselves, as agents of institutional change. 
most other advanced central banks as the ‘path-dependent’ legacy of monetarist ideas 
remained integral to the banks credibility and legitimacy. 
 
In relation to the impact of the financial crisis at the EU-level, relatively little ideational 
research has been produced, and even less on the evolution of the ECBs concern for 
financial stability. Nevertheless, there have been some references to the role of ideas in the 
usage of heterodox monetary policies by the ECB, and in the literature surrounding the 
growing importance of financial stability policies more broadly (Farrell and Finnemore 2016; 
Schmidt 2016; Blyth 2013[b]). 
 
Farrell and Finnemore (2016) argued briefly that although the crisis has fundamentally 
changed the environment within which the ECB operates, the bank has been incapable of 
altering its price stability ideas. They suggest that despite the ECB recognising conventional 
monetary policy in the new macro-economic environment is incapable of maintaining both 
price and financial stability, it has remained committed to traditional monetary policy 
(Farrell and Finnemore 2016, p.585). While these authors accept the ECB has begun to 
manipulate more unorthodox policy tools, they submit that it has maintained its pre-crisis, 
legalistic, communicative discourse by continuing to insist that the aim of these adjustments 
is solely to maintain price stability, and that the new measures do not reduce the banks 
political or operational independence (Farrell and Finnemore 2016, p.585). 
 
Blyth (2013[b]), argues the slow response of the ECB in 2009-2010 to the sovereign debt 
crisis was due to the constraining effect of the pre-existing monetarist paradigm. He 
discounts the role of organisational structures in limiting ECB action and instead maintains 
that the banks’ tentative behaviour was testament to the power of ideas in determining 
outcomes (Blyth 2013[b], p.209). Because Blyth (2013[b]) argues the ECB bought so 
prodigiously into pre-crisis monetarist ideas, which were heavily tied to the notion of 
‘efficient markets’ and the optimality of previous regulatory practices, the bank has 
continued to stick to its pre-crisis narrative, regardless of the weight of evidence supporting 
change (Blyth 2013[b], p.210).  
 
Although Blyth (2013[b]) and Farrell and Finnemore (2016) are right to argue the ECB was 
reluctant to alter its monetarist programmatic ideas and therefore slow to respond to the 
crisis, their analysis misses the fact the bank began moving away from a strict monetarist 
interpretation of central bank policy and towards an engagement with financial stability 
objectives long before the crisis erupted. Under EMU, the ECB became increasingly 
concerned with the implications of an integrated and market-based Eurozone overseen by 
national financial regulators and supervisors on financial stability (Trichet 2003; ECB 
2000[d], p.62). Moreover, during the crisis, the ECB began implementing policies which it 
would never have sanctioned before the crash, even adopting bond buying programs and 
MPR which signify clear shifts from traditional philosophical and programmatic ideational 
practices (Baker 2012; Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.5). 
 
Schmidt (2016) acknowledges this shift in ECB policy but argues that while the bank has 
altered its operational stance, it has maintained a commitment to price stability within its 
communicative discourse as price stability policy ideas provide legitimacy to the banks’ 
actions (Schmidt 2016, p.1033). Because the ECB had more institutional autonomy than 
other EU bodies, it was also able to use this discursive continuity to disguise a 
reinterpretation of its mandate, allowing it to assume responsibility for saving the euro 
during the sovereign debt crisis ‘in plain view’ of market participants (Schmidt 2016, 
p.1049). By using ‘communicative’ discourse in this way, the bank was able to claim its 
actions were entirely consistent with the Treaties, despite overseeing a clear extension of its 
responsibilities. 
 
Although Schmidt’s (2016) analysis is largely correct, it misses the importance of ECB 
monetarist ideas in promoting the discursive and policy continuity highlighted in other 
studies (Farrell and Finnemore 2016; Blyth2013[b]), as well as the gradual strengthening of 
policy ideas in relation to financial stability. Critical junctures, such as the 2010-12 sovereign 
debt crisis (Jones et al. 2016, p.1011), can often be a catalyst for institutional change already 
underway (Posner 2007), with policy change frequently having its origins in previous 
thought structures and policy developments (Immergut and Anderson 2008, p.349). The 
‘critical juncture’ of the 2010-12 crisis may therefore have allowed financial policy ideas 
(which had remained stunted prior to the crisis), to gain greater influence and catalyse more 
vigorous institutional change. 
 
Within broader ideational literature, Baker (2012) looked at the increased popularity of MPR 
in the wake of the 2007-8 crash and concluded that macro-prudential polices gained 
credence as a result of incremental ideational changes complied over the previous 20 years. 
However, from late 2008 onwards, change became more rapid as policymakers presided 
over an important ideational transition by explicitly recognising the significance of counter-
cyclical policies (Baker 2012, p.113). This resulted in regulators and supervisors, including 
the ECB, beginning to accept the importance of intervention and of setting limits on 
financial market activity – representing a significant ideational shift from the pre-crisis neo-
liberal orthodoxy of reverence for efficient markets. Although the financial crisis acted as a 
catalyst for these developments, both Baker (2013; 2012) and Moschella (2011) stress the 
gradual advancement of these policy ideas which evolved during previous financial crises, 
such as those in Mexico (1994) and Asia (1997-8) (Moschella 2011, p.123)46.  
 
Grabel and Gallagher (2015) maintain that we should not be surprised by this post-crisis 
desire for interventionism, arguing that the current crisis has simply intensified ongoing 
ideational changes while providing space and impetus for definitive policy adjustment 
(Grabel and Gallagher 2015, p.3). These authors each produced important findings. This 
thesis seeks to build on their results by exploring the extent to which broader ideational 
change took place within pre-crisis EMU, and how such evolving financial ideas may have 
influenced the ECBs response to the crisis. 
 
An ideational shift is also said to have occurred in the field of post-crisis monetary policy. 
Prior to the crash, the established view was that monetary policy should focus exclusively on 
price stability. Since then, this understanding has been questioned and increasing attention 
has been devoted to financial stability (Moschella 2014, p.136). Although few consider the 
previous monetary consensus to have been abandoned entirely, there is a growing 
acceptance that central banks need now to secure both monetary and financial stability 
objectives (Bernanke 2011; Moschella 2014, p.144; Praet 2011). Uncovering the extent to 
which financial goals have become incorporated into the policy frameworks of the ECB, DB, 
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 Indeed, (Baker 2012) showed that references to MPR could be found as far back as 1986 (BIS 1986, p. 2). 
and BdE over the duration of EMU, and the reasons behind this shift, will provide the main 
focus of this research. 
 
Finally, Gabor (2014[a]) also claims that the evolution of central bank monetary policy 
cannot be fully understood using HI arguments. She looked at the policy lessons central 
banks drew from the unconventional monetary policies adopted by the Bank of Japan (BoJ) 
in the early 2000s and found that the monetarist New Keynesian policy framework provided 
the lens through which lessons were interpreted. This meant other central banks, including 
the ECB, viewed the BoJs bond purchasing programs as an extension of loose monetary 
policy47 rather than as a way of improving the funding conditions of financial institutions by 
allowing them to sell less liquid assets to the central bank (Gabor 2014[a], p.198).  
 
This, Gabor (2014[a]) argues, was due to the incommensurability of New Keynesian 
monetary ideas with the purchase of government bonds which was seen as irrelevant to the 
functioning of the interest rate transmission channel. These purchases were also thought to 
reduce central bank independence as well as lower funding costs for governments and were 
therefore directly at odds with traditional monetarist thinking (Gabor 2014[a], p.197). While 
important in helping to show how ideas can shape the way organisations view financial 
problems and understand policy solutions, Gabor’s (2014[a]) work does not touch upon 
some of the structural restraints the ECB faced in attempting to move away from its 
traditional ideational framework (ECJ 2012; TEU 1992, Art.105). It also lacks a discussion of 
non-monetary post-crisis measures implemented at the EU-level48, or any examination of 
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 Signalling to financial markets the commitment of the BoJ to maintain low real interest rates (Blinder 2010, 
p. 3). 
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 Such as MPR and ESM. 
the national dimension of the Eurosystem, including how NCBs viewed and tried to 
influence EU and ECB policies (Khan 2016). This thesis therefore aims to broaden Gabor’s 
(2014[a]) analysis of the way central banks have come to understand market-based finance 
into these areas. 
 
2.4 Uniting the HI and DI Approaches 
Some academics within political economy have previously attempted to marry insights from 
HI and DI into a single conceptual frame.  Cox (2004) did this through the notion of 
‘ideational path-dependence’ (Cox 2004).  DI claims institutions are constructed upon 
ideational foundations, which often exert a constraining influence that impacts their 
subsequent development (Hay 2011, p.69).  In his study into Scandinavian welfare systems, 
Cox (2004) argues that although the welfare states of Scandinavian countries have been 
constantly evolving, the ‘idea’ of a distinctive system persists, even as the definition of what 
constitutes such a system becomes ever more difficult to define49. Policymakers, Cox (2004) 
suggests, must at least pay lip-service to this popular idea due to the ‘stickiness’ of the 
model’s reputation to have any hope at maintaining electoral popularity (Cox 2004, p.206). 
 
This research builds on these theoretical innovations by using the HI notion of path-
dependence to help explain the durability of philosophical and programmatic ideas (Schmidt 
2014). It reveals how policy ideas can be used to undermine, weaken or ‘stretch’ 
overarching programmatic ideas, without those original concepts losing their emotional 
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the EU Commissions’ Single Market Programme were ill-defined and understood differently by different 
groups. 
appeal or usefulness in justifying policy actions. Some ideas seem so highly regarded that 
policymakers are obliged to justify their proposals for reform by making reference to them, 
despite any level of conceptual stretching that may be required to locate new policies and 
reforms within the existing paradigm (Cox 2004, p.216). These concepts are crucial to 
establishing a coherent path towards to the use of both the HI and DI within the same 
methodological approach, and will be used to explore the ECBs continued commitment to 
price stability. 
 
The concept of ‘cognitive locking’, where ideas become rooted within a particular 
institutional setting, has also been developed in other fields of comparative politics. Berman 
(1998) explained that the Weimar Republic’s Social Democratic Party (SDP) failed to fight 
Germany’s interwar economic problems with counter-inflationary policies due to traditional 
HI institutional path-dependence, coupled with an ideational legacy within the SDP that 
prevented the party from reducing spending (Berman 1998). This insight may be useful 
when exploring the ECB’s willingness to embark upon ultra-loose monetary policy. Not only 
did the institutional structure of the bank constrain action through various statutory 
provisions, but so too did the domination of monetarist ideas and the legacy of German 
ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik). 
 
A contemporary source of note that has attempted to entwine the HI and ideational 
approaches, as well as explore Eurozone financial stability issues, is Braun (2015), who made 
two interesting theoretical observations. Firstly, using HI concepts, he argued current 
literature understates the importance of critical junctures in economic crises because during 
these ‘emergency’ phases, policymakers sometimes act without reference to previously 
dominant thought structures. At this point, according to Braun (2015), policy decisions may 
be guided neither by any old nor new policy paradigm. Crisis managers therefore (often 
without realising) set precedents at this crucial stage which leave their mark on the 
ideational and institutional landscape (Braun 2015, p.420). 
 
Secondly, Braun (2015) states that it is not possible to determine whether a dominant idea 
or set of ideas is likely to be replaced simply by looking at whether or not a crisis has 
occurred. He suggests a dominant economic idea is not necessarily undermined by 
economic instability, as long as it can account for the occurrence of such crises within the 
theory and offer direction on how to deal with it. A policy paradigm is less likely to be 
displaced if it maintains ‘crisis preparedness’ and offers solutions going forward (Braun 
2015, p.420). The crisis solutions offered by traditional monetary policy since Walter 
Bagehot (1873)50, Braun (2015) maintains, coupled with the incompleteness of EMU51, 
meant that post-2007, the ECB was the only institution capable of stepping in and 
preventing a collapse of EMU (Braun 2015, p.436).  
 
Yet Braun (2015) purports that during the crisis, an ideational shift did take place because 
the no-bailout and Bagehot rules were broken by the ECB propping up ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
financial institutions. Because the ECB began accepting reduced quality collateral that 
expanded the banks’ balance sheet and increased moral hazard, Braun argues a 
fundamental tenet of EMU became altered (Braun 2015, p.434). This, however, fails to 
consider the impact of the ECBs mark-to-market collateral framework which continued to 
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 With no common banking or fiscal authority during the crisis. 
discriminate against lower-rated sovereign bonds in repo transactions and exacerbate pro-
cyclicality (Gabor and Ban 2016, p.630). Moreover, by focusing on the crisis itself and failing 
to take a more longitudinal approach to the study of the Eurosystem, it also underplays the 
importance of the ECBs financial stability agenda before 2008. It could indeed be argued 
that the seeds for ECB action in 2008 were in fact sewn much earlier52. 
 
Finally, Lombardi and Moschella (2016) looked specifically at the ECBs post-crisis bond 
purchasing programs and discovered that both ideational and structural factors were at play 
in dictating policy parameters. They found that the banks legal structure which prioritised 
price stability over other policy goals, and the ECBs ‘economic doctrine’ which promoted 
monetary dominance, help explain why the bank was reluctant to take extraordinary 
measures (Lombardi and Moschella 2016, p.852). Yet they also found the banks institutional 
independence from member-states gave it room for manoeuvre and provided it with legal 
justification for its eventual bond purchase programs (Lombardi and Moschella 2016, 
p.865).  
 
While this paper is important as one of precious few studies to explicitly incorporate 
structural and ideational explanations for institutional behaviour, it only looks at a very 
narrow field of ECB policy in a short period of EMU history. Presently, no HI or DI research 
has taken sufficient account of the rise of market-based finance53; the changing role of 
government debt as collateral in short-term debt markets, or; the difficulties these issues 
                                                          
52
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53
 Either in explaining the evolution of national financial systems, or in the development of central bank 
policies. 
raise with respect to the cognitive locking of monetarist central bank thinking (Gabor 
2014[a]). While government debt continues to be seen primarily as a question of fiscal 
policy, its importance in the fields of monetary policy and financial stability as a result of the 
growth of market-based banking has been largely neglected. This research aims redress this 
oversight.  
 
2.5 German and Spanish ‘Philosophical Ideas’ 
The preceding pages have concentrated on the supranational level of the Eurosystem. Yet 
the ESCB exists as a federation, with NCBs maintaining important roles in the 
implementation and operation of monetary and financial policies (Cohen-Setton 2011; Gros 
2017; Quaglia 2008, p.3). The purpose of this section is to examine current scholarship on 
the dominant ideas found within the German and Spanish central banks, and how they are 
understood to have influenced central bank policy.  
 
To understand why Spain and Germany were impacted differently by the 2007-8 crisis, and 
why they pursued different policy objectives at the European level54, it is necessary to 
explore the extent to which pre-crisis ideational idiosyncrasies may have led to divergences 
in the way Spanish and German banks were regulated. This may explain why banks in each 
state accumulated different sorts of balance sheet risk55, why they were affected differently 
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 German banks were exposed on the asset-side of their balance sheets through the accumulation of 
peripheral and ‘sub-prime’ debt, while Spanish banks became exposed on the liabilities-side of their balance 
sheets by over lending to the real estate and construction sectors (Hardie and Howarth 2013[a], p.104; Royo 
2013[a], p.154). 
by the crash, and why their national governments reacted differently to supranational 
policies aimed at mitigating its effects.  
 
This section sets out the core philosophical ideas of the DB and BdE. Differences between 
these ideas, as well as in the ‘programmatic’ and ‘policy’ ideas of the two NCBs (which form 
the focus of later chapters), are sketched out in table 5 below. These ideational 
dissimilarities are very important for understanding how the crisis unfolded in each nation. 
 
Table 2.5: Levels of financial ideas 
 ECB (pre-crisis) Deutsche 
Bundesbank 
Banco de España 
Philosophical Ideas: 
Webs of Belief 
Neo-liberalism Ordo-liberalism  Neo-liberalism 
Programmatic Ideas: 
Policy Paradigms 
Monetarism 
(contemporary) 
 Inflation 
targeting 
 Aversion to 
countercyclical 
policy 
Monetarism 
(orthodox) 
 Money growth 
targeting 
 Aversion to 
countercyclical 
policy 
Monetarism 
(idiosyncratic) 
 Inflation 
targeting 
 Role for 
countercyclical 
policy 
Policy Ideas: 
Policy Agendas 
 Price Stability 
(inflation) 
 Fiscal 
conservativism 
 Financial 
Integration 
 Financial stability 
(weak) 
 Price stability 
(M3) 
 Fiscal 
conservativism 
 Financial stability 
(non-
interventionism) 
 Price stability 
(inflation) 
 Fiscal 
conservativism 
 Financial stability 
(interventionism) 
 
Source: Adapted from Schmidt (2014)  
 
 
 
GERMANY: DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK 
To fully understand the euro crisis and the EUs reaction to it, it is essential to explore 
literature relating to the dominant financial ideas of Europe’s largest country, Germany 
(Matthijs 2016, p.379). Due to the size of Germany’s economy and the countries centrality 
to the European project, Germany is often regarded as Europe’s ‘indispensable nation’ 
(Sikorski 2011) and more tends to be written about the German financial system and 
German financial ideas than those of peripheral nations like Spain. The dominant economic 
idea in the country, ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik), is said to have deeply influenced EMU 
from the outset and to have been largely responsible for its conservative, rule-based 
structure (Allen 2004; Bibow 2013, p.612; Bulmer 2014, p.1246). 
 
Ordo-liberal ideas have helped condition and constrain plausible options for German policy-
makers for decades56 (Dyson 2002[c], p.174; Matthijs 2016) and were originally developed 
by German speaking economists as a reaction to the consequences of unregulated 
liberalism during the early twentieth century (Dullien and Guérot 2012, p.2). Many authors 
point to the hyperinflation of the early 1920s Weimar Republic as the time when ordo-
liberal ideas became grounded into the collective conscience of the German people 
(Schmidt 2014, p.193). This hyperinflationary period is often refereced to explain why 
Germans tend to be so weary of governmental borrowing and monetary expansionism 
(Polonyi 2011; Tognato 2012, p.137), and has even been sighted by Germanys’ Federal 
Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, as one of the key reasons Germany considers the 
accumulation of Government debt to be such a serious issue (Schäuble 2011[a]).  Indeed, 
Germany’s experiences of hyperinflation – which became seared into German folk memory 
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 Particularly within the DB. 
(Atkins 2011) – underpinned the DBs post-war commitment to a culture of central bank 
independence and monetary stability (Bulmer 2014, p.1246; Fairness 2016). 
 
The central contention of ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik) postulates that governments 
should regulate markets to ensure actual results approximate the outcomes which would be 
achieved in a perfectly competitive market (Nedergaard and Snaith 2015, p.1096; Wren-
Lewis 2014) and that individuals and countries should not be incentivised to take on risk at 
the expense of others.   
 
The word ordo, Latin for ‘order,’ points to a rejection of laissez-faire economic principles 
and towards a system in which the state constructs a strong regulatory environment for 
markets to function (Oliver 1960, p.133–134; Wörsdörfer 2010, p.23). Unlike Keynesian 
theory, it discourages state intervention beyond the setting of a robust legal framework 
(Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.61) and strongly rejects the idea of using expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policies to help stabilise the business cycle (Bulmer 2014, p. 1246; Dullien and 
Guérot 2012, p.2; Siems and Schnyder 2014, p.389).  
 
Importantly, although there is significant overlap in this respect between ordo-liberalism, 
neo-liberalism and monetarism, ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik) came first (Nedergaard 
and Snaith 2015, p.1102) and constituted the ‘dominant logic’ (Streek and Thelen 2009, 
p.116) within German policy circles long before monetarism gained hegemonic global status 
(Garber 1993, p.463; McNamara 1998). Indeed, the success of German monetarist policies 
has been widely regarded as one of the key factors explaining the rise of monetarism 
throughout the late twentieth century (Howarth and Loedel 2005, p.15; Kaelberer 2003, 
p.369; McNamara 1998, p.157). 
 
Table 2.6: German and EU ‘philosophical’ ideas 
Ordo-liberal Principles Expression in EU Keynesian Alternative Neo-liberal Alternative 
 
Avoidance of moral 
hazard  
The ‘no bail-out 
clause’; 
Refusal to accept debt 
mutualisation through 
a common DGS57 or 
‘Eurobonds’ 
Fiscal transfers 
beneficial to assist 
states in distress 
Debt should be 
individualised and 
subject to market 
forces 
Preference for stable 
monetary aggregates 
ECB aim to maintain 
inflation at below 2% 
High inflation 
acceptable to 
stimulate growth in a 
crisis 
Low inflation 
preference 
Regularity in economic 
policy established 
through strong legal 
framework 
Implementation of 
fiscal frameworks: 
SGP58, ‘Fiscal Compact’ 
etc. 
Policy flexibility is 
necessary to help 
tackle a crisis 
Legislation should be 
kept to a minimum. 
Outcomes can be 
predicted through the 
behaviour of ‘rational’ 
actors 
Interventionism (other 
than through the 
setting of a legal 
framework) should be 
resisted 
An independent 
central bank reluctant 
to expand monetary 
policy beyond interest 
rate manipulation 
Monetary and fiscal 
expansionism required 
by the state to boost 
growth  
Government 
borrowing kept to a 
minimum, market 
forces best allocate 
scarce resources  
Overarching concern 
with stability 
Maintain low public 
debt and deficits 
Deficits should be used 
as a counter-cyclical 
measure 
Low tax and spending 
is the best way to 
stimulate an economy 
 
Source: Author (2018); Nedergaard and Snaith (2015) 
 
In Germany itself, the ‘economic miracle’ (Wirtschaftswunder) which took place in West 
Germany throughout the post-war period (Blackstone and Walker 2012) was largely 
attributed to the economic oversight provided by the DB59, and to adherence to economic 
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 Deposit Guarantee Scheme. 
58
 Stability and Growth Pact. 
59
 Widely regarded as the ‘epicentre’ of price stable, ordo-liberal ideas (Blackstone and Walker 2012; Dyson 
2002[c] p.177; Nedergaard and Snaith 2015, p.1097; Young 2014, p.279), the DB became one of the most 
and fiscal rules (Atkins 2011). These factors together secured the Deutsche Mark as one of 
the world’s strongest and most successful currencies. Within the DB, ordo-liberalism was 
established at its ideational core and became fundamental to the central bank’s 
understanding of events, and of itself (Schmidt 2014, p.194). 
 
The founding fathers of ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik) were the economist, Walter 
Eucken, and two lawyers, Franz Böhm and Hans Grossmann-Doerth, all from the University 
of Freiburg (Siems and Schnyder 2014, p.379). Europe’s experiences with Communism and 
National Socialism encouraged post-war Germans to limit discretionary government action 
(Atkins 2011). From the very beginning therefore, ordo-liberals stressed the need for a 
strong and stable legal framework to prevent excessive state control (Bulmer 2014, p. 1246; 
Nedergaard and Snaith 2015, p.1097), and to avoid power differentials between producers 
and consumers undermining market function (Siems and Schnyder 2014, p.379). 
Consequently, ordo-liberalism and German democracy share very strong legal foundations, 
with many government officials being proficient with legal training60.  
 
Crucially, ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik) also stresses the importance of avoiding ‘moral 
hazard’. This phenomenon is generated by the ‘free-rider problem’: When individuals or 
institutions cannot be held accountable for their actions, bad behaviour goes unpunished 
and the consequences of such behaviour become felt by those other than the culprit, 
leading to an incentivisation of reckless behaviour (Berger and Hershey 1994; Stiglitz 1983). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
respected institutions in post-war Germany and was even seen by many to represent a moral authority in the 
country (Tognato 2012, p.45), with its commitment to price stability viewed as the guarantee of a free and 
democratic order (Howarth and Loedel 2005, p.54; Issing 2002[a], p.23; Lynn 2011, p78). 
60
 Including Wolfgang Schäuble, the German Minister of Finance, who was set to become a professor of law 
before turning to politics. 
Ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik) therefore couples economic arguments with a moral 
conviction that if rules are to be effective, inappropriate behaviour should be penalised, 
whatever the impact on the individual, society or country (Atkins 2011; Brunnermeier et al. 
2016, p.66; Nedergaard and Snaith 2015, p.1098). The ‘liability principle’ (Haftungsprinzip) – 
the idea that those who take the risk should bear the cost – seeks to prevent moral hazard 
by ensuring market participants are not incentivised to free-ride (Pies and Sass 2010)61. 
These ideas help explain the German aversion to risk-sharing, which often allows feckless 
actors to profit from the responsible behaviour of others. 
 
Another popular concept within German society is the ‘Social Market Economy’ (Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft)62. Although this idea evolved from ordo-liberal thinking, it coexists with 
ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik) as an alternative ‘policy program’ (Schmidt 2014, p.196). 
Social Market ideas substitute a strictly rule-based economic liberalism for one in which the 
state assumes a duty to promote market conditions which result in an amenable social 
balance (Glossner 2010, p.11). It attempts to establish a socio-economic system that 
incorporates both economic freedom and social security, and formed one of the bedrocks of 
German post-war policy (Felice 2015, p.79). Social Market ideas, however, are less 
comprehensive and far less prescriptive than ordo-liberalism, and contain many of ordo-
liberalisms core values. 
 
Several papers have been published on ordo-liberalism and how these philosophical ideas 
have influenced Germany’s post-crisis response. Matthijs (2016) argues ordo-liberal ideas 
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 Former Italian Prime Minister, Mario Monti, once remarked: ‘For Germany, economics is a branch of moral 
philosophy’ (Monti 2012). 
62
 First discussed by Alfred Müller-Armack (1947): Wirtschaftslenkung und Marktwirtschaft – Hamburg. 
advanced by Germany at the European level not only worked against Germany’s national 
interest by advocating policies which weaken domestic demand, but also made the crisis 
worse by insisting on ‘austerity’ measures being taken by states suffering fiscal problems 
(Matthijs 2016, p.378). Steinberg and Vermeiren (2016) meanwhile viewed the German 
government’s commitment to ordo-liberalism using an HI framework and argued that due 
to traditional economic ideas, Germany and other ‘northern’ European states refused to 
sanction inflationary policies to help rebalance competitiveness in the Eurozone. This 
resulted in the ECB having to implement unorthodox monetary policy to deal with the threat 
of deflation (Steinberg and Vermeiren 2015, p.404). 
 
Brunnermeier et al. (2016) also looked at the impact of ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik) on 
Germany’s response to the crisis, arguing it represented the ‘world view’ 
(Weltanschauungen) of many German policymakers (Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.17) and 
heavily influenced the structure of EMU. According to Brunnermeier et al. (2016), Germany 
remained opposed to ESM, expansionary monetary policy and a common deposit protection 
scheme (DPS) because of its ordo-liberal preferences for fiscal conservativism, monetary 
stability and fear of moral hazard (Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.218).  
 
However, whilst these scholars highlight the connection between ordo-liberalism and 
German monetary and fiscal policy, they fail to explore the connection between these ideas 
and German financial regulations (Röper 2017). German regulatory preferences, grounded 
in ordo-liberal principles, may help explain why German banks reacted to market-based 
finance in the way they did, and why they were impacted so harshly during the initial crisis 
period. Existing literature also fails to expound why despite the DB, Federal Finance and 
Economics Ministries all opposing state ownership of Germany’s large public banks63 
(Landesbanken), they were unable to sever the link between the state and public financial 
institutions. Each of these studies therefore also pays insufficient attention to the structure 
of the German financial system64. This thesis aims to redress these oversights by analysing 
the significance organisational structures as well as ideas in limiting institutional evolution. 
 
SPAIN: BANCO DE ESPAÑA 
Prior to democratisation, Spain was governed by an autocratic military leader, General 
Francisco Franco. The ideational driving force behind the regime was the suppression of 
socialism and parliamentary democracy and the advancement of traditional ‘Spanish 
Catholic Authoritarianism’. Catholicism and the military formed the two pillars of Franco’s 
Spain, with strict control from the centre (Barton 2004, p.246-8).  
 
Under this regime, government officials implemented a technocratic, interventionist model 
and used financial restrictions on capital and interest rates to advance political goals and 
allocate preferential credit to favoured groups (Cases 1996, p.180; Lukauskas 1997, p.3; 
Pérez 1997, p.69). This state controlled credit allocation system formed a fundamental part 
of Spanish economic policymaking and subordinated monetary and financial considerations 
(Martín-Aceña et al. 2014, p.58; Pérez 1997, p.80). The philosophical idea of Spanish 
Catholic Authoritarianism however largely died with Franco and throughout the latter years 
of the regime and into the 1980s, liberal ideas began to penetrate state institutions, 
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 Largely for ideational reasons in that ordo-liberalism does not favour state ownership (German Economics 
Ministry: interview #11, 2015). 
64
 The German banking system maintains a ‘three pillar’ structure consisting of public, private and cooperative 
banks (see figure 4.7: Structure of German’s banking system). 
particularly within the Finance Ministry and the BdE’s Research Service (Tortella and Garcia-
Ruiz 2013, p.150).  
 
Despite the Franco regimes preference for state control, liberal ideas had many 
sympathisers in Spain, largely thanks to the influence Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg, a 
German ordo-liberal economist who settled in Madrid during the 1940s (Ban 2012). Due to 
the following he amassed, Spain became the only non-German speaking country in which 
ordo-liberal ideas gained significant influence (Ban 2016, p.109). Although von Stackelberg 
died in 1946, his followers helped implement the economic Stabilisation Plan (1959), and an 
amalgamation of ordo- and neo-liberal economic ideas flourished throughout the Franco 
period. Liberal advocates gained positions of power and influence during the 1960s and 
1970s, particularly within the BdE and Finance Ministry (Ban 2012, p.150). 
 
By the 1970s, neo-liberal ideas had become dominant, particularly within the BdE’s 
Research Service which became the country’s premier economic research institute. While 
Spain continues to be viewed in the literature as a ‘state influenced’ or ‘mixed-market’ 
economy (Molina and Rhodes 2007; Schmidt 2007), neo-liberal economic and financial 
policies increasingly became seen within state institutions as a way of advancing Spain 
economically, as well as paving the way towards EC membership (Brias 2002; Lukauskas 
1997, p.97-8).  By the 1990s, Spanish economists had become some of the most influential 
international standard bearers of neo-liberal and monetarist thinking (Ban 2016, p.136), 
with the BdE becoming one of the first central banks to promote inflation targeting over the 
pursuit of monetary aggregates (Debelle 1997; Goerlich et al. 1995; Tortella and Garcia-Ruiz 
2013, p.160). 
While some research has been produced which examined the effects of the crash in Spain, 
and the BdE and Spanish governments responses to it (Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016; Quaglia 
and Royo 2015; Royo 2013[a,b,c]), none has looked at the importance of BdE neo-liberal 
philosophical and idiosyncratic monetarist programmatic ideas65 on; the formation of 
Spanish regulatory practices; how these practices may have impacted Spanish banks 
behaviour within the new market-based financial environment, or; on Spanish preferences 
towards post-crisis policies implemented at the EU-level. This research aims to address 
these oversights and reveal the extent to which ideas and structures are responsible for the 
particularities of Spain’s post-Franco financial system. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the respective strengths and weaknesses of the DI and HI approaches 
and how they have been used within the literature to explore various aspects of European 
political economy. Whilst HI is convincing when applied to research seeking to explain the 
idiosyncrasy of national financial systems (Deeg 2005; Lutz 2004[a]; Vitols 2005), the falling 
forward of European integration (Jones et al. 2016), and the path-dependence of ECB 
monetary policy (particularly pre-2007 [Howarth and Loedel 2005; Quaglia 2008]), it 
contains weaknesses in other areas.  
 
HI views institutions as constricting to human behaviour and can therefore often be overly 
deterministic. Despite the concept of critical junctures which allows for institutional change 
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 Unlike German monetarism, Spanish Monetarism reserved a role for countercyclical policies and due to 
inflation targeting, was less concerned about short-term finance that the DB which continued to target M3. 
during crisis periods (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p.341; Thelen 1999, p.388), it struggles to 
account for change emanating from within institutions themselves (Blyth et al. 2016, p.148; 
Schmidt 2011, p.48). As a result, HI interpretations of post-crisis ECB policy shifts often tend 
to be understated (Salines et al. 2011; Yiangou et al. 2013). HI also finds the important 
liberalising developments of the previous three decades problematic to explain (such as 
‘market-based’ finance and the changing role of government debt). As soon as one 
conceives of ideas as being able to break free from institutional norms, institutions lose 
their constrictive properties and the concept of path-dependence loses its allure.  
 
DI meanwhile is very useful for understanding institutional change, but suffers from other 
weaknesses. It envisages institutions as being constituted by ideas (Schmidt 2010, p.10), 
which by their very nature are subject to constant change and modification. As a result, it 
struggles to account for institutional resilience. DI also has a tendency to overplay the 
importance of ideas. Suggesting for example that a European-wide policy consensus could 
be responsible for EMU (McNamara 2006; 1998) belies the fact monetary union was 
proposed many years before monetarist ideas became dominant (Garber 1993, p.463), as 
well as the intense negotiations which took place prior to Maastricht (Jabko 2006; Sadeh 
and Verdun 2009, p.291). The approach also struggles to explain the path-dependence of 
national financial systems, and to fully account for different national responses to post-crisis 
ECB policies, ESM and BU.  
 
The chapter then described how, buy using insights from both approaches, the weaknesses 
of each may be mitigated. By incorporating the many HI concepts which help account for 
path-dependence into an ideational framework which recognises that different levels of 
ideas have different strengths and durability (Schmidt 2014), it may be possible to better 
conceptualise when and under what conditions ideas are able to generate institutional 
change, and when institutional structures are able to repel demands for reform. The notions 
of conceptual stretching, and ideational and discursive path-dependence, were shown likely 
to be crucial to this endeavour (Cox 2004; Jabko 2006; Schmidt 2016). 
 
The chapter also highlighted key trends which had been missed by HI and DI scholarship to 
date. It specifically pointed to a lack of research on the rise of market-based finance, the 
changing role of government debt and the cognitive locking of monetarist ideas by 
European central bankers. Contemporary research also seems to have neglected the growth 
of financial ideas at the supranational level (undermining programmatic monetarist ideas), 
and the role they have played at the national level in crafting financial regulations and 
determining post-crisis policy responses (Röper 2017). Using insights from HI and DI 
together, this research addresses these gaps while seeking to better understand the process 
of gradual ideational and structural change and each level of EMU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
 
This thesis seeks to understand why and in what ways the financial stability agenda within 
the Eurosystem (at both the national and supranational levels) evolved over the lifespan of 
the euro, and how influential ideas and structures were in constraining and enabling this 
change. This chapter describes the research methodology adopted by this study and begins 
by outlining the research questions established to broach this enquiry. It then explores what 
methods have been used to conduct HI and DI research in the past, before moving on to 
explain why process tracing was adopted as the overarching methodological framework. 
The following section goes on to clarify why Spain and Germany were chosen as the 
strategic comparison for the research, and what it is about these two euro member-states 
that makes them such interesting subjects to contrast. In the penultimate section, the 
reader is taken through the research process and the specific applied methods that were 
used to both generate and analyse data in later chapters. The final section concludes. 
 
3.1 Research Questions 
 
The Main Research Question (MRQ) asks the following: 
To what extent can changing ideas and intuitional structures explain 
the evolution of Europe’s financial stability agenda?  
This research is primarily concerned with how financial stability came to be viewed initially 
as a secondary consideration within central banking circles, to attaining co-equal status with 
price stability (Bernanke 2011). Within Europe, the Treaty establishing Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) provided the European Central Bank (ECB) with no direct 
responsibility for financial stability (Papademos 2006) and many legal provisions were made 
to prevent the bank straying from its price stability mandate (TEU 1992, Art. 105). The task 
of defending financial stability remained the duty of national regulators and supervisors 
(Duisenberg 2000[b]). Over the duration of EMU however, the European Union (EU) and ECB 
became increasingly involved with financial stability issues and responsibility for its 
maintenance began to migrate away from member-states towards the supranational level. 
This research aims to track this process of change from 1999–2014 and explain how 
important ideas and structures were in:  
 
i) pushing the ECB to think more about and openly discuss financial stability 
ii) advancing and justifying institutional change at the EU and national levels in 
relation to financial stability 
iii) acting as restraints on institutional change at the EU and national levels  
 
The thesis breaks down the MRQ into three subsidiary research questions which are 
addressed in subsequent chapters. 
 
 
Subsidiary Research Question 1 (SRQ1): 
Why has the ECB become increasingly attentive to financial stability 
concerns? 
Although the ECB was initially handed very limited competence over financial stability, even 
before the crisis, it began discussing financial stability as an independent concern - even 
producing a mission statement on the topic in 2005 (Trichet 2005[a]). Following the 2007-8 
financial crisis, the ECB took a much more active role in trying to stabilise European financial 
markets, culminating with the completion of Banking Union (BU) in November 201466. This 
question seeks to explain why this evolution took place, and to assess the importance of the 
ideational and structural factors which helped facilitate it. 
 
The question is tackled in two parts. Using the start of the financial crisis in 2007 as a natural 
analytical break, chapter 5 looks at the evolution of the ECB’s financial stability agenda from 
1999-2007, while chapter 7 looks at the ECB’s reaction to the crisis from 2007-2014. Using 
insights from DI and HI throughout, attention focuses on the importance of history, 
structure and ideas in both aiding and constraining institutional and policy change at the 
European level. 
 
Subsidiary Research Question 2 (SRQ2): 
Why did German and Spanish financial institutions react differently 
to the advent of market-based banking and the creation of EMU? 
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 At this time the ECB was handed direct responsibility for supervising the Eurozone’s 130 largest financial 
institutions. 
This question is tackled in chapter 4 and examines the importance of ideas and structures in 
explaining how the Deutsche Bundesbank (DB) and Banco de España (BdE) liberalised their 
economies, conducted monetary policy, supervised financial institutions and prepared for 
EMU. The chapter shows how different financial ideas led directly to different supervisory 
practices becoming adopted in each country, and the impact this had on banking activity 
and the desirability of Spanish and German sovereign debt. The appendix also contains a 
critical case study of two public banks, Caja de Ahorros del Mediterráneo (CAM) and 
Bayerische Landesbank (BayernLB) to highlight structural similarities between the Spanish 
and German financial systems. It reveals the typical problems found within Spanish and 
German public banks67, and uncovers the political obstacles their two central banks faced 
while trying to reform their respective public banking sectors. 
 
Subsidiary Research Question 3 (SRQ3): 
Why were Spain and Germany impacted differently by the financial 
crisis, and why did they pursue different policy objectives at the 
European level? 
 
This question is addressed in chapter 6, with analysis commencing at the start of the 
financial crisis in 200768. Given the structural similarities between the Spanish and German 
financial systems, this research expects to uncover ideational reasons which may explain 
why Spain and Germany were impacted differently by the crash, why the Spanish system 
subsequently changed more radically than its German counterpart, and why each country 
pursued different post-crisis policy preferences at the EU-level.  
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 Which often related to their linkages with regional politicians, see chapter 4. 
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 Again, analysis concludes with the commencement of BU in November 2014. 
Chapter 6 also contains a critical case study of two public bank bailouts in Germany and 
Spain: Hypo Real Estate (HRE – Germany) and Bankia (Spain). These cases are deemed 
critical because they represent both extreme cases – with HRE denoting Germany’s only 
modern-era bank nationalisation (Scally 2014), and Bankia’s collapse forcing the Spanish 
government to seek EU assistance (De Olza 2013) – but they also magnify the difficulties 
found within many other banks in the two countries. These examples therefore also provide 
a degree of generalisability (Flyvbjerg 2006, p.226; Yin 2003, p.40), revealing common 
problems within the two systems. The case of Bankia is particularly important because it 
also represented the critical juncture for both Spain and Europe. The collapse of this bank 
not only forced wholesale change of the Spanish public banking system (De Olza 2013; Royo 
2013[b], p.200), but also obliged the ECB to embark upon more expansionary monetary 
policy and ultimately led to the creation of BU (Citibank 2012; Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016). 
 
3.2 HI and DI Methodological Approaches  
 
Within HI, there is no established methodology to which all authors ascribe and many HI 
scholars tend to mix rationalist and constructivist methodologies when compiling their 
research, depending on the subject of enquiry (Immergut 2005, p.250; Pierson 1996, p.131; 
Steinmo 2008, p.130).  Indeed, many HI studies have employed both quantitative and 
qualitative methods to examine both broad and more specific themes which are said to 
influence institutional behaviour.  Because HI contends that the past can influence the 
present through tangible, structured political organisations as well as through more 
subjective ‘institutions’ such as conceptions around broadly accepted patterns of behaviour 
(Immergut 2005, p.242), a variety of methods may be deemed appropriate.  
 
Yet there are some methods which appear time and again in HI research. Because HI is 
principally concerned with explaining the significance of and institutional structures and 
past events in determining social outcomes (as opposed to predicting future occurrences 
[Steinmo 2008, p.134]), it tends to adopt methods designed to accommodate in-depth 
longitudinal historical study. HI research also frequently seeks to contrast national 
institutional developments to show how historical events can impact institutions differently 
(Hopkin 2002, p.302). If similar exogenous events can be shown to have struck different 
institutions and generated contrasting results, it becomes difficult to refute the importance 
of institutions themselves in determining social outcomes. Therefore comparative historical 
analysis is frequently used in the design of HI studies to draw attention to event similarities 
and to identify factors which help explain differential outcomes within cases (Thelen 1999, 
p.374).   
 
The comparative method is a distinctive approach that offers a richer set of observations 
(especially regarding causal processes), than other methods are able to provide (Hall 2003, 
p.397).  It enables contemporary political and economic developments to be perceived in 
greater depth, and in their historical contexts, while helping to show why institutional 
developments are frequently challenged by conservative elements, and why change tends 
to occur on a slow and cumulative basis (Steinmo 2016, p.110). While accounts of single 
cases can produce evidence of possible explanations for the way history unfolded in a 
specific setting, there may be alternative and equally plausible explanations offered by 
other scholars examining the same phenomena. Comparative analysis allows these 
alternative possibilities to be checked against other cases, showing one explanation to be 
potentially more plausible than others (Hopkin 2002, p.286).   
 
Because HI is less interested in predicting future outcomes than explaining past events 
(Steinmo 2016, p.110) quantitative deductivist methods are not generally adopted in HI 
research. Instead, qualitative process tracing techniques are frequently used to help tease 
out the historical and political processes behind subjects under investigation (Steinmo and 
Thelen 1992, p.9). Process tracing allows phenomena to be investigated in ample detail 
using thick descriptions (Hall 2003, p.393), and enables a greater depth of understanding by 
recognising the importance of history and context in fully comprehending and explaining 
social development (Bennett 2008, p.704; Collier 2011, p.824).  The technique involves a 
detailed systematic tracing of history by identifying causal mechanisms which explain 
specific events or outcomes (Beach and Braun-Pedersen 2013, p.1), and can be found in 
many examples of HI research (Quaglia 2008; Thelen 2003). 
 
Analogous techniques are also popular within ideas research as DI similarly attempts to 
explain past events rather than predict future ones. However, whereas HI research attempts 
to show the importance of structure and path-dependence on historical events, DI tries to 
demonstrate the importance of ideas and discourse in explaining institutional change. 
Schmidt (2008) argues that only by adopting a research style capable of incorporating the 
societal constructs of ideas and discourse can we fully understand the reasons behind both 
institutional change and continuity. Any research attempting to examine the importance of 
ideas and discourse should therefore firstly define the norms, rules, world views and 
cognitive frameworks within the area of research, and then try to establish correlations 
between these ideas and policy outcomes. Longitudinal analysis is therefore often best 
suited to exploring a history which goes beyond moments of crisis and looks deeper at less 
obvious causal mechanisms (Saurugger 2013, p.902).  
 
Hay (2011) also trumpets the benefits of a longitudinal approach to DI research, asserting 
that retrospective process tracing should be foundational to ideational study as it can help 
demonstrate how different cognitive influences emerge and develop over time. This allows 
ideational scholars to be better able to assess the impact of ideas on any given institution 
(Hay 2011, p.79). Berman (2011) and Parsons (2011) both argue, that ‘careful reconstruction 
and process tracing’ should form the bedrock of ideational scholarship (Berman 2011, 
p.124) and are an ‘unavoidable method of ideational argument’ (Parsons 2011, p.135). 
 
Nevertheless, it is accepted that historical process tracing alone cannot be relied upon to 
produce reliable, empirical work. Over reliance on the method would enable critics to argue 
economic pressures and material considerations may have played a greater role in any 
particular outcome and may question the part played by ideas in the process.  Although 
most academics accept people have ideas and that they play some kind of role in 
policymaking, many also contend that these ideas only retain space for a small residual 
amount of autonomy outside the predetermined boundaries of ‘fixed’ rationality, 
socialisation and historical context.  Consequently, Parsons argues, cross-case comparative 
analysis to support process tracing can strengthen a discursive argument and demonstrate 
how different ideas can create different outcomes by causing people to act in different ways 
(Parsons 2011, p.135).   
Many HI (Steinmo 2016, 2008; Thelen 1999) and DI (Hay 2011; Parsons 2011; Saurugger 
2013) scholars hence argue that historical and ideational researchers should rely on process 
tracing and comparative analysis as the cornerstones of their research designs. These 
methods, they claim, are able to plot both the evolutionary development of ideas and 
structures, and help show how different ideas and histories can create different outcomes in 
different contexts.  
 
Finally, there is also a large amount of support within HI and DI literature for the use of in-
depth qualitative interviews which focus on the beliefs, understandings and personal 
experiences of interview subjects (Vromen 2010, p.258). There is a sense that large-scale 
quantitative questionnaires would give an insufficiently robust insight into the thought 
processes and determining factors which influence individual behaviour within an 
institutional setting. The purpose of comparative analysis and process tracing is to attain a 
deeper understanding of not only the formal institutions of a given locality or organisation, 
but also to grasp the informal norms and expectations which also pervade. Surveys are 
judged insufficient to give a nuanced enough comprehension of the perceptions and trade-
offs individuals are willing to make, and the belief structures which help govern their 
behaviour (Steinmo 2016, p.109). Semi-structured qualitative elite interviews are therefore 
deemed preferable within both HI and DI when generating data in the field work phase 
(Quaglia 2008, p.12; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004, p.205). 
 
 
 
3.3 Methodological Framework: Process Tracing 
 
Having justified the use of DI and HI as the theoretical framework for this study (chapter 2) 
and having outlined the types of methods the two approaches tend to use when conducting 
research, namely: process tracing, comparative analysis, and qualitative interviews; the 
following sections describe which methods this research adopted and explains why they 
were best suited to answer the research questions detailed above. It also expounds why 
these methods are epistemologically compatible with HI and DI and how combining them 
enables the generation of valid and reliable results. 
 
 
PROCESS TRACING 
 
As touched upon above, the process tracing method carefully plots historical events while 
seeking to find answers to causation and is often sighted by DI and HI scholars as an 
indispensable part of their investigative toolkit (Berman 2011, p.124; Parsons 2011, p.135; 
Thelen 1999, p.374).  This method provides the analytical framework for the entire research, 
allowing for the inclusion of detailed comparative analysis, critical case studies, thick 
descriptions of important events and trends, and critical discursive analysis of important 
texts. The approach was adopted as a way of systematically plotting broad historic events 
within the Eurosystem and in seeking to establish ideational and structural causation.  
 
Process tracing initially requires an enormous amount of data to ensure valid and conclusive 
results, ideally from a wide range of different sources (George and Bennett 2005, p.206; 
Tansey 2007, p.765). The method then helps narrow down the scope of such material in a 
way which does not weaken the research going forward, and that establishes causality with 
the help of counter factual arguments69. It adopts a systematic examination of historical 
evidence analysed in light of pre-established research questions (Collier 2011, p.823), whilst 
explicitly recognising the importance of sequencing and context in understanding and 
explaining social phenomena (Bennett 2008, p.704; Collier 2011, p.824).  
 
Process tracing was ideally suited for this study as establishing what factors explain the 
evolution of Europe’s financial stability agenda throughout EMU history necessarily requires 
longitudinal historical investigation.  To understand why the ECB was initially inattentive to 
financial stability concerns and why this began to change as EMU evolved, it is imperative to 
accurately grasp the historic context of the Eurozone both before and after the financial 
crisis.  Moreover, comprehending why the German and Spanish financial systems were 
impacted differently by the crisis (Howarth and Quaglia 2015, p.460; Otero-Iglesias et al., 
2016, p.17) requires an even longer historical lens which extends prior to the creation of 
EMU.  
 
Process tracing does however suffer from limitations when applied to areas of investigation 
which are large in scope (rather than to succinct historical periods), as it has a tendency to 
identify a single explanatory variable across an entire period (Collier 2011, p.827). But by 
using insights from DI and HI, this weakness is mitigated as each approach focuses on 
different explanatory variables (ideas and structures) to explain institutional continuity and 
change.  Within a study exploiting both approaches therefore, process tracing is perfectly 
suited is it provides a methodology capable of identifying when either ideas or institutional 
structures were most relevant in dictating outcomes. 
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 Process tracing was used throughout this study to identify, describe and explain key events 
which occurred between the collapse of the ‘Bretton Woods’ fixed exchange-rate system in 
the 1970s, to the completion of BU in 2014, that led Europe, Spain and Germany to their 
current positions.  Once a comprehensive timeline was created for the period by evaluating 
existing literature and secondary data, information was analysed to tease out key themes 
and ideas which dominated European institutions over the duration of study. In this 
instance, process tracing worked to affirm potential explanations whilst eliminating others 
after a thorough and even-handed analysis (Bennett 2008, p.705-7), allowing for assessment 
of how and why some ideas gain traction and triumph over others (Bennett 2008, p.717). 
 
In relation to SRQ1, process tracing was used to find explanations to how and why certain 
key concepts such as price stability and central bank independence became the 
foundational ideas upon which EMU was constructed (TEU 1992, Art.105), why financial 
stability was initially overlooked at the EU-level (Issing 1999[a]; Papademos 2006), and why 
it has since become an overriding preoccupation (ECB 2011[b], p.83; Papademos 2009; 
Trichet 2010[a]). Because process tracing seeks to establish a causal chain of events that can 
be traced back through time, it was also particularly helpful when addressing SRQ2. Here, it 
allowed the causal mechanisms in regards to the way Spain and Germany dealt with the rise 
of market-based finance to be teased out, revealing the ideational and structural factors 
which explain differences in national financial regulations. Process tracing was therefore not 
only an invaluable first step in becoming familiar with the data and in searching for 
important themes and events which warranted further analysis (Collier 2011, p.824), but as 
an overarching approach in which different theories, concepts and methods could be 
accommodated and causal links established. 
 
Process tracing also helped identify critical junctures, which are particularly important in HI 
analysis, and are said to establish starting points for many ‘path-dependent’ processes 
(Capoccia and Keleman 2007, p.348; Pierson 2004, p.135). The signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992) marked one such juncture (Verdun 2007; 2015, p.231; Yiangou et al. 2013, 
p.225) as it set the course of EMU history by establishing monetarist ideas at the heart of 
the single currency (Heipertz and Verdun 2010, p.24; Jabko 2006, p.170). While it was 
initially assumed that the 2007-8 financial crisis represented a second critical juncture 
(Braun 2015, p.422; Verdun 2015, p.222), closer analysis revealed that it was in fact the 
‘sovereign debt crisis’ (2010-12) – with the collapse of Bankia in May 2012 representing its 
apex – which should be regarded as Europe’s real critical juncture (Citibank 2012; Otero-
Iglesias et al. 2016; Schmidt 2014, p.189). It was this period, rather than the initial crisis 
phase, which marked a fundamental shift in both the Spanish and European approaches to 
tackling financial instability.  
 
3.4 Research Structure: Comparative Analysis 
 
WHY SPAIN AND GERMANY? 
Because the Eurosystem contains diverse economies and financial systems (Micossi 2015, 
p.9), and pertains at both the national and supranational levels, concentrating analysis at 
the EU-level alone would be inadequate to obtain a true picture of EMUs institutional 
transition. National authorities and central banks (NCBs) remain important institutions 
(Cohen-Setton 2011; Gros 2017; Quaglia 2008, p.3) and therefore warrant attention by 
scholars of European political economy70. This research seeks to uncover why Eurozone 
member-states adopted different approaches to financial stability prior to the 2007-8 
crisis71, the extent to which ideas and structures were responsible for the differential manor 
in which they were impacted by the crash, and why different levels of enthusiasm were 
exhibited by governments and NCBs towards European policies aimed at alleviating its 
effects72 (Restoy 2012; Weidmann 2015). 
 
Given this, and the benefits that may be obtained by using comparative study within a DI-HI 
framework (Hall 2003, p.397; Thelen 1999, p.374), analysis of two Eurozone countries were 
included in addition to EU-level analysis to generate more reliable results. This section 
underscores the reasons for choosing Spain and Germany for this detailed comparative 
component. 
 
‘THREE-PILLAR’ BANKING STRUCTURE 
The two countries were chosen on the basis of a most-similar structural comparison (Anckar 
2008; Esser and Vliegenthart 2017, p.6). Although Spain and Germany were impacted 
differently by the crisis, prior to this, their financial systems exhibited many structural 
likenesses. Both had ‘three-pillar’ banking systems (Bleuel 2009, p.2; Maudos and Vives 
2017, p.567; Stefanelli 2010, p.24; Zimmermann 2014, p.487) consisting of large 
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international banks (which mainly relied on global markets for liquidity), regional public 
banks known as cajas (Spain) and Landesbanken and Sparkassen (Germany), as well as 
smaller cooperative sectors. The public banks in both countries were heavily politicised, 
both in the sense that regional governments often relied on them to fund local projects (IMF 
2003, p.3; Johnson 1998, p.45; Royo 2013[c], p.25), and also in that many had 
representatives from political parties located within their corporate governance frameworks 
(Cardenas 2013, p.9; Simpson 2013, p.12; Tortella and García-Ruiz 2013, p.183). 
 
The appendix includes a critical case study (Flyvbjerg 2006), of two of these public banks 
(CAM and BayernLB) to provide an illustration of the extent to which this politicisation had 
taken root by 2007. Many of these institutions provided large amounts of credit to their 
autonomous regions (Comunidades Autónoma, Spain) and Federal States (Länder, Germany) 
and had close relationships with local businesses and governments (IMF 2003, p.3; Santos 
2014, p.19). Before the crisis, depositors in Spain and Germany maintained a larger 
proportion of their cash in public banks than in any other EU member-state (Smith 2001, 
p.127), revealing the particular importance of this sector to both countries.  
 
Both systems were also principally supervised by their respective NCBs, which struggled to 
make significant reforms to their public banking sectors (Deutsche Bank 2004, p.6; Smith 
2001, p.136). Post-2007, the majority of these institutions in both nations had to be bailed-
out through government interventions, state funded mergers, emergency loans and 
recapitalisations, as well as helped kept afloat by Eurosystem Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance (ELA), Long-Term Refinance Operations (LTROs) and bond purchase programs. 
Such measures began with assistance provided by the German government to the state-
owned IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG (IKB) in July 2007 and the Sachsen Landesbank 
takeover by Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW) the following month. Spanish cajas 
managed to weather the initial financial storm, but were heavily affected by the secondary 
sovereign debt crisis between 2010-1273 (Howarth and Quaglia 2015; Otero-Iglesias et al., 
2016). 
 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM TYPOLOGIES 
In order to justify the choice of Spain and Germany for comparative analysis in more detail, 
it is necessary to touch upon the literature surrounding typologies in Comparative Political 
Economy (CPE), and where Spain and Germany are located within this field of research. 
Financial system typologies distinguish between the corporate governance structures found 
in national financial institutions, the methods by which such institutions and businesses 
tend to obtain funding (Hardie et al. 2013, p.691), and the types of relationships they build 
with customers. For many scholars, the way a nation’s financial system operates forms the 
epicentre of its particular ‘variety of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice 2001) and is constitutive of 
the economy more broadly (Deeg 2010, p.309). 
 
For a considerable period, the CPE work of reference on national financial systems was 
Zysman’s Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial 
Change (1983), which distinguished between ‘credit-based’ and ‘capital-market-based’ 
financial systems (see Allen and Gale 2000; Deeg 2010; Hardie and Howarth 2013; Hardie et 
al. 2013). Over time, this conception evolved to divide financial systems into ‘bank-based’ 
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 To illustrate differences and similarities between the way Spanish and German banks were impacted by the 
crisis, another ‘critical case study’ (Baxter and Jack 2008) of two financial institutions, Bankia and HRE, is 
provided in chapter 6. 
and ‘market-based’ systems (Hardie et al. 2013 p.692; Levine 2002; Vitols 2005, p.386).  
Financial institutions in bank-based systems are usually said to finance themselves in a 
traditional manner through customer deposits. Loans are not securitised but remain on 
balance sheet and are not hedged to offset potential losses in international markets (Hardie 
et al. 2013, p.707). Here, banks are the most important players in the financial system and 
are frequently involved in long-term relationships with corporate clients.  This ‘relational 
banking’ or ‘patient capital’ structure allows banks to exercise influence in client firms 
through equity stakes and representation on company boards (Deeg 2010; Vitols 2005).  
This arrangement is said to support niche firms, allowing them to finance long-term 
investments and maintain market share.  This bank-based, insider-controlled stakeholder 
corporate governance structure has traditionally been the mainstay of German corporate 
governance arrangements (Goyer 2007; Hackethal et.al. 2006, p.432; Vitols 2005, p.386). 
Although less is generally written about the Spanish financial system, it is also said to be 
characterized by strong strategic coordination (Royo 2013[a], p.632) and is frequently 
categorised as a predominantly bank-based system (Deeg and Posner 2016, p.441). 
 
Market-based financial systems meanwhile are seen as a core element of more liberal 
economies, such as the United Stated (US) and Great Britain, where more attention is paid 
to market signals through price fluctuations (Goyer 2007, p.200; Hardie et.al 2013, p.3). 
Financial institutions depend much more heavily on wholesale markets and securities for 
funding.  The ownership of firms tends to be floated and dispersed between various share-
holders, and contractual rather than relational banking tends to dominate.   
 
Nonetheless, the encroachment of the market into bank-based systems following the 
liberalisation of international financial markets has led many to question the continued 
expediency of the bank-market dichotomy (Hardie et al. 2013, p.695). In traditional bank-
based models, commercial banks make loans to customers, keep those loans on their 
balance sheets, make a profit on the interest they charge, and finance lending with 
customer deposits (Pozsar 2009, p.13). Yet this model no longer holds for most advanced 
economies with almost all financial systems containing at least some elements of market-
based financing. Lending decisions have become at least partly driven by the banks own 
creditworthiness and ability to borrow money in the wholesale markets, undermining long-
term relational banking (Hardie et.al. 2013, p.696).  
 
Deeg (2010) argues many banks have sold their long-term equity stakes to free up capital to 
invest in more profitable ventures (Deeg 2010, p.8). Larger firms in particular have begun 
accessing external financing by issuing securities, and there is much evidence that as banks 
retreat in the wake of the financial crisis, ‘shadow banks’ appear to be taking on a growing 
share of lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (McBride 2014). Even in 
Germany, the number of capital market-based financing options available to SMEs are 
steadily increasing (Sandvoss 2007, p.2).  
 
In Spain and Germany, both the form and functioning of their respective financial systems 
on the lead up to the crisis increasingly adhered to market imperatives (Hardie and Howarth 
2013[b], p.109; Royo 2013[b], p.155), making the distinction between market and bank-
based systems less useful (Dixon 2012, p.585). Indeed, Deeg (2010) and Hardie et al. (2013) 
argue that the literature is moving away from trying to categorise national financial systems 
and is instead looking towards micro-level analysis of individual financial institutions. 
Nevertheless, although the categories may now be blurred, comparative typologies remain 
helpful for depicting a conceptual frame for seeking to understand the general structure of 
national financial systems, and particularly for identifying hybrid arrangements combining 
features of both. It is commonly accepted that within this context, both Spain and Germany 
represent bank-based financial systems (Deeg and Posner 2016, p.441; Royo 2013[a], p.632; 
Vitols 2005, p.386) and that although financial marketisation became more important in 
both states before the crisis, it is not clear market imperatives loomed larger in one over the 
other. The literature therefore suggests that given how differently the crisis affected the 
two countries, explanations other than financial system typologies may hold the key to 
understanding this divergence.  
 
As touched upon in the previous chapter, the central banks and finance ministries of Spain 
and Germany exhibited different ideas at all three levels of abstraction. Spanish and German 
institutions are understood to exhibit different philosophical ideas (neo- versus ordo-
liberalism), programmatic ideas (different interpretations of monetarism) and policy ideas 
(intervention versus non-intervention in financial stability policy)74 (Schmidt 2014). 
Comparison of these two nations could therefore reveal the importance of ideas in 
facilitating institutional change and continuity under EMU. Both states were not only 
affected differently by the crisis, but adopted very different positions on post-crisis attempts 
by the EU to improve financial stability; particularly with regards to the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), ‘extraordinary’ ECB monetary policy and the creation of BU (BdE 2012, 
p.12; Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.218; Linde 2013; Münchau 2016). The German financial 
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system also proved more resilient to change than its Spanish counterpart (particularly from 
2012 onwards) despite both systems continuing to be classified within the literature as 
‘bank-based’ (Deeg and Posner 2016, p.441; Quaglia and Royo 2015, p.488). 
 
3.5 Applied Methods 
 
Having outlined the theoretical and methodological frameworks75, and having described the 
structure the thesis assumed76, the following section describes the applied methods that 
were used to conduct this study and how the research was directed from a practical 
perspective. 
 
DATA TRIANGULATION 
Within process tracing, the selection of text and data marks a crucial step in the research 
process (Reisigl 2017, p.54), with data triangulation seen as critical to facilitate balanced 
research (Meyer 2001, p.30; Wodak 2001[b], p.65). ‘Triangulation’ is a term derived from a 
navigation strategy that uses multiple points of reference to plot more accurately an 
object’s exact location (Jick 1979, p.602). Stemming from the work of Denzin (1978), there 
are generally said to be four different types of triangulation: theoretical, data (Decrop 1999, 
p.159), investigator (Mathison 1988, p.14), and methodological (Downward and Mearman 
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2007, p.83). This research however only used one, data triangulation, to ensure construct 
validity77 (Yin 2003, p.100).  
 
Data triangulation involves the use of different sources of data within one study, and by 
incorporating both primary and secondary data within one project (Decrop 1999, p.159). In 
this way, construct validity is achieved by preventing one specific type of data enacting 
overdue significance on the conclusions of the research. In order to understand and 
evaluate the importance of history, structure and ideational factors on the decision-making 
apparatus of the Eurosystem, numerous sources of secondary data were required to ensure 
as comprehensive and as thorough analysis as possible (Yin 2003, p.100). These data sources 
included speeches by leading politicians and central bankers, secondary elite interviews, and 
articles written by EU officials78, national political figures and central bankers. 
 
The ECB, Commission, DB and BdE also produce official documents which are readily 
available to view online.  The ECB publishes a regular Monthly Bulletin79, working papers, 
occasional papers, research papers and a bi-annual Financial Stability Review (from 2004 
onwards). The DB and BdE likewise issue similar material which was particularly important 
in helping to track institutional opinion on policy proposals.  The Commission too circulates 
economic papers and policy documents, and all these organisations maintain readily 
assessable and extensive English language material on their websites. 
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Some of the most important secondary data sources proved to be: ECB, DB and BdE board 
member speeches; secondary ECB, DB and BdE interviews, and; speeches given by German 
and Spanish Finance and Economy Ministers.  From this material it was possible to track 
discursive changes within the Eurozone and to follow how attitudes, ideas, justifications and 
policies evolved through time (Claeys et al. 2014, p.7). The resources of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) were particularly useful as it maintains a comprehensive set 
of transcripts from central bank speeches on its website dating as far back as March 1997. 
Similarly, DB Annual Reports (Geschäftsbericht) and Financial Stability Reviews 
(Finanzstabilitätsberichte), BdE Annual Reviews (Informe Annual) and Financial Stability 
Reviews (Estabilidad Financiera) and ECB Financial Stability Reviews and EU Banking Sector 
Stability reports were especially helpful80. 
 
GENERATING PRIMARY DATA - QUALITATIVE ELITE INTERVIEWING 
Both DI and HI accept that institutions help formalise ideas and discourses (Capoccia 2016; 
Schmidt 2010, p.3; Titscher et al. 2000, p.174). To try to understand how ideas are formed 
within institutional contexts, large scale quantitative questionnaires would have provided 
insufficient depth into the thought processes and structural factors which influence human 
behaviour. Surveys and structured interviews are generally judged ill-equipped to provide a 
nuanced enough understanding of the perceptions individuals hold and the trade-offs they 
are willing to make to advanced their goals (Steinmo 2016, p.109; Vromen 2010).  
 
Due to the nature of the questions this research aims to answer, the usual criticisms of 
qualitative interviews: that they lack objectivity and are ill-suited to generalise from (Kvale 
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1994), hold little water. Indeed, a quantitative approach to an ideational and subjective area 
of research would have been wholly inappropriate. Therefore although a great deal of care 
needed to be taken to prevent interviewer bias and to avoid the subjective preferences of 
the researcher seeping into the analysis of interview data (Boyatzis 1998, p.35), this study 
generated primary data through the conducting of qualitative ‘semi-structured’ interviews 
with relevant participants.   
 
Whilst it has been argued that fully structured and/or unstructured interviews are ultimately 
impossible to attain as each contains some degree of structure in order to abstract 
information and some degree of judgment when considering which questions to ask (Mason 
2004, p.62), the approach to interviewing adopted for this project took a more qualitative 
line.  A list of open-ended questions specific to each institution (see appendix III) were 
constructed based on previous research into the structural and ideational importance of 
factors which may influence institutional continuity and change. Time was then given to 
allow respondents to talk through and describe events and processes in their own time, as 
they saw fit. A total of 19 interviews were conducted, 17 of which were one-on-one, with 
two containing two participants. Three participants had worked at two of the institutions 
under investigation, allowing them to discuss aspects of both. The average length of time 
given for each interview stood at 1 hour and 3 minutes, with the shortest being 32 minutes 
and the longest 1 hour 45 minutes. Further details are laid out in table 3.1 below. 
 
This thematic, biographical approach is similar to what Burgess (1988) describes as 
‘conversations with a purpose’, containing a fluid and adaptable structure (Mason 2004, 
p.62). This method sits well within the ontological and epistemological positions of DI and  
Table 3.1: Primary Qualitative Interview Sample 
Institution Department Number of 
Participants 
Position Interview 
Number 
ECB Monetary Policy 3 Senior Economist 1 
   Economist 2 
   Economist 3 
 Financial Stability 1 Economist 4 
 SSM 1 Economist 1 
DB Financial Stability 1 Head of Division 5 
 Monetary Policy 0  N/A 
BdE Research Department 4 Head of Division 6 
   Economist 7 
   Economist 8 
   Economist 9 
 Financial Stability 0  N/A 
 Financial Stability and Resolution 1 Senior Economist 10 
German 
Economics 
Ministry 
 1 Deputy Head of 
Division 
11 
German Finance 
Ministry 
European Economic and 
Monetary Affairs 
1 Head of Division 12 
Bundestag Finance Committee Secretariat 1 Senior Officer 13 
 Budget Committee Secretariat  1 Senior Officer 13 
Spanish Foreign 
Office 
European Union 1 Head of Division 14 
Spanish 
Economics 
Ministry 
Macroeconomic Analysis and 
European Affairs 
1 Senior Economic 
Advisor  
15 
Spanish Treasury  2 Chief of Staff  16 
   Chief of Staff  16 
Commission DG ECFIN  3 Head of Division 17 
   Economist 2 
   Economist 3 
 DG FISMA 1 Head of Division 18 
European 
Parliament 
Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs (UK) 
1 MEP 19 
     
 Total: 24(19)   
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
HI, allowing individuals within institutions to express their views organically, in their own 
words and at their own pace (Wood and Kroger 2000, p.72). Through such open-ended 
accounts, researchers can gain information about the discursive deliberations that 
accompany decision-making, and supplement official data with first-hand authentication 
(Tansey 2007, p.767).  
 
Although some of the information required for this research may have been obtained 
without interviewing, for example, through the qualitative thematic analysis of secondary 
speeches, interview transcripts and articles authored by relevant officials (See Rosenhek 
2013, p.256), interviewing added a valuable additional layer and further depth to the data 
(Lilleker 2003, p.208). It also helped provide context and improved understanding of 
people’s motivations (Schonhardt-Bailey 2013, p.450). Despite some of the methodological 
and practical issues surrounding elite interviewing, it is often the most effective way to 
determine how subjective factors influence political and economic decision-making, and for 
understanding the incentives and preferences of actors (Berry 2002, p.682; Rathbun 2008, 
p.686-90).   
 
QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW SAMPLING 
Taken originally from Grounded Theory81, ‘theoretical’ sampling dictates that researchers 
come to the study of a phenomenon with some pre-conceptions and prior knowledge of 
specific groups and/or institutions. Based on this knowledge, the researcher selects certain 
groups or individuals which are most likely to be able to assist with the project (Corbin and 
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Strauss 1990, p.420).  The aim is not to be representative per se, but to speak to as many 
people as deemed necessary to provide enhanced insight. 
 
One of the main sampling issues in conducting research of this nature is gaining access to 
relevant individuals who can add intuition to the field of investigation.  Elite access can be a 
major sampling problem (Goldstein 2002, p.669), particularly when such individuals would 
ideally include former Presidents of the EU Commission, ECB, NCBs and government 
ministers. Nonetheless, this problem may be overcome by considering the ‘wider universe’ 
of the research. Within the scope of this project, all financial institutions of the EU (ECB - 
including the SSM82 - DG-ECFIN83, FISMA84, ECOFIN85 and the Eurogroup86), government 
economics and finance ministries, representatives of political parties, and commercial 
financial institutions may be considered useful interview respondents.  This provides a 
potentially very large sampling frame. 
 
Although high-profile individuals who currently occupy senior positions within the EU and 
national governments are unlikely to have the time to participate in research of this nature, 
such actors often give interviews to quality newspaper and media titles, speeches at events 
and press conferences, as well as publish their own articles and blogs (see Buti 2014; 
Schäuble 2011[a]).  A relatively thorough understanding of their theoretical and practical 
positions can therefore be obtained through such secondary sources. Due to the salient and 
topical nature of financial instability in Europe and the response of institutions like the ECB 
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 Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. 
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 The Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union. 
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 Economic and Financial Affairs configuration of the European Council. 
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 Economic and Financial Affairs configuration of the European Council consisting only of Euro member-states. 
to enhance their public communication strategies (Draghi 2014[a]), there is a great deal of 
elite discourse readily available in the public domain.  
 
Individuals lower down the chain of command meanwhile, for which there is less 
attributable literature, can often provide valuable insights into the everyday functioning of 
institutions. Such persons offer specific knowledge of various departments within 
organisations that those at the top may be less able to provide. Seeking respondents who 
can convey knowledge of different institutional functions help improve the depth of 
research and add value to the sample of informants (Weiss 1995, p.17). Each respondent 
was therefore chosen on the basis that there was a likelihood of new information coming to 
light, with the aim to cover all relevant departments within the organisations under study to 
generate a holistic picture of the institutions in question.  
 
However, the issue of respondents not necessarily being entirely honest with the 
interviewer is a problem for qualitative interviewing (Berry 2002, p.680). Interviewees may 
try to present themselves or their organisation in an overly positive light, or convey a 
creative version of events which fits with their own interpretations, but does not necessarily 
align with observed empirical facts (Ball 1994, p.97–98). Those involved within the higher 
strata of institutions are also under intense pressure to speak ‘on-message’ and may 
therefore be less able to give as detailed answers as desirable, skewing potential results. 
Likewise, such individuals could also be concerned about their historical legacies and public 
perceptions, which may mean their reconstruction of events contain strategic omissions or 
increased emphasis on certain aspects (Berry 2002, p.680; Rathbun 2008, p.689). Talking to 
people who do some of the more ‘hands-on’ work therefore, and who have lower public 
profiles, may even provide more insightful acumens than those at the top. Homan (1991) 
and Ostrander (1995) have also suggested that less influential people may be less skilled at 
deflecting questions and hence more likely to answer truthfully87.  
 
Within this research therefore, as is the case with the majority of political research, elite 
interviewing tends to involve less well known participants with ‘close proximity to power’ 
(Lilleker 2003, p.207), partly due to issues surrounding access (Goldstein 2002, p.669), but 
also because they may be more likely to answer honestly and have less reason to by coy 
about institutional failures or setbacks (Homan 1991; Ostrander 1995; Rathbun 2008, 
p.689). Sampling for primary interviews within this project therefore did not rely on 
obtaining the ‘big names’ within European institutions, but instead tried to ensure a wide 
range of relevant organisations were represented. Interviews were also conducted 
anonymously, with direct quotations left unnamed to ensure respondent confidentiality. 
This knowledge provided interviewees with more confidence to speak freely about their 
experiences without fear of any backlash. 
 
In terms of size, qualitative samples must be large enough to guarantee that most, if not all, 
important ideas and concepts under investigation are uncovered and discussed by the 
sample (Mason 2010, p.2). But equally, if the sample is too large, the data produced may 
become repetitive and eventually, superfluous. When data collection reaches this point of 
‘saturation’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967) and new data fails to add any additional depth, no 
further interviews are necessary. Rather than representing a population then, the aim of 
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 Interview subjectivity can also be reduced by honing interview techniques. For example, asking respondents 
to critique their own case by asking them to outline an alternative point of view, or by moving to different 
questions should the interviewee fail to deviate from ‘the party line’ (Berry 2002, p.680). 
generating primary data was to improve understanding of the complexities of EU and 
national institutions, the relationships between them, and the process of change which has 
unfolded throughout the history of the Eurozone.  A strategic and illustrative approach is 
therefore preferable to any attempt to be representational (Mason 2004, p.135; Tansey 
2007, p.771).  
 
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
The transcripts of primary interviews and secondary sources were analysed using process 
tracing, in conjunction with Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA contains some key 
assumptions. It assumes that to understand institutions and institutional change, it is 
necessary to study their discourses and examine justifications for action (Fairclough 2010, 
p.349). It presumes that discourses are inherently ideological (Jones 2012, p.15) because 
institutional structures are legitimated by the ideologies of powerful groups which are 
expressed as written and verbal communications (Fairclough 2010, p.58; Reisigl and Wodak 
2009, p.88; Wodak 2001[a], p.3). It therefore sees language as a social phenomenon that 
contains meaning and value that is detectable through the study of context-specific 
discourse (Fairclough 2010, p.272; van Dijk 2008, p.5).  
 
The concept of ‘interdiscursivity’ is used within CDA to denote a discursive event in which 
two sets of ideas are expressed (Fairclough 2010, p.95; Wodak 2001[b]). CDA is therefore 
able to detect the point at which one hegemonic idea becomes challenged or starts to be 
replaced by another. Moreover, readers and listeners are not regarded as passive recipients 
of discourse. Individual actions and ideas are said to be influenced by language (Wodak 
2001[a]), helping to explain institutional change. 
 
Although CDA does not view discourse as powerful on its own, it does see it as a means of 
gaining and maintaining power (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, p.88). CDA therefore often tends 
to focus on mass-media coverage and power relations between ruling elites and the wider 
population (Meyer 2001, p.24). While mass-media is not the focus of this research, central 
bank communication has much in common as it aims to influence markets, decision-makers, 
and wider populations (Draghi 2014[b]). Moreover, central banks have increased the 
frequency and transparency of their communications in recent years (Hughes and Kesting 
2014, p.329; Schonhardt-Bailey 2013, p.395), allowing for the possibility of more in-depth 
research using CDA.  
 
CDA also tends to use mid-range theories such as DI and HI to serve the analytical aims of its 
research while using grand theories such as Marxism to act as the ideological foundation 
(Fairclough 2010, p.282; Wodak 2001[b]). Indeed, the ‘critical’ component of CDA is 
sometimes interpreted as a Marxist social critique (Reisigl 2017, p.50). Others meanwhile 
understand the ‘critical’ aspect of CDA as simply maintaining distance from data by 
preserving a focus on continuous self-reflection while undertaking research (Reisigl and 
Wodak 2009, 87). This latter interpretation is the understanding this thesis applies to CDA. 
While this study combined insights from DI and HI to serve as the analytical lenses, it is not 
grounded in a meta-theory. Because it does not aim to explore power relations or 
inequalities between countries or peoples, or to take any moral position on the suitability or 
otherwise of certain policies or ideas, no such overarching theory was considered necessary. 
The intention is not to judge the merits or de-merits of European institutions or policies, but 
simply to attest to the importance of ideas and structures during their formation.  
 
Figure 3.1: Methodological matrix  
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter began by outlining the specific research questions this thesis poses. To address 
these questions, and to attest to the significance of ideas and structures in determining 
institutional change, HI and DI were chosen to establish the overarching theoretical 
framework. To ensure epistemological coherence, the chapter examined which research 
methods tend to dominate in existing DI and HI studies. It confirmed that the majority of 
scholars in these fields find the most effective methods for helping to understand structural, 
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historical and ideational change are process tracing, comparative analysis and qualitative 
interviews. Each of these techniques aim to find causality between structures, ideas and 
events, and to reveal how ideas are tied to action (Hay 2011, p.79; Parsons 2011, p.135; 
Schmidt 2008, p.308).  
 
The chapter demonstrated that adopting process tracing as the principal methodological 
framework has strong epistemological backing and robust peer precedent (Berman 2011; 
Hay 2011; Parsons 2011; Saurugger 2013). By conducting in-depth historical analysis and 
producing thick descriptions of key events and ideas, process tracing can help uncover the 
structural and ideational causal mechanisms at play throughout institutional transition.  At 
the national level, this endeavour was assisted by the adoption of comparative analysis and 
the selection of a most-similar structural comparison between Spain and Germany (Anckar 
2008; Esser and Vliegenthart 2017, p.6). These countries were chosen because despite their 
structural similarities (Deeg and Posner 2016, p.441; Royo 2013[a], p.632; Vitols 2005, 
p.386), each financial system adapted differently to the onset of market-based banking, 
were impacted differently by the 2007-8 financial crisis, and subsequently pursued different 
objectives at the EU-level in response to the crash. By comparing these two nations, it was 
considered possible to explore the institutional and ideational factors which best account 
for this differentiation. 
 
With regards to the applied methods this research adopted, data triangulation was shown 
to provide greater construct validity by making use of a number of different sources and 
data types (Meyer 2001, p.30; Wodak 2001[b], p.65; Yin 2003, p.100). This helped                              
ensure no one set of information could dominate analysis and skew results. The inclusion of 
primary elite interview was also deemed imperative to uncover further in-depth ideational, 
discursive, attitudinal and practical changes within the institutions under investigation 
(Rathbun 2008, P.686-90; Schonhardt-Bailey 2013, p.450). Semi-structured qualitative 
interviews which allow respondents to discuss and elaborate on matters they considered of 
importance were reasoned the most empirical method for gathering primary data in 
relation to ideas and the internal workings of relevant institutions (Berry 2002, p.682). 
 
Finally, CDA was used in conjunction with process tracing to analyse primary and secondary 
data in an attempt to detect ideational and structural causation through language and text 
(Fairclough 2010, p.58; Reisigl and Wodak 2009, p.88; Wodak 2001[a], p.3). Using these 
methodologies and applied methods, the thesis now moves on to explore the evolution of 
Europe’s pre-crisis financial stability agenda, beginning at the national level with a 
comparative analysis of Spain and Germany. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Pre-Crisis  
National Financial Systems 
 
Why did German and Spanish financial institutions react differently 
to the advent of market-based banking and the creation of EMU? 
 
Previous studies have made important discoveries in relation to how Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) member-states were shaped by the growth of market-based finance 
and how the differing extent of their marketization influenced the degree to which they 
were impacted by the crisis (Hardie et al. 2013; Howarth and Quaglia 2015; Röper 2017). In 
Spain and Germany, variances were shown to have materialised amid their financial 
institutions composition of risk, with German banks exposed on the asset-side and Spanish 
banks on the liabilities-side of their balance sheets (Hardie and Howarth 2013[a], p.104; 
Royo 2013[a], p.154). By using Historical (HI) and Discursive Institutionalism (DI), this 
research goes further by revealing how institutional ideas and structures explain why these 
differences materialised. The chapter shows why ideationally idiosyncratic national central 
banks (NCBs) supervised financial institutions in the manner they did, and why this led to 
different practices becoming adopted across the Eurosystem. 
 
From the 1970s until the 2007-8 crisis, European financial markets underwent a period of 
sustained liberalisation and ‘marketisation’. Yet while securities markets became global pre-
2008, their regulation and prudential treatment remained national - even within the 
Eurosystem (Thiemann 2012, p.40). This chapter examines the interplay between ideas and 
structures in Spain and Germany, arguing specifically that important ideational differences 
between the countries NCBs, the Deutsche Bundesbank (DB) and Banco de España (BdE) – 
both prior to and during EMU – were crucial in determining how the two financial systems 
adjusted to the acceleration of market-based practices, prepared for EMU, and adapted to 
life under the euro. These differences, coupled with structural specificities, ultimately 
explain why Spain and Germany were impacted differently by the crisis, and why they 
subsequently pursued different policy priorities at the EU-level in its aftermath. 
 
Figure 4.1 below illustrates the thrust of the argument. Before EMU, different 
interpretations of monetarism led to different DB and BdE attitudes towards monetary 
policy and the role market-based finance (Covil 1996; Gabor 2016, p.977; Pellicer 1995, 
p.36). Once EMU was established, structural factors with regards to the impact the single 
monetary policy had on the two countries (coupled with the low profitability of the 
Germany system [Commission (2014[c], p.40; Hardie and Howarth 2009, p.1019] and 
Spanish political links between politicians and public banks [Molinas 2013]), lead to financial 
institutions in each state adopting different market-based practices. Dissimilar DB and BdE 
supervisory policy ideas – resulting from their particular interpretations of monetarism – 
also influenced the behaviour of Spanish and Germany banks in different ways, with the BdE 
assuming interventionist policies and the DB espousing a more ‘hands-off’ approach. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Why German and Spanish banks reacted differently to pre-crisis trends 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
Using process tracing and thick historical descriptions (Hall 2003, p.393), the chapter begins 
by analysing the evolution of the German financial system, exploring how important ideas 
and structures were in shaping DB attitudes towards liberalisation and financial stability. 
Specifically, it focuses on interbank repo markets, securitisation and counter-cyclical 
regulatory practices as these factors are crucial to understanding the mechanics of market-
based finance. The following section focuses more explicitly on the structure of the German 
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Comparative Analysis 
 
Germany Spain 
system: Looking in detail at the large and politically sensitive public banking sector. It uses 
insights from HI and DI to reveal that ideas, as well as concepts such as path-dependence 
and vested interests, are vital to elucidating German financial trends. The third section 
examines the evolution of the Spanish financial system and its adaptation to market-based 
practices. Again looking principally at the interbank repo markets, securitisation and 
counter-cyclical regulatory measures, it uses HI and DI to explore the role of ideas and 
structures in determining BdE regulatory and supervisory policies. The penultimate section 
evaluates Spain’s large and historically significant public banking sector and its resistance to 
regulatory reform efforts. The final segment draws to a conclusion. 
 
4.1: Liberalisation and Financial Supervision in 
Germany 
 
Ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik) has constituted the dominant philosophical idea within 
the DB and wider German policy circles since the end of the Second World War (Dyson 
2002[c], p.174; Matthijs 2016). As chapter 2 underscored, its main features are that it seeks 
to establish a strong, rule-based framework, but beyond this advises against state 
intervention and micro-management (Siems and Schnyder 2014, p.379). It also attaches a 
great deal of importance to price stability and the containment of monetary aggregates by 
an independent central bank88 in order to still confidence in the German currency (the 
Deutsche Mark) and anchor market expectations of a stable financial environment.  
 
                                                          
88
 Independence was critical as it allowed central banks to inhibit money supply by growth by increasing 
interest rates in the event of excessive private sector borrowing or government spending (DB 2012[a]). 
Long before monetarism became accepted as the consensus economic view, this stability 
orientated position, informed by ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik), represented the 
programmatic idea behind DB monetary policy (Garber 1993, p.463; McNamara 1998; 
Schmidt 2014). Although such ideas were often challenged by social-democratic 
governments89 (Allen 1990, p.16; Childs 1994), the relative success of German monetarist 
polices were widely regarded as one of the key factors explaining the rise of monetarism 
throughout the late twentieth century (Howarth and Loedel 2005, p.15; Kaelberer 2003, 
p.369; McNamara 1998, p.157). These ideas, which rejected Keynesian notions of 
establishing countercyclical economic or financial policies (Bibow 2017; Economist 2015), 
fed through to produce non-interventionist policy ideas in relation to financial stability as it 
was feared moral hazard may be produced if interventions created inflationary effects 
(Dyson and Marcussen 2009, p.141). While the DB sought to construct a sound financial 
framework, it established what may be termed a ‘bottom-up’ supervisory structure, taking 
its regulatory cues from financial institutions themselves through the various German 
Banking Associations90. 
  
Importantly, despite the global shift towards market-based banking, it remained sceptical of 
short-term finance (Trampusch 2015, p.122) and hostile towards intermediary structures 
such as hedge funds and complex risk-transfer products which were seen to distort market 
discipline and operate exogenously to traditional supervisory regimes (DB 1999[b], p.29; 
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 Karl Schiller, Social Democratic Party (SDP) Federal Economics Minister (1966-72), was particularly important 
in this regard. During the 1960s and 1970 he attempted to promote Keynesian economic policies with the 
slogan, ‘As much competition as possible, as much planning as necessary’ (Childs 1990). Schiller was also 
responsible for creating the Council of Experts (Sachverstdndigenrat), known as ‘the Wise Men’ in 1963. 
90
 The National Association of German Cooperative Banks (Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und 
Raiffeisenbanken, BVR), the Association of German Banks (Bundesverband deutscher Banken) and the German 
Savings Banks Association (Deutscher Sparkassen und Giroverband, DSGV). 
2004[c], p.40; 2005[a], p.48). The diagram below illustrates the interplay between these 
three levels of ideas (Schmidt 2008; 2014) and how they relate to German finance. These 
ideational characteristics are essential in explaining how the DB reacted to and facilitated 
financial liberalisation, and the attitude it adopted towards the supervision of its financial 
sector. 
 
Figure 4.2: German financial ideas 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
MONETARY POLICY AND THE GROWTH OF MARKET-BASED FINANCE 
For Germany, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, domestic liberalisation came partly in 
response to external forces in the shape of European Community (EC) competition policy 
pressed from member-states like Britain and adopted by the Commission (Helleiner 1995; 
Jabko 1999). But it also enabled advocates of reform within the country to drive forward 
Philosophical Idea: 
Ordo-liberalism 
Strong legal framework & micro-
managerial restraint;  
preference for stability and economic 
liberalism  
Programatic Idea: 
Monetarism 
Independent central  bank, oposition to 
countercyclical policies, concern for 
monetary aggregates & financial 
liberalisation 
Financial Policy Idea: 
Non-interventionism 
Off-site supervision, 'self-regulation', no 
macro-prudential policy, liberal economic 
and financial policies 
liberalising measures, which were then pursued at the European level (Jabko 2006, p.64; 
Lütz 2005, p.141).  
 
The DB and Federal Ministries of Finance and Economy all ascribed to ordo-liberalism 
(Ordnungspolitik). The Commissions’ neo-liberal ideas, although distinct, in many ways 
coalesced with traditional ordo-liberal concepts (see table 2.5). This gave new impetus 
towards a significant relaxation of previous customs in other areas of the economy too, such 
as collective wage bargaining and corporate governance rules (Streeck 2009, p.33). The 
philosophical closeness between German ordo- and European neo-liberal thought is crucial 
to explaining why Germany agreed to move in a more liberal direction (Jabko 2006, p.20), 
demonstrating the importance of ideational factors in enabling institutional change.  
 
Table 4.1 below outlines some of the key steps Germany took towards liberalising its 
financial system after publication of the Delors Report (1989) which confirmed the ECs 
intention to proceed with EMU91. The euro was expected to bring increased competition 
between members, especially in the finance sector. This led commercial banks in particular 
to press for enhanced regulatory liberalisation (Gabor 2016, p.977; Röper 2017, p.10), and 
for the Ministry of Finance (Trampusch 2015, p.120) and DB (DB 2004[a], p.47) to take steps 
to ensure Germany remained a viable financial centre. Such concerns pressed the 
government to introduce four Financial Market Promotion Acts 
(Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz), a Financial Market Promotion Plan (Finanzmarktförderplan) 
and a series of Tax Acts which eliminated price fixing, permitted the operation of hedge 
funds (2003) and brought German tax rules into line with foreign practices.  
                                                          
91
 The Report recommended a three-stage approach to establishing the single currency, with stage one 
beginning on the 1st July 1990. 
Table 4.1: Important statutory financial liberalisation in Germany 
1990 First Financial Market Promotion Act (Erstes 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) 
1995 Second Financial Market Promotion Act (Zweites 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) 
 Stock exchange turnover tax abolished (from 1 January 
1991) 
 Capital duty and stamp duty abolished (from 1 January 
1992) 
 Financial futures contracts and trading in equity and 
bond options authorised  
 Permission to hold liquidity in certain money market 
instruments  
 Limited- term bond funds authorised 
 Federal Supervisory Office for Securities Trading 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel) 
established 
 Regulations on insider trading 
 Asset management companies allowed to invest in 
money market funds and  engage in securities lending 
1998 Third Financial Market Promotion Act (Drittes 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) 
2002 Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act (Viertes 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) 
 New types of funds authorised
92
 
 Limited- term equity funds and equity index funds 
authorised 
 Investment opportunities in derivatives (up to 49% of 
contractual investment funds) 
 Investor protection and supervisory toolkit improved 
 Capital gains from sales of shares in incorporated 
enterprises exempted from tax 
 
2000 & 2003 Tax Acts 2004 Financial Market Promotion Plan 
(Finanzmarktförderplan) 
 Tax Reduction Act (Steuersenkungsgesetz, 2000): 
Official price fixing abolished 
 Investment Tax Act (Investmentgesetz, 2003): 
differences between foreign and domestic tax 
arrangements eliminated 
 Investment Modernisation Act, 
(Investmentmodernisierungsgesetz, 2003): Permitted 
hedge funds to operate, if they complied with rules 
concerning risk diversification 
 Measures affecting asset management companies: 
capital requirements eased
93
  
 Unlimited scope to invest in derivatives 
 
 
Source: DB (2015[c]) 
 
However, as an institution with strong monetarist programmatic ideas, the DB, unlike the 
Federal Finance Ministry, was initially sceptical about short-term market-based finance and 
deregulating interbank lending markets (Gabor 2016, p.978; Trampusch 2015, p.122). It 
worried that if banks abandoned the uncollateralised open-market liquidity operations94 
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 Pension-based contractual investment funds, mixed securities and property-based contractual investment 
funds and closed-ended funds in the legal form of a public limited company (investment stock corporations) 
were authorised for the first time. 
93
 Maximum of €10 million in capital required (initial capital and additional own funds), regardless of 
contractual investment fund size. 
94
 The purchasing of eligible paper from banks in exchange for reserves (DB 1991, p.101). Although open-
market operations were the DBs main liquidity tool, it should also be noted that the bank did permit ‘Lombard 
loans’: short-term, relatively expensive collateralised loans to banks, under certain circumstances, as well as 
Pensionsgeschäfte and Schnelltender repurchase operations from 1985 to try to steer very short-term interest 
rates (Hardy 1998, p.649). 
through which it conducted monetary policy, it would be much harder to control the money 
supply. Because the DB used monetary policy to target a specific monetary aggregate95 (M3 
from 1988), encouraging interbank repo transactions96 and commercial paper markets97 
would have made this task more difficult (Covil 1996; Gabor 2016, p.977). It therefore 
employed restrictions on interbank repos by introducing a reserve requirement98, and kept 
the Federal Finance Ministry from issuing short-term Treasury Bills (Gabor 2016, p.977; 
McCauley 1999, p.4). Such activity provides an example of outcome F as depicted in the 
ideational versus structural matrix, table 2.2 (chapter 2): 
 
German market-based finance before EMU: 
 
F) established ideas in old institutions  ->  sluggish policy change 
 
 
Orthodox monetarist programmatic ideas established DB aversion to short-
term finance and hindered financial liberalisation. 
 Illustration 4.1 
 
Until 1991, Germany also lacked a commercial paper market due to a combination of 
regulatory and tax barriers imposed at the behest of the DB (Deeg 1999, p.88). As a result, 
German firms increasingly began issuing commercial paper in foreign currencies in overseas 
markets. German banks also continued to conduct repo transactions, but in London rather 
than Frankfurt. Because Germany began to lose business, and under intense pressure from 
German firms, large banks, and the Finance Ministry, the DB eventually began to soften its 
strict monetarist position by implementing gradual technocratic change in preparation for 
EMU (Covil 1996; Deeg 1999, p.88; Röper 2017).  
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 As opposed to the ECB and Bank of England, for example, which target an aggregation of consumer prices. 
96
 Where banks typically trade sovereign debt with one another temporarily for liquidity. 
97
 The trading of short-term unsecured promissory notes issued by companies. 
98
 German banks were forced to deposit a percentage of the loan with the DB, free of interest. Until March 
1994 this requirement was 12.1 percent, although it was gradually lowered to 2 percent (Covill 1996). 
In 1991 it suspended approval requirements for debt issuance, enabling the creation of a 
Deutsch Mark commercial paper market. In 1995 the government passed the Second 
Financial Market Promotion Act which permitted asset management companies to invest in 
money market funds and engage in securities lending. The DB also removed reserve 
requirements for repos in 1997 and dropped its opposition to the production of 2-year 
Treasury Bills (Schätze) in 1996. In 1998, the ‘Bond Issues Auction Group’ was established, 
creating a primary dealer system for short-term Treasury Bills and special 5-year Federal 
Bonds (Bobls) (DB 2002, p.154). These actions doubled the number of German banks active 
in domestic repo markets to 30 between March 1996 and April 1998 (BIS 1999, p.78; Gabor 
2016, p.978; McCauley 1999, p.4), and stimulated the production of non-bank issued 
Deutsch Mark denominated securities and market interest in German debt.  
 
A year after first issue, around half of all 6-month Treasury Bills (Bubills) were acquired by 
non-residents (DB 1996, p.29), transforming Germany into the de facto issuer of European 
‘safe assets’, with German debt constituting around a third of all collateral in European repo 
transactions by 2001 (figure 4.3). Under EMU Germany remained the benchmark issuer of 
European sovereign bonds due to the record volume of issues, and because 10-year bond 
(Bund) futures remained an effective hedging instrument against interest rate risks, 
ensuring demand remained high (DB 2001, p.48). The DB thus appeared to understand the 
importance of sovereign bonds as collateral within financial markets and that shortages in 
their production could cause liquidity problems (DB 2002, p.62). Nevertheless, the eligibility 
criteria for collateral used in DB repos pre-EMU continued to be restricted as the bank 
sought to remain focused on monetary policy through the use of open-market operations 
whilst avoiding involvement in financial stability policies (Prati and Schinasi 1999, p.31). 
Figure 4.3: Debt used in European repo transactions (2001) 
 
Source: ISMA European repo market survey (2001) 
 
Under the euro, however, the DB lost full control of monetary policy in exchange for voting 
rights on the ECBs Governing Council, altering the banks policy objectives.  With no 
monetary aggregate to control, it gradually became less concerned about some short-term 
financial practices and expanding collateral eligibility. In 2002, the EUs Financial Collateral 
Directive (FCD) established a common tier 1 collateral framework for all Euroarea states, 
and in 2003, German banks responded positively to a consultation on extending the number 
of assets eligible as repo collateral. German banks were particularly keen to see bank loans 
included in the list, which the DB hoped would off-set the privileged status of government 
bonds which was thought to lower the cost of sovereign debt and reduce fiscal discipline, 
potentially threatening price stability by increasing the money supply (DB 2006[a], p.31-3)99.  
                                                          
99
 In May 2004, the ECB Governing Council decided to gradually switch to a single extended list of eligible 
collateral for all EMU member-states (ECB 2004[a]). Prior to this change, only non-financial enterprises located 
in Germany were admitted to the German tier two list. After the changes, maturity limits on accepted 
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Whilst the DB retained full control of monetary policy and sought to control monetary 
aggregates, short-term finance was seen as a threat to ordo-liberal, monetarist principles. 
But under EMU, repo operations were no longer viewed this way as the ECB conducted 
monetary policy partly through the repo markets by targeting short-term interest rates to 
control inflation (ECB 2000[a], p.37-47; Weber 2005, p.15). Moreover, the diversification of 
collateral acceptable in repo transactions was actively encouraged by the DB to promote 
traditional ideas in relation to the importance of fiscal rectitude (DB 2006[a], p.31-3).  
 
Under EMU, DB priorities shifted from hostility towards many market-based practices 
towards an enhanced concern for tight fiscal policy. DB research in 2003 concluded that 
under the ECBs inflation targeting regime, additional fiscal restraint may be required to 
achieve price stability than under the DBs approach of constant money growth (von 
Thadden 2003, p.28). Reducing the dependence of the financial system on sovereign debt 
was thought to diminish demand for government paper, increase market discipline in the 
sovereign bond markets, discourage government borrowing and reduce inflationary 
pressures. These new market-based policy ideas therefore became seen as a way to 
strengthen traditional ‘philosophical’ and programmatic ideas at the EU-level, representing 
as example of scenario C from table 2.2 (see below). The DBs objective of reducing reliance 
on sovereign debt as repo collateral was met with some success (figure 4.4), with only 
around 25 percent of collateral held in DB repo transactions consisting of government bonds 
by end-2004 (DB 2004[a], p.120). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
collateral were relaxed and debt denominated in any Euroarea country became accepted by the DB (DB 
2006[a], p.34). 
Market-based finance under EMU: 
 
C) new ideas in old institutions   ->  accelerate policy change 
 
 
iii) new policy ideas    -> Strengthen existing  
structures and/or  
dominant ideas 
 
 
Under the ECBs inflation targeting regime, the DB evoked new policy ideas 
aiming to expand collateral eligibility to promote traditional programmatic 
ideas. 
Illustration 4.2 
 
Figure 4.4: Collateral in DB repo operations (2004) 
  
Source: DB (2004[a]) 
 
FINANCIAL CONCERNS UNDER EMU 
How the DB viewed financial stability and reacted to potential threats to it is crucial to 
understand why market-based finance, EMU, and the eventual 2007-8 crisis affected the 
German financial system in the way it did. Due to increased financial activity in Europe100 
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 Largely facilitated by European financial integration and the rise of market-based banking. 
25% 
35% 
32% 
8% 
Deutsche Bundesbank Collateral 2004 
Government bonds
Covered bonds
(Pfandbriefe)
Uncovered bonds
Other marketable assets
and its loss of control over monetary policy, the DB began to discuss financial stability issues 
more frequently. Within its Annual Reports (Geschäftsbericht) and Financial Stability 
Reviews (Finanzstabilitätsberichte [from 2003]), the bank drew attention to some of its 
more pressing anxieties. These publications are analysed throughout this section, with the 
results in tables 4.2 and 4.3 below.  
 
Table 4.2: Areas of concern within DB Financial Stability Reviews 
 Bank 
profitability 
and 
provisionin
g 
Global 
imbalances 
Low 
growth, 
domestic 
demand & 
employmen
t 
Complex 
derivative
s & 
hedge 
funds, 
“search 
for yield” 
Exposure to 
US real 
estate  
Landesbanken
* 
 
 
(* Large 
Public Banks) 
Exposure 
to 
Spanish 
real 
estate 
Inter-bank 
markets 
2003 
   
  
  
 
2004 
       
 
2005 
      
  
2006 
  
 
  
   
2007  
 
 
  
  
 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
 
As evidenced by these reports, under EMU, the main economic and financial problems were 
considered to be a lack of investment, low growth and low financial sector profitability (DB 
2004[a], p.50). Due to these apprehensions, and the existence of DB ordo-liberal 
‘philosophical’ and non-interventionist policy ideas which discouraged interference in 
financial markets beyond the setting of a strong legal framework, the bank failed to 
establish tough regulation on securitisation and off-balance sheet activity, or to increase risk 
provisioning for banks101 (Thiemann 2012). 
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 All measures that would have been likely to produce a reduction in investment and bank profitability, but 
which were adopted by the BdE in Spain. 
Table 4.3: Areas of concern within DB Annual Reports102 
 Bank 
profitability 
and 
provisioning 
Global 
imbalances 
Low 
growth, 
domestic 
demand & 
employment 
Complex 
derivatives 
& hedge 
funds, 
“search for 
yield” 
Fiscal policy Monetary 
policy / price 
stability / 
M3 
Low credit 
growth 
and 
investment 
/ strong 
saving 
State 
bailouts 
and moral 
hazard 
Stock 
Market 
1999   
 
 
  
 
 
 
2000  
  
 
 
  
 
 
2001   
 
 
  
 
  
2002   
 
 
 
 
   
2003 
   
 
     
2004 
   
 
 
 
 
  
2005  
     
 
  
 
2006  
      
 
 
 
2007  
 
 
  
   
 
 
2008 
  
 
  
     
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
 
Although we have never been interventionist, what we knew before the crisis was 
that you need a sound and proper framework with the right incentives so that 
systemic risk does not accumulate 
(DB: interview #5, 2015) 
 
As the quote above reveals, the DB approach to financial stability centred not on 
interventionism, but on the setting of a robust legal framework which disincentivised banks 
from taking undue risk. This again helps underscore why the DB was initially so reluctant to 
encourage short-term finance, and continued to be concerned about the propagation of 
hedge funds, private equity funds and complex derivatives which it feared incentivised risk 
proliferation (DB 1999[b], p.31; 2004[c], p.40), (see tables above). 
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 Dates given are publication dates, not year under review. 
Nevertheless, German banks still proved able to amass huge amounts of risk during the pre-
crisis period. The extent to which national financial systems were impacted by the crash 
depended to a large degree on their exposure to off-balance sheet activity (Thiemann 2012, 
p.43), and that depended significantly on the pre-crisis financial ideas and policies of 
national regulators. As the quote above makes clear, despite financial liberalisation and the 
transition towards market-based banking, the DB upheld traditional non-interventionist 
policy ideas in relation to financial stability, resulting in a failure to take action on the risks 
German banks were accumulating on the asset-side of their balance sheets. 
 
In Spain, the BdE introduced ‘consolidated’103 accounting rules which limited off-balance 
sheet activity and asset-side risk (Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-Herrero 2009, p.7; Saurina 
2009[a]). Yet in Germany, no separate bookkeeping guidelines for banks were introduced 
until 2009. Instead, there was a single set of accounting regulations applied to all sectors 
equally, and considerable political opposition to splintering the overall accounting 
framework to intervene in specific areas of the economy (Thiemann 2012, p.50).  
 
As a consequence, the DB did not examine the balance sheets or business compliance of 
individual institutions (which it felt may have compromised its independence [Deeg 2001, 
p.17; Zimmermann 2014, p.488]). Instead, German supervision consisted of a legalised off-
site regulatory approach, often described as ‘self-regulation’, as the monitoring, auditing 
and enforcement of banking standards was left largely to the Banking Associations 
representing each of Germany’s three banking ‘pillars’ (Cases 1996, p.180; Deeg 2001, p.17; 
Hassan 2014; Lütz 2004, p.173; 2005, p.142). This structural diffusion of financial authority 
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 ‘Financial statements of a group in which the assets, liabilities, equity, income, expenses and cash flows of 
the parent (company) and its subsidiaries are presented as those of a single economic entity’ (IFRS 2017). 
meant the DB suffered both ideational and structural impediments to centralised 
intervention, lacking both the motivation and the means of intercession. Resultantly, from 
2004, the DB presided over a financial system in which institutions progressively wound 
down provisions in pursuit of profitability, particularly within larger German public banks 
(Landesbanken) (DB 2004[a], p.35; 2005[a], p.69). Although by 2006 the DB recognised 
provisions were ‘low’ (DB 2006[c], p.57), it failed to take action to implement countercyclical 
capital buffers.  
 
Nonetheless, despite the DB’s non-interventionist approach and support for securitisation 
and off-balance sheet activity within the Finance Ministry (Asmussen 2006; Thiemann 2012, 
p.51), the DB remained sceptical of complex risk-transfer products and the role of hedge 
funds in the financial system. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 (above) show the DB began to voice 
concerns about these issues more frequently from 2004 onwards when hedge funds 
became operable in Germany and complex securitised products became more popular. The 
banks suspicion of these instruments was due largely to its adherence to ordo-liberal 
philosophical ideas. It feared complex non-synthetic104 securitisation could create moral 
hazard by distorting market discipline and the proper functioning of the financial system (DB 
1999[b], p.31; 2004[c], p.40). If the risk of holding complex securities were opaque and 
understood better by the originator than the buyer, ‘shadow banks’ could transfer risk much 
easier than under perfect market conditions, incentivising banks to extend credit to 
questionable borrowers and threatening systemic stability. 
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 Securitisation which transfers risk from the originator to the holder of the asset. 
Figure 4.5: Securitisation and shadow banking 
 
 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
Whilst ordo-liberalism is enthusiastic about free markets, it maintains that they should 
operate within a clearly defined legal framework (Oliver 1960, p.133–134; Wörsdörfer 2010, 
p.23). Hedge funds however were seen by the DB to abuse regulatory arbitrage and distort 
market discipline (DB 2004[c], p.40). While the DB maintained a ‘bottom-up’, self-regulatory 
approach to German banks, it did not trust hedge funds in the same way, fearing they would 
fail to report their activities properly (DB 2004[b], p.28-9). Moreover, because generating 
large profits became increasingly difficult as yields became compressed under EMU, the DB 
worried hedge funds would take on unsustainable risk in specific sectors, creating pockets of 
systemic fragility (DB 2005[a], p.48). These concerns lead to hedge funds becoming 
liberalised much later in Germany than in ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries like Britain and America. It 
was not until 2003 that hedge funds became permissible (table 4.1), and even after this 
date, the DB compelled them to operate within restrictive rules concerning the 
(non-synthetic) Securitisation 
•The re-package of loans into readable assets 
•Banks hold the asset on its ballance sheet, and/or remains responsible for the performance of the 
underlying loans once the asset is sold 
•Examples include Covered bonds and some Asset Backed Securities (ABS) 
(synthetic) Securitisation 
•Created through Special Purpose Venicles (SPVs) to take assets 'off-ballance sheet' 
•Credit risk is transfered from the originator to the holder of the asset 
•Examples inclused most ABSs and Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) 
(hedge, equity, insurance, money market firms etc.) Shadow Banking 
•Like traditional banks, they conduct credit, maturity and liquidity transformation functions 
•Yet have no access to central bank liquidity or state guarantees, and operate without customer deposits 
•They generate liquidity by transforming long-term assets into money-like Asset Backed Commercial 
Paper (ABCP) through SPVs  
diversification of asset portfolios (DB 2015[c], p.40). Ideas and the banks traditional 
scepticism towards short-term finance are therefore essential to fully understand the DB’s 
attitude towards financial stability, representing another example of scenario F from the 
ideational versus structural matrix. 
 
German financial supervision under EMU: 
 
F) established ideas in old institutions  ->  sluggish policy change 
 
 
Ordo-liberal philosophical ideas and non-interventionist policy ideas 
hindered policy change and reinforced DB path-dependence towards non-
interventionist financial supervision105. 
Illustration 4.3 
 
Although larger commercial banks and Landesbanken had dealt in securitised products for 
years, before EMU, these tended to be restricted to more stable long-term sources such as 
covered bonds (Pfandbriefe) and unsecured bonds sold to individuals. While the risk of non-
payment in the covered bond market is retained by the issuer of the security and is 
therefore classed as a liability, the risk of Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) non-performance is 
usually passed on to the holder of the product and is therefore traded as a financial asset106. 
For Landesbanken in particular, investing in these products (which were often originated 
abroad [table 4.5]), was the easiest way to expand given their prohibition from competing 
too strongly with local public savings banks (Sparkassen) due to their mutual ownership 
(Ross 2014[a]), and the broader structural specificities of the German financial system: 
namely the propensity of Germans to save and the low profitability of the domestic market 
(Commission (2014[c], p.40; Hardie and Howarth 2009, p.1019).  
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 Particularly in regards to the late liberalisation of hedge funds and the maintenance of non-interventionist 
financial regulation. 
106
 In the case of synthetic ABSs. 
Consequently, German banks increased their holdings of foreign securities to a far greater 
extent than domestic instruments. By end-2003, holdings of foreign securities had grown by 
over 70 percent to nearly €1.1 trillion (Remsperger 2005, p.10). Such investment frequently 
drew on the deposits of Sparkassen107 at the expense of diverting funding from domestic 
‘parent capital’ ventures (Borges and Bayoumi 2011, p.22; DB 2006[c], p.41; OECD 2010, 
p.94).  This process intensified after 2005 (figure 4.6) as between 2001-2005, Landesbanken 
raised as much capital as they could at cheap rates prior to the expiration of their state 
liability guarantees (DB 2006[c], p.61). Once capital had been raised in the wholesale 
markets, they needed to find ways of investing the proceeds (Economist 2012[b]; Hassan 
2014), creating an explosion of cheap credit for peripheral states (Micossi 2012, p.2) and 
drastically increasing the amount of market-based assets on their balance sheets (Borges 
and Bayoumi 2011, p.23; OECD 2010, p.94).  
 
Figure 4.6: Foreign assets (€ billion) held by German banks 
 
Source: DB Data (2017) 
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 Landesbanken act as regional central banks for the Sparkassen – see following section (4.2). 
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Table 4.4: Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) 
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) 
Pools of assets that are held off-balance sheet by large financial institutions such as commercial 
banks or investment houses 
Types:  
SIVs issue commercial paper that is continuously renewed or 
rolled over to invest in longer-term assets (such as ABS and MBS) 
that have less liquidity but pay higher yields. The SIVs earn profits 
on the spread between incoming cash flows (e.g. interest 
payments on ABS) and the highly liquid commercial paper it 
issues. 
Structured Investment 
Vehicles (SIVs) 
Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper (ABCP) Conduits 
Institutions which buy debt from companies and then issue 
investors with commercial paper. The commercial paper is backed 
by the expected cash inflows from the interest on the debt. As the 
receivables are collected, the companies are expected to pass 
funds to the conduit, which then passes interest to the note 
holders. 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
Although the shadow banking system in Germany itself remained small before the crisis, 
largely due to the DBs reluctance to encourage short-term finance (Gabor 2016, p.978; 
Trampusch 2015, p.122), large commercial banks and Landesbanken began making use of 
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) in foreign locations to originate securities based on US 
mortgage debt (table 4.5) (Detzer et al. 2017, p.68). The increasingly marketised activity of 
German public banks, however, did not appear to concern the DB. The bank commented in 
2006 that Landesbanken had made notable progress towards developing new business 
models in the wake of the withdrawal of their state guarantees, which were assessed 
positively by the markets (DB 2006[c], p.10). This demonstrates the evolution of DB thought 
under EMU. While before EMU DB programmatic monetarist ideas made it wary of short-
term finance (DB 1999[a], p.82), by the 2007-8 crisis, it had become much less concerned 
about many market-based financial developments. 
 
Table 4.5: German SPV usage (2007) 
Bank Type Location Billion ($) 
Bankgesellschaft 
Berlin 
Landesbanken Delaware, US 2.1 
Bayern 
Landesbank 
Landesbanken St. Helier, New Jersey 7.4 
Commerzbank Commercial Bank Delaware, US 9.4 
Deutsche bank Commercial Bank St. Helier, Jersey 14.7 
Dresdner bank Commercial Bank George Town, Cayman 
Islands 
8 
DZ bank Cooperative  London 4 
Helaba Landesbanken Dublin, Ireland 1.9 
HSH Nordbank Commercial Bank St. Helier, New Jersey 6.9 
Hypo-Vereinsbank Commercial Bank St. Helier, New Jersey & 
Dublin, Ireland 
4 
IKB Publically owned Delaware, US 18.6 
LBBW Landesbanken Bangore, Ireland 9.1 
Sachsen 
Landesbank 
Landesbanken Dublin, Ireland 17.9 
Westdeutsche 
Landesbank 
(WestLB) 
Landesbanken Dublin, Ireland 8.4 
 
Source: Detzer et al. (2017) 
 
Indeed, although it remained wary of complex derivatives which it feared distorted market 
forces and hedge funds that it saw as operating outside conventional rules (DB 2004[c], 
p.40; 2005[a], p.48), securitisation was thought to reduce demand for sovereign debt in the 
repo markets, improve market discipline in the sovereign segment and diminish the 
likelihood of fiscal expansionism (DB 2006[a], p.31-3). Its research gradually began to see 
market-based financial systems as inherently more conducive to economic growth (Fecht et 
al. 2005), and even as more stable than hybrid bank-market-based systems (Fecht 2003).  
 
Additionally, two further concerns were highlighted consistently within DB Annual Reports 
(table 4.3): IMF calls for the creation of an ‘insurance facility’ for IMF member-states108 (DB 
2002, p.120; 2007, p.73), and; German government fiscal deficits and the consequent 
weakening of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (DB 2005[a], p.83; 2004[a], p.93). In 
parallel to the banks later opposition to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)109, the DB 
feared establishing an ‘insurance facility’ would create moral hazard by encouraging reckless 
state borrowing (DB 2002, p.120; 2005[a], p.90). In the event of IMF assistance being 
provided, the DB argued funds should be conditional upon ‘extremely strict’ reform criteria 
(DB 2003[c], p.99) and prior ‘haircuts’ (reductions in payable debt) being taken by private 
bondholders110 (DB 2002, p.119-20). These positions were formed as a direct consequence 
of ordo-liberal philosophical ideas in relation to the liability principle (Haftungsprinzip), 
which stresses that actors should bear the consequences of their own decisions (Stark 
2015). Any departure from the liability principle was thought to create moral hazard and 
distort market discipline.  
 
The bank also expressed deep concern about German government deficits and recorded its 
strong opposition to the weakening of the SGP (Zeitler 2005). The bank cited the diminution 
of the Pact as a ‘major concern’ (DB 2004[a], p.93) which constituted a violation of an 
‘inherent part’ of EMUs foundations (DB 2005[a], p.83). The DB took this stance because its 
‘programmatic’ monetarist ideas purport that sustained fiscal deficits expand the money 
supply and ultimately feeding through into higher inflation (Weidmann 2013). The bank 
therefore vehemently opposed the government’s fiscal stance prior to the crisis, just as it 
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 Automatic bailout fund called for in the wake of the Turkish and Argentinean bailouts of 2001. 
109
 A European bailout fund agreed in February 2012 in response to the European sovereign debt crisis. 
110
 Known as Private Sector Involvement, or PSI. 
supported efforts to improve market discipline in the sovereign bond markets to reduce 
fiscal expansionism. Monetarist and ordo-liberal ideas were therefore crucial in determining 
DB attitudes toward fiscal policy. 
 
SUMMARY  
This section showed how ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) philosophical ideas, orthodox 
monetarist programmatic ideas and non-interventionist policy ideas within the DB help 
account for the way Germany adapted to the onset of market-based finance, prepared for 
EMU, regulated its financial sector and explain the sorts of risks German banks accumulated 
pre-2007. It revealed how the traditional understanding of monetarism in Germany as a 
concern for monetary aggregates was the main cause of DB anxieties towards short-term 
interbank markets during the 1990s (Covil 1996; DB 1999[a], p.82; Gabor 2016, p.977). Yet 
under EMU and the ECBs inflation targeting regime, these same ideas eventually led the DB 
to call for the diversification of collateral eligibility in repo transactions as a means of 
reducing dependence on sovereign debt and promoting fiscal conservativism (DB 2006[a], 
p.31-3). These new DB policy ideas were therefore used by the bank to help strengthen 
traditional philosophical and programmatic ideas at the EU-level. 
 
Literature to date has tended to underappreciate the significance of country-specific 
regulatory measures when analysing the effects of the crisis on national financial systems 
(Thiemann 2012, p.39). This chapter redresses this failing. While under EMU, the DB 
continued to exhibit its historical mistrust of hedge funds and complex derivatives (DB 
2004[c], p.40; 2005[a], p.48), the DBs ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) inspired non-
interventionist policy ideas discouraged it from introducing countercyclical regulations (DB: 
interview #5, 2015). While Spain, for example, introduced measures to prevent the 
accumulation of risk on the asset-side of bank balance sheets (Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-
Herrero 2009, p.7; Poveda 2012, p.248), the DB took no such action. 
 
Structural factors were also important in explaining why German banks reacted to market-
based developments and the creation of EMU in the way they did. The structural low 
profitability of the German financial system and the propensity of Germans to save 
(Commission (2014[c], p.40; Hardie and Howarth 2009, p.1019), encouraged German 
institutions to rapidly expand their holdings of foreign debt (DB 2006[c], p.41; Remsperger 
2005, p.10), and for large private banks and Landesbanken to access such markets by 
creating SPVs domiciled in foreign financial jurisdictions (Detzer et al. 2017). German’s 
supervisory system also handed much responsibility to financial institutions themselves 
through the Banking Associations (Cases 1996, p.180; Deeg 2001, p.17; Hassan 2014; Lütz 
2004, p.173; 2005, p.142). Introducing a more centralised and intrusive regulatory approach 
would have incurred significant structural realignment and substantial sunk costs, thus 
reducing the ability of the DB to initiate interventionist measures. 
 
Both ideational and structural factors are therefore crucial to understand why Germany’s 
pre-crisis financial system evolved as it did, and hence HI and DI essential to improve our 
understanding of the process of institutional change through time. 
 
4.2: The German Banking System 
 
Although ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik) represents the dominant  philosophical idea 
orchestrating German’s post-war economic thinking, sections of the country’s banking 
system align more closely to Social Market preferences than pure ordo-liberalism (Smith 
2001, p.136). While liberalisation acted to weaken the traditional structure of German 
banking, prior to EMU, each sphere of Germany’s three-pillar arrangement (Bleuel 2009, 
p.2; Zimmermann 2014, p.487) performed a specific function and was strictly separated 
(Figure 4.7).  
 
In the first pillar, private commercial banks (Kreditbanken) performed investment functions 
with profit maximisation as their primary focus. Before the crisis, Germany had a sizable 
proportion of large private investment banks with global reaches and diverse asset 
portfolios (table 4.6). Many, including Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank, were particularly 
active in generating market-based assets through their foreign domiciled SPVs (table 4.5). 
 
Germany also had a very large number of cooperative banks (Raiffeisenbanken and 
Volksbanken)111. These institutions maintained societal functions and had their own central 
banks to perform clearing activities: DZ-Bank112 and WGZ-Bank113. Before the removal of the 
‘identity principle’ through the Cooperative Societies Act (Genossenschaftsgesetz, [GenG] 
2006), cooperatives could only lend to members through mutual lending and saving 
arrangements (Biasin 2010). The removal of this principle, however, ensured they became 
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 The Cooperative Financial Network currently comprises 972 local cooperative banks (Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken, 2017). 
112
 German Central Co-operative Bank (Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank). 
113
 West German Co-operative Central Bank (Westdeutsche Genossenschafts-Zentralbank) - Rhineland and 
Westphalia. 
able to lend to anyone, regardless of membership. Aside from their regional orientation and 
separate associations, cooperatives now differ little from private banks (Faltermeier 2013, 
p.18). 
 
Figure 4.7: Structure of German’s banking system 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
Table 4.6: German and Spanish banks in global top 50 (total assets, 2004) 
Bank Country World Ranking  Ownership 
Deutsche Bank AG Germany 4 Commercial 
Dresdner Bank Germany 23 Commercial 
Hypovereinsbank 
(HVB)  
Germany 24 Commercial 
Commerzbank Germany 28 Commercial 
Banco Santander  Spain 33 Commercial 
DZ Bank Germany 35 Cooperative  
Landesbank Baden-
Wuerttemberg 
Germany 38 Landesbanken 
Bayerische 
Landesbank 
Germany 40 Landesbanken 
KfW Group Germany 41 State owned 
investment 
bank 
Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya Argentaria 
(BBVA)  
Spain 45 Commercial 
NRW Bank Germany 46 Landesbanken 
WestLB Germany 50 Landesbanken 
 
Source: The Banker (2004) 
 
Figure 4.8: Structure of Germany’s financial system at the birth of EMU (1999) 
 
Source: IMF (2003) 
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Landesbanken 
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German state-
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banks. 
Small public savings banks (Sparkassen) meanwhile are committed by their municipal 
ownership to serve their local region and are obligated to help cultivate local economic, 
social and cultural development (Simpson 2013, p.12)114. They numbered 414 in 2016 (BNP 
Paribas 2016, p.4) and are administered by local authorities. They traditionally formed the 
backbone of Germany’s bank-based financial system, playing a key role in financing small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs, Mittelstand) (Steinberg and Vermeiren 2015, p.393). 
Their supervisory boards are assembled from members of the local community and are 
usually chaired by local mayors. Any taxation raised through Sparkassen goes directly to 
help fund regional budgets (Simpson 2013, p.12).  
 
Figure 4.9: Sparkassen structure 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
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 According to the Bavarian Savings Banks Directive (SpkO), Sparkassen are defined as: 
‘Independent commercial enterprises owned by municipal governments with the task (public mandate) of 
providing all elements of society and the economy, particularly German small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs - Mittelstand) and the public sector, with appropriate and sufficient financial and lending services within 
the area they serve’ (SpkO 2007). 
Ownership 
•  No shareholders  
•  Local Authorities (i.e., the city, town or district council) are the responsible public 
body 
Supervisory 
Board 
•  Representatives of the local population (customers) 
•  Employees and members of the town/city council 
•  Chairmanship is generally held by the mayor of the district authority 
Management 
Board 
•  Responsible for day-to-day operations 
•  Consists mainly of banking professionals 
•  Must have at least two qualified members 
These banks are supported by Landesbanken, which originally operated as regional central 
banks for the Sparkassen, providing them with investment and wholesale funding 
opportunities (Döring 2003, p.95). As a consequence of Germany’s post-war federal 
constitutional system, each German region (Länder) had its own Landesbanken to provide:  
 
 Support to regional lenders 
 Funding to regional governments and SMEs  
 Regional economic development  
 Subsidies for public works 
 A counter to market failure and pro-cyclicality 
 
Box 1: Example of Landesbanken Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale (NordLB) 
NordLB is almost 60 percent owned by the State of Lower Saxony, with minority stakeholders consisting of the 
State of Saxony-Anhalt and local Sparkassen. Of the 17 members of the banks supervisory board 
(Verwaltunggsrat); 5 are politicians, 4 are from Sparkassen, 3 are bank employees, 3 are from business and 2 
from trade unions. 
 
NordLB ‘Ownership’ 
 
Source: NordLB (2017), adopted with permission: https://www.nordlb.com/nordlb/about-us/portrait/  
 
 
This Social Market institutional structure meant that in exchange for providing these 
services, Landesbanken received state liability guarantees (Ayadi 2009, p.120; Dixon 2012, 
p.591), the maintenance obligation (Anstaltslast) and liability obligation 
(Gewährträgerhaftung). These ensured that in the event of default, the state would step in 
to fund the claims of creditors (Brunnermeier et.al 2004, p.24; Dixon 2012, p.591), allowing 
them to benefit from high credit ratings and low wholesale financing costs (Döring 2003, 
p.87; Smith 2001, p.127)115.  
 
However, as a consequence of the ascendancy of liberal economic and financial ideas, 
distinctions between the three-pillars of Germany’s bank-based system started to blur, 
particularly under EMU. Especially important here was the behaviour of Landesbanken, 
which began operating outside of their traditional regions, diversifying financial activity and 
competing in the same markets as private banks (Dixon 2012, p.591; Grossman 2006; Lütz 
2004; Smith 2001, p.128). As they continued to abandon their traditional business models 
by becoming heavily embroiled in foreign lending through investment in US and peripheral 
ABSs (Bleuel 2009, p.3; Sinn 1999) (see table 5 and figure 4.6 above), they became 
increasingly subjected to demands to be privatised.  
 
As early as 1992, calls were made to this effect by the German Monopolies Commission 
(Ayadi et al. 2009, p.41). The Commission argued Landesbanken state guarantees handed 
them a competitive advantage by allowing cheaper access to wholesale financing. By the 
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 Two ‘joint-liability schemes’ (Haftungsverbund) – arrangements that ensure member banks are jointly liable 
if any are threatened with liquidation –continue to cover the public banks and cooperatives (Howarth and 
Quaglia 2016, p.76; Howat and Theodore 2016, p.4). Although their main function is to avert the bankruptcy of 
member institutions, they also cover customer deposits and are recognised as statutory deposit guarantee 
arrangements (DB 2015[b], p.48). 
early 2000s, the German federal government, the Association of German Banks, the 
European Commission and DB all supported restructuring the sector (Hardie and Howarth 
2009, p.1020). Yet despite this, local governments and the public banks themselves 
successfully resisted reform efforts, demonstrating the strength of structural path-
dependence and an instance of scenario B from the ideational versus structural matrix. 
 
Landesbanken path-dependence pre-EMU: 
 
B) structures trump ideas   ->   institutional continuity 
Illustration 4.4 
 
In 2003, the IMF also joined the chorus of voices calling for a fundamental restructuring of 
the German banking system and the elimination of its three-pillar structure. It argued the 
unsatisfactorily low profitability of the German system was largely attributable to the role of 
public banks (IMF 2003). Although the DB vigorously rejected this claim (DB 2003[b], p.43), 
it did accept IMF recommendations that changes should be made to the corporate structure 
of Landesbanken. The DB maintained that whilst reforms were: 
 
Unlikely to involve a complete change from public to private ownership in the 
foreseeable future… Greater transparency and a better corporate governance 
structure are generally desirable at public sector institutions… Possible approaches 
include revising the statutory regulations… with a view to reducing the scope for 
political influence, [and] introducing a quota system for board membership 
according to interest groups 
(DB 2003[b], p.45-6) 
 
The DB was particularly keen to weaken the link between the state and Landesbanken. In 
2001, it was still expressing concern that regional (Länder) deficits were too high, 
particularly in the new Eastern (Flächenländer) territories (DB 2001[b], p.57). The political 
connections between Landesbanken and regional politicians were therefore opposed by the 
bank for traditional ideational reasons concerning ordo-liberalism’s unease with state 
ownership and intervention, but also for the same reason it favoured securitisation as a 
means of reinforcing market discipline in the bond markets (DB 2006[a], p.31-3): because it 
was concerned about fiscal expansionism and its effect on price stability (DB 2005[a], p.83; 
2004[a], p.93).  
 
The political links to Landesbanken made it easier for local governments to borrow by 
issuing regional bonds (Schuldscheine). Part of the Landesbanken’s public mandate required 
them to lend cheaply to local government to help finance social projects116 (IMF 2003, p.3). 
Although Landesbank domination in the field of local government lending began to wane 
under EMU as the three-pillar structure started to weaken117, public banks still provided the 
bulk of lending to regional administrations before the crisis (figures 4.10 and 4.11). By 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Lending to German local government 
 
                                                          
116
 This effectively made Landesbanken the central banks of Länder governments (Johnson 1998, p.45). 
117
 Figure 4.10 shows a notable drop in lending to local government after the expiration of public guarantees in 
2005. 
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Figure 4.11: Lending to German local government (% of total assets, 1999) 
 
Source: DB Datasets (2016) 
 
weakening the link between politicians and Landesbanken, the DB sought prevent loose 
fiscal policy at the Länder level and reduce threats to price stability. 
 
Interviews conducted for this research also suggest a deep distrust of politicised banking 
within the ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) Finance and Economics Ministries. Yet despite the 
desire for reform and the liberalisation that German finance has undergone, the essential 
structure of the public banking system remains and path-dependence has been largely 
preserved. Therefore although ideas are crucial to comprehend the motivation behind the 
desire for change at the federal level, path-dependence and political vested interests are 
also  essential to understand structural resistance at the regional level: 
 
I see frankly no signal to reform Landesbanken because they are so stable, 
because politicians are sitting there. On the municipalities side you have a certain 
director from one of the big two parties and the big two parties are managing 
certain things at the Länder level. When you need money for a big project it’s 
much easier to go to a savings bank.  To be blunt, it’s not a typical German thing 
0
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6
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Local Government Lending: 
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what’s going on here. In industry we have a total open market economy, but in 
the banking sector we have a state approach, more or less. 
 
(German Finance Ministry, interview #12, 2015) 
 
This ‘state approach’, however, is often strongly defended by the political left and regional 
(Länder) governments (Hardie and Howarth 2013[b], p.108; Smith 2001, p.120). Regional 
politicians have sought to protect their financial patronage networks surrounding the public-
banking system which provides positions of privilege for local officials (Behn et al. 2014; 
Ewing 2010; Lütz 2004, p.188). Politicians are able to use these banks as tools to further 
political objectives (Döring 2003, p.97; Münchau 2016) and hence oppose calls which would 
see a dissipation of their authority and influence. As a result, federal administrations have 
been unable to push through meaningful change.  
 
By examining ideas, this research reveals the extent of the Federal aversion to politicised 
banking and the importance of ideational factors in forming financial policies and attitudes 
towards specific sectors (DB 2003[b], p.45-6; German Economics Ministry: interview #11, 
2015; German Finance Ministry: interview #12, 2015). But the example of the Landesbanken 
also reveals that when political vested interests are instituted within a polity and oppose 
change, even ideas advanced by central government cannot override them. Appreciation of 
both ideational and structural factors is therefore crucial to fully understand the evolution 
of German finance.  
 
Critical Case Study: BayernLB 
 
See Appendix I 
EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
In the late 1990s, private European banks also began to question the system of 
Landesbanken state guarantees. In 1999, the European Banking Federation filed a complaint 
with the EU Commission, which ruled in 2001 that state obligations be phased out by 2005 
(Commission 2002; Lütz 2005, p.143). In 2004, the Commission also concluded an 
investigation into the provision of state aid to Landesbanken. It ordered the German state to 
recover €3 billion it had loaned to Landesbanken via federal state deposits at below market 
rates (Commission 2005; DB 2005[b], p.72). Given the close relationship between politicians 
and Landesbanken, it seems unlikely that any reform efforts would have been possible 
without such external intervention (Smith 2001, p.136). 
 
Moreover, even the Commission’s intercession did not fundamentally alter the structure of 
German public banks and failed to remove state guarantees entirely. Regional (Länder) 
governments remain the ultimate owner of Landesbanken, so public support could still be 
forthcoming in the event of a crisis (as occurred post-2007). Guarantees were also made 
explicitly permissible, provided any financing the state delivers is remunerated at market 
rates, and Landesbanken continued to stand behind the Sparkassen due of their joint 
liability protection scheme (Brunnermeier et.al 2004, p.24)118. Consequently, this represents 
an illustration of scenario B from the matrix displayed in chapter 2 (table 2.2). 
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 This national path-dependence in the face of European reform efforts also demonstrates the limits of 
literature concerning ‘Europeanisation’, which seeks to explain European convergence amongst EU member-
states (see Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). 
Landesbanken path-dependence under EMU: 
 
B) structures trump ideas   ->   institutional continuity 
 
 
Path-dependence is particularly strong when political vested interests seek 
to maintain institutional continuity. 
Illustration 4.5 
 
SUMMARY 
This section provided an overview of the structural makeup of the German financial system 
which before EMU was widely regarded as a traditional bank-based system (Dixon 2012). It 
showed that its established three-pillar structure became weakened throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s as banks within each group became progressively marketised and able to offer 
similar financial services. This generated particular resentment towards Landesbanken 
which, before 2004, were able to borrow cheaply on wholesale markets and undercut 
competitors due to their state guarantees (Ayadi et al. 2009, p.41; Hardie and Howarth 
2009, p.1020).  
 
The DB, Federal Finance and Economics Ministries were each inherently distrustful of 
political involvement in financial institutions (German Economics Ministry: interview #11, 
2015; German Finance Ministry: interview #12, 2015), with the DB holding Landesbanken 
partly responsible for Länder fiscal deficits which they believed could ultimately threaten 
price stability (DB 2004[a], p.93; 2005[a], p.83). Owing to these philosophical ordo-liberal 
and programmatic monetarist ideas, federal institutions wished to sever the links between 
Landesbanken and regional politicians.  Ideas are therefore fundamental to properly 
understand the motivations behind the DBs public banking concerns. Yet to comprehend 
why the DB and the rest of the German federal state apparatus failed to implement 
significant reform, structural explanations are also required.  
 
Insights from HI better account for how the vested interests of politicians who benefited 
from close relationships with public banks were able to maintain institutional continuity 
(Behn et al. 2014; Ewing 2010; Lütz 2004, p.188). Only the external intervention of the EU 
Commission managed to push through some limited changes, demonstrating the strength of 
institutional path-dependence. Therefore while DI insights reveal the influence of traditional 
ideas within German’s central state architecture, HI concepts prevailed in this instance, 
largely due to Germany’s decentralised, federal financial structure.  
 
4.3: Liberalisation and Financial Supervision in Spain 
 
Throughout the Franco period, the Spanish financial system was governed by the Ministry of 
Finance which had virtually complete control over finance and monetary policy. Between 
1946–1959, the BdE was merely an accessory to the Finance Ministry, only becoming the 
official central bank in 1962 when it was nationalised and gained responsibility for 
implementing monetary policy (BdE 2013[a], p.13; Lukauskas 1997, p.77). As Spain entered 
the democratic era in the late 1970s, the BdE gradually attained greater influence and 
authority. The 1980 Law of the Governing Bodies of the Bank of Spain (Ley de Organos 
Rectores del Banco de España) handed almost all responsibility for banking supervision and 
accounting regulation to the BdE, which also gained greater political autonomy from the 
Finance Ministry (Martín-Aceña et al. 2014, p.64). The bank was eventually handed full 
independence in 1994 and joined the Eurosystem in 1999. Using process tracing, this section 
uncovers key themes and events which took place during this transition, and ascertains the 
ideational and structural factors behind Spain’s conversion to a more liberal, market-based 
financial system. 
 
Chapter 2 described how Spain was exposed to ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) ideas during 
the 1940s119. Over time, these ideas became more neo-liberal in nature and predominated 
within the BdE and Finance Ministry (Tortella and Garcia-Ruiz 2013, p.150). The greater 
freedom and authority handed to the BdE therefore helped spur the process of liberalisation 
in Spain, exemplifying an instance of scenario E from the matrix displayed in table 2.2 (see 
illustration 4.6 below). This was aided principally by the BdE’s Research Service which began 
exporting its neo-liberal and idiosyncratic monetarist thinking to a wider audience 
(Lukauskas 1994; Pérez 1997[a]). 
 
This process intensified during the 1970s, culminating with the Pactos de la Moncloa in 1977 
which introduced market principles to the Spanish economy (Ban 2016, p.39; Pérez 
1997[a]). For Spain, creating a more liberal system based on market forces rather than 
central command and clientalism was a huge undertaking (Lukauskas 1997, p.125; Pérez 
1997[b], p.136). While Spain is still described in the literature as a ‘state-influenced’ or 
‘mixed-market’ economy (Molina and Rhodes 2007; Schmidt 2007), gradually, driven by the 
liberal reformist agenda within the BdE and Finance Ministry (Ban 2016; Brias 2002; 
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 The German economist, Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg, took up a teaching position in Madrid during the 
1940s and amassed a large following. The intellectual decedents of this movement went on to claim positions 
of power and influence in the Franco government during the 1950s and 1960s (Ban 2016, p.109). 
Lukauskas 1997, p.97-8), the Spanish economy transitioned from one of centralised control 
towards a more open, liberal system.  
 
Liberalisation and market-based finance, post-Franco: 
 
E) new ideas in new institutions  ->   rapid policy change 
 
 
The newly influential BdE (1960s>) became infused with new neo-liberal 
‘philosophical’ and ‘programmatic’ monetarist ideas, sparking rapid policy 
change. 
Illustration 4.6 
 
 
Table 4.7: Important statutory financial liberalisation in Spain 
1977 Pactos de la Moncloa Introduced market economics to the country. 
Price caps and compulsory investments 
(coeficientes de inversión obligatoria) were 
gradually eliminated 
1980 The Law of Governing Bodies of 
the Bank of Spain 
Transferred all responsibilities for bank 
supervision, discipline and sanctions to the 
BdE. Also granted additional autonomy from 
the Finance Ministry 
1981 Regulation of the mortgage 
market (Law 2/1981)  
Regulated the Covered Bond market for the 
first time 
1986 Liberalization of capital 
movements (implemented 
1992) 
Implementation of EU Directive 88/361/EEC 
1988 Securities Market Law (24/1988) Numerous provisions governing the securities 
market, including ownership in repo 
transactions 
1992 Securitisation Law (Law 
19/1992) 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) become 
legally tradable, permitting ‘off-balance sheet’ 
securitisation for mortgage-backed assets 
1994 Autonomy of the Bank of Spain 
(Law 13/1994) 
Gave the BdE full independence and a 
mandate for price stability, as required by 
EMU 
1998 Royal Decree (Law 926/1998) Other ABSs [other than MBSs] become 
permissible and tradable ‘off-balance sheet’ 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
Throughout the 1970s, BdE Governor Mariano Rubio, and Director of Research Services, Luis 
Angel Rojo, crafted the banks Research Service into the country’s premier economic 
research institution (Lluch 1990, p.3). Rojo himself even wrote a book, The New Monetarism 
(1971), in which he strongly criticised the Keynesian economic consensus of the time. 
Importantly though, Rojo’s thinking deviated from German monetarism through his belief 
that inflation was created not just by money supply growth, but by other factors too, such 
as excess demand in the labour market. He and the Research Service also failed to dismiss 
the value of countercyclical macroeconomic interventions which traditional monetarism 
thought harmful (Ban 2016, p.46). These programmatic Spain-specific monetary ideas laid 
the foundation for future interventionist, countercyclical financial policy ideas at the bank, 
and contrasted with German ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) inspired ideas which aimed only 
to set a strong legal framework whilst limiting intervention to the manipulation of interest 
rates (Bibow 2017; Dyson and Marcussen 2009, p.141; Economist 2015). 
 
Figure 4.12 below illustrates the interplay between the three levels of ideas (Schmidt 2014; 
2008) and how they relate to Spanish finance. Neo-liberal philosophical ideas helped create 
a liberalising zeal within the BdE, leading to a rejection of programmatic  
Keynesian demand-stimulus policies and their replacement with an idiosyncratic Spanish 
monetarism more open to countercyclical state intervention (Ban 2016).  This fed through 
to the deployment of interventionist policy ideas in relation to financial stability which 
helped establish a ‘top-down’ supervisory approach with countercyclical accounting 
methods introduced from the centre (BdE 2001; Pérez 1997[b]). In this respect, BdE neo-
liberalism also differed from traditional neo-liberalism as it implicitly recognised that 
markets are capable of acting inefficiently. These ideational characteristics are vital in 
explaining how the BdE facilitated financial liberalisation, the approach it adopted towards 
financial supervision, and why Spanish financial institutions consequently reacted in the way 
they did to the growth of market-based finance and the commencement of EMU. 
 
Figure 4.12: Spanish financial ideas 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
Spain began targeting the M3 monetary aggregate in 1973120. However, due to the 
combined impact of the international oil crisis, a domestic banking crisis and growing wage 
pressures, controlling the money supply became increasingly difficult. As a result, the BdE 
transitioned away from monetary targeting during the 1980s towards manipulating short-
term interest rates in the pursuit of low inflation (Goerlich et al. 1995; Lukauskas 1997, 
p.205). In 1984 it started targeting a broader measure, the total liquidity of public assets 
(‘ALP’), then in 1989 when Spain joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), it 
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 15 years before the DB began targeting the same measure in Germany. 
Philosophical Idea: 
Neo-liberalism 
Preference for stable prices over demand 
stimlus, and liberalisation over state control 
Programatic Idea: 
(Spanish) Monetarism 
Concern for inflation over monetary 
aggregates; open to narrow countercyclical 
policies & regulation  
 
Financial Policy Idea: 
Interventionism 
On-site supervision, macro-prudential policy, 
liberal economic and financial policies 
effectively abandoned targeting monetary aggregates altogether to peg the exchange rate. 
In 1994, Spain became only the seventh country in the world to officially ditch monetary 
targeting in favour of inflation steering (Debelle 1997) and the distinct monetarist ideas of 
the Research Service were crucial in facilitating this transition. 
 
Figure 4.13: Evolution of Spanish monetary policy 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
These ideas also had important implications for financial policy. Before 1987, the BdE forced 
banks to hold sovereign debt in mandatory public debt coefficients. After this date, Spain 
abandoned this approach and begun organising sovereign debt auctions. To ensure its 
bonds were purchased at a reasonable price, it instituted a system in which ‘market-makers’ 
(creadores de mercado or ‘primary dealers’) were given privileged access at auctions, as long 
as they agreed to attend regularly and established debt placement targets with the Treasury 
and Financial Policy Directorate (Pellicer 1992, p.86). This began informally at first, but was 
implemented officially in July 1991. 
 
Due to BdE concern for inflation over monetary aggregates, well-functioning, liquid 
interbank repo markets were seen as advantageous to the smooth transmission of 
monetary policy (Malo de Molina 2012, p.192). This contrasted to the DB approach which 
saw the expansion of interbank liquidity as detrimental to the provision of monetary targets 
1973: BdE begins 
targeting M3 
1984: BdE targets 
'ALP'  
1989: Spain joints 
ERM  
(abandoning 
monetary aggregates) 
1994: BdE officially 
begins inflation 
tageting 
(Covil 1996; Gabor 2016, p.977). Therefore while the DB was reluctant to initiate regular 
public debt auctions and encourage short-term borrowing by introducing short-term 
Treasury Bills (Gabor 2016, p.977; McCauley 1999, p.4)121, the BdE took the opposite view, 
embracing market-based financial developments. 
 
Spain liberalised and removed interest rate controls from its interbank market in 1969 
(Lukauskas 1997, p.111) and developed a functional repo market relatively early by global 
standards (World Bank 2010, p.24). Collateral for repos was initially restricted to high quality 
public paper, which often led to collateral shortages when the Spanish currency (the peseta) 
reduced in value (Cabrero et al. 1997, p.31-2). To combat this, as early as 1973 the Treasury 
began producing three-month Treasury Bills (with no specific budgetary purpose) with the 
aim of facilitating a better functioning interbank market (Pellicer 1995, p.36). The BdE 
maintained a daily presence in these markets, using repo operations to inject and drain off 
liquidity (Cabrero et al. 1997, p.14). These procedures were seen as crucial to facilitating a 
functioning interest rate transmission mechanism (Pellicer 1995, p.39), and the Securities 
Markets Law (24/1988) explicitly set out ownership rights in relation to repo collateral 
practices to support this process (Law 24/1988, Art.36).  
 
In 1990, the BdE also began recording direct accounts for repos and from 1991, non-
residents were no longer forced to pay tax on Spanish bond yields, leading to a sharp 
increase in external demand (Malo de Molina 2012, p.198). The contrast between BdE and 
DB attitudes and practices towards the interbank and short-term debt markets prior to EMU 
could hardly be starker, and distinctions between their interpretations of monetarist 
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 The DB failed to initiate its own primary dealer system until 1998 (DB 2002, p.154). 
programmatic ideas are crucial to understanding this dichotomy. Illustration 4.7 shows how 
these events correspond to scenario C from the matrix displayed in chapter 2. 
 
Spain’s transition to market-based banking: 
 
C) new ideas in old institutions                ->  accelerate policy change 
 
 
iii) new policy ideas   -> strengthen existing structures  
and/or dominant ideas 
 
 
New market-based policy ideas strengthened BdE programmatic monetarist ideas, 
helping facilitate inflation targeting.  
Illustration 4.7 
 
Differences between the two NCBs also existed with regards to bank supervision. Although 
the BdE pursued a philosophical neo-liberal agenda in terms of its liberalising zeal and 
rejection of Keynesian monetary policy (Ban 2016; Rojo 1971), it maintained a more 
interventionist set of policy ideas in relation to financial supervision (BdE 2001; Pérez 
1997[b]), which linked to its specific interpretation of monetarism (Ban 2016). While the DB 
favoured a ‘hands-off’, self-regulatory approach (Deeg 2001, p.17; Lütz 2004, p.173; 2005, 
p.142), the BdE preferred to nurture close relationships with institutions under its 
supervision, maintaining on-site inspections and requiring banks to submit large amounts of 
confidential material (BdE 2001, p.70 and 76).   
 
In 1993, the BdE even took full control of Banesto bank and replaced its directors when an 
audit revealed an over valuation of assets (Pérez 1997[b], p.161; Poveda 2012, p.251). This 
was possible not only because of ideational dissimilarities, but also structural differences. 
Unlike the DB, the BdE acted as the accounting regulator for Spanish banks as well as their 
supervisor (Saurina 2009[a]; Thiemann 2012, p.39). This differentiated Spain’s supervisory 
framework from the abstracted legalistic approach adopted in countries like Britain and 
Germany and permitted the BdE a much greater role in financial stability policy (Cioffi 2006, 
p.539; Lütz 2004, p.173; Royo 2013[a], p.647). 
 
In September 2001, two years before the DB and three years before the ECB, the BdE 
launched a bi-annual financial stability publication (Estabilidad Financiera), in addition to its 
Annual Review (Informe Annual), outlining areas of potential concern. These publications 
are analysed throughout this section, with the results outlined in tables 4.8 and 4.9 below.  
 
Table 4.8: Main concerns highlighted in BdE Financial Stability Reviews 
 Low 
interest 
rates, 
credit 
growth & 
inflation 
Housing 
Market 
Securitisation122  
replacing 
deposits, 
increasing risk 
appetite & 
opacity 
Bank 
Internationalisation 
(foreign exposure) 
Inter-bank 
borrowing: 
more 
expensive 
than deposits 
& liquidity risk 
Global 
financial 
Imbalances 
Caja 
(un)profitability 
& exposure to 
doubtful assets 
Stock 
Market 
Nov 
2002  
  
 
   
 
May 
2003   
 
 
  
  
Nov 
2003    
  
  
 
May 
2004   
  
 
   
Nov 
2004    
 
 
   
May 
2005 
 
  
 
 
   
Nov 
2005 
 
 
   
  
 
May 
2006   
   
 
  
Nov 
2006   
   
  
 
May 
2007  
    
 
  
Nov 
2007 
  
 
  
 
  
May 
2008 
 
  
 
  
  
 
Source: Author (2018) 
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 Including covered bonds (cédulas hipotecarias). 
Table 4.9: Main financial concerns highlighted in BdE Annual Reports123 
 Low 
interest 
rates, 
credit 
growth & 
inflation 
Housing 
Market 
Securitisation124  
replacing 
deposits, 
increasing risk 
appetite & 
opacity 
Bank 
Internationalisation 
(foreign exposure) 
Inter-bank 
borrowing: 
more 
expensive 
than deposits 
& liquidity risk 
Global 
financial 
Imbalances 
National loss of 
Competitiveness 
& Productivity 
Government 
bond 
markets 
1999 
 
 
   
 
  
2000 
 
   
 
 
 
 
2001 
  
 
 
  
  
2002 
  
 
 
  
 
 
2003 
  
    
 
 
2004 
  
   
   
2005 
  
  
   
 
2006 
  
   
  
 
2007 
 
    
 
  
2008 
 
    
 
  
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
True to its ‘programmatic’ ideational stance, the majority of issues concerning the BdE 
throughout the pre-crisis period related to the historically low interest rates Spain 
experienced as a result of euro membership, leading to inflation running higher than the 
Eurozone average (figure 4.14). Despite Spain’s strong economic expansion, this 
phenomenon reduced Spain’s competitiveness and prejudiced productivity growth, which 
continued to increase at an inferior rate to its European competitors (figure 4.15). These 
problems were highlighted in every Annual Report from the first issue (1999) to the final 
edition before the crisis in 2007. 
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 Dates given are publication dates, not year under review. 
124
 Including covered bonds (cédulas hipotecarias). 
Figure 4.14: CPI Inflation (1999-2007) 
 
Source: OECD Datasets 
 
Figure 4.15: Productivity Growth (GDP per hours worked, 2010 = 100) 
  
Source: OECD Datasets 
 
 
The other major problem highlighted consistently throughout EMU was the issue of Spain’s 
housing market. From 2001-2006 the bank worried increasingly about the unsustainable 
nature of Spain’s property bubble, noting regular double digit price increases. In contrast to 
Germany which witnessed house price deflation under EMU (Ahearne et al. 2005, p.13), 
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between 1997-2007, Spain’s housing stock grew by almost 30 percent, while property prices 
rose 191 percent125 (Royo 2013[c], p.14). 
 
The BdE held EMUs low interest rate environment largely responsible for this phenomenon, 
coupled with domestic banks willingness to securitise mortgage loans to finance Spain’s net 
borrowing position (BdE 2006[b], p.32; Cardenas 2013, p.7; De Barron 2011). By end-2005, 
non-residents held 73 percent of Spanish securitisations, against 40 percent in 2001 (BdE 
2006[b], p.149), meaning that the Spanish financial system had become deeply interwoven 
with the rest of the Eurozone, and with Germany in particular: 
 
The way in which we [Spain] benefited from financial liberalisation was though 
the securitisation of Spanish mortgages, sold to German banks.  It was money in 
Germany that came to Spain in search of yield that created this housing bubble… 
It was completely reliant on the expansion of credit, and the expansion of credit 
was external credit 
(BdE, interview #6, 2015) 
 
As the quote above reveals, thanks to the ‘benign neglect’ of German and EU supervisors, 
many German financial institutions purchased large quantities of Spanish debt on the 
wholesale markets, compiling risk on the asset-side (Sinn 2014, p.92). Yet there was also 
another factor encouraging this phenomenon. Whilst non-Spanish banks use of repos 
increased dramatically under EMU, despite BdE repo market liberalisation, this trend did not 
extend to Spain (table 4.10) (BdE 2006[b], p.157).  
 
This was partly because (unlike in Germany) the main assets used as repo collateral 
(sovereign bonds) were not being generated by the Spanish state due to net fiscal surpluses 
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 BdE researchers estimated that house prices had become 20 percent overvalued by 2002 (Ayuso and Restoy 
2003). 
from mid-2004 which were used to offset rapid increases in household and corporate debt 
(BdE 2006[b], p.29). Indeed, despite the rest of the Eurozone compiling ever larger public 
deficits under EMU, Spain exhibited a ‘Spartan-like’ resistance to fiscal exuberance (Sinn 
2014, p.57). Figure 4.16 contrasts government borrowing in Germany, which exceeded rules 
laid down in the SGP, with the surpluses recorded in Spain during the same period. 
 
Table 4.10: Spanish repo business 
 Spain 
 Interbank 
liabilities 
minus 
assets (% 
of GDP) 
Total 
interbank 
liabilities 
(% GDP) 
Total 
interbank 
assets 
(% GDP) 
2007  2.5 6.7 4.2 
2006  -2.8 0.6 3.4 
2005  4.0 7.2 3.2 
2004  4.3 5 0.7 
2003  4.8 5.3 0.5 
2002  0.8 3.1 2.3 
 
Source: BdE (2007) 
 
Figure 4.16: Spanish vs German net government borrowing under EMU 
 
Source: OECD Data 
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This encouraged Spanish banks to obtain liquidity by selling Mortgage-Backed Securities 
(MBSs) (figure 4.17) – which became popular due to their favourable risk-weighting within 
the Basel II framework126 (ECB 2005[c], p.25) – rather than through the repo markets. It also 
resulted in Spanish sovereign bonds having a minimal presence in the repo markets and 
therefore becoming less well regarded than German bonds. This is important for 
understanding why German government debt became so highly prized in the repo markets 
while Spanish bonds did not. It also ultimately explains why Germany was able to continue 
borrowing in the aftermath of the 2007-8 crisis whereas Spain was forced to seek EU 
assistance.  
 
Figure 4.17: Spanish securitisation by underlying asset (€ millions) 
 
Source: Millán, I., Securitization in Spain: Past developments and expected future trends. 
  BBVA Research (2014, p.5). Re-published with permissions. 
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 Basel II (2004) was the second international financial regulatory standard framework agreed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BSBS). It required financial institutions to maintain a percentage of assets 
on their books to cover risks incurred by operations. It applied risk-weights to financial assets used as reserves 
by banks, depending on their perceived level of risk. 
A further factor encouraging Spanish securitisation was the US Federal Reserve’s lowering of 
collateral standards for repos in 1999 which increased demand for ABS across the globe127. 
The Fed believed that, as a consequence of tight US fiscal policy, the system would no 
longer contain enough US government paper to implement monetary policy through Open 
Market Operations (Gabor 2016, p.982). The lack of government borrowing in countries like 
the US and Spain therefore forced central banks to look beyond sovereign bonds as repo 
collateral, spiking demand for ABS (Gabor 2016) and helping to turbo-charge Spain’s housing 
boom. 
 
Spanish banks generally did not generate ABSs to redistribute risk128, but to raise funds to 
facilitate lending at a time when deposits failed to keep pace with demand for credit (BdE 
2005[a], p.43; 2006[a], p.30).  In the case of Spanish covered bonds (cédulas hipotecarias) 
and most Spanish ABSs (particularly those originated by cajas [BdE 2005[a], p.45]), the 
originator of the security upheld management of the loans making up the asset129. While 
this allowed Spanish banks to maintain strong commercial relationships with their 
customers, it also meant the risk of non-performance largely remained on-balance sheet 
(BdE 2003[b], p.15; 2004[a], p.26), particularly after 2004 when accounting rules were 
amended130 to ensure securitisations continued to be recognised where risk was not 
transferred (BdE 2005[a], p.30131).  
 
                                                          
127
 This is particularly in Europe after the EUs Financial Collateral Directive (2002) lowered collateral 
requirements for European banks seeking liquidity from the ECB. 
128
 This differentiated Spanish securitisation from the ‘originate to distribute’ model of found in other 
jurisdictions. 
129
 In 2006, three-quarters of the assets securitised by Spanish deposit institutions were ‘non-synthetic’ and 
remained on balance sheet (BdE 2006[a], p.31). 
130
 Banco de España Circular 4/2004. 
131
 Banco de Espana (2004). Circular 2004: Credit Institutions, Public and Confidential Financial Reporting Rules 
and Formats (English Version). Madrid: Banco de España, pp.55. 
The BdE therefore recognised Spain’s financial conditions were particularly sensitive to 
developments in the real estate sector through external demand for ABSs (BdE 2006[b], 
p.149). In a bid to curtail this dependence and prevent excessive lending, the BdE 
strengthened its financial regulations in 2003 (Law 19/2003) by ruling that financial 
institutions with significant exposure to ABS would be regulated on a ‘consolidated’ basis, 
meaning all the assets of sister companies and SPVs pertaining to umbrella banking groups 
would fall under Spanish capital requirements132 (Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-Herrero 2009, 
p.7).  
 
This style of regulation was originally introduced in 1985, but the legislation contained no 
mention of investment services firms as they were only permitted in Spain after the 
introduction of the securities market reform law (Law 24/1988) (Poveda 2012, p.248). In 
1992 rules were strengthened further to ensure mixed groups (e.g., banking and insurance) 
were subject to duel capital requirements as a banking group and a mixed group. These 
rules attempted to deal with complex financial conglomerates 10 years before the EU 
attempted to do likewise and fell squarely in line with BdE programmatic and interventionist 
policy ideas. 
 
The 2003 amendments aimed to address the fact Spanish banks were becoming increasingly 
dependent on shadow banking and the production of synthetic securitisations (BdE 2006[b], 
p.149; Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-Herrero 2009). While German banks often used SPVs to 
originate US and peripheral MBSs, in Spain, these securities were mainly structured around 
domestic mortgage loans (BdE 2006[b], p.149). The new regulations forced Spanish ‘shadow 
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 This measure was strongly resisted by Spain’s large private banks which feared the move would reduce 
profitability (Tett 2008). 
banks’133 to become integrated within their parent commercial banks (or simply to become 
unviable), by ensuring capital buffers became applied to both activities jointly (Brañanova 
2012, p.3). This drastically curtailed off-balance sheet securitisation in Spain, which by 2007 
had reduced to around only 6-7 percent of total securitisation in the country.  
 
Such activity that did then occur tended to take the form of simple ‘plain vanilla’ 
instruments (Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-Herrero 2009), far less opaque than more 
complex derivatives (Ordóñez 2011). These accounting changes, informed by BdE 
interventionist policy ideas, were crucial to curtailing the shadow banking industry in Spain 
and in sheltering the country from the initial stages of the crisis. These ideas helped 
maintain structural continuity in Spain and shows how combining insights from DI and HI 
together can improve understanding of institutional development: 
 
Spanish interventionist financial regulation: 
 
C) new ideas in old institutions ->  accelerate policy change 
 
 
iii) new policy ideas   -> strengthen existing structures  
and/or dominant ideas 
 
 
New financial policy ideas strengthened BdE programmatic ideas and the 
existing institutional framework. 
Illustration 4.8 
 
In 2000 the BdE also established a new framework for provisions, requiring banks to set 
aside additional capital against default. A lack of provisioning was one the key factors 
behind previous banking crises in Spain (Lukauskas 1997, p.167), and the positive economic 
environment in the country saw a significant reduction in nonperforming loans (NPLs). This 
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 Referred to as Specialised Credit Institutions (SCIs) by the BdE (BdE 2004[b], p.52) 
resulted in Spain having the lowest ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans in the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) by 1999 (Saurina 2009[a], 
p.1-2). To tackle this, the BdE became the only major central bank in the world to enforce 
countercyclical ‘dynamic’ or ‘statistical’ provisions before the crash (Fernandez de Lis and 
Garcia-Herrero 2009; Jiménez et al. 2012).  
 
These measures took effect from July 2000 (Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-Herrero 2009, p.7; 
Saurina 2009[a]) and forced lenders to build up an additional €40 billion safety net to guard 
against future loss, costing banks around 10 percent of their net operating income (Saurina 
2009[a]). The policy was hence not only intended to mitigate bad times, but also to cool 
lending at a time when the country was experiencing low real interest rates and strong 
credit growth (BdE 2001, p.43; 2013[b]; Fernández de Lis et al. 2000). 
 
Table 4.11: Original statistical provisions (2000) 
Months in 
Default 
3-6 6-12 12-18 18-21 21+ 
Provision: % 
of loan 
10 25 50 75 100 
 
Source: BdE Circular 9/1999 
 
Whilst other central banks and central bank governors were arguing macro-prudential 
regulation134 (MPR) could do harm to a nation’s economic prospects (Bernanke 2002; 
Duisenberg 2003; Greenspan 2002), and German banks were winding down provisions, the 
BdE, driven by policy ideas derived from its idiosyncratic interpretation of monetarism, was 
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 Defined by the IMF as the use of primarily counter-cyclical prudential (bank capital) tools to limit overall 
systemic risk (IMF 2013, p.6). 
convinced implementing countercyclical regulations in the face of sustained credit growth 
could prove invaluable (Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016, p.27). Indeed, prior to the crisis, it cited 
pro-cyclicality as one of the biggest threats to long-term financial stability (BdE 2004[b], 
p.34-5).  
 
Implementing dynamic provisioning, however, was politically difficult and was criticised 
both by the Spanish banking sector as well as the EU and faced stiff opposition from 
politicians (De Barron 2011). In 2004, the BdE was forced to revise the system in response to 
the EUs adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (BdE 2005[c], p.13; Saurina 
2009[a], p.2), ensuring that although other MPR measures were floated by BdE officials, no 
further policies were implemented: 
 
There were discussions about using some [additional] macro-prudential measures 
like cutting LTV135 ratios, but it was very difficult given the political and economic 
situation at the time 
(BdE: interview #6, 2015) 
 
 
While the BdE expressed concern about securitisation and lending to the construction 
sector (BdE 2005[a], p.43; 2004[a], p.23), Spanish banks maintained very low exposures to 
hedge and private equity firms (BdE 2005[a], p.58), and repo market borrowing also 
remained low136 (BdE 2007[b], p.129). Consequently, when issues began to surface in the US 
sub-prime market in 2007, the BdE was confident of escaping the problems due to the low 
investment of Spanish banks in such assets, the almost non-existent Spanish shadow 
banking industry (BdE 2007[a], p.15-19; 2008, p.11), and the high quality of Spanish 
securities (BdE 2007[a], p.31). Yet despite all this, and the interventionist policies which 
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 Loan-To-Value Ratios: limiting the amount individuals can borrow depending on the equity they can raise. 
136
 In stark contrast to other EU states, Spanish interbank borrowing even saw negative growth during 2006 
(table 4.10). 
helped delay the crisis in Spain, the BdE was ultimately unable to prevent the country 
suffering a catastrophic banking crisis. 
 
Figure 4.18: BdE measures to slow credit growth 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
SUMMARY 
The BdE and its Research Service subscribed to a distinct set of ideational preferences which 
framed their policy goals and objectives. Their neo-liberal philosophical ideas helped shape 
Spain’s transition from an economy based on central control and clientalism to one based 
predominantly on liberal market forces (Ban 2016; Lluch 1990; Lukauskas 1997, p.97). The 
BdE’s distinct interpretation of programmatic monetarist ideas also facilitated Spain’s early 
shift from a monetary policy based on targeting monetary aggregates to one built on 
controlling inflation. By using process tracing, this section showed how important ideas 
were be in delivering substantive institutional change both within the BdE itself, and the 
Spanish economy more broadly. 
 Asset-Backed Securities (Law 926/1998) 1998 
•  Legalised ABS market, but ensured high quility standards for covered bonds (cédulas hipotecarias) and MBS's. 
•  No 'originate to distribute' : Originators continue to play the role of credit managers with responsibility for monitoring and supervision.  
•  Securitised assets therefore mostly remained on the books of originating groups, meaning they were included in solvency ratios, reducing 
scope for off-balance sheet lending. 
 Dynamic Provisions 2000 
•Dynamic 'statistical' provisions first introduced. 
•Banks forced to provision 100% of loan value after 21+ months of non-payment (even in relation to property loans). 
•The 2004 shift to international accounting standards reduced its scope, allowing provisions to be included in banks ‘own funds’. Prior to the 
change, Spanish capital adequacy ratios were effectively 2% higher than the European average. 
 Consolidated Regulation Strengthened (Law 19/2003) 2003 
•  First introduced in 1985, but with no mention of investment services firms as they were only permitted in 1988. 
•In 1992 rules were strengthened as banking groups solvency requirements were judged on a consolidated basis; and mixed groups became 
subject to duel capital requirements. 
•The 2003 rules meant the exposure of all sister companies and SPVs pertaining to banking groups  fell under Spanish supervision and capital 
requirements. 
The BdEs reading of monetarism also had important implications for the advance of market-
based finance in Spain and for the creation of Spain’s repo market which was nurtured to 
ease monetary policy transmission (Pellicer 1995, p.39). These programmatic ideas also 
facilitated countercyclical interventionist policy ideas designed to maintain financial stability 
and reduce credit growth – concepts most central banks rejected before the crisis (Bernanke 
2002; Duisenberg 2003; Greenspan 2002). These developments cannot be properly 
understood without recognising the extent to which ideas helped expedite important policy 
changes. 
 
Yet while ideas are crucial in explaining pre-crisis financial developments, Spain’s 
supervisory structure was also important. Spain’s centralised supervisory architecture 
allowed greater scope for BdE intervention than that afforded to the DB in Germany. While 
Germany’s decentralised framework prevented intervention, the BdE was handed 
supervisory, regulatory and accounting authority over its banks and maintained a personal 
presence on bank boards (BdE 2001, p.70 and 76; Saurina 2009[a]; Thiemann 2012, p.39). To 
fully understand the dichotomy between the German and Spanish approach to financial 
regulation, it is therefore necessary to analyse both ideational and structural factors, 
incorporating insights from HI and DI concurrently. 
 
4.4: The Spanish Banking System 
 
While the previous section focused primarily on ideas, this section concentrates chiefly on 
the structural dynamics of Spain’s financial system. Akin to Germany, the Spanish system 
centred on three-pillars, consisting of private banks (bancos privados) cooperatives 
(cooperativas de credito or ‘cajas rurales’) and public savings banks, (cajas de ahorro or 
‘cajas’) (Maudos and Vives 2017, p.567; Stefanelli 2010, p.24). Spanish private-universal  
 
Figure 4.19: Structure of Spain’s banking system (1978-2012) 
 
 
Source: Author (2018)137 
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 Banking associations are less important in Spain than Germany, with the National Union of Cooperatives 
(Union Nacionale de Cooperativas de Credit – UNACC), the Association of Spanish Private Banks (Asociación 
banks existed principally to turn a profit, whilst the smaller cooperative sector distributed 
credit to members, primarily in rural areas. Before the crisis, the three most important 
private banks were Banco Santander, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) and Banco 
Popular. Santander and BBVA in particular operated as large international investment banks 
(table 4.6) with substantial holdings in Europe and Latin America138 (BBVA 2010; Elliott 
2016; Tortella and Garcia-Ruiz 2013, p.164). 
 
Figure 4.20: Structure of Spain’s financial system at the birth of EMU (2000) 
 
Source: IMF (2006) 
 
Cooperatives meanwhile represent a small but steadily growing proportion of Spanish 
banking activity139. Since 1988 when cajas became permitted to operate outside their 
autonomous regions, cooperatives – which base their business models on localism and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Española de Banca Privada – AEB), the Confederation of Spanish Cajas (Confederacion Española de Cajas de 
Ahorros – CECA) only becoming founded in 1969, 1977 and 2000 respectively (Stefanelli 2010, p.25). 
138
 BBVA, for example, currently generates around two-fifths of its overall earnings from Mexico (Montijano 
and Penty 2016). 
139
 Representing 3.7% of total assets in 2000, and 5% in 2014. 
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provision of services for their members – started to become more popular (Stefanelli 2010, 
p.35). There are now 73 regionally restricted cooperatives in Spain which, like German 
cooperatives, are still able to offer similar services to larger banks through their Association 
while maintaining local connections (Ruralvía 2017). 
 
This segment concentrates principally on the cajas as they are the most important of the 
three-pillars for understanding how Spain came to be impacted so severely by the sovereign 
debt crisis (2010-12), and for illustrating how Spain’s financial system adapted to the onset 
of market-based finance. Indeed, the crisis in Spain originated almost exclusively in the cajas 
whose lending stimulated a huge housing bubble they were unable to sustain once the 
market for ABS collapsed during the crash (Royo 2013[a], p.637; 2013[b] p.153; Garicano 
2012[b]).  
 
Cajas were originally state-owned and while made independent during the liberalisations of 
the 1970s, remained public law institutions, retaining strong connections to their local 
municipalities (Bülbül et al. 2013, p.15; Schmidt 2009, p.367). Analogous to German public 
banks, cajas were originally restricted to activity within their autonomous regions and were 
structured partly to advance social goals, using a proportion of their profits to invest in 
charity work for the benefit of local communities (Cardenas 2013, p.8; Caruana 2003, p.3; 
Minder 2012; Ysa et al. 2012, p.269).  
 
Within the cajas corporate framework, the General Assembly was the most important 
structure and comprised the banks stakeholders. It performed a similar function to a 
shareholder meeting in a publically limited company and was responsible for providing its 
strategic orientation and selecting management (IMF 2006, p.8). Before 2010, the ‘LORCA’ 
law (1985) established the legal framework of cajas governing bodies, affording politicians a 
strong presence. 
 
Figure 4.21: Caja corporate framework 
 
Source: Reused with permission, “Spain: Financial Sector Assessment Program—Technical  
  Note— Regulation, Supervision, and Governance of the Spanish Cajas” (IMF  
  Country Report No. 06/215, p.8). 
 
Regional governments directly appointed local politicians and businessmen to sit on 
corporate boards (Cardenas 2013, p.9; Molinas 2013; Tortella and García-Ruiz 2013, p.183), 
frequently leading to cajas being used as ‘piggy banks’ for regional representatives to 
distribute patronage (Minder 2012; Royo 2013[c], p.25; Tremlett 2012). This resulted in 
similarities being drawn between cajas and Landesbanken (Ayadi 2009, p.43; Beck 2012, 
p.16; Hernández et al. 2015, p.1), although unlike Landesbanken, cajas operated without 
explicit state guarantees140. 
 
Cajas were also part-regulated by the same politicians involved in their corporate 
governance (Cardenas 2013, p.9; Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016, p.26; Tortella and García-Ruiz 
2013, p.183). The post-Franco constitution of 1978 granted Spanish regions a high degree of 
autonomy and significant influence over their local cajas (Molinas 2013). Consequently, 
unlike cooperative or private banks, cajas were subject not only to the supervision of the 
BdE, but also of regional governments who had a direct interest in the institutions 
profitability (Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016, p.26; Quaglia and Royo 2015, p.491; Ysa et al. 2012, 
p.266). This regional political control of cajas, coupled with authority over local planning 
laws, meant politicians were able re-zone large tracts of land and borrow cheaply to fuel a 
huge construction boom (Molinas 2013), resulting in cajas in particular accumulating huge 
levels of risk on the liabilities-side of their balance sheets.  
 
Due to such governance problems, calls were made repeatedly by BdE officials to liberalise 
and reform cajas (Caruana 2001; Martín 2000). The IMF and OECD, as well as the Spanish 
Business Confederation (Círculo de Empresarios), all recommended privatising the sector 
(Euromoney 2000), arguing it was wrong for much of Spain's financial system to be lacking 
ownership and under the control of political parties (Stewart 2000). The former Spanish 
Finance Minister, Cristóbal Montoro, also called for the political presence in cajas to be 
reduced (De Barron 2011), and in 2003, BdE Governor Jamie Caruana again pressed cajas to 
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 Although in the case of cajas the system of ownership was complex, the ultimate guarantor in the event of 
bankruptcy was largely understood to be the Spanish state (Cardenas 2013, p.7). 
professionalise their boards and concentrate on activities for which they were originally 
designed (Caruana 2003). 
 
Yet despite these demands, political forces maintained their positions within cajas 
(Deutsche Bank 2004, p.6) and no domestic reforms were forthcoming due to the role of the 
autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas) in their supervision and the vested 
interests of politicians seeking to retain the status quo (Stewart 2000). The failure of the 
Spanish state to implement reform in the face of neo-liberal philosophical ideas at the BdE 
and calls for change from within the Spanish federal government points to the significance 
of vested interests in facilitating path-dependent trends - revealing an instance of scenario B 
from table 2.2. Indeed, as in Germany, the only limited reform that did take place in the 
sector came as a result of supranational edict from the EU Commission. 
 
Path-dependence in Spain’s cajas 
 
B) structures trump ideas   ->   institutional continuity 
 
 
The story of the cajas shows path-dependence is particularly strong when 
political vested interests seek to maintain institutional continuity. 
Illustration 4.9  
 
 
Critical Case Study: CAM 
See Appendix II 
 
 
EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
Before 2002, public authorities accounted for more than half of representatives on cajas 
corporate boards. This risked the banks becoming defined as public institutions under EU 
law. As a result, some of the corporate loans granted by cajas may have become classified 
as state aid, in violation of EU competition rules. To prevent this, a law on financial market 
reform (Ley Financiera, 44/2002) was passed, capping the number of political 
representatives at 50 percent. This remained the only legislative reform to affect cajas until 
the commencement of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010, and may be cited as an example of 
‘Europeanisation’: of EU member-states adapting to EU rules requiring regional 
harmonisation (see Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). 
 
Table 4.12: Important pre-crisis caja legislative changes 
1985 The ‘LORCA’ (Law 
31/1985, 1985) 
Established a new corporate framework for cajas.  
 Cajas free to open branches in traditional regions 
 Reduced political control by enhancing the power of 
depositors, founders, charitable organisations and 
others within the General Assemblies 
 Equalisation of the investment coefficient for 
commercial and savings banks 
1988 STC 48 & 49 1988 Ended the ‘regional principle’, allowing cajas to operate 
outside of their autonomous region, but increased public 
sector representation 
2002 La Ley Financiera 
(44/2002) 
Reduced public sector representation to 50 percent 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
SUMMARY 
This section provided an overview of the Spanish financial system. Concentrating on the 
public banking sector, it drew parallels between the Spanish and German systems, and 
between cajas and Landesbanken in particular. It showed that despite internal and external 
calls to reform and privatise cajas, particularly within the BdE (Caruana 2001; 2003; Martín 
2000), significant legislative change was avoided. This was largely due to the structure of 
existing institutional arrangements and the vested interests of politicians141 who sought to 
maintain influence over caja activity (De Barron 2011; Molinas 2013; Pérez 1997[b], p.167; 
Royo 2013[b], p.175).  
 
As with Landesbanken, it was only intervention in the form of European competition policy 
which managed to instigate some limited reform of the sector.  This reveals the importance 
of incorporating the HI concepts of path-dependence and vested interests into analysis of 
European financial systems, which in this case were able to maintain continuity despite 
liberal reform efforts stemming from national and international organisations (Moe 2015, 
p.285). This demonstrates the significance of structural constraints as well as ideational 
factors on the evolution of European finance, and speaks to the benefits of combining 
insights from HI and DI in political economy research. 
 
4.5: Conclusion 
 
Why did German and Spanish financial institutions react differently 
to the advent of market-based banking and the creation of EMU? 
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 Who, as the ‘critical case study’ makes clear, were sometimes drawn into outright corruption (Cardinas 
2013, p.16; Molinas 2013; Villoria et al. 2013). 
This chapter showed how important ideas and structures were in shaping the evolution of 
German and Spanish finance and how each financial system contended with the investiture 
of market-based banking. Philosophical ideas in the form of ordo- and neo-liberalism, held 
predominantly within the two countries NCBs and finance ministries guided the process of 
liberalisation in each state (Ban 2016; Dyson 2002[c], p.174; Matthijs 2016). They also 
helped inform distinct ‘programmatic’ monetarist and financial ‘policy’ ideas in each nation.  
 
Whereas the DB subscribed to traditional monetarist ideas advancing a concern for 
monetary aggregates, the BdE adopted an alternative interpretation and remained more 
concerned with inflation. Therefore while the DB was reluctant to liberalise short-term debt 
markets (Gabor 2016, p.978; Trampusch 2015, p.122), the BdE saw repo markets as a means 
of conveying effective monetary policy (Pellicer 1995, p.39). Although under EMU DB 
attitudes to securitisation began to change as it started to see private financial assets as a 
means of reducing demand for sovereign debt and therefore as conducive to price stability 
(DB 2006[a], p.31-3), it remained sceptical of complex risk-transfer products and hedge 
funds which it saw as capable of distorting market discipline and operating outside 
traditional legal frameworks (DB 2004[c], p.40; 2005[a], p.48). 
 
The two NCBs also developed distinctive financial policy ideas which they derived from their 
contrary monetarist outlooks. Spain established an interventionist ‘top down’ on-site 
supervisory approach, tightly regulated its securities markets and introduced ‘dynamic 
provisioning’ (BdE 2001, p.43; Fernández de Lis et al. 2000). Conversely, the DB adopted a 
non-interventionist ‘hands-off’ approach to supervision, resulting in risk being accumulated 
on the asset-side of German bank balance sheets. These NCB policies cannot be fully 
understood without recourse to ideas at each level of abstraction142.  
 
Yet the chapter also revealed structures to be vital in explaining pre-crisis financial trends. 
The structural low profitability of the German financial sector (Commission (2014[c], p.40; 
Hardie and Howarth 2009, p.1019) helps illuminate why German banks and Landesbanken 
sought opportunities abroad, and Germany’s decentralised, federal supervisory framework 
also partly expounds why the DB was unable to take more intrusive action to promote 
financial stability. Likewise, the low interest rate environment under EMU and political 
control of both planning regulations and cajas in Spain meant that despite ‘top-down’ on-
site supervisory methods and a more interventionist approach to financial regulation (BdE 
2001, p.43; Fernández de Lis et al. 2000), the BdE was unable to prevent regional politicians 
stoking the Spanish construction boom (Molinas 2013) and risk accumulating on the 
liabilities-side of bank balance sheets.  
 
Moreover, despite repeated calls from national and international bodies to reform their 
respective public banking sectors (Caruana 2001; DB 2003[b], p.45-6; Euromoney 2000; IMF 
2003; Martín 2000), change was resisted in both countries by embedded political ‘vested 
interests’ (Behn et al. 2014; De Barron 2011; Ewing 2010; Lütz 2004, p.188; Pérez 1997[b], 
p.167; Royo 2013[b], p.175). This shows that domestic path-dependent structures are able 
to resist changing ideas and calls for reform (even when pressure is applied by domestic and 
international organisations) if political vested interests are strong enough. The fact that the 
only (limited) pre-crisis reforms applied to Landesbanken and cajas came as a result of 
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supranational demands from the European Commission speaks to the strength of domestic 
path-dependence. Only by combining insights from DI and HI is it therefore possible to reach 
a comprehensive understanding of the factors determining the behaviour of German and 
Spanish financial institutions throughout this period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
The Eurozone Pre-Crisis 
 
 
Why has the ECB become increasingly attentive to financial stability 
concerns? 
 
Ideational research on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has tended to focus almost 
exclusively on neo-liberal philosophical ideas (Blyth and Matthijs 2016; Kaelberer 2003; 
McNamara 1998), monetarist programmatic ideas (Baimbridge et al., 2001; Ban 2016; 
McNamara 1998), and policy ideas which pressed for further financial integration (Jabko 
2006; Parsons 2003; Schmidt 2005). This chapter fills an important gap in the literature by 
exploring the extent to which the European Central Bank (ECB) also prioritised policy ideas 
in relation to financial stability before the 2007-8 crisis, and why it sought to do so. 
Appreciating how officials viewed financial stability before the crash is essential to 
understanding why the Eurozone was impacted in the way it was, and why European 
policymakers took the decisions they did in its aftermath (Borio 2011; Cooper 2008, p.25). 
 
Using process tracing and discernments from Discursive (DI) and Historical Institutionalism 
(HI), the chapter furthers analysis of institutional change by tracking how financial stability 
ideas143 evolved over the course of EMU. It reveals that true to insights from both these 
approaches, once the founders of EMU settled upon monetarism as their core 
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programmatic idea, the concept was ‘locked in’ through the creation of structural 
impediments which prevented the ECB deviating from its price stability144 mandate. This 
ensured the bank maintained a strong path-dependent commitment to monetary stability 
above all else (Howarth and Loedel 2005, p.15; Quaglia 2008, p.110).  
 
However, measures taken by the European Commission and ECB to try to improve the 
functioning of monetary policy subsequently exposed an innate contradiction within EMUs 
framework. The ECBs targeting of inflation through the manipulation of interest rates 
required financial integration to improve monetary transmission (Gabor and Ban 2016, 
p.618; Issing 2008, p.214; Tumpel-Gugerell 2005). Yet EMU also imposed a strict separation 
of monetary, fiscal and financial policy to ensure bond markets discriminated between EMU 
sovereigns to promote fiscal conservativism. As Eurozone capital markets became more 
integrated, sovereign bond yields narrowed and the risk of financial contagion exacerbated, 
leading the ECB to become increasingly concerned with financial stability as well as price 
stability.  
 
This sparked a gradual ideational transition from 2003 when ECB President, Jean-Claude 
Trichet, officially connected financial integration with financial fragility (Trichet 2003). ECB 
discourse then shifted from suggesting financial stability could be achieved simply by 
delivering price stability (Duisenberg 2003; Noyer 1999[b]), towards recognising financial 
stability as an objective in its own right (Padoa-Schioppa 2003; Papademos 2006; Trichet 
2003). Nevertheless, despite this evolution, monetarist ideational path-dependence (Cox 
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2004) and EMUs stringent legal structure ultimately prevented extensive institutional 
change during the period.  
 
Figure 5.1 below provides an illustration of the argument and shows how ideational change 
within EMU should not be viewed as a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (Krasner 1988) between 
two critical junctures145. Rather, concern for financial stability strengthened incrementally as 
banking became more market-based and integrated. This supports the DI claim that the 
cognitive abilities of decision-makers are capable of breaking from structural impediments 
and enacting gradual institutional change endogenously (Blyth 2011; Hay 2011; Schmidt 
2010).  
 
Figure 5.1: EMU institutional evolution 1992-2007 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
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The chapter begins by exploring the structural and ideational foundations of the euro and 
analyses why the founders of EMU eventually settled upon the monetarist framework 
fashioned at Maastricht (Risse et al. 1999, p.152). It also discusses the extent to which 
financial stability was recognised as an independent policy objective at the supranational 
level during this time. The second section analyses the early history of EMU between 1999 
and the eve of the crisis in 2007. In this segment, the reader is taken through developments 
which pushed the ECB to become progressively concerned about more than just inflation 
targeting and to enhance supranational financial oversight. The third section draws to a 
conclusion. 
 
5.1 Birth of the Euro and the Primacy of Price Stability 
 
In legal terms, the monetary policy of the ECB rests on three pillars: prohibition of 
monetary financing; central bank independence; primacy of price stability 
 
(Issing 2008, p.54) 
 
Under the forerunner to the Eurosystem, the European Monetary System (EMS), monetary 
coordination centred on the harmonisation of exchange rates. Recognising the structural 
and ideational developments which took place during this period is essential to 
understanding why the ECB was initially handed only a limited advisory role in relation to 
financial stability (Scheller 2006, p.111), and why the core function of the ECB was largely 
restricted to maintaining price stability.  
 
The main component of the EMS was the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) which was 
introduced on the 13th March 1979 in a bid to reduce exchange rate variability between 
members and support monetary stability. The ERM pegged member currencies to each 
other within a variance of 2.25 percent of a basket of averages, known as the European 
Currency Unit (ECU).  As guardian of the largest and most important economy in the system, 
many came to view the Deutsche Bundesbank (DB) as the de facto central bank for the 
entire EMS, and the Deutsche Mark as the ERMs currency anchor (Heipertz and Verdun 
2010, p.22; Howarth and Loedel 2005, p.18; Nedergaard and Snaith 2015, p.1099). Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen, the former Danish Minister of Economic Affairs, complained in 1991 that: 
 
If the Bundesbank's Directorate even blinks, it sends shock waves through the 
capital markets across the whole of Europe without us having even the slightest 
means of intervention 
 
(Rasmussen 1991, no page) 
 
If the DB raised interest rates to reduce inflation in Germany, other central banks were 
effectively forced to do likewise to keep parity with the Deutsche Mark (Levitt and Lord 
2000, p.121; Sinn 2014, p.28). Through this inadvertent German dominance of the system, 
Dyson (2000) argues the EMS acted as an ‘elite socialisation mechanism’ through which 
monetarist conceptions of price stability became dispersed (Dyson 2000, p.128). 
Importantly, monetarist ideas which derived from ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik) 
dominated in Germany long before ‘neo-liberalism’ and monetarism became the consensus 
Western economic view (Garber 1993, p.463; McNamara 1998; Nedergaard and Snaith 
2015, p.1102). Indeed, the perception that it was ideas emanating from the DB that 
provided the ideational framework for EMU is widely asserted within HI and DI literature 
(Bibow 2013; Blyth 2013[a], p.141; Dyson 2002[c]; Quaglia 2008, p.47-74).  
For the DB, the pursuit of price stability was the raison d'être for the existence of both 
central banks and monetary policy. Monetarist ideas were seen as more than just salient 
economic policies, but the very foundation of a stable socio-economic order. In 2002, 
former Bundesbanker and ECB Chief Economist, Otmar Issing, put the argument as follows: 
 
Stable money, stable prices: these are the very foundations of a well-functioning 
market economy… However, the case for price stability goes beyond the purely 
economic sphere. Price stability, the ability to rely on stable money, is the basis 
for trust in the interaction among economic agents, trust in property rights, trust 
in society and trust in the future more generally. Trust in stable money is also the 
basis for a free society, the ability of people to take decisions and plan their 
future for themselves 
 
(Issing 2002[a], p.23) 
 
The success of monetarist policies in Germany and the heightened linkages wrought by the 
EMS undoubtedly helped spread stability orientated ideas across the continent (Blyth 
2013[a], p.141; Jabko 2006, p.170). It created substantial policy synchronisation among 
European central banks and provided member-states with a powerful example to emulate 
(Dyson 2000, p.129; McNamara 1998, p.6; Quaglia 2008, p.73).  
 
However, the extent of neo-liberal and monetarist ideational convergence between the 
nations of Europe is often overstated in the literature (Quaglia 2008, p.104). Although there 
are similarities between neo- and ordo-liberalism, there are also important differences (see 
chapter 2). This meant, for example, that philosophical ideas within the ordo-liberal German 
Federal Economics Ministry, Federal Finance Ministry and DB, remained distinct from those 
in the Spanish Ministries of Economics, Finance and the BdE, which tended to subscribe to 
neo-liberal ideas (Lukauskas 1994; Pérez 1997[a]; Tortella and Garcia-Ruiz 2013, p.150). 
Moreover, negotiations over the creation of EMU were not straightforward and discussions 
were often fraught with differences of opinion within states (Dyson and Featherstone 1999, 
p.33) as well as between them (Jabko 2006, p.178; Radaelli 2002; Sadeh and Verdun 2009, 
p.291).  
 
At the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference on EMU, the French government sought to 
incorporate an ‘economic government’ into the Eurosystem’s architecture as a direct 
counterweight to the independent ECB envisaged by monetarist nations such as Germany 
and the Netherlands. Although the plan was ultimately rejected, it demonstrates that 
programmatic monetarist ideas had not converged to the extent often assumed (Dyson 
2000, p.13). Whilst the French reluctantly accepted a monetarist EMU framework, there is 
little evidence to suggest traditional French ideas concerning a preference for growth and 
social order over fiscal conservativism and price stability were ever fundamentally altered 
by the creation of the euro (Jabko 2006, p.163). 
 
Nevertheless, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (TEU 1992) was viewed by many HI 
scholars as a critical juncture for European monetary cooperation (Verdun 2015, p.231; 
2007; Yiangou et al. 2013, p.225), and by HI and ideational scholars alike as a crystallisation 
of German ideas at the EU-level (Heipertz and Verdun 2010, p.24; Jabko 2006, p.170). The 
new ECB was considered ‘the Bundesbank writ large’ (Dyson 2002[b], p.186), and its 
mandate for price stability became inscribed explicitly into Article 105 of the Maastricht 
Treaty:  
 
The primary objective of the ESCB
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 shall be to maintain price stability. Without 
prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general 
economic policies in the Community 
 
(TEU 1992, Art.105) 
 
This philosophy became etched not only into the ECBs founding documents at EMUs 
institutional formation (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p.342), but also into the manner in 
which the bank operated. The standard New Keynesian Model (NKM) that provided 
empirical justification for price stable monetary policy (Gabor 2013, p.10) suggested that 
constant low-levels of inflation delivered a zero ‘output gap’, defined as the difference 
between the level of actual and potential economic output (Blanchard and Galí 2007). This 
‘divine coincidence’ (Blanchard et al. 2010, p.200) implied that even if central bankers 
wished to increase economic activity, the best they could do was to maintain stable 
inflation. The quote below from Otmar Issing demonstrates the degree to which this 
thinking was accepted by the ECB: 
 
Economists are in substantial agreement on the benefits deriving from price 
stability. They also broadly share the view that the best contribution that 
monetary policy can give to the efficient functioning of monetary economies is to 
ensure price stability 
 
(Issing 1999[a], no page) 
 
Expansionary monetary and/or fiscal policy designed to stimulate growth and employment 
during normal times was understood to create inflation in the medium-term as people over 
borrow and over spend, increasing the amount of money in circulation (Weber 2006). Loose 
economic policies, leading to greater risk-taking, leveraging, and ultimately to higher 
inflation, would therefore require future interest rates to be raised higher than usual to 
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prevent further inflation. This would create an economic slowdown and lower than trend 
growth, producing a net loss to society (Hämäläinen 2000[a]; Hannoun 2012).  
 
The Tinbergen Rule (Tinbergen 1952) further established that one instrument can only ever 
achieve one objective. Monetary policy, it was therefore assumed, should only be used to 
maintain price stability using policy interest rates (Gabor 2012, p.5; Hämäläinen 2002; Noyer 
1999[a]). Any attempt to use monetary policy for a financial stability purpose was thought 
dangerous and counterproductive (Bernanke and Gertler 2000, p.46).  
 
Therefore although Europe’s ideational consensus may not have been as deep or as 
widespread as generally assumed (Jabko 2006, p.178; Radaelli 2002; Sadeh and Verdun 
2009, p.291), there certainly existed a dominant set of economic and financial concepts 
woven into the fabric of EMU. As table 5.1 (below) illustrates, there was a general 
subscription to broad neo-liberal philosophical ideas at the EU-level (McNamara 1998, p.56-
7), and an explicit commitment to monetarist programmatic ideas in the treaties (TEU, 
1992). This translated into policy ideas which promoted the manipulation of traditional 
monetary instruments to achieve price stability and, it was assumed, financial stability also 
(Duisenberg 2003; Noyer 1999[b]). The institutionalisation of these preferences at 
Maastricht represented a critical juncture which has since exerted powerful structural and 
ideational path-dependent forces on the ECB and broader Eurosystem (Farrell and 
Finnemore 2016, p.584; Yiangou et al. 2013; Salines et al. 2011, p.31). 
 
To the extent independent financial policy ideas existed at the European level in 1992, they 
advanced non-interventionism (in line with DB preferences), as interfering in markets was 
generally considered counterproductive (Issing 2002[b]; Noyer 1999[a]). Indeed, the 
European Commission actively opposed the implementation of countercyclical accounting 
methods for Spain in 2000147 because they did not conform to the non-interventionist 
supervisory and accounting consensus of allowing banks to model their own provisioning 
requirements (Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016, p.50). European involvement in financial stability 
policy was therefore initially restricted to coordinating national regulations and facilitating 
information sharing.  
 
Table 5.1: EU-level ideas at the founding of EMU 
Level of idea Description EU Ideas Examples  
Philosophical Ideas: 
Webs of Belief 
World views & public 
philosophies that underpin 
the core understandings of 
individuals and society 
Neo-liberalism  Competition policy 
 Stability and 
Growth Pact  
Programmatic Ideas: 
Policy Paradigm 
Paradigms which support a 
conceptual approach and set 
an overarching policy 
program 
Monetarism  Commitment to 
price stability 
 ‘No-bailout-clause’ 
Policy Ideas: 
Policy Agenda 
Ideas contained within 
specific policies, norms, 
values, and political 
discourse 
1. Price Stability 
2. Financial integration 
3. Financial stability 
(weak) 
1. Inflation 2% or 
lower 
2. Banking & Collateral 
Directives 
3. ECB advisor to the 
Commission 
 
Source: Adapted from Schmidt (2014) 
 
FINANCIAL STABILITY AT THE BIRTH OF EMU 
When the EMS was created in 1979, two international bodies already existed which helped 
coordinate financial policy within the European Economic Community (EEC). The first was 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision within the Bank for International Settlements 
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(BIS). Founded in 1974, it was created in response to the collapse of the ‘Bretton Woods’ 
fixed exchange-rate system which generated significant financial market turmoil, notably 
culminating with the collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt in West Germany (BIS 2016). Its 
objectives were to enhance financial stability by improving the quality of global banking 
supervision and to create a forum for regular cooperation between members. 
 
Within the EEC more specifically, the Banking Advisory Committee (BAC) established under 
the First Banking Directive (1977) was attached to the European Commission. It comprised 
of representatives from member-states’ supervisory authorities, finance ministries and 
central banks, with its primary aim to assist the Commission in preparing prudential 
legislation for Europe’s banking sector (Commission 2000, p.5). The directive also set a 
precedent for permitting supranational involvement in financial policy and for beginning the 
process of harmonisation in prudential tasks (Dermine 2002, p.4). European policymakers 
even briefly considered creating supranational financial regulation during this time, but 
eventually came down on the side of ‘mutual recognition’ and national responsibility (Jones 
et al. 2016, p.1019; Vipond 1991). This demonstrates that although supranational 
involvement in financial stability had not yet extended into areas of risk-sharing or joint 
liability, there was implicit recognition of the need for European-level participation in 
financial policy, even before EMU.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Key EU Banking Directive (1977 and 1989) achievements 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
Europe-wide financial stability initiatives stepped-up further once proposals for EMU were 
set in motion. The Delors Report (1989) recommended creating a single currency with a 
three-phase transition from EMS to EMU. Stage I ran from the 1st July 1990 to 31st 
December 1993, establishing free capital flows and closer coordination of national monetary 
policies. At this early stage, structural changes to better facilitate discussion of financial 
concerns were made through the creation of the Banking Supervisory Sub-Committee to the 
Committee of Governors. Stage II began in July 1994 with the foundation of the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI) – the forerunner to the ECB – governed by its President Alexandre 
Lamfalussy. In this stage, the Banking Supervisory Sub-Committee became a Sub-Committee 
of the EMI. Once the EMI evolved into the ECB, it transformed into a full Banking 
Supervision Committee (BSC) (Commission 2000, p.11). The BSC was tasked with better 
coordinating member-state financial regulation and supervision and provided a ‘key forum’ 
for discussing financial stability issues during the early years of EMU (Padoa-Schioppa 
1999[a], p.302).  
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There were also explicit legal provisions handed to the ECB in relation to financial stability. 
Article 105(5) of the Maastricht Treaty gave the bank the task of contributing: 
 
To the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating 
to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial 
system 
(TEU 1992, Art. 105[5]148) 
 
Article 105(6) also provided an enabling clause. With the agreement of other EU institutions, 
the ECB may be granted further: 
 
Specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance 
undertaking 
(TEU 1992, Art. 105[6]149) 
 
The ECB was also responsible for monitoring Euroarea financial markets through its ‘two-
pillar’ monetary strategy (figure 5.3).  The ECBs overarching objective was to maintain a 
quantitative definition of price stability, interpreted initially as an annual increase in the 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) of below 2 percent. But the way it monitored 
threats to this objective was by analysing monetary, financial and economic data collected 
by national central banks (NCBs) and collated centrally at the ECB (Cecchetti and 
Schoenholtz 2008, p.8; ECB 2000[a], p.37-47).  
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Figure 5.3: The ECB’s ‘two-pillar’ monetary policy 
 
Source: Bank of Lithuania (Lietuvos Banko). Bank of Lithuania website (2018):  
  https://www.lb.lt/en/how-monetary-policy-works 
 
 
The second pillar gave a prominent position to the role of money, signalled by a reference 
value for M3150 monetary growth of 4.5 percent (DB 2000, p.39; Duisenberg 2000[c]), 
another technique borrowed from the DB (Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.318; DB 1999, p.84; 
Issing 2008, p.93). But the first pillar analysed a wide range of additional economic and 
financial gages to give the Governing Council a comprehensive understanding of specific 
effects which may threaten the primary objective (ECB 2000[a], p.42). Developments in 
financial markets and the performance of asset prices were therefore always closely 
monitored by the ECB (Micossi 2012, p.3), but were analysed strictly in relation to how such 
movements may affect interest rate transmission and future price developments (ECB 
1999[a], p.42), as the quote below makes clear: 
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The maintenance of price stability in the Euroarea is the primary objective of the 
single monetary policy. All aspects of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy serve 
the achievement of this primary objective 
 
(ECB 2000[a], p.47) 
 
RESTRAINTS ON ECB AUTHORITY 
Since independence is a core element of democratic legitimacy, it must be accompanied by 
the strict application of controls… This obligation, which is the flip-side of its independent 
status, effectively imposes discipline on the central bank to perform its tasks in line with its 
mandate 
 
(González-Páramo 2005, no page) 
 
Although the ECB was structured to monitor financial stability and provided a forum for 
financial ideas through the BSC, its competences with regards to financial stability were 
restricted both ideationally and structurally. In terms of ideas, there was broad agreement 
within international central banking circles at the time of EMUs founding that central banks 
should not target asset prices or intervene generally in matters of financial stability 
(Bernanke and Gertler 2000, p.46; Greenspan 2002). This attitude was expressed by former 
ECB Vice-President, Christian Noyer in 1999: 
 
Of course, it goes without saying that financial markets can also be wrong in their 
assessment of the fundamental determinants of asset prices. International 
investors can sometimes be influenced by fads and self-fulfilling beliefs which 
drive prices away from their fundamental determinants. Asset price ‘bubbles’ can 
emerge. However, it is very difficult for policy-makers to identify such 
misalignments and bubbles 
(Noyer 1999[a] no page) 
 
In the absence of policymakers ability to spot bubbles as and when they occurred, 
uncertainty over how asset prices may react to changes in monetary policy (Remsperger 
2006), and the professed belief that any attempt to prick an asset bubble would trigger a 
‘panic’ or ‘severe recession’ (Bernanke and Gertler 2000; Greenspan 2002; Issing 2002[b]), it 
was argued the best course of action central bankers could take was to provide the financial 
system with stable monetary conditions (Noyer 1999[b]151). 
 
These ideas manifested themselves into the structure of the Eurosystem. The ECB was 
established as one of the most independent152 central banks in the world (Howarth and 
Loedel 2005, p.53; Nedergaard and Snaith 2015, p.1103; Quaglia 2008, p.120)153. It was 
commonly assumed that independence enabled central banks to achieve the associated 
goals of fiscal discipline and price stability by preventing governments from artificially 
boosting economic output through government borrowing (DB 2012[a]; Issing 2002[a], p.27; 
Noyer 1999[c]).   
 
By controlling interest rates, central banks were able to influence the cost of borrowing, 
counteracting any governmental stimulus which often tended to coincided with the 
electoral cycle. Central bank independence was therefore heralded as a necessary check on 
politicians seeking to temporarily spur economic growth for their own electoral gain (Blinder 
1998, p.50; Nedergaard and Snaith 2015, p.1103; Polillo and Guillén 2005, p.1768), and as 
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 Understood as the expelling of political influence over monetary policy decisions. 
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 As outlined in Article 108 of the Maastricht Treaty (TEU 1992, Art.108). 
the most efficient way to safeguard price stability (Alesina and Summers 1993; González-
Páramo 2005)154.   
 
For the ECB, however, independence also provided an additional function. Independence 
and a limited mandate prevented risk-sharing and fiscal transfers between member-states 
(Sandberg 2015, p.3). Any wealth transfer from savers to borrowers instituted by the ECB 
constituted a political act to which EU leaders had not agreed. Such actions could therefore 
threaten its independence and undermined its legitimacy (Feldstein 2011, p.7; Sibert 2009, 
p.7). Monetary, fiscal and financial policies were thus purposefully separated under EMU, 
with supranational authorities only handed responsibility for monetary policy (Bibow 2015). 
 
For these reasons, even areas of financial stability policy which for generations had been 
regarded as core central bank competences were retained at the national level. Despite the 
importance of the ‘lender of last resort’155 (LOLR) facility in safeguarding financial stability, 
this capability was retained by NCBs in a bid to de-couple monetary and fiscal policy, and to 
forestall any moral hazard problems generated by well-regulated financial systems having to 
bailout irresponsible Eurozone states (Bibow 2015, p.22; Duisenberg 1999[b]156). Emergency 
Liquidity Assistance157 (ELA) was instead provided by NCBs, with the risk of loss remaining 
on NCB balance sheets (Praet 2016[a]), creating a two-tier system of ESCB balance sheets to 
prevent joint liability. 
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Moreover, while the ECBs collateral framework encouraged financial institutions to treat all 
Eurosystem sovereign debt the same way during interbank ‘repo’ trades158 - creating an 
implicit ‘subsidy’ to lower-rated member-states that weakened fiscal discipline (Buiter and 
Sibert 2005) – ECB repo operations were ‘marked-to-market’ to reinforce market discipline 
and limit supranational risk-sharing. This meant if the markets began to view a member-
states sovereign debt as risky, the ECB would require additional collateral to set aside 
against default, placing further pressure on yields and generating pro-cyclical effects (Gabor 
and Ban 2016, p.627).  
 
NCBs also retained exclusive authority over the supervision of domestic financial institutions 
(Alford 2006, p.396; Bibow 2015, p.21; Scheller 2006, p.111), the conduct of open-market 
operations, and responsibility for feeding in economic data to the ECB (Cecchetti and 
Schoenholtz 2008, p.14; Duisenberg 2000[a]). On financial matters therefore, the ECB was 
initially restricted to surveying financial markets, monitoring key financial players, 
structuring the payment and securities settlement systems, and developing an advisory role 
in the production of financial legislation (Duisenberg 1999[a])159.  
 
A number of further restrictive provisions were placed in the Treaties to prevent the ECB 
transgressing into areas deemed unnecessary solely for the preserve of price stability, and 
which may have seen funds shift from one member-state to another (Frankel 2015, p.430). 
It was acknowledged that the political benefits enjoyed by Governments from deficit 
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 Repurchase agreements where banks temporarily borrow cash from central banks in exchange for collateral 
(usually sovereign debt securities). 
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 Article 6.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European 
Central Bank: ‘The General Council shall contribute to the ECB’s advisory tasks under Article 4 and Article 25.1 
of the Statute’. 
spending, or by economies and banks through over lending, tended to be preserved at the 
national level, while the negative effects in the form of higher interest rates due to 
increased debt could be felt by all euro-members (Issing 2008, p.193; Papademos 2004; 
Weidmann 2016[b]). The authors of TEU therefore included explicit legal provisions (figure 
5.4 below) intended to avert moral hazard and prevent the ECB directly purchasing 
government bonds to support loose fiscal policy and bailing-out failing Eurozone 
governments (Bibow 2013, p.617; ECB 2016[a]; European Parliament 1998). 
 
These practices and treaty articles should be viewed collectively as a way of limiting the 
ECBs responsibility to the preservation of price stability, reducing the possibility of collective 
wealth transfers and moral hazard, and of promoting stability orientated monetary policies 
across the Eurozone. Importantly, they were also a means of enforcing market discipline on 
Eurozone governments to prevent expansive fiscal policy (Yiangou et al. 2013, p.227). 
 
Figure 5.4: Maastricht Treaty restrictions on ECB financial activity   
 
Source: Treaty of the European Union (TEU, [Maastricht Treaty], 1992)  
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TEFU, [Lisbon Treaty], 2007) 
 
 
 
• The prohibition of monetary financing  
Article 104 
 (123 of TEFU) 
• The prohibition of privileged access to financial 
institutions  
Article 104a 
(124 of TEFU) 
• The ‘no-bail-out clause’  
Article 104b 
(125 of TEFU) 
Although he accepts markets can often over-price and under-price sovereign risk at 
different phases of the financial cycle, the quote below from ECB Executive Board Member, 
Benoît Cœuré, underscores the ECBs belief in the power of market discipline to help steer 
governments towards the nostrum of stability orientated policies: 
 
The construction of the Euroarea – the monetary financing prohibition enshrined 
in the EU Treaty, the ‘no-bailout-clause’ – is deliberately intended to encourage 
markets to differentiate between Euroarea sovereigns based on their fiscal 
sustainability (market discipline). The idea is that the exercise of market discipline 
will provide a continuous assessment of government actions, which will in turn 
lead to sounder policies 
 
(Cœuré 2016) 
 
While Eurozone nations were politically able to pool monetary sovereignty, there was little 
appetite amongst the public or policymakers alike to institute further risk-sharing measures, 
mutualise banking supervision, or implement fiscal transfers between states (Schuknecht et 
al. 2011, p.5). This restrictive, legalistic framework should therefore be viewed as a result of 
these political decisions, and as a way of maintaining traditional monetarist programmatic 
ideas as the touchstone of Eurosystem operations. 
 
It should also be noted that further fiscal restrictions other than those provided by market 
discipline, like the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP, 1997), were also enacted to help maintain 
price stability by keeping borrowing low and preventing wealth transfers through the need 
for state bailouts (Issing 1999[b]). The SGP aimed to curb government borrowing by setting 
a budget deficit limit of 3 percent GDP and an overall government debt ceiling of 60 percent 
GDP. The Treaty was particularly important for the Dutch and German governments who 
feared many countries that joined the euro in the initial phase had a relatively short history 
of fiscal prudence (Levitt and Lord 2000, p.147). The SGP was also regarded as an essential 
element of EMU by the ECB to prevent excessive deficits and avert the need to react with 
restrictive monetary policy (Duisenberg 1999[a]; Quaglia 2008, p.125). 
 
SUMMARY 
Although the philosophical neo-liberal and programmatic monetarist ideational consensus 
within pre-EMU Europe was not as widespread as often claimed (McNamara 1998), these 
principles, together with a non-interventionist approach to financial policy and belief in the 
importance of fiscal conservativism and central bank independence, broadly formed the 
ideational foundation of EMU. Germany and the DB were particularly important in 
promoting these ideas (Dyson 2000, p.128; Heipertz and Verdun 2010, p.46; Quaglia 2008), 
which consequently levied an ‘ideational path-dependence’ (Cox 2004) on future ECB 
action. 
 
During this period it was widely assumed that if price stability was maintained, financial 
instability could be avoided (Bernanke and Gertler 2000, p.46; Noyer 1999[b]). It was 
therefore asserted that the ECB should focus on preserving price stability, while authority 
over financial supervision was retained by national bodies. Nonetheless, a precedent of 
European involvement in financial policy was established through the First (1977) and 
Second Banking Directives (1989), and the inclusion of the BSC within the ECB. The ECB was 
also handed responsibility for monitoring Eurozone financial data under the first monetary 
pillar, established itself as an advisor to the Commission on future financial policy, and had 
an enabling clause inserted into the Treaty (Art.105[6] TEU). This provided a foundation for 
future ECB financial influence.  
 
Yet the bank was also hamstrung on financial stability by the federal structure of the ESCB 
and the Treaty articles prohibiting monetary financing, privileged access to financial 
institutions and the ‘no-bail-out’ clause (figure 5.4). These provisions, including the 
application of ‘mark-to-market’ accounting practices, were not only incorporated to help 
preserve price stability, but to prevent sovereign risk-sharing, moral hazard and encourage 
market discipline in the bond markets (Frankel 2015, p.430; Schuknecht et.al. 2011, p.5). 
 
5.2 Pre-Crisis EMU (1999-2007) 
 
The ECBs early years were epitomised by a search for credibility (Cecchetti and Schoenholtz 
2008, p.4). It is one thing to model a central bank on the DB and endow it with 
independence and a price stability mandate, but quite another to be seen as credible by the 
markets (Howarth and Loedel 2005, p.143). This could only be achieved by communicating a 
consistent communicative discourse (Hughes and Kesting 2014; Schmidt 2010), formulating 
a coherent monetary strategy, and delivering a stable economic environment over the 
medium-term. As the HI approach suggests, the ideational and structural foundations of 
EMU established at the critical juncture of Maastricht exerted a profound path-dependent 
force on the ECBs goals and objectives (Immergut and Anderson 2008; Katznelson and 
Weingast 2005), and its credibility became interwoven with the preservation of price 
stability (González-Páramo 2005; Quaglia 2008, p.110; Sibert 2009). 
Over the first nine years (1999-2008), the ECB delivered on this objective and conveyed an 
average HICP inflation rate of 2.06 percent. Long-term interest rates also remained low due 
to low levels of uncertainty about future inflation expectations (Cecchetti and Schoenholtz 
2008, p.18; Issing 2008, p.141-4). Yet in the background, two significant developments took 
place which had important financial implications. Firstly, financial liberalisation resulted in 
banks becoming increasingly marketised, meaning they became progressively less 
dependent on customer deposits for funding and instead relied on the production and trade 
of securities to raise capital (ECB 2002, p.9). Secondly, under EMU, European financial 
markets became much more tightly integrated (Cœuré 2012). This was encouraged by 
coordinated ECB and Commission policies which aimed to facilitate harmonised interest rate 
transmission160 across the Eurozone (Gabor and Ban 2016, p.618; Issing 2008, p.214; 
Tumpel-Gugerell 2005). 
 
During the early years of EMU, much of the ECBs financial discourse simply discussed 
transition to the euro and the importance of promoting financial integration (Hämäläinen 
1999). As this integration and market-based financing became more pronounced, and cross-
border financial linkages became larger and more complex, financial stability became a 
more pressing concern, particularly from 2003 onwards. Although the ideational and 
discursive commitment to price stability remained, the bank began talking much more 
openly about financial stability issues (tables 2 and 3), and started to recognise that 
preventing financial contagion in a closely interconnected Eurozone would require more 
than just the delivery of low inflation (Papademos 2006; Trichet 2005[a]). This pre-crisis  
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 ‘The process through which monetary policy decisions affect the economy in general and the price level in 
particular’ (ECB 2016, no page). 
Table 5.2: ECB speeches which include discussion of financial stability issues 
Year Specific Financial 
Stability 
Concerns 
Financial 
Integration 
Financial System 
and Banking 
Supervision 
Total 
1999 1 3 5 9 
2000 3 10 5 18 
2001 0 5 4 9 
2002 3 7 7 17 
2003 6 2 7 15 
2004 5 12 5 22 
2005 10 17 5 32 
2006 6 11 13 30 
2007 11 10 19 40 
 
Source: ECB, Author (2018) 
 
Table 5.3: ECB articles and press releases concerning financial stability 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Number 3 6 4 4 11 8 17 10 13 
 
Source: ECB, Author (2018) 
 
Figure 5.5: Visualisation of ECB discourse (tables 2 and 3) 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
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period therefore demonstrates path-dependent characteristics which fall in line with HI 
analysis, but also gradual ideational changes which are better explained through DI. By 
adopting insights from both these approaches and by continuing to use process tracing to 
detail important events and trends, the following section tracks and analyses these 
institutional developments from 1999-2008. 
 
MARKET-BASED BANKING AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION  
Beginning with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 and the subsequent 
growth of neo-liberal philosophical ideas, global capital controls became liberalised, leading 
to an internationalisation of finance (McNamara 1998, p.50; Padoa-Schioppa 1999[b]). This 
was particularly true in Europe where throughout the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s, the 
Commission led attempts to liberalise and integrate EU capital markets through the Single 
Market Program (Jabko 2006; Story and Walter 1997, p.254; Underhill 2002, p.36). 
Before the deregulation of capital markets, banks held liabilities on their balance sheets and 
generated profits on the interest they received until the loan was repaid (Pozsar 2009, p.13).  
The development of ‘securitisation’161 enabled banks to restructure these loan payments 
and transform them into tradable assets. Debt instalments could be separated out and sold 
individually, or bundled up as pools of debt and sold to investors as an income generating 
investment. This meant banks could make more loans because the risk of non-performance 
was frequently no longer borne by the issuer of the debt, but by the holder of the asset, 
taking the risk ‘off-balance sheet’ (Deeg 2010, p.7; Adrian and Shin 2009, p.11). The advent 
of securitisation and technical innovations like the TARGET electronic payments system 
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 The pooling of debt into structured instruments which are then sold to third party investors as income 
generating assets. 
enabled huge amounts of money to be generated through financial market activity and 
dispersed across borders (Stockhammer 2004, p.720). 
 
Because of these innovations, as well as manipulating interest rates, the ECB (via NCBs) was 
given the power to conduct open market operations where the bulk of pre-crisis liquidity 
was provided to the banking system (ECB 2011[b], p.104). The weekly main refinancing 
operations were the most important open market procedures the ECB executed before the 
crisis162 and aimed to influence very short-term interest rates in the pursuit of price stability 
(Duisenberg 1999[a]; ECB 2011[b], p.107; Issing 2008, p.125). They adjusted the supply of 
central bank money by allowing financial institutions to borrow liquidity from the 
Eurosystem in exchange for collateral via repos. Although the ECB always tried to preserve a 
‘separation principle’ between its monetary stance of maintaining price stability and the 
liquidity management procedures through which it implemented its policies (Bordes and 
Clerc 2013, p.66; ; González-Páramo 2007; Trichet 2008[a]163), these operations also helped 
stabilise financial markets by keeping banks flush with funds (DB 2000, p.36).  
 
Under EMU, the ECB expected securitisation and non-bank intermediation to intensify as 
low interest rates, increased competition and the reduced profitability of traditional banking 
activities encouraged banks to take on more risk (ECB 1999[a], p.41; 1999[b]; 2000[c]). 
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 At its meeting on 8th June 2000 the Governing Council decided to alter the tender of its main refinancing 
operations and switch to a ‘variable rate tender’ using a multiple rate auction procedure whereby the ECB sets 
a minimum bid rate and banks accepting the highest interests rates became endowed with liquidity (ECB 
2000[b]). 
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 ‘The ECB makes a clear separation between, on the one hand, the determination of the monetary policy 
stance and, on the other hand, its implementation using liquidity operations. The monetary policy stance is 
determined so as to serve the primary objective of the ECB, namely the maintenance of price stability. The 
implementation of the stance through liquidity operations aims at steering very short-term money market 
rates close to the ECB’s key policy rate (the minimum bid rate in the Eurosystem’s main refinancing 
operations)’ (Trichet 2008[a]). 
Indeed, market-based banking became much more prevalent under EMU, with the total 
value of securitized assets rising from €47 billion in 1997 (Deeg 2010) to almost €500 billion 
ten years later.  
 
Figure 5.6: European securitisation issuance (€ billion)  
 
Source: European Securitisation Forum (2008) 
 
Much of this growth came as a direct consequence of ECB and Commission policies (Jabko 
2006). In 1999, the Commission published its Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) 
containing 42 legislative proposals aimed at removing variances in national regulations and 
legal systems (Commission 1999)164. This, along with the single currency, created an 
environment within which European financial institutions were able to borrow from one 
another more easily. While integration in the retail segment remained sluggish (Baele et al., 
2004; Cabral et al., 2002), it accelerated markedly in the wholesale debt markets (Cœuré 
2016; Duisenberg 2000[c]; ECB 1999[a], p.41; Hämäläinen 2000[b]), which tripled in volume 
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to €6 trillion between 2001-2008 (Gabor and Ban 2016, p.617). As customer deposits fell 
under EMU (ECB 2005[c]), financial institutions began relying increasingly on short-term 
lending from the interbank repo markets.   
 
Whereas traditional bank deposits are usually guaranteed by home sovereigns, there are no 
such guarantees in the repo markets and assurances are instead provided by collateral 
(Gabor 2012, p.17).  This collateral (usually government bonds or asset-backed securities 
[ABS]165) is ‘marked-to-market’, meaning value is derived not from assets stated worth, but 
by the prevailing market price.  This means collateral prices can fluctuate quite dramatically.  
Daily ‘margin calls’ are made by lenders (DB 2005[b], p.30), and if asset prices deteriorate, 
‘collateral calls’ may be requested to set aside additional assets against default, or a ‘hair 
cut’166 taken from the stock the borrower retrieves at the end of the agreed term (Blyth 
2013[a], p.23-6; Gabor 2012, p.15; Hardie et al. 2013, p.709). As discussed above, the ECB 
also adopted these practices when conducting its own repo operations to reduce moral 
hazard and encourage market discipline, despite most European central banks prior to EMU 
not assuming ‘mark-to-market’ methods (Gabor and Ban 2016, p.627). 
 
Once capital markets became liberalised and market-based banking and securitisation 
become established practice, there were good ideational reasons for the ECB to encourage 
financial integration (ECB 2003[a], p.55). Aside from increasing efficiency, generating higher 
returns for investors and improving the provision of finance for lucrative businesses (Baele 
et.al 2004, p.7; Duisenberg 2000[a]; Levine 2001), more integrated money markets helped 
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 In the US, US Treasury securities in outstanding repos ranged from between 56 percent  and 66 percent 
between 2001-2006, with agency and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) accounting for about 15% each. 
Corporate bonds made up the rest (ECB 2006[a]). 
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 The amount of collateral repurchased being reduced due to a fall in the price of the collateral. 
smooth the transmission of monetary policy (Gabor and Ban 2016, p.618; Issing 2008, p.214; 
Tumpel-Gugerell 2005). A single monetary policy loses its singleness if different member-
states experience different real interest rates (Bibow 2015, p.64). For a central bank 
constructed on a monetarist ideational platform of tackling inflation, harmonised interest 
rates and an integrated Eurozone money market were considered a sine qua non for the 
successful implementation of monetary policy and delivery of price stability (ECB 2003[a], 
p.58; Papademos 2005). 
 
The ECB therefore developed a Master Agreement sponsored by the European Banking 
Federation and backed by the Commissions’ 2002 Financial Collateral Directive (FCD). The 
FCD committed member-states to the removal of constraints on banks’ use of repos by 
establishing a simplified legal framework for collateral, as well as proposals for a single pan-
European central counterparty (ECB 2002[a], p.11; 2004[a]; Tumpel-Gugerell 2006). Despite 
ECB recognition that integrated interbank markets risked creating financial contagion during 
a downturn167 (ECB 2000[d], p.50; 2002[c], p.56), this Directive provided the basis for a 
European repo market where financial institutions could move liquidity and collateral across 
borders without obstacles (Bibow 2015, p.64; ECB 2002[b], p.55-68; Gabor and Ban 2015, 
p.618).  
 
Importantly, these capital market reforms not only led to an increase in Euroarea financial 
integration, but also to a gradual weakening of EMUs monetarist framework by exposing the 
paradox of a currency union which sought to implement a single monetary policy through an 
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 Integrated money markets can generate problems by increasing the likelihood of cross-border financial 
contagion (Commission 2007[b], p.37; McNamara 1998, p.50; Story and Walter 1997, p.254). If one bank 
suffers financial difficulties and reneges on its liabilities to other financial institutions, those institutions 
themselves may face severe financing problems. 
integrated interbank market, whilst concurrently requiring market discipline in the 
sovereign bond markets to maintain fiscal discipline. The Master Agreement, FASP and FCD 
boosted demand for securities and bonds accepted as collateral in the repo markets (Gabor 
and Ban 2016, p.621; Pozsar 2014, p.10-12). Because the ECB began to treat all Euroarea 
sovereign bonds the same in repo transactions, it made little difference to market 
participants whether they invested in German Bunds or Greek bonds as each could be 
traded in exchange for liquidity. This ensured all Euroarea sovereign bonds (even those from 
the periphery), said to account for around 80 percent of EU repo collateral (ICMA 2015, p.8), 
became important and sought after assets (Gabor 2016, p.984).  
 
The no-bailout-clause and other structural mechanisms implemented at Maastricht were 
put in place to separate monetary and fiscal policy and encourage investors to discriminate 
between sovereigns (Bibow 2015, p.22; Cœuré 2016). Yet these collateral reforms had the 
exact opposite effect: converging yields, reducing market discipline and easing fiscal 
pressures. As figure 5.7 (below) indicates, there is a clear correlation between these repo 
policies and converging bond yields. These policies appear to have been far more successful 
at achieving convergence than the Maastricht Treaty articles were at encouraging market 
discrimination. Programmatic monetarist imperatives which drove the process of financial 
integration therefore weakened the neo-liberal structure of EMU and acted to mask 
fundamental underlying structural differences between member-states, creating a well of 
cheap credit for peripheral nations (Blyth 2013[a], p.78; Lynn 2011, p.61; Schnabl and 
Freitag 2011). This shows how ideational contradictions can lead to institutional change 
through time, depicted by scenario G from table 2.2: 
 
Financial integration: 
 
G) ideational contradictions  -> gradual policy /  
     or failures     Institutional change 
 
 
Monetarist attempts to enhance financial integration and improve 
monetary policy transmission reduced market discipline in the 
sovereign bond markets. 
Illustration 5.1 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Eurozone 10-year sovereign bond yields 
 
Source: UN Data (2017) 
 
Figure 5.8 below illustrates how monetarist ideas aiming to maintain price stability through 
inflation targeting within a market-based financial environment led the ECB and Commission 
to press for further financial integration to enhance the transmission of monetary policy 
(Issing 2008, p.214; Tumpel-Gugerell 2005). These actions however led directly to a slow 
diminution of the philosophical and programmatic ideas upon which EMU was founded by 
weakening discipline in the sovereign bond markets and converging interest rates, 
encouraging ‘southern’ states to take on more public and private debt (Sinn 2014, p.77). 
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This required the ECB to recognise that within an integrated and marketised European 
financial system, it would need to do more than simply generate price stability to ensure 
financial stability (Tricht 2003; Padoa-Schioppa 2003), leading the bank to evolve its pre-
crisis financial policy ideas. 
 
Figure 5.8: The cause of ECB concern for financial stability 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
In 2001 the EU launched the Lamfalussy Process168. Although a supranationalisation of EU 
financial regulations was considered at this stage to be a step too far (Alford 2006, p.396; 
Duisenberg 2001), this initiative sought to converge European supervisory practices and 
enable the EU to respond rapidly and flexibly to developments in European financial 
markets (Commission 2007[a], p.2). The Process introduced public hearings and 
opportunities for outside bodies to comment on financial legislation. It created a network of 
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committees, engaged national financial ministries and supervisors, and facilitated a 
substantial shift in financial regulation away from national bodies towards the supranational 
level (Posner 2007, p.142)169. During preparation for the Process, the ECBs role and 
participation was discussed. ECB Executive Board Member, Sirkka Hämäläinen, commented 
in 2002 that: 
 
Even though it is self-evident and without doubt that the unambiguous primary 
goal of the monetary policy in the ECB is domestic price stability… it also has 
effects, via numerous channels
170
, on global financial stability… [Therefore] close 
co-operation between the central banks and supervisory authorities is needed to 
transfer and exchange information 
 
(Hämäläinen 2002, no page) 
 
This quote shows that whilst the ECB remained officially outside the Lamfalussy Process, a 
realisation quickly emerged that as European financial markets became more market-based 
and integrated, the ECB would need to cooperate with national financial authorities more 
closely and to take a deeper interest in Euroarea financial affairs (ECB 2000[d], p.64; 
Hämäläinen 2002).  
 
GROWING CONCERN FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 
At the turn of the century, the ECB had as its primary goal the attainment of price stability. 
But it had also become an active participant in European finance. It enthusiastically 
promoted European financial integration to help facilitate monetary policy transmission 
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 2004 saw the creation of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) as part of the Lamfalussy 
Process, with the aim of facilitating further supervisory convergence, cooperation and information sharing 
(ECB 2007[a], p.40). 
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 Namely, the elimination of exchange rate volatility inside the Euroarea and reduced vulnerability of the 
area to global exchange rate turbulence. The significance of the ECB and its close contacts with other 
important central banks, Hämäläinen argued, also improved global readiness to react promptly in the event of 
a crisis (Hämäläinen 2002). 
(ECB 2003[a], p.58) despite recognising such integration increased the risk of financial 
contagion (ECB 2000[d], p.62). As a result, by as early as 2003, the beginnings of a more 
substantial ideational shift in relation to financial stability started to emerge within the ECB 
and wider central banking community.  
 
Scholars and practitioners from the BIS began to question the perceived wisdom of the 
‘continuity view’ that price stability was a ‘prerequisite’ for financial stability (Schwartz 
1995). They suggested the ‘new environment’ of low inflation and low interest rates could 
generate a situation whereby price and financial stability policy could conflict, creating a 
trade-off between the two (Borio et al. 2003; Borio and Lowe 2002; White 2006). This they 
argued may occur by a central bank maintaining low interest rates in line with its price 
stability mandate, which consequently encouraged over borrowing and asset price inflation 
in financial markets. There is evidence that although the ECB did not recognise the 
possibility of a trade-off – given the legitimacy of the institution was premised on 
monetarist programmatic ideas and the preservation of price stability – it did at least begin 
to engage with such matters (Issing 2003). 
 
The bank also began to voice concern over the form European financial integration was 
starting to take, with highly integrated capital markets and negligible cross-border retail 
activity (Baele et al. 2004; Cabral et al. 2002; Trichet 2003). It therefore increasingly argued 
that central banks could not afford to simply ignore financial stability whilst maintaining 
price stability (Padoa-Schioppa 2003).  
 
Although in the final few months of his presidency, Wim Duisenberg continued to argue: 
The best contribution a central bank can make to prevent financial bubbles from 
forming and bursting is to continue pursuing a monetary policy aimed at 
maintaining price stability 
 
(Duisenberg 2003, no page) 
 
In the same year, Executive Board Member Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa insisted that: 
 
While both inflation and deflation are detrimental to financial stability, price 
stability is certainly not a sufficient condition for financial stability… tools 
primarily intended for maintaining price stability, interest rates and market 
operations, can at times be used to promote financial stability [particularly during 
a downturn] 
 
(Padoa-Schioppa 2003) 
 
These are important remarks and the contrast between the two speakers is stark. Dr Padoa-
Schioppa’s comments show for the first time a discursive shift in ECB communicative 
discourse with external parties (Schmidt 2008; 2010) concerning the inability of price 
stability policies alone to maintain financial stability. The quote also voices the idea that 
monetary policy tools may at times be used to promote financial stability rather than just 
price stability. This signifies a substantial shift in ECB thinking and the two quotes together 
represent a clear example of interdiscursivity (two competing ideas being aired by the same 
institution [Fairclough 2010, p.95; Wodak 2001{b}]), as the bank evolved its ideational and 
discursive approach to price and financial stability. 
 
2003 also saw a change at the helm of the ECB, with President Duisenberg (a Dutchman) 
replaced (largely at the insistence of the French government) by Jean-Claude Trichet, former 
Governor of the Bank of France (Banque de France). This change heralded a renewed focus 
on financial stability. In only his third speech on the 26th November, just over three weeks 
after taking office, the new president delivered an address entitled ‘Financial Stability’. In it, 
he struck a very different tone from that of his predecessor: 
 
The single currency, the ESCB and single market for liquid reserves – the money 
market in euro – are creating a much more interconnected European financial 
system than is usually acknowledged… [The ECB should therefore begin]… 
enhancing its activities in the field of European financial stability [to prevent 
potential problems] 
 
(Trichet 2003, no page) 
 
He drew attention to the fact investors had begun moving away from bank deposits towards 
direct and collective security investments and commented that banks hold significant 
exposures in relation to non-bank financial institutions which themselves suffer from direct 
market exposures. He went on:  
 
These concerns are severe and great caution is warranted in the reform of 
accounting standards… When bank capital is largely based on risk and risk 
increases in a recession, macroeconomic consequences might arise through a 
pro-cyclical reduced ability of banks to lend… The deepening market integration 
experienced in the EU has given rise to the need for enhanced supervisory 
cooperation and common financial stability surveillance 
 
(Trichet 2003, no page) 
 
Under the presidency of Jean-Claude Trichet and long before the financial crisis, the ECBs 
commutative discourse towards financial stability started to look a lot different. This came 
as a direct consequence of monetarist programmatic ideas which successfully encouraged a 
rapid integration of EU capital markets. In terms of concrete policy actions, however, the 
ECB remained hamstrung both structurally and ideationally by the structure of EMU and the 
dominance of non-interventionist policy ideas derived from traditional monetarism. The 
bank therefore only acted to improve transparency by increasing the number of articles and 
reports on the subject and by stepping up its internal coordinative discourse (Schmidt 2014), 
increasing the number of discussions concerning financial stability in the Governing Council 
(Trichet 2003).  
 
By end-2005, the ECB had also formulated a mission statement for the Eurosystem, 
incorporating financial stability into its charge: 
 
We in the Eurosystem have as our primary objective the maintenance of price 
stability for the common good. Acting also as a leading financial authority, we 
aim to safeguard financial stability and promote European financial integration 
 
(Trichet 2005[a], no page) 
 
This statement provides another example of interdiscursivity (Wodak 2001[b]) as it 
encapsulates nicely both the path-dependence one would anticipate from HI, and the 
ideational change one would expect from DI. We can see the continuity of monetarist ideas 
which reaffirm price stability as the ECBs primary objective, but can also view the ideational 
shift towards greater concern for financial stability. Although monetarism remained weaved 
into the fabric of the ECB and the credibility and legitimacy of the bank continued to depend 
on the maintenance of price stability (Högenauer and Howarth 2016), there becomes a clear 
acceptance that the delivery of price stability alone would be insufficient to guarantee 
financial stability within a progressively integrated and market-based financial system 
(Papademos 2006; Trichet 2004[a]; 2005[a]).  
 
As a consequence, the bank developed new financial policy ideas. It enhanced the 
monitoring of financial developments at the supranational level (Trichet 2003; 2004[a]; 
2005[a]; 2005[b]) and produced two new publications: EU Banking Sector Stability reports 
and the Financial Stability Review. Both tended to concentrate on similar topics, but EU 
Banking Sector Stability publications focused specifically on the banking sector, while 
Financial Stability Reviews took a broader perspective.  
 
The main concerns raised in these publications are discussed throughout this section and 
are set out in tables 5.4 and 5.5 below. They show that the ECB drew consistent attention to 
the exposure of many states banking systems to inflated real estate prices. These exposures, 
it suggested, may occur either directly through non-performing loans (NPLs) during a 
downturn, or indirectly by holding ABSs underpinned by commercial or residential property 
(ECB 2003[b], p.31; 2005[a], p.79; 2006[a], p.23). It worried too about interstate financial 
imbalances both internal and  
 
Table 5.4: Main concerns within EU Banking Sector Stability reports 
 Real 
Estate 
exposure 
& ABS 
Profitability 
/ Weak 
Economy 
High 
Corporate & 
Household 
Indebtedness 
Complex 
Securitisation 
& Hedge 
Funds 
Global 
Imbalances 
/ US Debt 
Low 
Provisions 
Search for 
Yield / low 
credit 
standards 
Low 
Deposits / 
Interbank 
Borrowing
171 
2003, 
Feb     
  
  
   
2003, 
Nov       
     
2004, 
Nov       
 
  
 
    
2005, 
Oct   
 
            
2006, 
Nov   
 
            
2007, 
Nov     
 
    
 
    
 
Source: Author (2018) 
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 Liquidity risk concerns, but mainly anxieties about profitability. 
external to the Euroarea (ECB 2005[b], p.9; 2006[a], p.10), as well as high levels of 
household and corporate debt facilitated by historically low interest rates (which the ECB 
believed was partly caused by the successful implementation of monetary policy [ECB 
2005[b], p.11]) and increased banking competition (ECB 2005[c], p.23; 2006[a], 2007[c], 
p.11). 
 
Table 5.5: Main concerns within Financial Stability Reviews 
 Real 
Estate 
exposure 
& ABS 
Profitability 
/ Weak 
Economy 
High 
Corporate & 
Household 
Indebtedness 
Complex 
Securitisation 
& Hedge 
Funds 
Global 
Imbalances 
/ US Debt 
Low 
Provisions172 
Search 
for Yield / 
High 
Asset 
Prices 
Interbank 
Markets 
and 
Liquidity 
2004, 
Dec     
 
    
 
    
2005, 
June   
 
          
 
2006, 
Dec   
 
          
 
2006, 
June   
 
          
 
2006, 
Dec   
 
      
 
  
 
2007 
June   
 
      
 
    
2007 
Dec   
  
    
 
    
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
This competition and low interest rate environment led to a ‘search for yield’ by financial 
institutions, including hedge funds (ECB 2005[a]), which lowered credit standards and 
inflated asset prices on the run up to the crisis (ECB 2004[b], p.9; 2005[b], p.11; 2006[a], 
p.9). While the ECB was fully aware of these problems and consistently drew attention to 
them, it had neither the ideational nor policy tools to deal with them: 
 
It’s as if our models weren’t working in the sense that something must be wrong. 
Aren’t we too successful? But we had money growth and we were looking at it 
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 Because of low Non-Performing Loan (NPL) rates. 
because we designed the ECB to be like the Bundesbank, but then there were 
even people like [redacted] who… would say things like, maybe you should just 
abandon the monetary pillar because you… are just introducing noise to the 
communication 
(ECB: interview #3, 2015) 
 
As the quote above shows, although the ECB recognised credit growth was becoming 
uncomfortably high and a search for yield was under way, the banks mandate extended only 
as far as controlling inflation. Despite the improved monitoring and communicative 
discourse with market participants, the ECB was structurally and ideationally restricted from 
intervening in financial markets (Papademos 2006). Therefore whilst over the course of the 
pre-crisis period a substantial ideational shift took place in relation to financial stability 
(which is best explained with insights from DI), it was also constrained by path-dependent 
forces (better understood through HI). EMUs legalistic structure prevented the ECB 
implementing interventionist financial policy ideas, and its legitimacy and credibility 
remained tied to the delivery of price stability (Praet 2016[b]; Issing 2001). Scenarios D and I 
from table 2.2 are therefore each relevant for EMU during this period. 
 
 
The ECBs monetarist framework: 
 
D) established ideas in new institutions  ->  hinder policy change 
 
 
ii) established programmatic ideas  -> strengthen existing  
structures  
 
 
I) ridged legal structure   -> hinders policy /  
institutional change 
 
 
A combination of established programmatic ideas and a ridged legal 
structure meant financial stability policy ideas failed to provoke 
fundamental institutional change. 
Illustration 5.2 
President Trichet therefore ruled out targeting asset prices, attempting to prick asset 
bubbles and even the so-called ‘leaning against the wind’ strategy whereby policymakers 
increase interest rates to slightly above the level necessary to maintain price stability in the 
hope of slowing asset price increases and creating more leeway for rate reductions during a 
downturn (Trichet 2005[c]). Instead, the ECB merely advocated increased transparency; 
price stability analysis being conducted over the longer-term to accommodate monetary 
developments; monetary analysis to include an assessment of financial market liquidity to 
spot potential issues early; and the publication of regular financial stability publications 
(Papademos 2007[a]).  
 
With regards to interbank repo markets, the discrepancies between the two publications 
are due to the fact EU Banking Sector Stability reports mainly drew attention to the markets 
‘micro’ role in plugging liquidity shortages. Because they were often used by banks as a 
replacement for customer deposits, they improved bank profitability (ECB 2004[c], p.10; 
2005[c], p.21; 2006[b], p.21). Financial Stability Reviews meanwhile tended to take a 
‘macro’ view and discussed anxieties about contagion risks (ECB 2004[b], p.83; 2007[b], 
p.153; 2007[c], p.31). While Trichet directly addressed worries about repo market contagion 
in a speech in 2004 (Trichet 2004[a]), these risks were little discussed within written 
publications between 1999-2007. 
 
The reason for this lack of attention on the potential contagion effects of repo markets was 
due to the ECBs growing confidence in its ability to deliver a stable economic and financial 
environment within a monetarist EMU framework. National financial supervisors had 
implemented liberalising market-based measures to ease banks financing conditions in 
preparation for the euro (Gabor 2016, p.978; Malo de Molina 2012, p.198). During the early 
years of EMU, the ECB and Commission built on this foundation by implementing the FSAP 
(1999) and FCD (2002). These policies were deemed so successful that the interbank market 
was considered too big and too liquid to fail. 
Liquidity is just trust. I mean, I will lend you money unconditionally if I trust you, if 
I don’t trust you, I don’t give you liquidity it’s as simple as that… [redacted] 
always used to say that the European interbank market would never fail because 
it was so liquid. But what he was actually saying is that it cannot fail because 
everybody trusts each other so much.  But if you take that trust out it fails 
instantly 
 
(Commission: interview #18, 2015) 
 
As this quote from a member of the Commission’s Financial Stability and Monetary Affairs 
Directorate makes clear, the amount of liquidity and trust within European capital markets 
meant little consideration was devoted to the possibility of their collapse. In the repo 
markets, this trust extended even further as banks provided liquidity in exchange for 
collateral that was secured against highly rated government debt or real estate loans. Even 
if interbank liquidity did dry up, there was little reason to suspect banks may become unable 
to obtain liquidity as the ECB accepted such a wide range of collateral in its Open Market 
Operations (ECB 2004[b], p.83; 2006[a], p.72; Ullrich 2006). This confidence in the interbank 
market and in the collateral underpinning it also explains the ECBs failure to discuss 
European ‘safe assets’ before the crisis. 
 
While the German government sought to stimulate demand for German bonds prior to 
EMU, the need for a specific European debt security backed by ECB firepower was regarded 
as neither necessary nor desirable. It was considered unnecessary because it was assumed 
‘flight to quality’ would benefit all Eurozone government bonds during a downturn, limiting 
contagion effects173 (ECB 2005[b], p.149), and it was thought undesirable because the 
existence of a ‘safe asset’ was expected to weaken market discipline and reduced fiscal 
pressures on EMU governments. The Maastricht framework was specifically structured to 
encourage discrimination between sovereigns (Bibow 2015, p.22; Cœuré 2016) and creating 
a safe asset would have undermined this monetarist structure. By 2003, Germany had 
already raised fears that bond market participants viewed the no-bailout-clause as un-
credible, as they were failing to distinguish between EMU sovereigns (Heppke-Falk and 
Hüfner 2003, p.3). Monetarist nations were therefore unlikely to have accepted any moves 
towards weakening market discipline still further by creating a mutual sovereign debt 
security. 
 
SUMMARY 
As a consequence of market-based banking and ECB programmatic monetarist ideas, during 
EMU, the Commission and ECB pushed for closer European financial integration (Gabor and 
Ban 2016, p.618; Issing 2008, p.214; Tumpel-Gugerell 2005). This was particularly successful 
in the interbank repo markets after the completion of the FCD (2002) which aimed to 
harmonise financing conditions across the Eurozone and allow for the smooth 
implementation of monetary policy. This integration was pursued despite ECB acceptance 
that one likely consequence could be increased financial instability (ECB 2000[d], p.50; 
2002[c], p.56). Recognising the dominance of monetarist ideas is therefore essential to 
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 During the initial phase of the crisis in early 2007, interest rates for all EMU member-states did indeed start 
to decline (ECB 2007[c], p.80), with little divergence visible until late 2009 (figure 5.7). 
understand the ECBs position on financial integration and why an EMU-wide money market 
was deemed so important. 
 
Crucially however, these initiatives also acted to weaken traditional monetarist ideas as they 
reduced market discipline in the sovereign bond market and converged interest rates on 
government debt, allowing peripheral states to borrow more cheaply (Blyth 2013[a], p.78; 
Schnabl and Freitag 2011; Lynn 2011, p.61). This reveals the inherent contradiction at the 
heart of the Maastricht framework which called both for inflation targeting to be 
implemented through the manipulation of interest rates, and for bond markets to 
discriminate between EMU sovereigns in a bid to separate monetary and fiscal policy. The 
history of EMU has since proven these two ideals cannot be maintained simultaneously. 
 
At the birth of EMU, responsibility for financial stability remained with national regulators 
and central banks considered the delivery of price stability to be the best way to promote 
financial stability (Issing 1999[a]; Noyer 1999[b]). But closer integration heightened 
contagion risks, resulting in the ECB monitoring and communicating its financial stability 
concerns more explicitly (Padoa-Schioppa 2003; Papademos 2006; Trichet 2003). A clear 
ideational shift therefore took place within the ECB during this period, along with a 
definitive change in ECB communicative discourse.  
 
While insights from DI help contextualise both these developments, significant path-
dependent trends could also be detected. Structural factors explain why despite drawing 
attention to financial stability concerns, the ECB remained powerless to implement 
interventionist policy ideas aimed at tackling them.  National regulators remained in control 
of national financial systems (Bibow 2015, p.21; Scheller 2006, p.111), which meant the ECB 
had neither the tools nor the mandate to act on financial anxieties (Papademos 2006).  
 
The legalistic structure of EMU exerted a powerful path-dependent force on the ECB, and 
the legitimacy and credibility of the institution remained wedded to the conveyance of price 
stability (Issing 2001; Praet 2016[b]). Indeed, even under the presidency of Jean-Claude 
Trichet, the bank remained committed to monetarist ideas and continued to promote 
financial integration while rejecting the use of monetary policy for any purpose other than 
the pursuit of price stability (Trichet 2004[b]; 2005[c]). Analysis of the pre-crisis period 
therefore shows that despite substantial ideational change, transformative ideas were 
compressed by the dominance of traditional ideas, and by the ridged structure of EMU, 
resulting in fundamental institutional change being avoided. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
Why has the ECB become increasingly attentive to financial stability 
concerns  throughout its history? 
 
This chapter filled an important gap in contemporary literature by examining the extent to 
which the ECBs approach to financial stability evolved during the first 8 years of EMU. It 
showed although differences existed between member-states during the institutional 
formation of the euro (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p.342), monetarist programmatic ideas 
nevertheless became the ideational foundation of the single currency (McNamara 1998, 
p.56-7; Schmidt 2014). This ensured the ECBs primary objective throughout the period was 
the pursuit of price stability using policy interest rates (Howarth and Loedel 2005, p.15; 
Issing 2002[a], p.23; Quaglia 2008, p.110).  
 
This sent the ECB on a path-dependent trajectory, knotting together monetarist ideas and 
inflation targeting with the bank’s credibility and legitimacy (Cecchetti and Schoenholtz 
2008, p.4; Issing 2001; Praet 2016[b]). Distancing the ECB from such ideas would have 
involved significant ‘sunk costs’ and brought into question the legality of its actions 
(González-Páramo 2005; Högenauer and Howarth 2016; Sibert 2009). Yet the chapter also 
showed that while financial stability was certainly viewed as a secondary, or even tertiary 
consideration behind price stability and financial integration during the early years of EMU, 
it was never wholly neglected and became increasingly important through time. Indeed, 
financial policy ideas always played a role within EMU (Micossi 2015, p.3), beginning with 
the Banking Supervisory Sub-Committee of the EMI and continuing with the BSC, the 
monitoring of financial data within the first monetary pillar, and the management of open 
market operations.  
 
As European finance became increasingly interconnected and market-based programmatic 
monetarist ideas led the Commission and ECB to pursue integrationist policies aimed at 
improving interest rate transmission (Gabor and Ban 2016, p.618; Issing 2008, p.214; 
Tumpel-Gugerell 2005).  This began to expose contradictions within EMUs framework as 
other monetarist imperatives – such as the need for discipline in the sovereign bond 
markets – were counteracted by collateral policies which treated all Euroarea sovereign 
debt equally. These rules not only weakened monetarist principles regarding fiscal 
conservativism, but also exacerbated financial contagion risk (Papademos 2006; Trichet 
2004[a]; 2005[a]). This realisation led the ECB to alter its contention that price stability 
should be the only objective central banks should pursue during ‘normal times’, towards 
recognising the importance of financial stability as an independent policy goal (Padoa-
Schioppa 2003; Tricht 2003). 
 
Therefore while the ECB undoubtedly displayed path-dependency through its commitment 
to price stability (Salines et al. 2011), the early years of EMU should not be viewed as a 
‘punctuated equilibrium’ (Krasner 1988) either side of two ‘critical junctures’ (Capoccia and 
Kelemen 2007, p.346) in the form of the Maastricht Treaty (Verdun 2015, p.231 and 2007; 
Yiangou, et al. 2013, p.225) and the financial crisis (Braun 2015, p.422; Verdun 2015, p.222). 
Substantive ideational and discursive changes took place endogenously during this ‘normal’ 
period, which may easily be missed viewed solely through the prism of HI (Lieberman 2002, 
p.698; Posner 2007, p.145). By combining both HI and DI, the chapter exposed the 
ideational and structural forces constraining and enabling institutional change. As a result, it 
was able to fully account for why the ECB became increasingly attentive to financial stability 
concerns throughout the pre-crisis period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Post-Crisis  
National Financial Systems 
 
Why were Spain and Germany impacted differently by the financial 
crisis, and why did they pursue different policy objectives at the 
European level? 
 
Although the European Central Bank (ECB) has recently gained significant authority over 
financial supervision as well as monetary policy, the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB) continues to exist as a federation, with National Central Banks (NCBs) maintaining 
important roles in the implementation and operation of monetary and financial policies 
(Cohen-Setton 2011; Gros 2017; Quaglia 2008, p.3). This chapter explores the extent to 
which pre-crisis structural and ideational idiosyncrasies between two ESCB central banks – 
the Deutsche Bundesbank (DB) and Banco de España (BdE) – led to divergences in the way 
Spanish and German banks were hit by the crisis, and to differences in the way each country 
reacted to supranational policies aimed at mitigating its effects. 
 
While previous research has analysed the different ways Spanish and German banks dealt 
with the advent of market-based banking and how this influenced the timing and extent of 
the crisis in each state (Hardie and Howarth 2013[a]; Quaglia and Royo 2015; Royo 2013[a]), 
this chapter argues important ideational and structural dissimilarities evident before 2008 
are crucial to explaining why the two nations were impacted differently. It also reveals the 
significance of these factors in determining why national responses to European Union (EU) 
policies aimed at combatting the financial and sovereign debt crises differed so visibly. 
 
Using process tracing and employing insights both Historical (HI) and Discursive 
Institutionalism (DI), the chapter progresses chronologically, beginning with the initial phase 
of the crisis from 2007-2010. It asks why German banks were initially affected much more 
severely than their Spanish counterparts (Howarth and Quaglia 2015, p.460; Otero-Iglesias 
et al., 2016, p.17), and includes a critical case study of the German bailout of Hypo Real 
Estate (HRE) - the biggest bank nationalisation in German history (Scally 2013[a]).  
 
The second section examines the start of the sovereign debt crisis between 2010-2012. This 
segment contains a critical case study of Spain’s bailout of Bankia and explains why this 
event should be regarded as the climax of the sovereign debt crisis and as a critical juncture 
which catalysed change in both Spain and the wider EU (Romero 2012). It also explains why 
German and Spanish policymakers exhibited different levels of enthusiasm towards 
supranational policies which intended to diffuse the crisis; focusing specifically on the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the ECBs Securities Markets Program (SMP). The 
penultimate segment explores the German and Spanish authorities differing attitudes 
towards Banking Union (BU), while the final section draws a conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
6.1: Initial Crisis Phase (2007-2010) 
 
GERMANY 
Because under EMU the DB and Federal Finance Ministry became less concerned about 
short-term finance and actively promoted German securitisation (Asmussen 2006; DB 
2003[a], p.22; 2006[a], p.31-3), large German banks became marketised predominantly on 
the asset-side of their balance sheets (Hardie and Howarth 2013[a], p.104). Having invested 
heavily in foreign securities, once asset prices began to fall in July 2007, financing options 
began to dry up and the German banking system quickly became one of the most battered 
in Europe174.  
 
Germany was impacted so quickly by the crisis because of the vulnerability of assets held 
principally by large commercial banks (Kreditbanken) and Landesbanken175. The pre-crisis 
accumulation of such risk was facilitated by the DBs subscription to non-interventionist 
financial policy ideas which it derived from its ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik), monetarist 
approach to economic and monetary policy. The DB allowed German banks to run down 
their loan-loss provisions and failed to implement countercyclical policies which may have 
softened the initial crash (DB 2004[a], p.35; 2005[a], p.69). Pre-crisis financial ideas thus had 
a direct bearing on both the speed and magnitude of the crisis in Germany. These findings 
allow us to understand more comprehensively than any research to date the underlying 
reasons behind the severity of the crisis in Germany in 2007 (figure 6.1). 
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 Between 2008 and September 2012 around €646 billion was set aside to rescue German banks, the second-
highest amount of any country after Great Britain (Ewing 2013; Spiegel 2013). 
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 Notably, in July 2007, IKB Deutsche Industriebank (FWB: IKBG) received a bailout package, and on the 26th 
August 2007, Sachsen Landesbank announced it was being taken over by Landesbank Baden-Württemberg 
(LBBW) after losses in the US sub-prime market meant it required an immediate cash injection of €250 million 
(Simensen 2007). 
Due to the immediacy of financial turbulence and weakness of many large German banks, 
Germany was one of the first countries to create a so-called ‘bad bank’ 
(Finanzmarktstabilisierungsanstalt, SoFFin) through the Financial Market Stabilisation Act 
(2008). This voluntary scheme allowed banks to offload their ‘toxic’ assets to a government 
backed Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV176) in exchange for safe, interest-paying bonds able to 
be used in repo transactions across the Eurosystem (DB 2009[a], p.56). SoFFin provided 
€102 billion in loan guarantees and a further €80 billion in liquidity to recapitalise distressed 
banks (Zimmermann 2014, p.493).  
 
Figure 6.1: Ideas and the German financial crisis 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
The fact Germany chose to create a voluntary program with few conditions to entry is 
telling. As the quote below from a German Economy Ministry official reveals, the 
government was reluctant to invest political capital in restructuring the banking system and 
little political pressure was directed towards reform (Röper 2017; Wilson 2012). It also 
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exposes unequivocally the importance of ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) thinking within the 
ministry and its dislike of the link between politicians and Landesbanken: 
 
This is one of those ordo-liberal things that we don’t think that the state can run 
business too well, and the Landesbanken are very good proof that they can’t run 
banks very well. Of course to change a longstanding system like this takes some 
time. Some of the Landesbanken disappeared more or less by themselves thanks 
to the last banking crisis. I think we didn’t try too much for their disappearance… 
but of course those banks are nothing you would build if you were setting up a 
new system on a green field. But they’re there and it takes time to change 
 
(German Economics Ministry: interview #11, 2015) 
 
This quote illustrates that despite the dominance of ordo-liberal ideas in the ministry, the 
path-dependent structure of Germany’s financial system was largely preserved. As 
highlighted in chapter 4, path-dependence in the Landesbank sector was facilitated by the 
vested interests of regional politicians who sought to continue using the banks to advance 
their own objectives (Rawcliffe 2007; Ross 2014[b]; German Finance Ministry: interview #12, 
2015). To spur reform, the government could have imposed higher capital ratios and forced 
struggling banks and Landesbanken into the SoFFin program to change their business 
models (Spiegel 2008). Yet despite ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) preferences for de-
politicised banking, wholesale structural reform was avoided and path-dependence 
preserved.  
 
The salvation of Germany’s public banking sector and three-pillar structure was also due to 
the fact smaller public banks (Sparkassen) and cooperatives (Raiffeisenbanken and 
Volksbanken) remained domestically orientated and continued to lend to small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs, Mittelstand) during the crisis (Röper 2017, p.18; Simpson 
2013, p.20; Steinberg and Vermeiren 2015, p.397). As a result, the utility of Germany’s 
Social Market banking structure was not completely undermined, preventing alternative 
ideas from driving institutional change (Röper 2017, p.17). This ensured that Germany’s 
public banking structure fought off ideational challenges and that scenario B from the 
ideational versus structural matrix was played out. 
 
Three-pillar path-dependence: 
 
B) structures trump ideas   ->   institutional continuity 
 
 
Political vested interests and the continued functioning of smaller German 
banks prevent alternative ideas gaining traction. 
Illustration 6.1 
 
Nonetheless, by January 2009 direct government intervention did materialise when 
Commerzbank, Germany's second-largest lender, became part-nationalised with the 
government taking a 25 percent stake. This was the first time in Germany’s modern history 
that the state had taken ownership of a private consumer bank and was a matter of serious 
concern both economically and ideationally (Ward 2009; Zimmermann 2014, p.492). At the 
time, the centre-right Die Welt newspaper commented: 
 
For decades, the widespread renunciation of an active role for the state in 
economic activities has been one of the pillars of Germany's economic success. In 
cases of emergency such as this, this rule must be broken… but… such actions 
must be restricted 
 
(Die Welt 2009) 
 
As this quote indicates, state intervention ran counter to ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) 
orthodoxy and was therefore regarded as a retrograde step by many in the country. The 
liability principle (Haftungsprinzip), a key feature of ordo-liberalism (Pies and Sass 2010), 
stresses that moral hazard is created through wealth transfers and state bailouts, allowing 
investors to amass profits during good times while socialising losses in bad times (Dam and 
Koetter 2012; DB 2014, p.77). Such measures were therefore implemented with distinct 
unease (DB 2011, p.60; Hardie and Howarth 2009, p.1032; Ward 2009), with the DB making 
clear that in future, banks should be allowed to fail without jeopardising the stability of the 
system and creating moral hazard (DB 2009[b], p.12; 2014, p.74). 
 
Nevertheless, in March, Germany’s parliament passed the Expropriation Law (2009), giving 
the state authority to seize control of banks whose failure posed a risk to financial stability 
(Kollewe 2009; Mayer Brown 2009, p.4). This allowed SoFFin to take full control of HRE, and 
for a resolution vehicle (FMS Wertmanagement) to be created to manage bank liquidations 
(FMS Wertmanagement 2017). By 2014, although no small cooperatives (Raiffeisenbanken 
and Volksbanken) or savings banks (Sparkassen) had failed due to their traditional business 
models, all the larger commercial banks177 and Landesbanken178 were forced to accept state 
aid to help stabilise themselves (Gaulard et.al 2015; Ross 2014[b]).  
 
This aid was given despite the ideational discordancy of bank bailouts with ordo-liberalism 
(Ordnungspolitik), the liability principle (Haftungsprinzip), and moral hazard, and without 
the government insisting upon structural reform (Münchau 2016; Röper 2017; Wilson 2012). 
Understanding the importance of institutional structures in Germany during the early crisis 
period is therefore critical, as bailout decisions were often taken with political-electoral and 
material considerations in mind and in opposition to dominant philosophical ideas (Bastasin 
2012, ch.1; Dam and Koetter 2012, p.2353; New York Times 2008). 
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 Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Postbank and HVB Group. 
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 With the single exception of Helaba Bank. 
These state interventions nonetheless proved adequate to bring relative stability to the 
German system. Germany was able to take such action primarily because German debt had 
long been considered ‘safe’ by financial markets, resulting in low governmental borrowing 
costs. Under the European Monetary System (EMS), Germany was regarded as the de facto 
currency anchor (Heipertz and Verdun 2010, p.22; Howarth and Loedel 2005, p.18; 
Nedergaard and Snaith 2015, p.1099) and pre-EMU liberalisation over the production of 
short-term Treasury Bills and repo market rules meant German sovereign bonds remained 
prised financial assets. Germany therefore experienced the ‘exorbitant privilege’ of a ‘flight 
to safety’ (Gabor and Vestergaard 2016) during the crisis, with debt becoming cheaper to 
service than during ‘normal’ times. For nations less well regarded by the bond markets, such 
as Spain, the bailout of domestic banks proved much more costly as debt became more 
expensive to acquire. 
 
Figure 6.2: Yield on 10-year government bonds (2000-2014) 
 
Source: OECD (2018) 
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The German government maintained that this divergence resulted from fiscal policy (DB 
2000, p.49; Schäuble 2011[b]): Germany benefited from low interest rates because of its 
fiscal prudence, while peripheral states were punished as a consequence of financial 
mismanagement (Jones 2015). But this argument fails to grasp the importance of the repo 
markets and the desire of banks to hold safe assets. This appears much more important 
than fiscal policy in determining yield spreads, particularly during crisis periods. 
 
As figure 6.3 shows, even before the crisis Germany found it cheaper to borrow, despite 
lower government debt and deficits in Spain. Interest on German bonds also began to fall 
and Spanish rates to rise between 2008-10, despite a banking crisis in Germany (which had 
not yet impacted Spain), lower government debt levels in Spain and similar fiscal deficits. 
The fact Germany could afford to borrow to bailout its financial system therefore bore little 
 
Figure 6.3: Government debt versus 10-year bond yields  
 
Source: Author, OECD data (2018) 
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relation to fiscal policy179. It instead had to do with Germany’s pre-crisis reforms which 
placed German debt in a privileged position on the interbank markets (figure 6.4). 
Consequently, Germany was able to borrow from the bond markets to finance bank bailouts 
without direct outside assistance and without a fundamental reorganisation or 
modernisation of its ‘three-pillar’ structure (Ewing 2013; Hassan 2014; Hüfner 2010, p.5).  
 
Figure 6.4: National bonds used as collateral in European repo transactions (2008) 
 
 
Source: International Capital Market Association (2008) 
 
This again highlights the importance of incorporating ideational and structural causation 
into a critical understanding of German’s banking crisis. Pre-crisis policy ideas help explain 
why Germany was so severely impacted during the early stages. Germany did not 
implement ‘consolidated’ shadow bank regulation or countercyclical measures as Spain did 
(see chapter 4). Yet it was able to withstand the fiscal pressures of its bailouts and issue a 
raft of financial support measures due to actions it took pre-EMU to ensure the continuity of 
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 Germany also consistently broke EU Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) rules between 2002-2005, while Spain 
ran government surpluses. 
Germany’s status as a benchmark issuer of sovereign debt (Ewing 2013; Hassan 2014; 
Hüfner 2010, p.5). Structural characteristics meanwhile explain why smaller German banks 
were able to continue lending during the downturn (Röper 2017, p.18) and why despite 
holding philosophical ideas which stand opposed to state subsidies, the government 
decided (reluctantly) to step in to preserve Germany’s ‘three-pillar’ financial structure 
(Bastasin 2012, p.33; Ross 2014[a]). 
 
Critical Case Study: Hypo Real Estate 
HRE Group consisted of three parts180 which together formed Germany’s second-biggest 
property lender (Commission 2008; HRE Group 2008; Wilson 2008) with a balance sheet 
worth over €400 billion181 (Balzli and Dettmer 2009; Tyler 2008). It was the fifth German 
bank to be bailed-out in the wake of the crisis and the only German institution to be fully 
nationalised, representing the largest and most important of Germany’s bank bailouts 
(Kollewe 2009; Zimmermann 2014, p.491). Its example is also emblematic of the wider 
problems facing German’s financial system during the early crisis period.  
 
Due to the unprofitability of the domestic market (Commission 2014, p.40; Hardie and 
Howarth 2009, p.1019) and the self-regulatory approach adopted by the DB, HRE, like many 
large German banks, invested heavily in US and peripheral Asset-Backed Securities (ABSs) 
which they originated off-shore through SPV programs (Detzer et al. 2017, p.68). Once the 
financial crisis struck and the market for such products collapsed, the risk premiums for 
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 Hypo Real Estate Bank, Hypo Real Estate Bank International and Depfa Deutsche Pfandbriefbank. 
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 €403 billion in 2008, of which €294 billion consisted of infrastructure loans (HRE 2008, p.85). 
holding them increased exponentially182. This had an immediate impact on HRE and other 
banks conducting similar business. 
 
Table 6.1: HRE asset exposure by country (2008) 
 
Germany 23% 
USA 16% 
GIIPS183 26% (approx.) 
Other 35% 
 
Source: HRE Group Annual Report (2008, p.83) 
 
The table above highlights HRE’s high exposure to US and peripheral countries as a 
percentage of its overall balance sheet. The table below indicates how falling asset prices 
negatively impacted the banks’ capital ratios. Such a large reduction in the figures between 
2007-2008 meant the bank struggled to meet capital requirements and had fewer tradable 
assets with which to assess liquidity, resulting in its inability to meet financial obligations. 
 
 
Table 6.2: HRE capital ratio (2007-8) 
 
 2008 2007 
Core Capital  €5.9 bn €9.3 bn 
Own Funds €8.2 bn €12.2 bn 
Risk-Weighted Assets €95.3 bn €109.1 bn 
Core Capital Ratio 6.2% 8.5% 
Own Funds Ratio 8.6% 11.1% 
 
Source: HRE Group Annual Report (2008, p.2) 
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 In the case of AAA rated Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), premiums rose tenfold from 0.7% 
to 7%. For ABS, premiums rose from 5.5% to 13% (HRE 2008, p.29). 
183
 Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
The troubles began for HRE when it purchased the Irish lender Depfa Bank184 in October 
2007 for €5.7 billion. Depfa pursued a highly profitable yet speculative business model: 
lending capital for long-term infrastructure and commercial property projects through 
borrowing obtained on the short-term money markets (Commission 2008; 2011, p.41). Once 
this funding channel collapsed after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
Depfa was forced to appeal to the wider HRE Group for capital.  
 
Unfortunately, the wider group was also experiencing problems relating to poorly 
performing assets and HRE became unable to meet obligations (Commission 2008; 2011, 
p.41). In October 2008, despite reluctance from German officials, the government agreed a 
€50 billion partially state-backed aid package of loans and credit guarantees to bailout the 
lender (Bastasin 2012, p.33). HRE was eventually nationalised in October 2009 (Commission 
2011; Reuters 2009), with SoFFin taking full control of all assets and liabilities. This action 
was taken as a ‘last resort’ by DB President Axel Weber and Bafin185 boss Jochen Sanio 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine 2009), to prevent a total collapse of Germany’s banking system186 
(Bastasin 2012, p.33; Manager Magazin 2009). In October 2010, FMS Wertmanagement was 
created as a winding-up vehicle for HRE. Based in Munich, it is the largest bad bank in 
Europe and is tasked with unwinding assets previously owned by the group (Commission 
2011, p.44; FMS Wertmanagement 2017). 
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Depfa Bank  was originally named Deutsche Pfandbriefanstalt, was founded in 1922 to provide residential 
property loans in Wiesbaden (Germany). It later opened an Irish subsidiary and transferred its headquarters to 
Dublin (Scally 2013[a]). 
185
 Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). The DB essentially acts as both a regulator and supervisor, 
while BaFin conducts accounting functions and ensures that established rules are followed (DB 2017[b]). 
186
 Such a scenario would have been considered ‘the end of the world’ by German officials (Manager Magazin 
2009). 
The affair marked one of the biggest injections of state-aid of the entire financial crisis. Such 
support was made possible because of the ‘safe asset’ status of German government bonds 
(Gabor 2016, p.978; Röper 2017) which was facilitated by the liberalising measures 
introduced by the DB and Finance Ministry during preparations for EMU. These changes 
were predicated on traditional ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) ideas and a reinterpretation of 
aspects of German monetarism which saw short-term finance as less threatening to price 
stability under a system of inflation targeting (Weber 2005, p.15). Ideas are therefore crucial 
to understand how the bailout of HRE and many other large German banks was made 
possible, while DB non-interventionist policy ideas (coupled with the decentralised structure 
of Germany’s regulatory framework) explain why German banks were permitted to invest so 
heavily in foreign assets (Reuter 2008; Spiegel 2008).  
 
However, recognising structural dynamics is also necessary to comprehend the full picture. 
Bank bailouts were provided despite ordo-liberal philosophical ideas which opposed any 
weakening of the liability principle (Haftungsprinzip) (DB 2011, p.60; Hardie and Howarth 
2009, p. 1032). The sunk costs involved in any ‘end of the world’ collapse of Germany’s 
banking system were considered too great to allow HRE and others to fail (Bastasin 2012, 
p.33; Manager Magazin 2009). A broad historical lens and recognition of ideational and 
structural factors are therefore essential to fully understand how structural path-
dependence in Germany was preserved during the immediate post-crisis period. 
 
 
 
 
SPAIN 
Before the crisis the BdE maintained distinct financial policy ideas, implementing strong 
interventionist regulation and countercyclical accounting standards. Unlike Germany 
therefore, Spain coped relatively well with the initial stages of the crisis (Howarth and 
Quaglia 2015, p.460; Otero-Iglesias et al., 2016, p.17). Due to consolidated regulation 
introduced by the BdE which severely restricted off-balance sheet activity, the liquidity 
support provided by Spanish banks to their SPVs was very low, just $7.08 billion in 2007 
compared to $310.84 billion for Germany (Fitch Ratings 2007).  
 
Until end-2010, dynamic provisions also helped dilute problems by allowing banks to draw 
down on the €40 billion safety net they accumulated during the boom. Evidence from the 
BdE shows that provisions worked largely as intended, dampening credit supply before 2007 
while softening the effects of the crash in the immediate aftermath (Jiménez et al. 2012). 
This again shows how pre-crisis financial ideas and the policies they gave rise to are crucial 
to explaining why countries were impacted differently by the crisis, and why Spain was able 
to withstand the early fallout187 (Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016, p.27). 
 
Nevertheless, provisions and astute regulation proved insufficient to mitigate the full-scale 
financial crisis that was to follow (Garicano 2012[a]). German banks amassed asset-side risk 
on the lead up to the crisis by purchasing foreign debt which they used as collateral in the 
repo markets. Spanish banks meanwhile operated at the opposite end of the equation, by 
transforming loans into covered bonds and ABSs which were then sold to create funds for  
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 Although the first Spanish bank to receive assistance, Caja Castilla La Mancha (CCM), did so in March 2009, 
this was an outlier and it was not until 2010 that problems really began to emerge. Indeed, the worst episode 
of the crisis in Spain, the collapse of Bankia in May 2012, came three years after the German bailout of HRE. 
Figure 6.5: Ideas and the Spanish financial crisis 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
additional lending. The collapse in demand for securitised assets post-2008 therefore 
reduced the ability of Spanish banks to lend, contributing to the bursting of Spain’s property 
bubble (Hardie and Howarth 2013[a], p.13; Tortella and García-Ruiz 2013, p.185). As Spain’s 
central bank Governor, Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, pointed out: 
 
The high dependence of the Spanish economy on external financing, as a result of 
many years of spending reliant on foreign savings, made it particularly sensitive 
to any turbulence that might undermine confidence and obstruct the access of 
banks to international financial markets 
 
(Ordóñez 2008, no page) 
 
This collapse in foreign demand for securities was felt particularly harshly in the cajas where 
securitisations, largely structured around mortgage loans, represented a higher proportion 
of balance sheet assets than in commercial banks (BdE 2005[a], p.45). Indeed, the Spanish 
crisis emanated almost entirely from the cajas whose lending had stimulated a housing 
bubble they were unable to sustain in the face of collapsing demand for ABS (Garicano 
2012[b]; Royo 2013[a], p.637; 2013[b] p.153). Yet during the initial crisis phase, cajas 
continued securitising loans, but instead of selling them to investors, they traded them for 
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liquidity via ECB refinancing operations, allowing lending to be sustained (Otero-Iglesias et 
al. 2016, p.25; Sinn 2014, p.159).  
 
Although still a long way off Germany and Greece, by March 2010, Spanish banks had 
borrowed as much as €90bn in liquidity through the ECBs Main (MROs) and Long-Term 
Refinancing Operations (LTROs), around 15 percent of the bank’s total balance sheet (figure 
6.6). This is important because not only were Spanish banks (and cajas in particular) 
becoming increasingly dependent on ‘extraordinary’ monetary policies for funding, but 
MROs and LTROs only replace assets for liquidity temporarily. Ultimately, Spanish 
institutions would have to repurchase these assets, which were likely to have reduced in 
value (Gabor 2012, p.14). Moreover, over half of the liquidity generated by LTROs was 
ploughed back into Spanish sovereign bonds (Thomas 2012; Whittall and Gore 2014). 
Because collateral held in ECB repo transactions is ‘marked-to-market’, falling bond prices 
from mid-2010 resulted in borrowing via LTROs becoming increasingly expensive for banks 
holding Spanish government paper, creating further financing problems (Bindseil et al. 2017, 
p.6; Gabor 2016, p.990). 
 
Figure 6.6: ECB liquidity provision (% of total balance sheet), 2010 
 
Source: Bruegel Datasets (2017) 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Spain Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Belgium Germany
LTRO
MRO
The Spanish government began taking action to avert the crisis in June 2009 with the 
creation of the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of Banks (Fondo de Reestructuración 
Ordenada Bancaria – FROB). This came in response to liquidity problems at CCM in March 
and was intended to create an environment within which cajas could begin restructuring 
(Ysa et al. 2012, p.269; Moya 2009). In a continuation of traditional interventionist policy 
ideas, and in contrast to Germany’s voluntary bad bank scheme, the BdE was given further 
interventionist powers to reject and modify viability plans, dismiss managers, impose new 
management, and restructure governance operations. It also set aside €9 billion188 to 
facilitate a series of merges between cajas (BdE 2009, p.22; 2010, p.28).  Although the 
mergers did not aim to change the basic governance model of cajas, it was expected 
economies of scale could be achieved, making them more efficient (Cardenas 2013, p.22; 
IMF 2012[b], p.12; Ordóñez 2009). 
 
While interventionist pre-crisis BdE policy ideas help account for the delay to the Spanish 
crisis by reducing asset-side risk and increasing provisions, and can explain why the bank 
and FROB were handed further powers post-crisis, it is also important to recall structural 
dynamics. Cajas were extremely reluctant to restructure in the wake of the crisis. In the first 
few months, no funds were requested from the FROB and larger cajas refused to partake in 
the process. This was chiefly due to the hostility of regional autonomous governments 
(comunidades autónomas) to any outside influence over their cajas (Otero-Iglesias et al. 
2016, p.41). Galicia even appealed to the constitutional court (Tribunal Constitucional de 
España) in protest at the prospect of a FROB inspired merger (Royo 2013[a], p.639), 
highlighting the strength of resistance the BdE faced while pressing reform.  
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 From which the FROB could leverage up to €99 billion (BdE 2009, p.22; 2010, p.28). 
Within cajas themselves, loans were often reclassified and extended to conceal the true 
extent of losses in an attempt to buy time in the hope the economy would improve and 
asset prices recover. They also made loan books appear healthier by refinancing credit to 
struggling homeowners and businesses with lower interest rates and more liberal terms 
(Brat and Bjork 2013; Garicano 2012[b], p.80).  Rather than write-off non-performing loans 
(NPLs), they participated in asset swaps by purchasing land, taking control of property firms, 
and extending loan maturities to protect borrowers from bankruptcy (Royo 2013[a], p.642). 
Yet despite preserving a supervisory presence within cajas corporate boards, the BdE did 
not take action to confront these issues (Garicano 2012[b], p.81). When questioned on this, 
one official gave the following response: 
 
The Bank of Spain knew everything, we have reports and the onsite inspectors 
knew everything. There was a political problem within the Bank of Spain which is 
not as independent as we hoped it would be as a supervisor. Everybody knew that 
there was a bubble in the real economy.  Everybody knew that we had a 
weakness because of the funding dependency of the cajas, but at the end of the 
day, what do you do?  It’s super scary 
(BdE: interview #10, 2015) 
 
As this quote demonstrates, the BdE faced strong resistance from politicians and cajas to 
any restructure of the public banking sector and to recognise losses from domestic real 
estate (BdE: interviews #7 & #10, 2015; Brat and Bjork 2013; Brunnermeier et al. 2016, 
p.189). In a similar situation to that experienced by the DB in relation to Landesbanken, it 
was path-dependent mechanisms supported and reinforced by traditional vested interests 
that created considerable structural and political resistance to BdE reform efforts (Buck 
2017; De Barron 2011). This meant that scenario B from the ideational versus structural 
matrix is most illustrative of Spain’s public banking system during this period. Although BdE 
interventionist policy ideas helped establish a delay to the Spanish crisis, structural-political 
imperatives helped determine the extent of the problems (Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016, p.37-
40). 
 
Caja path-dependence: 
 
B) structures trump ideas   ->   institutional continuity 
 
 
Despite ideational imperatives, political vested interests and the structure 
of Spain’s public banking sector prevented the BdE implementing 
institutional reform. 
Illustration 6.2 
 
SUMMARY 
Previous research on the financial crisis made important discoveries in relation to the 
differences between German and Spanish financial institutions composition of risk (Hardie 
and Howarth 2013[a], p.104;  Royo 2013[a], p.154). By exploring ideational and structural 
influences within a process tracing methodological framework, this research has been able 
to explain why these differences materialised. 
 
The nature of investments made by HRE and other German lenders were facilitated by the 
DBs ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) non-interventionist approach to regulation and 
supervision (Commission 2014, p.40; Dam and Koetter 2012, p.2349; Lütz 2004, p.173). In 
Spain, consolidated accounting regulations implemented by the BdE meant Spanish banks, 
by contrast, tended not to involve themselves in off-balance sheet activity, complex 
derivatives, or short-term repo markets (Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-Herrero 2009; 
Ordóñez 2011). These different supervisory practices, rooted in distinct ‘philosophical’, 
programmatic and policy ideas, are crucial in understanding why German banks compiled so 
much risk on the asset-side while Spanish banks did not. They also help expound why the 
BdE introduced dynamic provisions before the crisis while the DB allowed German 
provisions to be wound down (DB 2006[c], p.57). This had a direct bearing on the timing and 
severity of the crisis in each country, evidenced by the emblematic example of HRE. 
 
Ideas also explain why the DB liberalised its repo and short-term debt markets pre-EMU, 
and consequently why Germany continued to be regarded as a benchmark issuer of 
European safe assets (Gabor 2016, p.978; Röper 2017). This reveals why Germany was able 
to borrow so cheaply during the crisis and could afford to bailout its financial sector without 
instituting reform, while peripheral governments like Spain saw their borrowing costs 
increase (Gabor and Vestergaard 2016; Hassan 2014; Hüfner 2010, p.5). 
 
However, recourse to ideas cannot explain the early phase of the crisis in its entirety and 
structures were also vital. The unprofitability of German’s financial system189 helps elucidate 
why German banks amassed foreign ABSs. Further, Germany bailed-out its banks and 
nationalised HRE despite such actions running counter to ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) 
principles (DB 2011, p.60; Hardie and Howarth 2009, p. 1032). Although material 
considerations undoubtedly played a role in government calculations (DB 2009[b], p.33), so 
too did political imperatives and the desire to preserve the structure of the country’s 
banking system (Dam and Koetter 2012, p.2353; New York Times 2008). This shows that 
path-dependent forces can override the ideational concerns of national authorities to 
maintain existing structures, even during times of crisis. 
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 Caused partly by the existence of Germany’s large public banking sector (IMF 2003). 
Figure 6.7: The evolution of German finance (1999-2010) 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
In Spain too, structural dynamics help uncover why the BdE continued to experience 
resistance to restructuring cajas despite intimate knowledge of their balance sheets (Buck 
2017; De Barron 2011; Garicano 2012[b], p.81). These findings help fill an important gap in 
contemporary literature and show how our understanding of the crisis can be advanced 
considerably by using insights from DI and HI together to explain ideational and structural 
trends. 
 
Figure 6.8: The evolution of Spanish finance (1999-2010) 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
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6.2: The Sovereign Debt Crisis as a critical juncture 
(2010-2012) 
 
GERMANY 
Germany’s bank bailouts had been costly190, but due to the desirability of German 
government bonds, Germany found itself in a position of relative strength during this 
period. As a creditor state, the country was able to command a good deal of influence over 
the sorts of measures Europe took to combat the crisis (Lever 2017; Wren-Lewis 2015). With 
financial problems spreading across peripheral Europe and with the ECB legally prevented 
from monetary financing, on the 18th October 2010, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, 
and French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, met in Deauville, France, and provisionally agreed a 
Treaty that would create a permanent crisis fund able to loan money to EMU states facing 
fiscal distress (Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.29). 
 
Germany had originally sought to avoid constructing a lasting crisis mechanism and was 
adamantly opposed to expanding the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)191 
(Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.218; Steinberg and Vermeiren 2016, p.393), just as it had 
opposed the automaticity of IMF bailouts during the 2001 Turkish and Argentinian crises (DB 
2002, p.120; 2007, p.73). However, when it became clear that without fiscal assistance 
many Southern states would be unable to exit the crisis, the government eventually 
relented. Germany ultimately preferred assistance to come with democratic legitimacy and 
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 Between 2008 and September 2012 around €646 billion was set aside to rescue German banks (Ewing 2013; 
Spiegel 2013). 
191
 A fund established in May 2010 in response to rising Portuguese bond yields and continued volatility.  
moral hazard limiting conditions attached, as opposed to via the backdoor through ECB 
‘extraordinary’ monetary policy (Sinn 2014, p.259). 
 
In a further parallel between Germany’s reaction to ESM and pre-crisis IMF proposals (DB 
2002, p.119-20), at Deauville, Merkel and Sarkozy agreed upon the principle of Private 
Sector Involvement (PSI). PSI would have meant private bondholders being asked to take 
haircuts on investments, reducing the size of the required bailout package for ESM 
(Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.30). As before, reducing moral hazard was the chief reason 
Germany pursued PSI inclusion: 
 
The ESM will provide for private sector involvement. This is of very high priority to 
the German government. And for good reason: We have to deal with the problem 
of moral hazard. Risks and rewards should not be separated from each other. 
Investors – and that includes European bond holders – ultimately have to bear 
the risks as well as the rewards of their decisions…  In the long run a division 
between risks undermines the foundations of capitalism – which needs risks and 
rewards to be inseparable 
(Schäuble 2011[b]) 
 
This quote by Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, reveals the extent to which ordo-liberal 
(Ordnungspolitik) philosophical ideas and German policy at the EU-level had become 
interwoven192. The Finance Ministry sought to press ahead with PSI, despite the likelihood 
that forcing haircuts would have further eroded confidence in peripheral bonds and made 
the sovereign debt crisis much worse. The ECB set its stall against PSI for exactly these 
reasons, fearing it would create both a deepening and prolongation of the crisis (ECB 
2011[e]; Smaghi 2011). 
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 Former Italian Prime Minister, Mario Monti, made a similar observation, remarking that: ‘For Germany, 
economics is a branch of moral philosophy’ (Monti 2012). 
Although Germany was ultimately unable to force PSI into the ESM framework, it was able 
to have included other measures to reduce moral hazard. The final proposals allowed for a 
method for orderly default if a member-state was found to be insolvent, with debt seniority 
issued to ESM paper193 (ESM 2011, Art.13). ESM was also signed as an intergovernmental 
treaty, with any extension of credit subject to unanimous agreement, handing a veto to 
each signature state and assuaging concerns EU taxpayers would be automatically liable 
(Dyson 2013, p.216; Gocaj and Meunier 2013, p.248; Spiegel et al. 2011). ESM support was 
also made contingent upon European Commission, IMF and ECB (so-called ‘Troika’) 
demanded Memorandums of Understandings (MoUs): agreements which outline how fiscal 
consolidation and economic reforms should be implemented (Barroso 2011; ESM 2011, 
Art.13)194. Just as Germany had sought to levy strict conditions on IMF loans before the crisis 
(DB 2003[c], p.99), it successfully pressed for MoUs to be levied upon beneficiaries of ESM 
funds. 
 
Nevertheless, this ‘sidestepping’ of the Maastricht Treaty’s no-bailout clause (Howarth and 
Quaglia 2015, p.473) represented for many in Germany a weakening of positive incentives 
and an abuse of the treaties (Beck and Prinz 2012, p.82; Henerlein 2015, p.21). Although the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in 2012 that ESM did not break the no-bailout clause 
(Art.125 TFEU): 
 
Provided that the conditions attached to such assistance are such as to prompt 
that member-state to implement a sound budgetary policy 
(ECJ 2012, Art.137) 
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 Only IMF loans now take repayment precedence over ESM issued debt. 
194
 As well as implementation of the ‘Fiscal Compact’; The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in 
the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG). 
A group of German parliamentary members asked the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) to examine the compatibility of ESM with Germany’s 
constitution. They argued ESM committed Germany to funding limitless amounts of money 
without the countries only directly elected institution, the parliament (Bundestag), having 
any control (Bulmer 2014, p.1257). Although the court ruled ESM constitutional, so long as 
explicit parliamentary consent is sought before any further funds are provided 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht 2014; Fabbrini 2016, p.261; Janning 2014), the case showed 
many in Germany were reluctant to see the country take on responsibility for providing 
financial assistance to EMU states195.  
 
In a coordinated effort to try to quell financial turbulence, in the same month ESM was 
agreed, the ECB stepped up crisis mitigation activity and began implementing its Securities 
Market Programme (SMP). The ECB argued volatility in the sovereign debt market was 
impeding the transmission of monetary policy (Trichet 2010[b]). SMP aimed to restore the 
transmission channel by purchasing Eurozone government bonds on the secondary market 
to harmonise EMU interest rates (ECB 2010 [b], p.73). 
 
This provoked even stronger resistance from many in Germany than the battle over ESM. 
SMP ran counter to orthodox DB ‘programmatic’ monetarist ideas which aim to control 
monetary aggregates and which remained sceptical about policies which go beyond the 
manipulation of interest rates (Scharpf 2011). Despite ECB ‘sterilisations’196, bond purchases 
were thought by the DB to exacerbate price pressures and threaten long-term price stability 
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 Particularly within the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] political parties. 
196
 The ECB reabsorbed liquidity generated by SMP by extracting the highly liquid deposits through fine-tuning 
operations into fixed-term deposits. This aimed to keep banks’ holdings of central bank liquidity unchanged, 
precluding any increases in monetary aggregates (ECB 2010 [b], p.24). 
(Blackstone and  Walker 2012; Carrel 2012; Weidmann 2017). Indeed, for many Germans, 
buying sovereign bonds was understood as tantamount to giving government’s access to the 
printing press and represented a weakening of EMUs monetarist framework (Blackstone 
and Walker 2012; Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.194; Sinn 2014, p.5). Governments, they 
thought, could also persuade banks within their jurisdictions to buy home sovereign debt197, 
which banks could then sell to the ECB, mutualising losses and generating moral hazard. 
 
DB President, Axel Weber, and the ECBs German Chief Economist, Jürgen Stark, both argued 
strongly against SMP, suggesting it would blur the lines between monetary and fiscal policy 
and reduce ECB independence (Meiers 2015, p.41; Weber 2010). Moreover, unlike ESM, 
SMP support did not come with accompanying MoUs, further weakening incentives for fiscal 
discipline (Buiter and Rahbari 2012, p.26).  
 
Despite Weber being tipped to become the next ECB President, the decision to proceed with 
SMP triggered his resignation in February 2011 (Weber 2011). Weber was later followed by 
Stark in September who although cited ‘personal reasons’ for leaving (ECB 2011[a]), many 
suspect the reactivation of SMP in August and the purchase of Italian and Spanish bonds 
was the real motive for his exit (Blackstone 2011; Carrel 2011; Ewing and Kulish 2011; 
Müller et al. 2011). 
 
These positions on ESM and SMP are consistent with monetarist and ordo-liberal 
(Ordnungspolitik) ideas and demonstrate the opposition of many in Germany to a 
weakening of the liability principle (Haftungsprinzip) and an increase in the risk of moral 
hazard (Nedergaard and Snaith 2015, p.1101; Pies and Sass 2010). Recognising the influence 
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 Which would lower public borrowing costs and reducing market discipline. 
of these ideas on German policy is vital to fully understand the country’s position during the 
sovereign debt crisis.  The quote below from Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, 
emphasise again German’s hostility to any weakening of the liability principle, and the 
importance of ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) ideas in driving German sentiment: 
 
One central lesson of the financial crisis was that markets could only function 
properly if risk-taking were not divorced from liability [Haftungsprinzip]. The 
loosening of this bond was a central factor of the crisis… Hence my unease when 
some politicians and economists call on the Eurozone to take a sudden leap into 
fiscal union and joint liability 
 
(Schäuble 2011[a]) 
 
However, under EMU, ‘core’ European countries198 jointly increased their credit exposure to 
peripheral states by huge amounts; in the case of Spain, by 550 percent (Lynn 2011, p.73). In 
2011, German and French banks held more than US$1 trillion in exposures to Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS), making them highly exposed to redenomination 
risk (table 6.3). It could therefore be argued that the bailout of peripheral states through  
 
Table 6.3: ‘Core’ European exposure to GIIPS (€ billion, 2011) 
 Austria Belgium France Netherlands Germany Spain 
Total bank assets  
(€ trillion) 
1.43 1.55 7.81 3.26 11.49 4.99 
Portugal 1.6 3.5 26.9 6.5 36.4 84.6 
Ireland 2.9 25.4 29.6 16.7 118.1 10 
Italy 22.2 25.8 392.6 16.7 162.3 31.2 
Greece 3.4 1.9 56.7 5.0 33.9 0.974 
Spain 6.7 21.5 140.6 76.9 181.9 N/A 
Total GIIPS exposure 
(€ billion) 
36.8 78.2 646.5 150.5 532.73 126.8 
 
Source: BIS (2011); CNBC (2011) 
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 Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
ESM and SMP was in many respects also an implicit bailout of the German financial system, 
mitigating further heavy losses on the foreign assets of German banks (Bloomberg 2012; 
Steinberg and Vermeiren 2016, p.393).  
 
I witnessed several crises; Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus, I was always there engaged 
and Mr Asmussen [Jörg] when he was here at the time Secretary of State, when 
we went to Brussels, his first question was always, what is the exposure of 
German banks? This was his most important question. So you can imagine that 
the Left Party is right. The first aim was to safeguard German banks 
 
(German Finance Ministry: interview #12, 2015) 
 
As the quote above discloses, the exposure of German banks to peripheral debt was indeed 
an important consideration in German policy calculations. Although the government sought 
to uphold the rule-based Maastricht settlement199, the critical juncture of the sovereign 
debt crisis instituted a real threat of peripheral redenomination and further losses for 
German banks. Therefore although the DB never reconciled itself with SMP (Telegraph 
2012) as it came without democratic oversight and measures to limit moral hazard, the 
systemic risks and associated transaction costs (North 1987; Williamson 1981), coupled with 
German revulsion at backdoor ECB bailout operations, eventually forced Germany to 
concede ESM (Dyson 2013, p.219; Gocaj and Meunier 2013, p.249; Sinn 2014, p.259). While 
ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) ideas thus helped slow institutional change at the European 
level and were successful at inserting measures to restrict moral hazard and joint liability 
into ESM (Nedergaard and Snaith 2015, p.1106) – meaning that scenario D from table 2.2 
most accurately depicts this course of events – they were ultimately unable to prevent the 
creation of ESM or SMP. 
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 The prohibition of monetary financing; the prohibition of privileged access to financial institutions; and the 
‘no bailout clause’ (ECB 2016[a]). 
German ideational influence during the crisis: 
 
D) established ideas in new institutions  ->  hinder policy change 
 
 
Although ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) ideas were unable to prevent 
ESM and SMP, they were able to limit supranational risk-sharing and 
tighten fiscal restrictions. 
Illustration 6.3    
 
SPAIN 
While Germany entered the sovereign debt crisis from a position of relative strength and 
was able to meaningfully influence EU decision-making, Spain was less fortunate. The 
weakness of the cajas and, importantly, of Spanish government bonds, produced a lethal 
combination during this period. Spain therefore remained focused primarily on trying to 
tackle domestic problems. Although large privately owned Spanish banks had diversified 
asset portfolios and continued to fair rather well during the crisis (Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016, 
p.27), erosion in the value of assets linked to real estate created a real strain on the balance 
sheets of cajas (Royo 2013[a], p.640). The BdE therefore began forcing cajas to increase 
provisions with the intention of compelling them to request funds from the FROB and 
encourage merger activity. Although this strategy was successful, with 40 of the 45 cajas 
pressing for mergers by December 2010 (Ysa et al. 2012, p.270), it also had the effect of 
further restricting credit to the real economy, creating more downward pressure on house 
and land prices.   
 
An additional problem was the mergers which eventually took place were often decided 
against political and regional rationales rather than economic ones (Cuñat and Garicano 
2009, p.8; Tortella and García-Ruiz 2013, p.183). Cajas controlled by Popular Party (PP) 
politicians tended to merge with other PP cajas, resulting in two of the most problematic 
institutions, Bancaja and Caja Madrid, ending up within the same undercapitalised and 
eventually nationalised entity, Bankia. The two Galician cajas200 merged, creating 
Novagalicia Banco, which was also later nationalised (Minder 2012), and a similar situation 
occurred through the merger of the Catalan cajas.  
 
Of the three mechanisms used to integrate cajas: 15 percent were acquisitions; 46 percent 
full-mergers; and 39 percent Institutional Protection Scheme (IPS) mergers. IPS 
amalgamations were known as ‘virtual mergers’ and permitted each caja to keep its own 
brand, balance sheet and legal structure, allowing regional governing parties to retain 
control of both entities (Reuters 2010; Romero 2012). All full-mergers happened within the 
same autonomous region (comunidades autónomas) and all IPSs consolidations occurred 
across region, but with cajas involved governed by the same political party (table 6.4) (Ysa 
et al. 2012, p.271).  
 
Despite the BdE being fully aware of the financial position of each caja prior to 
consolidation, in the end, it allowed mergers to take place on political grounds (Buck 2017; 
Garicano 2012[a]). This structural path-dependence, reinforced by political vested interests, 
is critical to ascertaining a full picture of the Spanish crisis. Despite the dominance of neo-
liberal philosophical ideas and interventionist policy ideas within the BdE, it remained 
unable to use the crisis to de-politicise the caja sector. Although the government did 
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 Caixa Galicia and Caixanova. 
introduce some limited reforms which constrained the politicisation of cajas in 2010201, it 
was not until the apex of the sovereign debt crisis critical juncture – the collapse of Bankia – 
that wholesale change was finally forced through (Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016, p.30; Royo 
2013[b], p.200; De Olza 2013). Spain’s public banking sector is therefore best illustrated by 
scenario B during the crisis. 
 
Spanish cajas during the crisis:  
 
B) structures trump ideas    ->  institutional continuity 
 
 
Despite severe problems in the cajas and BdE desire for institutional 
reform, politicisation continued. 
Illustration 6.4 
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 Royal Decree Law (11/2010): National government senior executives could no longer sit on caja assemblies 
or corporate boards, and representatives of government, public law institutions and public corporations on the 
governing bodies of cajas reduced from 50 percent to 40 percent. 
Table 6.4: The integration of Spanish cajas 
 
Source: Ysa et al. (2012, p.268), reused with permission: Taylor & Francis Group Copyright 
 Clearance Centre 
 
Critical Case Study: Bankia 
Unlike German banks, cajas – the institutions overwhelmingly responsible for the Spanish 
crisis (Garicano 2012[b]; Royo 2013[a], p.637; 2013[b] p.153) – did not invest heavily in 
peripheral or US ‘sub-prime’ assets. Instead, they lent extensively to the domestic real 
estate sector. They then used these loans to manufacture ABSs in order to raise more funds 
to extend further lending. In 2011, Bankia held assets worth almost €300 billion202 (Bankia 
2012, p.1), of which €95 billion consisted of mortgage-backed and other debt securities 
(Bankia 2012, p.20).  
 
Table 6.5: Bankia exposure by country (2012) 
Spain 73% 
USA - 
GIIPS - 
Other 27% 
 
Source: Bankia Annual Report 2012 (p.67) 
 
Although the Bankia story is representative of the sector in general, its significance is 
amplified due to its size, and because its eventual collapse in 2012 marked a critical juncture 
for Spain which forced its government to turn to Europe for assistance203 (De Olza 2013; 
Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016, p.30; Royo 2013[b], p.200). It also marked a critical juncture for 
Europe more broadly as it sparked efforts to create a Europe-wide Banking Union (BU) 
(Citibank 2012; Jones et al. 2016, p.1024; Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016). 
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 €298,366,696 end-2011; €279,243,017 end-2012. 
203
 ESM funds were granted to Spain conditional upon wholesale reform of the caja sector (Crisp 2013; MoU 
2012, p.13; IMF 2012[a], p.12). 
Bankia-BFA represented the largest caja conglomeration in Spain. Beginning in 2010 as a 
merger between Caja Madrid and Bancaja204, it was later joined by five smaller cajas in 
2011205, becoming the third largest bank in the country behind the two international giants, 
Santander and BBVA. To fully understand the Bankia crisis, it is first necessary to describe 
how problems originated in Caja Madrid. 
 
By 2009, Caja Madrid was already experiencing funding difficulties206 as well as a political 
‘war’ within the PP concerning who should lead the bank (El Mundo 2010). The PP 
controlled both the regional government and City Hall. The President of Madrid’s regional 
government (comunidad autónomas de Madrid), Esperanza Aguirre, attempted to replace 
Caja Madrid’s President, Miguel Blesa207, with the Vice-President of Madrid’s government, 
Ignacio González (Tortella and García-Ruiz 2013, p.186). 
 
This was opposed by the Mayor, Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón, who instead supported the former 
Minister of Economy and IMF Managing Director, Rodrigo Rato’s candidacy. Rato eventually 
won the yearlong battle208 and moved swiftly to increase his annual salary by more than €1 
million209 (El Mundo 2010; López-Fonsecael 2017; Royo 2013[c], p.196). 
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 Creating Banco Financiero y de Ahorros (BFA). 
205
 Caja Insular de Canarias, Caja Ávila, Caja Laietana, Caja Segovia and Caja Rioja, creating Bankia-BFA. 
206
 Its bonds were rated as B2 ‘junk’ by Moody’s. 
207
 Who himself had no former banking experience and was reportedly handed the position as a result of his 
friendship with Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar (Royo 2013[c], p.196). 
208
 In order to try to smooth over tensions, Rato later gave a seat on the board of Bankia to Carmen Cavero, 
Ignacio González's sister-in-law and his wife's co-partner in a Madrid art gallery (Romero 2012). 
209
 Rato and Blesa, who became appointed Chairman, together ran up bills of more than €15 million on 
company credit cards during their time in office. Blesa recently committed suicide after being handed a six 
year prison term for misusing company funds (López-Fonseca 2017; Montijano 2017). 
Under pressure from the government and BdE, six months after his appointment Rato 
announced an IPS merger with Bancaja, another PP dominated caja based in Valencia. But 
Bancaja  was experiencing the same liquidity problems as a result of over lending to the real 
estate sector as Caja Madrid, ensuring the new entity was equally unstable (Romero 2012; 
Royo 2013[c], p.197).  
 
To deal with its overexposure to devalued real-estate assets, the BFA side of the business 
issued €4.5 billion in preferential shares and held on to poorly performing assets as a form 
of bad bank, while Bankia continued the banking side of the business, presenting itself as a 
new and untarnished institution (Cardenas 2013, p.36). To facilitate this, Bankia requested 
€4.465bn from the FROB in March 2011 and intensified efficiency savings by reducing 
operating costs by €550 million (Royo 2013[c], p.198)210.  
 
As Spain’s financial situation worsened, Finance Minister, Luis de Guindos, ordered banks to 
set aside additional provisions equivalent to 45 percent of loans linked to real estate.  
Bankia was unable to meet this and on the 18th May 2012, requested government assistance 
(De Olza 2013). The government duly purchased a 90 percent stake in the bank with an 
injection of €23.5bn of state-aid. Following the nationalisation, Bankia-BFA recast its 2011 
financial results which showed a €300 million profit to reflect an actual €3.3 billion loss 
(Romero 2012).   
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 In order to meet Core Tier One (CT1) capital requirements and secure further funding (Bankia 2012, p.8), 
Rato also decided to float Bankia on the stock exchange.  Spanish banks were required to hold a minimum CT1 
capital ratio of 10 percent of their assets. However, if they were listed on the Spanish stock exchange, this 
requirement was reduced to 8 percent (Bankia 2012, p.8; Cardenas 2013, p.36). Retail investors originally 
purchased shares at over €5 a piece, but by 2012 their price had slumped to less than €1 (Johnson 2011). 
During subsequent investigations, it came to light that supervisors within the central bank were aware of 
financial and management problems at Bankia and were convinced that the lender should not have be floated. 
One internal e-mail argued that Bankia was ‘unviable’, while others lamented the influence of politicians on 
the bank’s board, describing the institution as a ‘money-losing machine’ (Buck 2017). 
The fiscal pressure generated by this nationalisation caused yields between Spanish and 
German government bonds to diverge even further and proved to be the tipping point 
which led the Spanish government to seek an EU bailout package the following month (De 
Olza 2013; Romero 2012; Royo 2013[b], p.200; 2013[c], p.200). Whereas Germany had the 
luxury of its debt being highly prised in the repo markets (and therefore enjoyed lower 
borrowing costs during the crisis), despite an early liberalisation of its interbank market and 
an exemplary fiscal record before the crash (Lukauskas 1997, p.111; World Bank 2010, p.24), 
Spanish debt was not considered to have the same pedigree.  
 
Table 6.6: Yield on Spanish and German 10-year government bonds (%, 2007-12) 
 Jan 
‘07 
June 
‘07 
Jan 
‘08 
June 
‘08 
Jan 
‘09 
June 
‘09 
Jan 
‘10 
June 
‘10 
Jan 
‘11 
June 
‘11 
Jan 
‘12 
June 
‘12 
Germany 4.02 4.56 4.08 4.52 3.07 3.47 3.26 2.54 3.02 2.89 1.82 1.30 
Spain 4.07 4.62 4.18 4.79 4.15 4.24 3.99 4.56 5.38 5.48 5.40 6.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD  
 
Whilst reputational factors and the structure of the two countries’ economies can help 
account for some of this discrepancy, crucial too was the fact that under EMU, the Spanish 
government had ran fiscal surpluses as a counter to persistent current account deficits (BdE 
2006[b], p.29). While Spain was therefore seen as a ‘star pupil’ within EMU, it failed to 
implement regular debt auctions and its bonds were little used within repo markets – 
ensuring they remained less desirable. Spanish banks also failed to use interbank markets to 
German bailout of HRE Spanish bailout 
of Bankia 
the same extent as many other European countries, preferring instead to issue ABSs to meet 
funding gaps (BdE 2006[b], p.29 and p.157). This resulted in Spanish bonds being less 
sought-after and less frequently used as collateral in repo transactions (Figure 6.4), meaning 
Spain had to pay significantly more to borrow than Germany at the epicentre of its crisis. 
 
In light of Spain’s fiscal problems, EU finance ministers offered Spain an aid package of up to 
€100 billion contingent upon the country accepting an MoU211, which included a firm 
commitment to restructure the caja sector (MoU 2012). Just days later, the European 
Commission also unveiled plans to create an EU-wide BU to help break the ‘doom loop’ 
engulfing peripheral European banks and sovereigns (Howarth and Quaglia 2016, p.19). 
Bankia was therefore the catalyst that finally brought wholesale change to the Spanish caja 
sector, and shook European states of their hesitancy to deepen integration by handing 
greater financial authority to supranational entities.  
 
By using process tracing to plot the temporal progression of the crisis, it becomes clear that 
the sovereign debt crisis, the collapse of Bankia, the ESM bailout and associated MoU, 
represented a definitive critical juncture for both Spain and Europe (Bulmer 2009, p.310; 
Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p.346; Posner 2007, p.145). For Spain, the exogenous pressure 
applied by the MoU finally allowed state authorities to dispel political vested interests and 
provided an opportunity to fundamentally transform, liberalise and professionalise the caja 
sector.   
 
                                                          
211 Which was insisted upon by Germany (Weidmann 2012). 
In July, to comply with the MoU the government again strengthened BdE powers to 
intervene in failing institutions and the FROB gained authority to resolve banks by forcing 
shareholders and creditors in rescued institutions to take losses before state-aid was 
provided (Cardenas 2013, p.24; Gordon 2012). The government also created a bad bank, 
Sareb, into which Spanish banks could deposit ‘toxic’ assets (Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016, p.31). 
By end-2012 the nationalised cajas had transferred €36 billion worth of assets to Sareb at an 
average discount rate of 63 percent of their gross book value (Eurostate Research 2013; 
Royo 2013[c], p.211). 
 
In 2013, Spain implemented the final requirement of its MoU through the passing of Law 
26/2013 which forced cajas to ring-fence their banking and charitable activities, doing away 
with the caja banking model altogether212 (Crisp 2013; IMF 2012[a], p.12; MoU 2012, p.13). 
Banks derived from cajas now contain private investors and seek profit in line with 
commercial banks. Banking foundations213 though are still permitted to maintain a stake in 
credit institutions, with voting rights, which allow for the appointment or removal of a 
member of the banks governing body. Foundations are discouraged from owning a 
controlling stake (ECB 2013[c]), and only 25 percent of banking foundation board members 
(patronos) are now designated by political authorities. These institutions are also no longer 
supervised by their autonomous regions (comunidades autónomas) and have come fully 
into line with other banks (Otero-Iglesias et al. 2016, p.32). 
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 The only exemptions were the two smallest cajas which had not merged and had less than 10 million euros 
in consolidated assets. 
213
 The foundations purpose is to pursue charitable and community work and to manage its shares in the credit 
institution. 
SPAIN AND THE EU 
In terms of Spain’s attitude towards EU initiatives aimed at restoring financial stability, the 
merits or demerits were little discussed within BdE reports or speeches by BdE officials as 
decision-makers grappled with the domestic crisis. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern 
that the bank was far more relaxed about the creation of ESM than the DB. BdE neo-liberal 
philosophical ideas are less obsessive about the dangers of moral hazard and fiscal risk-
sharing than DB ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik). Even before the collapse of Bankia, the 
BdE supported ESM and decried the slow progress towards its completion, arguing that the 
scale of the crisis meant urgent steps were necessary to restore stability (BdE 2012, p.12).  
 
Once the Bankia crisis erupted, Spain became a recipient of ESM funds. Without this 
assistance, as the quote below underscores, Spain would have struggled financially and 
politically to implement the necessary restructuring of its banking system: 
 
Without it [ESM] we couldn’t have finished the bank restructuring. It was very 
important. It was key to changing the international perception of the Spanish 
financial system, it was very, very important 
 
(BdE interview #6, 2015) 
 
Consequently, unlike Germany, the BdE and the Spanish state had few reservations about 
the creation of ESM, or about accepting money from the fund with the goal of implementing 
banking sector reform (Restoy 2012), as the quote below confirms: 
Spain is quite proud that we only required, or only asked for, financial assistance 
for our financial sector, not for the whole economy  
 
(Spanish Foreign Ministry: interview #14, 2015) 
 
With regards to SMP, as a monetarist institution, the BdE initially expressed concern about 
over reliance on expansionist monetary policy to steer Europe through the crisis. It argued if 
such measures remained in place over an extended period they could: reduce the 
effectiveness of monetary policy; detract from the ECB’s credibility; distort the relative price 
of assets; and delay necessary reforms in certain segments of Europe’s banking system (BdE 
2011, p.20).  
 
However, as Spain became progressively afflicted by the sovereign debt crisis, it became 
increasingly anxious about the slow pace of EU reforms (BdE 2012, p.12). As a consequence, 
the BdE recognised ECB extraordinary monetary policy had become a linchpin of stability, 
providing an effective safety valve during turbulent times (BdE 2012, p.12). This less hostile 
attitude towards SMP may simply have come as a result of Spain becoming a recipient of  
 
Table 6.7: Eurosystem SMP holdings by country (31st December 2012) 
 
Source: ECB (2017) 
SMP support. Indeed, 20 percent of all SMP bond purchases were Spanish in origin (table 
6.7), reducing fiscal pressure on the Spanish government by lowering debt interest rates.  
 
However, it is likely Spain specific programmatic monetary ideas also contributed to this 
more relaxed approach. The BdE worried more about inflation than monetary aggregates 
and remained open to measures aimed at smoothing the economic and financial cycles (Ban 
2016, p.46; Lukauskas 1997, p.205). Idiosyncratic Spanish programmatic ideas therefore 
were not as opposed to SMP as orthodox German monetarism. When discussing this with a 
BdE Research Service official, the following response was offered: 
 
We have a single monetary policy but we don’t have instruments to face 
asymmetric shocks… At some points, especially viewed from Germany, it’s seen 
that things in the Euroarea weren’t that bad and they tend to think that there are 
problems for future inflation. But our point of view is that if you look at the 
Euroarea as a whole, clearly this was not the case. The vision of the Germans is 
too German 
(Interview: BdE) 
 
In other words, Germany’s traditional monetarist ideas were perceived by the Research 
Service – the epicentre of BdE institutional thought (Lluch 1990, p.3) – as too stringent, 
particularly for a monetary union without a common framework for addressing asymmetric 
shocks. While BdE monetarism had always sought to maintain a stable price environment 
(Dolado et al. 1997; Martín-Aceña 2017, p.61), it also adopted a more flexible approach to 
countercyclical policy (Ban 2016, p.46; Fernández de Lis et al. 2000, p.16). Ideas are 
therefore able to shed further light on the source of difference between BdE and DB 
attitudes towards EU-level post-crisis initiatives. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
Ideational and structural explanations are needed to fully understand national responses to 
the sovereign debt crisis. Ideas explain DB opposition to SMP as its ordo-liberal 
(Ordnungspolitik) and monetarist philosophies reject interventionist countercyclical policy 
and measures which are likely to expand the money supply (Carrel 2012; Weidmann 2017). 
Ordo-liberalism’s pre-occupation with the liability principle (Haftungsprinzip) and moral 
hazard were also central to Germany’s initial opposition to ESM, its desire to insert PSI and 
MoUs into any bailout package, and in Bundestag members seeking to prevent ratification 
of the Treaty through the courts (Schäuble 2011[b]). 
 
However, structural factors are also required to understand why Germany eventually 
relented. Although Germany wished to prevent a weakening of the rule-based Maastricht 
framework, sticking rigidly to the rules risked a total collapse of the Eurozone, entailing 
significant sunk and transaction costs through the redenomination of national debt (BIS 
2011; Bloomberg 2012; CNBC 2011; Gocaj and Meunier 2013, p.251; North 1987; Steinberg 
and Vermeiren 2016). The Germans also hoped instituting ESM would bring an end to 
expansionary ECB monetary policy and allow the bank to maintain its path-dependent 
commitment to price stability (Sinn 2014, p.259).  
 
For Spain, structural explanations are most important when analysing its domestic banking 
sector.  The government and BdE attempted to reform the cajas in 2009 with the creation of 
the FROB, yet the intended mergers were resisted by politicians aiming to maintain 
influence (Royo 2013[a], p.639). When the BdE later forced cajas to increase provisions, 
mergers were conducted, but with political rather than economic objectives in mind 
(Garicano 2012[a]; Ysa et al. 2012, p.271). Only the critical juncture provided by the collapse 
of Bankia and subsequent imposition of the MoU finally forced Spain to reform its public 
banking sector (De Olza 2013; Royo 2013[b], p.200).  
 
With regards to the BdE’s support for ESM and its more relaxed attitude to SMP, ideas 
maintain greater significance. Because the BdE often promoted domestic countercyclical 
measures, it supported ESM even before it appeared likely Spain would become a recipient 
of its funds (BdE 2012, p.12). On SMP, although the BdE did not initially approve of Eurozone 
dependence on expansionary monetary policy (BdE 2011, p.20), as the sovereign debt crisis 
intensified and EU reform efforts remained sluggish, it accepted ECB monetary policy had 
become the primary defender of Eurosystem stability (BdE 2012, p.12). Moreover, because 
the BdE was less concerned about monetary aggregates than the DB (Lukauskas 1997, 
p.205), it did not interpret the program as threatening to price stability (BdE: interview #7, 
2015). Recognition of ideational and structural factors in both countries are therefore 
necessary to provide a full understanding of each nations approach to financial policy 
between 2010-2012. 
 
6.3: The Creation of Banking Union (2012-14) 
 
As the collapses of HRE and Bankia brought dramatically to light, many European financial 
systems and sovereigns become severely weakened as a result of the 2007-8 crash. Banks 
were forced to request funding from their governments, while the following bailouts made 
states more indebted. In the case of GIIPS countries (but not creditor states like Germany), 
this resulted in sovereign bonds becoming less valuable, making it more expensive to 
borrow. The falling value of such bonds placed further pressure on peripheral banks holding 
these assets, necessitating more government funding to sustain troubled institutions 
(Blundell-Wignall and Slovik 2011). This situation, illustrated in figure 6.9 below, became 
known as the bank-sovereign ‘doom loop’ and afflicted many ‘southern’ European countries 
(Bibow 2015, p.92; Huertas 2013, p.33). 
 
Figure 6.9: The bank-sovereign ‘doom loop’ 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
In an effort to break this cycle, the Commission unveiled proposals for BU214 in September 
2012 (BdE 2013[c], p.51). This was to consist of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for 
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banks, handing the ECB ‘ultimate responsibility for banking supervision’ (Van Rompuy et al. 
2012[a], p.6); a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for resolving insolvent institutions, 
backed up with a Single Resolution Fund (SRF); a common Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS); 
a common backstop of temporary support to act as ‘lender of last resort’ (LOLR - a task 
eventually handed to ESM); and a Single Rulebook to apply to all EU states (Constâncio 
2013; Schild 2015, p.4; van Rompuy et al. 2012[b]). Using the process tracing technique and 
insights from the HI and DI approaches, the following section assesses German and Spanish 
reactions to these proposals.  
 
GERMANY 
Although Germany’s large international banks supported BU to create a level regulatory 
playing field across Europe (Howarth and Quaglia 2016, p 53; Speyer 2013), Germany 
remained subject to significant path-dependent pressure from regional governments, 
Landesbanken and smaller banks opposed to EU regulation that may have interfered with 
their traditional three-pillar structure (Howarth and Quaglia 2015, p.468; Münchau 2015; 
Strupczewski, and Heinrich 2015; Zimmermann 2014, p.497).  
 
Due to their solid performance during the crisis, smaller German banks were reluctant to 
integrate towards a comprehensive European system and considered their own 
arrangements to have been proven effective (Röper 2017, p.18; Simpson 2013, p.20; 
Steinberg and Vermeiren 2015, p.397). Moreover, because the German self-regulatory 
approach is not purely law-based but constructed on informal agreements with Banking 
Associations, it cannot easily be transplanted into a supranational framework215 (Hassan 
2014; Zimmermann 2014, p.495). Germany therefore had less incentive to seek the 
protection of BU than peripheral states like Spain (Howarth and Quaglia 2016, p.123).  
 
However, the critical juncture of Bankia’s collapse altered Germany’s calculations on BU. 
Even in the months prior to Bankia’s nationalisation, the Spanish government struggled to 
borrow, with one of its bond auctions falling short of its funding target (Guardian 2012; 
Toyer and White 2012). Bankia’s collapse meant an external recapitalisation of the Spanish 
system could no longer be avoided. This made establishing the common backstop element 
of BU a top priority for European policymakers (German Finance Ministry 2012; Citibank 
2012). 
 
On Germany’s urging, the European Council of 29 June 2012 made unmistakably 
clear that no direct assistance will be provided to banks until a unified European 
banking supervisor is in place. The Council also said that a supervisory authority 
on paper will not suffice; rather, it must be fully established and operable. This 
approach is in line with Germany’s demand that liability must be inextricably 
linked with supervision and control [Haftungsprinzip]. These conditions have not 
been met in the current case involving Spain 
 
(German Finance Ministry 2012) 
 
Nevertheless, as the above quote suggests, Germany feared allowing nations with different 
supervisory systems access to the same backstop would create moral hazard. Germany and 
others therefore insisted upon SSM as a precondition for permitting ESM to directly 
recapitalise European banks (Finnish Finance Ministry 2012). Although Germany was 
originally very reluctant to see Landesbanken submit to SSM supervision (Fox 2012), moral 
hazard concerns surrounding support and supervision of similar sized cajas induced a 
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 This is also true of the ‘joint liability schemes’ (Haftungsverbund) which cover public and cooperative banks 
(Howarth and Quaglia 2016, p.76; Howat and Theodore 2016, p.4). 
change of heart (Bibow 2015, p.22; Howarth and Quaglia 2016, p.100), resulting in both 
Landesbanken and merged cajas coming under direct ECB control.  
 
The DB also supported SSM because it believed the mechanism would improve financial 
stability, allowing the ECB to exit extraordinary monetary policies and focus more keenly on 
price stability (DB 2012[b], p.82). Ideas are therefore crucial in explaining the German 
position on SSM. Although political path-dependent forces in Germany resisted the 
supranationalisation of financial supervision, philosophical ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) 
moral hazard concerns and traditional programmatic monetarist ideas overrode 
conservative interests and encouraged Germany to petition for SSM216: 
 
German approach to Banking Union: 
 
A) ideas trump structures   ->  institutional change 
 
 
Ideational moral hazard concerns overrode domestic structural 
opposition SSM. 
Illustration 6.5 
 
Yet due to pressure from Germany (amongst others), the SSM which entered into force on 
4th November 2014 only saw the ECB take direct responsibility for ‘systemically important 
banks’217 (Donnelly 2014, p.993; Karkagiannis 2012). This meant smaller German banks 
which had remained opposed to SSM continued to be immune from direct ECB oversight. 
Moreover, national supervisors continue to play a key role in overseeing domestic 
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institutions, whether deemed systemic in importance or otherwise (Bibow 2015, p.95; 
Lautenschläger 2014). 
 
While the DB supported SSM for large European banks, it consistently opposed other areas 
of BU which may have submitted the country to moral hazard or interventionist supervision 
(Guarascio 2016). The dominance of ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) thinking is key to 
understanding this hesitancy. Moral hazard concerns were responsible for Germany’s 
resistance to a European DGS (DB 2012[b], p.83; Zimmermann 2014, p.496), which if 
implemented may have seen domestic money guaranteeing German deposits used to 
rescue savers elsewhere (Khan 2015; Strupczewski and Heinrich 2015). German 
policymakers argued such a scheme would create fiscal transfers between member-states 
without proper institutional or political oversight (Lautenschläger 2012; Weidmann 2015). In 
a speech opposing greater fiscal risk-sharing, DB President, Jens Weidmann, quoted one of 
the original ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) pioneers, Walter Eucken, in support of the liability 
principle (Haftungsprinzip): 
 
I regard cross-border risk-sharing in respect of deposit protection as premature… 
Walter Eucken once got straight to the heart of the liability principle 
[Haftungsprinzip] with the succinct line: ‘Whoever reaps the benefits must also 
bear the liability’. Without liability, a market economy system cannot function 
 
(Weidmann 2015) 
 
This quote, in line with speeches made by Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (Schäuble 
2011[a,b]), demonstrate the influence ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) ideas continue to hold 
over the German establishment and the extent to which they are responsible for German 
policy preferences. These ideas also led many in Germany to oppose SRM as it had the 
potential to create a ‘liability cascade’ (Haftungskaskade) from German taxpayers to 
European depositors in the event of foreign bank resolutions (Schild 2015, p.15). To limit 
this prospect, the DB insisted shareholders and creditors of ailing banks should first bear 
losses before SRM funds are tapped (DB 2014, p.74).  
 
Furthermore, since the de Larosière Report (2009), the EU has pushed for more 
interventionist countercyclical policies at the EU and national levels. The European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB) was created in 2010 to oversee macro-prudential regulation (MPR) 
(Commission 2013), and the ECB also developed its own directorate for Macro-Prudential 
Policy and Financial Stability in the same year (ECB 2010[d]). These developments run 
counter to traditional ordo-liberal policy ideas at the DB, where MPR is still considered a 
‘hard sell’ (DB: interview #5, 2015). Although Germany has since created its own Financial 
Stability Committee (Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität) to consider MPR (DB 2013[b], p.39), 
largely due to its ideational antipathy towards intervening in markets beyond the setting of 
a broad legal framework, only one initiative beyond those contained within Basel III has 
been recommended218 (German Finance Ministry 2016). Germany also opposed the 
wholesale transfer of MPR to the supranational level, fearing the exogenous imposition of 
countercyclical policies (DB 2012[b], p.84). 
 
Through interviews conducted for this research, it became clear that rather than Germany 
change to fit increasingly interventionist European financial policy ideas, the DB instead 
believes Europe would benefit from applying ordo-liberal ideas more thoroughly: 
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 This relates to the introduction of additional instruments that will enable authorities to set supplementary 
requirements for residential mortgage lending, and came in line with recommendations from the ESRB and 
IMF. 
I would be very surprised if the Bundesbank ever abandoned Ordnungspolitik. I 
think it’s a big worry that Europe doesn’t have more of it.  But this is not a view 
other European countries would be willing to subscribe to, because the basic idea 
of that policy is that you need a sound framework, then half the work is done. 
Rather than micro-managing the economy, the framework is more important… 
And I really think this is very important thinking at the Bundesbank, that this is 
needed in Europe as well, this kind of thinking 
 
(DB: interview #5, 2015) 
 
It therefore seems unlikely that Germany will alter its position on the incomplete areas of 
BU anytime soon. Indeed, the reluctance of parties within German’s financial system to 
submit to European oversight is further evidenced by the revision of the country’s Banking 
Act (Gesetz über das Kreditwesen – KWG, 2015). Despite ECB criticism, amendments made 
to the Act gave the Federal Finance Ministry powers to maintain German regulation and 
sidestep SSM rules with regards to recovery plans, risk management and internal decisions. 
The new rules ensure that even for German banks directly supervised by SSM, the ECB is still 
required to apply country specific regulations (Jennen and Groendahl 2015)219. In a letter to 
the Bundestag, the ECBs Sabine Lautenschläger wrote that the new regulations ‘contradict 
the spirit of the Banking Union’ by facilitating regulatory divergence (Lautenschläger 2015). 
 
SPAIN 
Before the crash Spain’s banking system was one of the least open to foreign banks in 
Europe, and apart from the ‘big three’, largely domestically focussed (Schoenmaker 2012). 
One may therefore have expected Spain to have little interest in supporting BU. But by 
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2012, the country had become deeply afflicted by the bank-sovereign doom loop and 
completion of BU was seen as its number one European policy priority (Restoy 2012). 
 
We were pushing very strongly that this [BU] happens. We were not so focused 
on trying to get the best… although of course every single member-state tries to 
do the best for its national interest, but Spain had a very clear view that we have 
to move on, we have to set up new instruments, and that we need more Europe 
 
(Spanish Foreign Ministry: interview #14, 2015) 
 
As this quote shows, post-crisis, Spain was far less cautious than Germany about sharing 
liabilities or submitting to European financial oversight. It was keen to press ahead quickly 
with BU, even if this resulted in new arrangements not aligning absolutely with existing 
practices. This was essentially due to the critical juncture of Bankia’s collapse which 
encumbered path-dependent predispositions in Spain. The country also hoped successful 
implementation would break the destructive debt cycle, bring renewed credibility to its 
financial supervision and allow cajas to be directly supported by ESM (BdE 2014, p.59; Linde 
2013; Huertas 2013, p.33). 
 
Spain’s large banks supported BU for similar reasons to large German banks: to ensure 
supervisory equivalence and better facilitate cross-border operations (BBVA 2013, p.4). But 
they also promoted European oversight because financial markets treated European 
businesses and financial institutions differently depending on nationality (Restoy 2012). For 
Spanish banks, even those without questionable real estate assets on their balance sheets, 
this meant higher financing costs and a damaging fragmentation of EMU (BdE: interview #9, 
2015; Commission: interview #18, 2015). BU, complete with common supervisory rules, 
fiscal backstop and SRM, was therefore strongly supported by Spanish banks as a way of 
harmonising market conditions (BBVA 2013). 
 
Figure 6.10: ECB’s Target2 balance sheet (2007-2015) 
 
 
Source: Reproduced by permission of the Levy Economics Institute from Bibow (2015, p.76) 
 
Importantly, BU was also supported by the BdE which by 2012 was facing a crisis of 
credibility. Because cajas had re-financed NPLs and attempted to conceal the extent of 
poorly performing assets220, post-Bankia, the central bank could only gain credibility by 
commissioning the accounting firm, Oliver Wyman (2012), to undertake banking stress tests 
and a comprehensive financial assessment (Garicano 2012[b], p.79; Otero-Iglesias et al. 
2016, p.45). The results of this research meant that by 2013, the Spanish financial system 
had become completely transparent about previous failings. But it also needed to persuade 
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markets that its supervisory approach had tightened. As the quote below shows, the easiest 
way to do this was to borrow credibility from the ECB. Indeed, the BdE even reorganised its 
internal governance structures to mirror the ECB’s Directorate-Generals for banking 
supervision more closely (BdE 2014, p.60)221. 
 
If at some point you have some lack of credibility in your institutions, having an 
outside stamp actually gives you the credibility that you were doing the right 
things. And that allows you to buy yourself time… borrowing credibility from 
others. Which is why a lot of countries accepted the ECB 
 
(BdE: interview #8, 2015) 
 
Moreover, whereas Germany had complicated joint liability schemes linked to the country’s 
Banking Associations that could not easily be replicated in the European context, Spain had 
a much simpler DGS and far fewer ideational reservations about shared liability. 
Consequently, Fernando Restoy, Deputy Governor of the BdE, actively pressed for a 
common DGS: 
 
Bank crisis-prevention and management mechanisms are needed along with risk-
mutualisation arrangements that minimise the link between national economic 
and fiscal conditions and the ability to preserve the value of bank liabilities in 
each jurisdiction. These requirements include a SSM as a prevention tool, a SRM 
that pursues the homogenous treatment of banks with viability problems and has 
a common fund to make this economically feasible, and an integrated DGS 
 
(Restoy 2015, no page) 
 
 
There are thus powerful structural explanations as to why Spain was so keen to pursue BU 
and was unconstrained by path-dependent imperatives. But there were also important 
ideational reasons too. Post-crisis, the ECB and ESRB were handed powers to impose 
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countercyclical policies with regard to capital buffers and accounting standards and 
encouraged MPR in other areas too, such as loan-to-value (LTV) ratios (ECB 2016[b]; ECB: 
interview #4, 2015). Given traditional interventionist policy ideas at the BdE, Spain was 
much more comfortable implementing these measures than the DB.  
 
Furthermore, a similar accounting system to the dynamic provisions implemented by Spain 
before crash has since been adopted by the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) board and by the EU through their expected credit loss provisioning mechanism 
(Cohen and Edwards 2017). New Basel III rules, also embraced by the EU through the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD IV), established a capital conservation buffer and 
countercyclical capital buffer to help limit and extend credit provision where necessary 
(Howarth and Quaglia 2013, p.336). These macro-prudential policies align succinctly with 
Spanish policy ideas. While the DB has been reluctant to implement MPR, Spain has since 
passed laws handing the BdE further competency in the application of macro-prudential 
instruments222 (BdE 2017).  
 
Spain therefore had few ideational or structural reasons to resist BU, and potentially had a 
lot to gain. Moreover, further integration coincides with traditional Spanish thinking on 
Europe. As the quote below from a Spanish Foreign Ministry official makes clear, Spain has 
consistently viewed Europe as a solution to its problems, and integration as a way of 
overcoming domestic structural inadequacies through modernisation and reform: 
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 Law 10/2014 on the regulation, supervision and solvency of credit institutions, and Royal Decree 84/2015. 
For Spain, Europe was a way to solve the problem. Of course it was a global 
problem and Spain always looked at it as a global problem and looked to solve it 
globally, but also in a European way. I guess for Spain, the EU has been a way to 
solve its internal problems. Because it [the crisis] hit Spain in a different way 
compared to other countries because of structural circumstances – that’s why we 
look for an EU solution 
(Spanish Foreign Ministry: interview #14, 2015) 
 
SUMMARY  
Structurally, although Germany’s large banks supported SSM supervision, Germany had 
reason to resist greater supranationalisation. The country’s smaller banks did not welcome 
the spectre of more rules and regulations complicating their operating practices (Wilson et 
al. 2012), and because they had fared well throughout the crisis, their joint liability and DPSs 
were seen to have worked soundly (Howat and Theodore 2016, p.4; Simpson 2013, p.20). 
Despite the initial crisis impacting German’s financial system hard, by 2012, the country was 
through the worst of its crisis and was resilient enough to withstand the fiscal demands of 
its bailouts. Germany therefore continued to exhibit path-dependence and opposed 
elements of BU (Münchau 2016; New York Times 2008). 
 
While HI insights help us understand structural these dynamics, perhaps even more 
important was German policymakers subscription to ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik) 
(Blackstone and Walker 2012; Dyson 2002[c] p.177; Nedergaard and Snaith 2015, p.1097; 
Young 2014, p.279). Recognising German moral hazard concerns is crucial to fully 
appreciating the countries position on BU. In this instance, ideas and structures worked 
hand-in-hand to slow the pace of change. Although the magnitude of the crisis forced 
Germany to relent to the creation of ESM, the DB and Finance Ministry were insistent that 
the fund should not be used to directly capitalise banks without SSM first being instituted to 
prevent regulatory arbitrage and moral hazard (German Finance Ministry 2012; Finnish 
Finance Ministry 2012).  
 
Fears over moral hazard and a weakening of the liability principle (Haftungsprinzip) pressed 
Germany to oppose the common DGS (Weidmann 2015), and German policy ideas derived 
from ordo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik) also explain its unease with interventionist European 
financial policies. Whilst MPR implemented at the European level introduced countercyclical 
measures to specific markets, German preferences centre on the creation of a strong legal 
framework without further state interference (DB interview #5, 2015). DI is therefore 
indispensable to fully understand Germany’s post-crisis financial preferences.  
 
For Spain meanwhile, the critical juncture of Bankia’s collapse was all important. This 
weakened traditional path-dependence as the Troika imposed MoU forced the country to 
completely restructure its public banking sector. Instead of being met with structural 
resistance therefore, BU proposals were welcomed in line with Spain’s traditional pro-
integrationist stance, and as a means of breaking the doom loop which placed such strain on 
the country’s government and financial system (Huertas 2013, p.33; Linde 2013). Due to the 
loss of credibility the BdE suffered from 2010-12 and the subsequent commissioning of the 
Oliver Wyman report (2012), the BdE and Spanish government were also keen to restore 
confidence in their supervisory framework. The most effective way to do this was to fully 
submerge the country into all aspects of BU, including the common DGS and SRM (BdE: 
interview #8, 2015).  
 
But ideational factors are important in explaining the Spanish position too. Whereas EU 
interventionist post-crisis regulatory practices exist in opposition to DB policy ideas, the BdE 
had long viewed countercyclical policies as advantageous (Ban 2016, p.46; Fernández de Lis 
et al. 2000, p.16). With Spanish accounting practices largely adopted within Basel III and 
CRD IV, and MPR playing a central role in ECB and ESRB supervision, Spain had few 
ideational qualms about submitting to greater European oversight.  
 
6.4: Conclusion 
 
Why were Spain and Germany impacted differently by the financial 
crisis, and why did they pursue different policy objectives at the 
European level? 
 
This chapter showed that to understand why the crisis impacted national financial systems 
differently, it is necessary to examine both ideational and structural mechanisms. 
Ideationally, pre-crisis policy ideas within NCBs were crucial in determining both the timing 
and scale of the crisis. Previous research showed how the makeup of bank balance sheets 
influenced the extent of the problems in Spain and Germany (Quaglia and Royo 2015; 
Hardie and Howarth 2013[a]; Royo, S., 2013[a]). This chapter deepened analysis by revealing 
why these differences occurred, and why Germany was able to withstand the fiscal 
pressures of its banking crisis whereas Spain was not. 
 
It also revealed why German and Spanish positions differed on ESM, SMP and BU. Ideational 
differences explain why Germany was initially reluctant to support ESM (Monti 2012; 
Schäuble 2011[b]), whilst the concepts of sunk costs and path-dependence explain why it 
eventually relented (once moral hazard limiting measures had been installed) (Gocaj and 
Meunier 2013, p.251; Steinberg and Vermeiren 2016, p.389). Recognising ideational and 
structural imperatives is also crucial to fully grasp the German position on BU. While 
Germany was initially hesitant to submit to ECB oversight in a bid to preserve its three pillar 
system, moral hazard concerns eventually persuaded policymakers to agree to SSM 
(Weidmann 2015). Philosophical ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) and programmatic orthodox 
monetarist ideas also account for the DBs unrelenting opposition to ECB extraordinary 
monetary policy (Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.194; Scharpf 2011). 
 
Ideational factors partly explain BdE support for ESM and its more relaxed attitude to SMP. 
The bank consistently promoted countercyclical measures pre-crisis which coalesced with its 
specific interpretation of monetarism (Ban 2016, p.46; Fernández de Lis et al. 2000, p.16). 
Consequentially, it supported EU countercyclical assistance during the crisis (BdE 2012, 
p.12), which coincided with traditional regulatory practices. Indeed, accounting procedures 
similar to those implemented by the BdE before the crash became incorporated within the 
Basel III and CRD IV frameworks (Howarth and Quaglia 2013, p.336), meaning that unlike the 
DB, the BdE was ideationally inclined to support BU. 
 
Structurally, while the German system exhibited path-dependence with only limited 
institutional change (Röper 2017; Münchau 2016; Wilson 2012) – thanks to the safe asset 
status of German government bonds – the critical juncture of Bankia’s collapse meant 
Spain’s public banking sector was forced into wholesale change (Crisp 2013; MoU 2012, 
p.13; IMF 2012[a], p.12). The resultant lack of credibility the BdE experienced also relates to 
this event, causing it to be more prepared to submit to ECB oversight to regain its integrity 
and prestige. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
The Eurosystem Post-Crisis 
 
Why has the ECB become increasingly attentive to financial stability 
concerns? 
 
While previous research has examined the ideational, discursive and policy shifts that have 
taken place at the European Central Bank (ECB) post-crisis (Blyth and Matthijs 2016; De 
Rynck 2014; Schmidt 2016), by using process tracing, this chapter analyses the process 
through which change occurred. It explains why the ECB acted as it did, attributing causality 
to ideational and structural dynamics, and advances our understanding of how and why 
institutional change takes place. Figure 7.1 (below) provides an illustration of the following 
argument. 
 
After the institutional formation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) at the critical 
juncture of Maastricht223 (1992), measures taken early on to strengthen financial integration 
and monetary transmission (Gabor and Ban 2016, p.618; Issing 2008, p.214; Tumpel-
Gugerell 2005) led to increased concerns about the risk of financial contagion (Papademos 
2006; Trichet 2004[a]; 2005[a]). This created a weakening of EMUs ‘siloed’ institutional 
framework (Bibow 2015, p.31; Gabor 2016, p.969) and resulted in President Trichet 
recognising the importance of financial stability as a distinct institutional objective (Trichet 
2003; 2005[a]). Given these evolving pre-crisis ideas, this chapter argues that the critical 
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juncture of the sovereign debt crisis (Braun 2015, p.422; Verdun 2015, p.222), should be 
viewed not as the cause of institutional change, but as a catalyst, hastening a transition that 
was already underway (Posner 2007, p.145).  
 
Figure 7.1: The evolution of financial ideas in the Eurosystem (1999-2014) 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
Once the 2007-8 financial crisis hit, the European Union (EU) and ECB became more 
interventionist, putting financial stability policy ideas into action by creating the European 
Financial Stability Facility (ESFS) and initiating the Enhanced Credit Support Program (ECSP), 
Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) and the Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP). 
Finally, the critical juncture of the sovereign debt crisis exposed the incompatibility of 
maintaining a single monetary policy, integrated capital markets and market discipline in the 
sovereign debt markets. This led to further conceptual stretching (Cox 2004, p.216) of the 
ECBs neo-liberal philosophical and monetarist programmatic ideas and to the bank 
reinterpreting its mandate to include preserving the euro as well as price stability (Matthijs 
2016, p.380; Schmidt 2016, p.1049). This culminated with the ECB acting as the ‘market-
maker of last resort’ by purchasing EU government bonds (Gabor and Vestergaard 2018; Le 
Maux 2017), and by becoming the financial supervisor to the entire Eurozone.  
 
Continuing with this thesis’ Discursive (DI) and Historical Institutionalist (HI) framework, the 
chapter begins by examining how the original ‘credit crunch’ period of the crisis unfolded in 
Europe between mid-2007-2010 and analyses how the ECB dealt with the fallout. The 
second section scrutinises the EUs response to the sovereign debt crisis (2010-12); focusing 
specifically on the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the ECBs sovereign 
bond purchase programs224 and the completion of Banking Union (BU).  The final section 
draws to a conclusion. 
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7.1 The ‘Credit Crunch’ – 2007-10 
 
During the summer of 2007, US ‘sub-prime’ mortgage lenders began to make heavy losses. 
Because many European banks had invested strongly in US Mortgage-Backed Securities 
(MBS), liquidity began to dry up across the Western world. In August the ECB reacted by 
providing overnight liquidity to interbank money markets through ‘reverse repurchase 
operations’: lending liquidity to banks against eligible collateral that was repurchased the 
following day. This was initially conducted at the policy interest rate of 4 percent at ‘full-
allotment’225. It also provided liquidity through its weekly Main Refinancing Operations 
(MRO) and two additional longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) with 3-month 
maturities (Papademos 2007[b]). Within the first few hours of the crisis, the ECB pumped 
€95bn into Eurozone credit markets (Evans-Pritchard and Bland 2007; Trichet 2009[a]).  
 
The ECB nonetheless emphasised that these operations did not change the overall stance of 
monetary policy (which remained committed to preserving price stability), and that it was 
not prepared to bailout banks with acute financing problems (Papademos 2007[b]; Trichet 
2008[b]). In continued attempts to demarcate monetary, fiscal and financial policy, the ECB 
maintained its traditional approach to monetary policy. Despite meeting extraordinary 
liquidity demands, it increased its main refinancing rate throughout 2007 and 2008, 
reaching a peak of 4.25 percent in July 2008.  
 
During the initial stages therefore, little changed for the ECB (Sinn 2014, p.150). It continued 
to maintain that interest rates were the only instrument through which monetary policy 
                                                          
225
 Meaning the ECB was willing to provide unlimited liquidity as long as banks were willing or able to provide 
adequate collateral (ECB 2014[c], p.36). 
should be implemented; that monetary policy should not be used to combat financial 
instability; that asset-prices should not be targeted; and that it would not try to resolve 
solvency problems in European banks (Smaghi 2008; Trichet 2008[b]).   
 
Then, on 14th September 2008, US banking giant Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, 
causing global stock prices to plummet (Bibow 2015, p.69). Just weeks later, Germany’s 
second largest property lender, Hypo Real Estate (HRE), was forced to apply for government 
assistance and financial institutions across Europe became starved of liquidity. As a result, 
ECB Open Market Operations became less about steering short-term interest rates and 
more about ensuring continued access to capital for solvent banks (Trichet 2008[d]). In 
September, a series of special term refinancing operations with a maturity of six weeks were 
also launched, meaning that by October, the outstanding amount of ECB refinancing had 
increased by around €270 billion from 2007 (Trichet 2008[d]).  
 
Liquidity provision was stepped up further on 8th October 2008 when the ECB initiated its 
Enhanced Credit Support Programme (ECSP) with the expressed aim of ‘reducing banks’ 
funding costs’ (Trichet 2008[f]), a clear deviation from strictly monetary objectives (Stark 
2009[b]). The ECSP established a ‘fixed-rate’ tender procedure with ‘full-allotment’ and 
reduced collateral requirements226 for all weekly MROs for ‘as long as market conditions 
dictate’ (Trichet 2008[d]). The ECSP marked another important step in the evolution of ECB 
financial policy and at end-2011 was still being described as ‘probably the most significant 
non-standard measure the ECB is implementing’ (González-Páramo 2011).  
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 By December 2008, the collateral threshold was cut to BBB- and interest rates reduced to 2.5 percent 
Partly because the ECB faced structural hurdles, having no specific mandate in the treaties 
to pursue financial stability (Papademos 2006; ToA 1997227, Art.127; Trichet 2008[e]), and 
partly because central banks generally did not feel comfortable breaking with the familiarity 
and continuity of traditional monetary instruments during the early crisis period (Bernanke 
2011), the ECSP represented an attempt by the ECB to ‘outsource’ financial stabilisation to 
private financial institutions (Buiter and Rahbari 2012, p.28; Gabor 2014[a], p.200).  This 
allowed the bank to continue monetary policy in a path-dependent fashion, whilst 
simultaneously expanding its liquidity operations to address financial instability (Stark 
2009[a]).  
 
Yet these measures effectively meant the ECB had become ‘lender of last resort’ (LOLR) to 
European banks, a responsibility which had hitherto remained with National Central Banks 
(NCBs) through their Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) facilities228. As the quote below 
makes clear, despite the ECBs reluctance to label its actions LOLR, it accepted it had begun 
to move far beyond any level of intervention it would have deemed appropriate before the 
crash: 
 
The ECB has had to come up with some measures which it no way would have 
considered before [the crisis]… I don’t want to term it this way because the ECB 
doesn’t term it this way, but effectively, this lender of last resort… for the ECB to 
extend this emergency liquidity, it still has to be convinced that the institutions 
it’s extending to are financially viable. So I don’t know if that’s lender of last 
resort in the broader sense… but it still has some lender of last resort function 
 
(ECB: interview #2, 2015) 
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 Treaty of Amsterdam. 
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 ELA remained in place and continued to be operated by NCBs at further reduced collateral standards. 
ECB activity during this period therefore reveals the path-dependence of ECB programmatic 
monetarist ideas and reluctance to abandon traditional monetary policy within EMUs ridged 
legal framework (Smaghi 2008; Trichet 2008[b]). Yet it also demonstrates the banks 
ideational transition towards recognising the need to implement policy ideas designed to 
combat financial instability (Stark 2009[a]; Trichet 2008[d]). Recognising both ideational and 
structural characteristics is therefore essential to fully understand why the ECB acted as it 
did during 2008. 
 
Figure 7.2: Use of Eurosystem liquidity (MROs and LTROs, % of total), Dec 2011 
 
Source: Bruegel Datasets (2017) 
 
The ECSP was bolstered in May 2009 with the creation of one year LTROs, again with fixed-
rate tender procedures and full-allotment. In response to rising Spanish and Italian bond 
yields the ECB went further still in December 2011 and launched LTRO IV, allowing banks to 
borrow capital for a three-year period using relaxed capital requirements (ECB 2009[a]; 
Steinberg and Vermeiren 2016, p.396; Wolff 2014).  During this program alone the ECB 
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provided over €1 trillion of liquidity229 at an average interest rate of just 60 basis points 
(Buiter and Rahbari 2012, p.27; Gros 2012, p.39).  
 
FROM LIQUIDITY PROVISION TO ASSET PURCHASES 
As the crisis became more acute, it became increasingly apparent that liquidity provision 
would be insufficient to defend the stability of a financial system progressively dominated 
by market-based practices. LTROs acted to reinforce the bank–sovereign doom loop as 
many banks used the liquidity provided by these operations to purchase home sovereign 
debt (Steinberg and Vermeiren 2016, p.397).  In Italy and Spain, over half the liquidity 
generated from LTROs was ploughed into home sovereign bonds, resulting in roughly 10 
percent of their entire banking systems net value being invested in national debt230 (Whittall 
and Gore 2014). 
 
Banks typically choose to hold sovereign bonds because they are regarded as safe, liquid 
investments which play a critical role as collateral in the repo markets, allowing banks to 
access cheap liquidity (Cœuré 2016). For as long as peripheral governments failed to default 
and domestic returns remained low during the downturn, lending to the state at around 6 
percent interest also produced a healthy return, as banks were able to borrow from the ECB 
at around one percent. 
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 ‘In the three-year LTRO 3 which was settled on 1 March [2012], 800 counterparties participated for a total 
amount of €529.5 billion, while in the three-year LTRO settled on 22 December 2011, 523 counterparties 
participated for a total amount of €489.2 billion’ (ECB 2013[b], p.82). 
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 By 2012, domestic investors, including banks, pension funds and insurance companies owned 67 percent of 
Spanish government bonds (Thomas 2012). 
But as the crisis continued, sovereign downgrades reduced the value of such bonds. Because 
collateral held in ECB repo transactions is ‘marked-to-market’, falling bond prices meant the 
ECB became forced to make ‘margin calls’, requiring additional collateral to be set aside 
against default (Gabor and Ban 2016, p.627). This practice effectively made borrowing via 
LTROs more expensive for peripheral banks holding national government paper and 
produced a pro-cyclical, destabilising effect on national financial systems (Bindseil et al. 
2017, p.6; Gabor 2016, p.990). Moreover, because sovereigns traditionally act as the 
ultimate fiscal backstop for banks, the burden of re-capitalising and bailing-out troubled 
lenders fell directly to national treasuries231 (De Groen 2015, p.2).  
 
These market-based repo practices designed to prevent sovereign risk-sharing and fiscal 
transfers therefore eroded the distinction between fiscal and monetary policy (Bibow 2015, 
p.31; Gabor 2016, p.969) and exacerbated the doom loop between weak banks and 
sovereigns (Bibow 2015, p.92; Huertas 2013, p.33). Consequently, the ECB began shifting 
away from repo operations towards conducting outright purchases. This implied an 
acceptance by the ECB that during a crisis within a market-based financial system, it was 
necessary not only to provide liquidity against eligible collateral (LOLR), but also to become 
the ‘market-maker of last resort’ (Gabor 2016; Le Maux 2017, p.1055; Mehrling 2016, p.166) 
by purchasing less valued assets and allowing banks to improve their balance sheets and 
future lending capacity (Gabor 2012, p.14).  
 
On 7th May 2009 the ECB announced a €60bl Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP) in 
response to rising spreads in the covered bond market and the destabilising effect this was 
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 In the Eurosystem NCBs are prevented from monetary financing (Art. 123 TFEU). 
having on wholesale funding. The covered bond market is one of the most important 
privately issued bond segments in Europe and was a key source of funding for Euroarea 
banks, with the market having grown to over €2.4 trillion by end-2008232 (ECBC 2009, p.88). 
The CBPP was described in monetarist terms as an attempt to increase the length of money 
market term rates and general liquidity in the interbank markets to facilitate monetary 
policy transmission as a ‘building block’ to ECSP (ECB 2010[a], p.105).  
 
But CBPP had additional importance as it attempted to ease funding conditions for credit 
institutions and businesses by encouraging banks to extend lending (Beirne et.al 2011, p12; 
ECB 2009[b]). This further shifted ECB policy away from traditional programmatic ideas and 
towards financial policy ideas which sought to stimulate economic growth. CBPP1 ran from 
July 2009 to June 2010 (ECB 2010[b]), but because the ECB halted the program on schedule 
despite continued volatility, the same policy was used again (CBPP2) from November 2011 
to October 2012 where another €40bl of covered bonds were purchased and held to 
maturity.   
 
Although the purchases were ‘sterilised’ to limit inflationary effects by auctioning fixed-term 
deposits, there could still be legitimate questions raised about the ECBs continued 
independence, price stability credentials and moral hazard (Beirne et al. 2011; Borio 2010, 
p.11), as the bank began targeting a specific asset class and absorbing risk from 
predominantly Spanish and German banks who were the main issuers and traders of 
European covered bonds (Beirne et al. p.23).   
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 Having grown from around €1.5 trillion in 2003. 
Table 7.1: Outstanding covered bonds by country (top 5) end-2007 (€m) 
 
Source: European Covered Bond Fact Book (2008) 
 
This action not only reduced the independence of the ECB as it acquired a vested interest in 
the success of Spanish and German banks, but it also had potential redistributive 
consequences (Gabor 2014[a], p.202).  If the ECB buys debt the debtor fails to service, it will 
make losses that will invariably be borne by European tax payers as a whole (De Grauwe 
2012[a], p.263; Weidmann 2014). This example thus demonstrates an instance of scenario G 
from the ideational versus structural matrix. In a market-based financial environment, 
maintaining a functioning interest rate transmission mechanism (in line with monetarist 
programmatic ideas), required the ECB to engage with financial policy ideas aimed at 
quelling financial instability and stimulating economic activity, weakening the original 
Maastricht settlement which expressly ruled out the targeting of assets (Issing 2002[b]; 
Noyer 1999[b]). 
 
ECBs financial crisis response (2007-10): 
 
G) ideational contradictions  -> gradual policy /  
     or failures      institutional change 
 
 
Monetarist ideas requiring a functioning interest rate transmission 
mechanism led the ECB to adopt financial policy ideas aimed at targeting 
financial assets that conflicted with traditional monetarism. 
Illustration 7.1 
 
Mortgage Public Sector Mixed Assets Ships Total
Germany 206,489 677,656 4,413 888,558
Spain 266,959 16,375 283,334
France 63,555 56,403 80,097 200,055
Ireland 13,575 51,204 64,779
Luxembourg 150 33,741 33,891
However, the reason the ECB chose to target covered bonds as opposed to other asset 
classes was precisely to try to limit aberration from its dominant ‘programmatic idea’ and 
restrict moral hazard. Covered bonds are corporate securities with recourse to a pool of 
assets that ‘covers’ the bond if the originator of the security (usually a bank) becomes 
insolvent. This recourse to the issuer distinguishes covered bonds from ‘synthetic’ Asset-
Backed Securities (ABSs) which are originated to distribute and transfer risk from the issuer 
to the holder of the asset (Beirne et.al 2011, p.9). This detail was an important component 
of the ECBs justification for CBPP:  
 
Financial support measures potentially involving the significant transfer of credit 
risk from financial institutions to the taxpayer clearly fall within the realm of 
fiscal policy. Our decision to conduct outright purchases of covered bonds is fully 
consistent with this fundamental principle. While they are expected to be 
effective in supporting credit, these purchases do not burden the Eurosystem with 
excessive credit risk 
 
(Trichet 2009[b], no page) 
 
Therefore although we see a very distinctive shift by the ECB towards more interventionist 
financial policy ideas, which would never have been sanctioned before the crisis (Issing 
2002[b]; Noyer 1999[b]), the bank remained very mindful of its obligation to limit risk-
sharing between member-states and to minimise fiscal repercussions. The ECB justified its 
decision to act in the covered bond market precisely because it argued such purchases did 
not cross the Rubicon from monetary into fiscal policy (Trichet 2009[b]). The program also 
finished on schedule despite continuing market instability, feeding into the suspicion that 
the ECB was uncomfortable using heterodox monetary leavers and reluctant to move away 
from its ‘programmatic’ ideational heritage (Economist 2012[a]; Pisani-Ferry and Wolff 
2012, p.3).   
The ECB also remained discursively couched in monetarist language, with price stability 
continually evoked as justification for new heterodox policy initiatives (Cœuré 2013[a]; 
Trichet 2011). During a speech in Munich in July 2009, President Trichet justified CBPP by 
reinforcing the claim that despite the introduction of unorthodox measures, the ECB 
continued to embody the monetarist ideals of the Deutsche Bundesbank (DB): 
 
With the creation of the euro, that [German] stability culture has been fully 
‘Europeanised’233, and was given a legal face in the Maastricht Treaty and an 
institutional face in the form of the ECB… we conduct all our policies in full 
continuity of our mission which started ten years ago, with foundations that have 
a much longer history and which are well anchored in the most stable monetary 
policy in Europe – the pursuit of price stability 
 
(Trichet 2009[b], no page) 
 
For the ECB, still a relatively new institution, maintaining credibility during the crisis was 
crucial, and this explains the discursive path-dependent commitment to price stability and 
Germanic stability culture exposed in the quote above234. Monetary policy uses 
communicative discourse to channel expectations, and credibility is often realised by 
nurturing discursive consistency and clarity (Hughes and Kesting 2014, p.333; Schonhardt-
Bailey 2013, p.100).  It is therefore difficult for central banks to significantly alter long-held 
ideas whilst at the same time preserve credibility (Schmidt 2016). Because the credibility 
and legitimacy of the ECB was predicated on the maintenance of its independence and 
defence of price stability (González-Páramo 2005; ECB 2011[b], p.91; Sibert 2009, p.7) – 
each of which were explicitly outlined in international treaties – policy justification 
continued path-dependently and change evolved more gradually than in other advanced 
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 The European Commission also continued to use monetarist language, see: Rehn 2011. 
central banks. This shows how established ideas in new institutions can hinder policy 
change: 
ECB monetary policy (2007-10): 
 
D) established ideas in new institutions  ->  hinder policy change 
 
 
Despite implementing interventionist financial policy ideas, the ECB 
maintained traditional monetarist communicative discourse and 
continued to try to separate monetary policy from measures taken to 
restore financial stability. 
Illustration 7.2 
 
 
SUPERVISORY INITIATIVES 
In response to growing financial instability, on the 25th February, the de Larosière Group of 
experts presented their report at the request of the Commission and recommended 
increasing financial supervision at the EU-level, stating: 
 
The ECB could play a major role in a new European supervisory system [by] 
ensuring adequate macro-prudential supervision in the EU 
 
(de Larosière 2009, p.42-44) 
 
 
The report built upon previous attempts by the EU to integrate and supranationalise 
financial supervision (Alford 2006; Jones et al. 2016). It argued for structural institutional 
change through the creation of a European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) under the auspices 
of the ECB (headed by the ECB President), which would be tasked with issuing early risk 
warnings and making recommendations on macro-prudential regulation (MPR) (de Larosière 
2009, p.44).  
 
The introduction of MPR at the European level represented a further substantive ideational 
shift from pre-crisis thinking (Baker 2012, p.113; Moschella 2014, p.137). MPR challenged 
pre-crisis neo-liberal philosophical ideas by recognising markets can often generate herding 
behaviours and perverse incentives and that central banks therefore need to do more than 
simply maintain price stability to ensure financial stability (Baker 2013, p.116; Moschella 
2014, p.143).  As this Senior Economist at the ECB put it: 
 
Macro-prudential policy must recognise that markets have some frictions, have 
some inefficiency… we often call them externalities created by the behaviour of 
one agent acting as a system as a whole… So this externality, this inefficiency if 
you will, needs to be there for macro-prudential policy to have a role 
 
(ECB: interview #4, 2015) 
 
MPR aims to strengthen the resilience of the financial system as a whole, rather than simply 
focus on the soundness of individual financial institutions (Papademos 2009). It does this by 
imposing countercyclical prudential requirements and capital buffers, as well as more 
fiscally targeted measures235. All of this required a significant deviation from neo-liberal 
philosophical ideas which, although recognised the possibility of market failure, saw 
markets as inherently stable and efficient. A member of the Commissions’ Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) acknowledged this ideational shift 
and summarised the change thusly: 
 
I think the paradigm that was prevailing before the crisis… was the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis. So basically, there may be ups and downs and there will 
always be periods of bubbles and periods of bubbles bursting, but overall the 
financial integration trend was towards a better allocation of risk and so forth.  
What we know now is that this clearly is not the case.  We have seen massive 
financial integration at the European level before the crisis, and this financial 
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 Such as loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios for mortgage borrowers, the implementation of which 
remains with member-states. 
integration has been associated with very little risk diversification, actually it has 
been associated with risk concentration in some geographical areas and in some 
specific markets. So this idea that left alone financial markets can function and 
deliver first best, or even a second best initiative has definitely gone 
 
(Commission: interview #17, 2015) 
 
Importantly however, in line with the ECSP, the introduction of MPR allowed the ECB to 
manipulate new tools distinct from monetary policy to help stabilise financial markets, 
whilst allowing traditional monetary instruments to remain focused on price stability: 
 
The ECB has the following view on that: its primary mandate and its primary 
objective continues to be price stability.  This remains the overriding objective.  
Subject to that, one can develop tools and activate instruments that we now 
have, in order to contain financial stability risks, through the macro-prudential 
tools 
 
(ECB: interview #4, 2015) 
 
The de Larosière report (2009) upheld the view that although the ECB should develop a role 
in MPR, micro-prudential policy236 should remain a national competence: 
 
The ECB is primarily responsible for monetary stability. Adding micro-supervisory 
duties could impinge on its fundamental mandate… [and] could result in political 
pressure and interference, thereby jeopardising the ECB's independence 
 
(de Larosière 2009, p.43) 
 
The report came to this position because macro- and micro-prudential authorities use 
similar tools, but apply them with different objectives in mind (Crockett 2000).  This may 
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leave scope for potential conflict between the two arms of regulation237 (Angelini et al. 
2012, p.20; Osiński et al. 2013 p.8). Responsibility for micro-prudential regulation may also 
leave the ECB prone to political pressure from member-states keen to secure rules more 
befitting of their own jurisdictions, threatening its political independence (de Larosière 
2009, p.43). The report therefore instead recommended creating a distinct European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) to better coordinate national micro-prudential 
policies (de Larosière 2009, p.47).  
 
At the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) meeting of the 1st-2nd December 
2009, the Council agreed to create three new European institutions to supervise banking, 
insurance and securities markets within the ESFS (Commission 2013): 
 
 The European Banking Authority (EBA) 
 The European Insurance and Occupation Pensions Authority (EIOPA)  
 The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)  
 
The overarching European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) entered into force on 16th December 
2010, and the three ESFS institutions two weeks later on 1st January 2011 (Commission 
2013). They were each tasked with promoting supervisory cooperation and advising the 
Commission and ECB on matters relating to their areas of competence (Quaglia 2013, p.24). 
While member-states were willing to enhance cooperation, they remained reluctant to 
supranationalise financial regulation (Jones et al. 2016, p.1022). Indeed, some have argued 
that because these institutions lack any binding authority to impose measures on member-
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 For example, during a downturn, a macro-prudential regulator may require financial institutions to draw 
down on their reserves and extend lending, while micro-prudential regulators may wish to see capital barriers 
extended to protect the stability of individual banks. 
states (Commission 2009), and because they are staffed by national regulatory authorities, 
they were in fact created by member-states as a way of increasing national control over EU 
financial policy. This view however was not shared by everyone: 
 
I saw their creation as a power grab by Europe and wish they hadn’t been 
created.  I wish that responsibility had remained with the nation states.  The 
difficulty is that the crisis originated in the United States and then came to 
London.  In the early stages of the crisis it was very much viewed as an Anglo-
Saxon and a London problem… You in London have failed to regulate your 
market, so we will now supervise you. And we lost that argument 
 
(UK MEP: interview #19, 2015) 
 
Indeed, these institutions represent a structural change from the mutual recognition of 
national rules towards an institutionalisation of harmonised EU financial laws. Under 
specific circumstances, these bodies can issue direct judgements on banks within member-
states (Busuioc 2013, p.12). It is therefore difficult to see their development as anything 
other than a transfer of authority away from member-states and towards the EU, with 
former Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso, describing the transition as a ‘silent 
revolution’ towards greater supranational economic governance (Barroso 2010). 
 
SUMMARY 
Although the ECB initially moved very quickly to extend capital to financial markets, 
between August 2007 and October 2008, capital was simply ‘frontloaded’ and given an 
extended maturity (Stark 2008). The ECB continued to maintain that interest rates should be 
the only tool of monetary policy and that monetary operations should not be used to 
resolve solvency problems in banks (Smaghi 2008; Trichet 2008[b]). Traditional monetary 
policy, and the separation principle (Stark 2008) between liquidity and monetary operations 
were therefore maintained.  
 
However, further change was detectable after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and HRE. 
Although the ECB’s programmatic monetarist ideas were largely retained, they were 
weakened and supplemented with interventionist policy ideas238 which were designed both 
to improve the interest rate transmission channel and support financial and economic 
stability (Trichet 2009[a]). The ECSP was created explicitly to pursue financial stability 
objectives (Trichet 2008[f]), and as more and more assets were brought onto the ECBs 
balance sheet, the likelihood of significant redistributive consequences in the event of non-
performance intensified (Borio 2010, p.11; Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.373; Lombardi and 
Moschella 2016, p.855). This had a corresponding impact on the independence of the ECB 
(particularly with respect of CBPP) and provides a clear example of how changing policy 
ideas, even when implemented with the intention of strengthening traditional 
programmatic ideas, can help generate important structural changes.  
 
The de Larosière report (2009) also recognised the need to promote financial policy ideas 
and endorsed the view that the ECB should play a direct role in orchestrating and setting 
MPR, handing the ECB responsibility for both price and financial stability. This represented a 
clear break from neo-liberal philosophical ideas as it overtly acknowledged that in an 
integrated market-based financial system, greater coordination and intervention by 
regulators was necessary to prevent damaging pro-cyclical effects (Baker 2012, p.113; 
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 The evolution of financial ‘policy ideas’ had begun in the pre-crisis era but developed more rapidly post-
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Moschella 2011, p.124). These ideas led directly to tangible institutional change and to the 
creation of the ESRB. 
 
Crucially however, handing the ECB responsibility for MPR was intended to facilitate path-
dependence in the field of monetary policy. MPR tools were to be used to fight financial 
instability, while monetary policy was to remain fully focused on price stability (Papademos 
2009). Therefore despite incorporating interventionist policy ideas which weakened neo-
liberal philosophical ideas and EMUs siloed institutional framework239, the ECB attempted to 
uphold monetarist programmatic ideas in the field of monetary policy. It is here that the 
institution derived most of its credibility and legitimacy (ECB 2011[b], p.9; González-Páramo 
2005; Sibert 2009, p.7), and where its founding ideas were most deeply embedded (TEU 
1992, Art.105). Therefore although important institutional and ideational change took place 
during this period, ideational and discursive path-dependence remained strongest in the 
ECBs commitment to price stability. 
 
Moreover, interventionist policies were implemented reluctantly by the ECB (Buiter and 
Rahbari 2012, p.7; De Grauwe 2012[b]; Lombardi and Moschella 2016, p.852). The fact safer 
covered bonds were purchased over other asset classes, and that CBPP1 finished on 
schedule despite continued market volatility, evidences this reality (Economist 2012[a]; 
Pisani-Ferry and Wolff 2012, p.3). Unlike other central banks (Benford et al. 2009, p.90), the 
ECB refused to instruct more radical policies such as Quantitative Easing (QE) until 2015240 
(Feldstein 2011, p.7; Lagarde 2013; Sibert 2009, p.7). Instead, it developed CBPP to limit 
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 The ECB embarked upon the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) on the 9
th
 March 2015. 
potential fiscal repercussions and designed the ECSP to allow monetary policy to be retained 
for price stability objectives (Gabor 2014[a], p.200; Stark 2009[a]). Any ‘extraordinary’ 
policies the ECB did implement also continued to be justified discursively in traditional 
monetarist terms (ECB 2010[a], p.105; Trichet 2009[b]). 
7.2 The Sovereign Debt Crisis as a critical juncture 
 
Before 2010, the ECB refused to sanction the purchase of government bonds to help 
stabilise financial markets241. But by this date, many peripheral governments were facing 
severe fiscal pressures in the wake of a series of bank bailouts, financial guarantees, and 
lower than trend tax receipts. LTROs and the ECBs mark-to-market collateral framework for 
repos further exacerbated the doom loop between peripheral banks and sovereigns (De 
Groen 2015, p.2; Gabor 2016, p.990; Steinberg and Vermeiren 2016, p.397), which 
dramatically altered the credit ratings and yield spreads of Eurozone sovereign bonds (figure 
7.3). Peripheral states borrowing costs increased drastically while ‘safe havens’ like 
Germany saw yields reduce as financiers scrambled for somewhere safe to house their 
investments (Gros 2012; Klose and Weigert 2012).  
 
Such was the scale of the problem that the sovereign debt crisis began to threaten the fiscal 
solvency of many peripheral nations and the existence of the euro itself (De Groen 2015; 
Farhi and Tirole 2015; Horváth and Šuster 2014, p.41). This led the ECB and other EU 
institutions to adopt far more radical policies which substantially broadened supranational 
authority into fiscal and financial policy areas. It is therefore the sovereign debt crisis, rather 
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 Despite many other leading central banks meanwhile initiated Quantitative Easing (QE) to help stabilise 
their financial systems and boost economic growth (Benford et al. 2009, p.90). 
than the initial financial crisis, which should be viewed as the critical juncture (Capoccia and 
Kelemen 2007, p.346) which further catalysed substantive institutional change. 
 
Figure 7.3: Eurozone 10-year Government Bond Yields (2006-2014) 
 
Source: OECD Data (2018) 
 
EUROPEAN ‘BAILOUT’ MECHANISMS 
By May 2010 problems in Greece and Portugal meant some form of bailout mechanism 
could no longer be avoided to prevent peripheral states sliding into bankruptcy. Given the 
ECBs prohibition on providing such assistance (TEFU 2007, Art.125), an extraordinary 
ECOFIN meeting242 was convened between 7th-9th May where ministers agreed details of a 
comprehensive package of measures, including the creation of the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) (De Groen 
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2015; Farhi and Tirole 2015; Horváth and Šuster 2014, p.41). The EFSM was operated by the 
Commission and given the ability to distribute loans of up to €60 billion. Funds were raised 
in the financial markets with implicit guarantees provided by the EU budget. The EFSF 
meanwhile had a total of up to €500 billion to distribute, but with strong conditionality 
attached to terms. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also participated in this 
arrangement by providing an additional €250 billion, bringing the total size of the EFSF to 
€750 billion ($1 trillion) (European Council 2010).  
 
The IMF, Commission, and controversially, the ECB, monitored the progress of reforms 
within states applying for EFSF assistance through the so-called ‘Troika’. The management of 
programmes targeting fiscal adjustment and structural reform in individual member-states 
was a far cry from the ECB’s pre-crisis role of simply maintaining price stability (Gros 2015, 
p.5). In a letter to the Irish Finance Minister in 2010, the ECB threatened to cut-off liquidity 
support for Irish banks unless Ireland agreed to a financial assistance programme (ECB 
2010[c]), leading to criticism that the ECB was overreaching its mandate (Chopra 2015, p.5; 
Whelan 2015, p.20). It also threatened to cut off ELA to Cyprus, and in the case of Greece, 
actually did so. This led to further questions about the political independence of the ECB 
and to concerns from within the bank itself about whether it should play such a role: 
 
The ECB has now got this new role as part of the Troika, which was something 
completely new that it had not done before, and there were many voices in the 
ECB who were saying they should not be involved in this kind of work… the 
conflict of interest is most difficult when you get to this financial viability topic… 
you’ve somehow got to be sure that the institution you are dealing with is 
viable… So this has been probably the most contentious issue about whether 
there is some sort of conflict of interest… 
 
The role of the ECB in the Troika was not the ECB deciding itself, ‘yes, we want to 
be involved in the Trokia’, it was invited by the Eurogroup243 because of concerns 
that there would just be the IMF and the Commission and the potential problems 
of that constellation 
 
(ECB: interview #2, 2015) 
 
This quote is important because it demonstrates the ECB was itself reluctant to become 
involved in the Troika and to expand its area of competence far wider than initially 
intended. The reason it did so was because ever since the publication of Walter Bagehot’s 
Lombard Street (1873), it has been generally accepted that during periods of financial panic, 
central banks should lend to solvent financial institutions with good collateral at high 
interest rates. Yet deciding which banks are insolvent and which are merely experiencing 
liquidity problems is notoriously difficult to judge during episodes of financial distress.  
 
Braun (2015) argues that because the ECB lent to Eurozone banks at below pre-crisis 
interest rates through its LTRO programs, the ECB broke the ‘Bagehot rule’ and aggravated 
moral hazard (Braun 2015, p.432). But this fails to consider the impact of the ECBs collateral 
framework which continued to mark-to-market, resulting in banks holding peripheral 
sovereign debt having to take ever larger haircuts. Indeed, the haircut rates the ECB charges 
on sovereign collateral can vary from between 15-71 percent (table 7.2), meaning it can be 
over four times more expensive to generate liquidity for owners of peripheral debt than 
holders of sovereign bonds regarded as ‘safe’. While these practices can increase pro-
cyclicality and exacerbate the bank-sovereign doom loop (Bibow 2015, p.31; Gabor 2016, 
p.969; Whittall and Gore 2014), they also reduce the risk of moral hazard and help the ECB 
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 The ‘Eurogroup’ is an unofficial ECOFIN configuration consisting only of euro member-states. 
differentiate between banks which are solvent and those which are not (Bindseil et al. 2017, 
p.11). 
 
Table 7.2: ECB collateral framework for ‘haircuts’ (2017) 
 
Source: Bindseil, U., et al (2017) 
 
With the EFSF and EFSM still failing to quell market volatility, European leaders reached 
agreement on the need for a permanent crisis fund at a meeting of the European Council on 
21st October 2010. The ESM came into force in July 2011 and succeeded the EFSF.  It was 
founded on an intergovernmental treaty which effectively sidestepped the ‘no-bailout-
clause’ (Howarth and Quaglia 2015, p.473) and was thus regarded by many as a violation of 
the treaties (Beck and Prinz 2012, p.42; Henerlein 2015, p.21). The new institution was given 
authority to lend up to €500 billion to Eurozone members facing fiscal pressures which 
threatened the stability of the Euroarea, but with assistance only provided with unanimous 
agreement from signatory states (Marzinotto et al. 2011, p.4).  
 
Moral hazard concerns were mitigated by ESM support being made contingent upon Troika 
imposed macroeconomic adjustment programmes – Memorandums of Understanding 
‘CQS’ denotes ‘credit 
quality steps’. These 
categories represent the 
maximum probability of 
default over a one-year 
horizon.  
 
CQS 2 for example 
represents an asset class 
with a maximum 
probability of default over 
1 year of 1 percent. 
(MoUs) – which detail how fiscal consolidation should be implemented (Barroso 2011). 
Indeed, the ECB stressed explicitly that ESM bailouts should:  
Not create moral hazard, but rather strengthen the incentives for prudent fiscal 
and economic policies in all Euroarea countries… any financing under the ESM 
needs to be subject to very strong policy conditionality 
 
(ECB 2011[c], p.71-2) 
 
 
Nevertheless, a pooling of fiscal authority in this way necessarily spreads liability across the 
Eurozone and consequently creates a degree of moral hazard. The establishment of ESM 
therefore represents an additional weakening of the original principles upon which EMU 
was founded: price stability primacy, market discipline and fiscal conservativism244 (Beck 
and Prinz 2012, p.42; Henerlein 2015, p.21). This led one Irish Member of Parliament, 
Thomas Pringle, to bring the ESM treaty before the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  
 
Mr Pringle argued that the Treaty, which also permitted ESM to purchase government 
bonds on the secondary market through the Secondary Market Support Facility, impinged 
upon the ECBs exclusive right to conduct monetary policy and violated the prohibition of 
monetary financing (TEFU 2007, Art.123; ECJ 2012). It was argued that if buying government 
bonds constituted a fiscal operation, the ECBs bond purchases meant it had overstepped its 
mandate. If however they were deemed monetary operations, as the ECB claims, ESM 
purchases would have been illegal as only the ECB is permitted to conduct monetary policy 
in the Euroarea (Sinn 2014, p.290).  
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 Indeed, ESM recipient states pay a lower rate of interest than under the EFSF, and a much lower rate than 
the prevailing market price (Booth 2013, p.170). 
In its ruling, the Court found that the objective of ESM: ‘To safeguard the stability of the 
Euroarea as a whole’, was distinct from the ECBs objective of maintaining price stability. 
Although it recognised that the stability of the Euroarea was likely to have repercussions for 
the stability of the euro, the ECJ judged that: 
 
An economic policy measure cannot be treated as equivalent to a monetary 
policy measure for the sole reason that it may have indirect effects on the 
stability of the euro 
 
(ECJ 2012, p.13, para.56)  
 
ESM was therefore saved245 by the ECJ conceptually stretching its idea of what constitutes 
monetary policy. Although the ECB has exclusive competence over monetary policy, it has 
only an indirect effect on price stability itself. Whist the ECB justifies its policies with 
reference to price stability; these policies only work through the altering of financial and 
economic conditions (Bibow 2015, p.26). The distinctions the Maastricht Treaty sought to 
draw between monetary, financial and fiscal policy are therefore necessarily artificial. Even 
though the ECJ was able uphold the distinction legally at an ideational level, the crisis 
revealed them to have little practicability. The creation of this new institution therefore 
substantially weakened the structure of EMU as originally conceived at Maastricht. 
 
The case was also significant because it demonstrated that the EU was able to overcome 
legal challenges which aimed to prevent it extending its competences and shifting EMU in a 
more interventionist direction. HI suggests such formal structural impediments are the main 
reason institutions remain path-dependent and resistant to change (Pierson 2000, p. 264-5; 
Hall and Taylor 1996, p.937). Yet this case demonstrates that the EU was able to vanquish 
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 The Treaty eventually became ratified as part of EU law in January 2013. 
structural rigidities and institute substantial institutional alteration despite legal challenges 
from conservative elements aiming to maintain the status quo. 
 
The creation of ESM: 
 
A) ideas trump structures    ->  institutional change 
 
 
Ideational conceptual stretching over what constituted monetary policy 
allowed the ESM to conduct similar policies to the ECB. This further weakened 
the original structural framework of EMU, as well as traditional monetarist 
programmatic ideas. 
Illustration 7.3 
 
That said, HI insights remain important in helping to conceptualise events surrounding the 
creation of the bailout mechanisms as they represent a critical juncture in the evolution of 
EMU which exposed the incompatibility of a single monetary policy, integrated capital 
markets and market discipline in the sovereign debt markets (Gabor 2016). The Maastricht 
settlement was unable to withstand the sovereign debt crisis as it placed the euro in an 
existential emergency (Jones et al. 2016, p.1011; Schmidt 2014, p.189; van Rumpuy 2011). 
The EU became incapable of maintaining a workable distinction between the various strands 
of economic policy (Bibow 2015, p.26), abide by the no-bailout-clause (Beck and Prinz 2012, 
p.42; Henerlein 2015, p.21), and secure the future of the euro. The very real prospect of 
EMUs collapse and the sunk costs (Bulmer 2009, p.310; Klaus 2010; Posner 2007, p.145) 
involved in such a scenario was enough to override programmatic ideational constraints and 
structural rigidities, allowing significant institutional change to take place. Insights from DI 
and HI therefore reinforce each other in this instance and are both essential to fully 
understand events within the Eurozone during this period.  
 
 
Figure 7.4: Process of causation: ideational and structural change (ESM) 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
MONETARY POLICY AND THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS 
What was a critical juncture for EMU as a whole proved likewise for the ECB. At the same 
time EU leaders agreed to the creation of EFSF, the ECB initiated further interventionist 
initiatives in the form of the Securities Market Programme (SMP). This apparently aimed at 
restoring the proper functioning of the monetary policy transmission channel by addressing 
specific malfunctioning debt market segments (ECB 2010[b], p.24; 2011[d], p.100), including 
the sovereign segment, by purchasing Eurozone government bonds on the secondary 
market (ECB 2010[b], p.73). 
 
This marked another substantial leap in the evolution of ECB balance-sheet activity246, going 
further in undermining the banks institutional independence. However, just as before, the 
bank remained discursively path-dependent and was at pains to stress that the measures 
were not taken to assist distressed sovereigns: 
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 Adding €74 billion to the ECBs balance sheet by 2011 (Bibow 2015, p.71). 
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(2010-12) 
Impairments to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy are not 
necessarily [only] located in the interbank market but… in other financial market 
segments, and one prominent financial market segment was of course as of 2010 
the sovereign segment, where we intervened directly in the sovereign market 
segment. But you know, not because we like to help the sovereigns but because 
we thought that this market is a key market that actually has a broader impact 
on financial conditions in the economy and which matters not only for the health 
of the banking system but also the financing conditions of households and firms 
 
(ECB: interview #1, 2015) 
 
The quote above outlines the ECBs contention that volatility in the sovereign debt market 
was creating secondary effects in the financial, stock, interbank and foreign exchange 
markets and that action was therefore required to ensure monetary policy remained 
effective247 (ECB 2010[b], p.24; Trichet 2010[b]). The bank also argued taking such measures 
fell fully in line with its price stability mandate and that SMP did not threaten the principles 
of central bank independence, or the prohibition on monetary financing (Trichet 2010[a]). 
Due to ‘sterilisations’248, it also claimed bond purchases did not alter the stance of monetary 
policy (ECB 2010 [b], p.24).  
 
Indeed, during the crisis, peripheral banks holding peripheral government bonds were 
forced to pay more to borrow in the capital markets than ‘northern’ European banks 
(Bindseil et al. 2017; Gabor 2016). This provides a certain validity to the ECBs ‘transmission 
mechanism’ argument for SMP. But not everyone was convinced and German monetarists 
were particularly sceptical (Weber 2011; Weidmann 2017[b]). Many ordo-liberals argued 
purchasing sovereign bonds was tantamount to giving governments’ access to the printing 
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 This shows once more the incompatibility of maintaining a single monetary policy, integrated capital 
markets and sovereign debt market discipline as the bank became forced to intervene in bond markets to 
support peripheral paper and preserve harmonised interest rates. 
248
 Through ‘sterilisations’, the ECB reabsorbed additional liquidity by extracting highly liquid deposits through 
fine-tuning operations into fixed-term deposits. This aimed to keep banks’ holdings of central bank liquidity 
unchanged, precluding any increases in monetary aggregates (ECB 2010[b], p.24). 
press (Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.194; Sinn 2014, p.5). Governments, they argued, could 
persuade banks within their jurisdiction to buy home sovereign debt (lowering national 
borrowing costs and reducing market discipline), which they could then either sell to the 
ECB or use as collateral in LTRO programs, mutualising losses and generating moral hazard 
(Sinn 2014, p.156-7). 
 
Axel Weber, the then DB President, and Jürgen Stark, the ECBs Chief Economist, both 
argued strongly against SMP, suggesting it would muddy the lines between monetary and 
fiscal policy and threaten ECB independence (Meiers 2015, p.41; Weber 2010). Unlike ESM, 
SMP support did not come with explicit fiscal or structural reform conditionality. It was 
therefore feared the program also had the potential to weaken fiscal discipline (Buiter and 
Rahbari 2012, p.26). This forced Weber to resign in February 2011 (Weber 2011) and Stark 
to do likewise in September249. Soon after his resignation, Stark made the following remark: 
 
We are not the lender of last resort [to governments] and I do not advise 
European governments to ask the ECB to become lender of last resort… This will 
mean that the ECB immediately will lose its independence 
 
(Stark 2011, no page) 
 
These policy decisions and the subsequent criticism from German quarters highlight the 
extent to which the ECB had shifted from its pre-crisis position. For an institution created in 
the mould of the DB (Dyson 2002[b], p.186; Heipertz and Verdun 2010, p.46; Quaglia 2008, 
p.47-74), to generate such disparagement from DB officials is striking. The quote below from 
an ECB economist highlights the discomfort many traditional monetarists felt towards SMP, 
and the extent to which the policy represented a break from previous customs: 
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 Although Stark cited ‘personal reasons’ for leaving (ECB 2011[a]), many suspect his real motivation was the 
reactivation of SMP in August (Blackstone 2011; Carrel 2011; Ewing and Kulish 2011; Müller et al. 2011). 
I think there was a really strong concern that if the program [SMP]… had become 
too big, it could become a threat, or be seen to become a threat, to ECB 
independence… It’s also relative to the reputation of the ECB at that time.  I think 
the model of the ECB was so much based on the Bundesbank, steady-as-you-go, 
very considered and well-founded decision model, that the SMP, to the believers 
in that model, were a bit shocked 
 
(ECB: interview #2, 2015) 
 
Yet not only did the ECB justify SMP by using traditional monetarist communicative 
discourse (ECB 2010[b], p.24; Trichet 2010[a]; 2010[b]), it remained reluctant to invoke 
heterodox policy and consistently sought to revert back to traditional instruments at the 
earliest opportunity (Economist 2012[a]; Howarth and Quaglia 2015, p.463). Rather than 
step-up SMP towards the end of 2010 as volatility continued, the ECB instead attempted to 
exit the policy and began weighting European debt according to its ratings to try to limit 
potential losses. This caused ‘fire sales’250 of peripheral paper and spiked yields 
(Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.322), necessitating further SMP intervention in the New Year. 
Despite this, in March 2011, the program was again halted due to a lack of progress on EU 
fiscal initiatives aimed at limiting moral hazard (Bastasin 2015). This reveals how established 
ideas in new institutions can hinder policy change, expressed through scenario D (table 2.2): 
 
ECB reluctance to use ‘extraordinary’ monetary policy: 
 
D) established ideas in new institutions  ->  hinder policy change 
 
 
ii) established programmatic ideas  -> strong institutional  
resistance  
 
 
The ECB faced strong internal and external resistance to the 
implementation of SMP and sought to exit the policy at the earliest 
opportunity. 
Illustration 7.4 
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 The mass selling of a specific asset class. 
This ideational conflict between traditional monetarist programmatic ideas which reviled 
central bank incursion into financial and fiscal policy, and policy ideas which sought to 
improve financial stability – with the ultimate aim of safeguarding price stability – became 
clear in discussions with members of the institution:  
 
They have actually been doing fiscal policy. My view on this is that, thank 
God they have done this, on the one hand. On the other hand I think this is 
not their job and they should stop doing it! It’s not their job to do fiscal 
policy. They should not be buying bonds, and of course they can’t on the 
primary market, but even on the secondary market, okay, you don’t violate 
any rules but it’s still fiscal policy… it’s not part of their mandate. It doesn’t 
say anywhere you should do fiscal policy. You cannot sustain this for very 
long without compromising credibility. We had independent central banks 
for exactly that reason 
 
(ECB: interview #3, 2015) 
 
This quote illustrates succinctly the ideational dilemma confronting the ECB in 2010 and 
represents an example of interdiscursivity between two overlapping discourses (Fairclough 
2010, p.95; Wodak 2001[b]). In no way did the bank feel comfortable using unorthodox 
policy levers or shifting from traditional ideas about how central banks should operate 
(Buiter and Rahbari 2012, p.7; De Grauwe 2012[b]; Lombardi and Moschella 2016, p.852). 
Yet the critical juncture of the sovereign debt crisis was such that if it was to maintain an 
effective monetary policy within a market-based financial environment, and path-
dependence in the pursuit of price stability, heterodox measures were plainly necessary.  
 
Therefore, whilst it is important to stress how far the ECB shifted during the sovereign debt 
crisis, it is also imperative not to overlook aspects of continuity. Although the bank 
implemented financial policies through ECSP, CBPP, MPR and SMP, it still attempted to use 
traditional monetary policy to tackle inflation. Whilst other central banks across the world 
were slashing rates to record lows and embarking upon huge asset purchase programs, on 
7th April 2011, the ECB actually began raising interest rates. It increased its main refinancing 
rate from 1 percent to 1.25 percent in April, and again to 1.5 percent in July sighting ‘upside 
risks to price stability’, despite noting a ‘slower pace’ in the expansion of economic activity 
(Trichet 2011). Therefore while the ECB was forced to act upon policy ideas which went far 
beyond the intentions of its creators, it remained reluctant to do so and consistently 
attempted to move back towards pre-crisis ideational norms (Farrell and Finnemore 2016, 
p.585; Pisani-Ferry and Wolff 2012, p.3; Schmidt 2014).  
 
Change advanced more rapidly with the anointment of President Mario Draghi who 
assumed office on 1st November 2011. Just as the appointment of President Trichet in 2003 
provoked ECB recognition that Eurozone financial integration had helped generate potential 
for financial fragility (Trichet 2003), President Draghi understood that without a 
commitment by the bank to support EMU sovereigns, the single currency faced the prospect 
of total collapse. Draghi held decidedly less orthodox ideas than his predecessor251 (Blyth 
and Matthijs 2016, p.26; ECB: interview #2, 2015) and in almost his first act as president on 
9th November, decided to cut the main refinancing rate to 1.25 percent, then to 1 percent 
just a month later (ECB 2011[d], p.84). Yet these rate reductions failed to prevent an 
escalation of the sovereign debt crisis over the spring and summer of 2012 (IMF 2012[a], 
p.5). Under mounting pressure from markets and with interest rates on Italian and Spanish 
bonds reaching unsustainable levels after the collapse of Bankia252, the ECB was forced to 
implement more extraordinary measures.  
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 ‘Mario Draghi has worked in the financial markets, he has a very different mentality, or philosophy, about 
central banking, certainly than Trichet’ (ECB: interview #2, 2015). 
252
 Spain’s third largest financial entity (see chapter 6). 
Previously, moral hazard concerns about bond purchases and bailouts, legal restrictions on 
monetary financing, worries about credibility and German disapproval meant it was very 
difficult for the ECB to provide discursive support for unorthodox policies (Buiter and 
Rahbari 2012, p.27). The worsening critical juncture, however, altered this hesitancy as it 
became a greater imperative to reassure markets than to try to soothe hawkish sensibilities 
regarding the ECBs continued commitment to monetarist programmatic ideas (Schmidt 
2016). In a speech on 26th July 2012, Draghi adopted a very different communicative 
discourse and spoke directly to the markets by saying: 
 
The ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro… and believe me, it 
will be enough 
 
(Draghi 2012[a], no page) 
 
Although the discursive commitment to price stability remained253 (Brunnermeier et al. 
2016, p.320; Schmidt 2016, p.1034), this new language implied the ECB was prepared to 
purchase government bonds in unlimited quantities (Blackstone and Walker 2012). The 
mere recognition by markets that the ECB was primed to take such action led almost 
immediately to rates on Italian and Spanish 2-year government bonds decreasing by around 
2 percent (Altavilla et al. 2014, p.5). This is a powerful example of communicative discourse 
having a direct impact on the course of history (Schmidt 2014, p.202). 
 
The speech was followed in August with the announcement of the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) program which replaced SMP. From the perspective of the wholesale 
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 ‘[OMT] builds on an established monetary policy doctrine that has gained prominence not least because it 
has been successfully pursued by the Bundesbank for several decades. Namely that the central bank should be 
endowed with a clear price stability mandate and, within this mandate, should be allowed – in fact obliged – to 
use its instruments in full independence to deliver price stability’ (Draghi 2014[c]). 
markets, OMT was successful because it put an end to uncertainty about the collateral 
qualities of Eurozone sovereign debt, providing ‘free-of-charge insurance’ for bond investors 
(Sinn 2014, p.2).  While LTROs tended to increase pro-cyclicality, OMT committed the bank 
to creating money to purchase struggling countries’ debt in the secondary markets without 
limit, guaranteeing demand for peripheral paper (Gabor and Ban 2015, p.16).  
 
Figure 7.5: Process of causation: ideational and structural change (OMT) 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
At the same time, this policy fundamentally altered a major plank of ECB ideational 
orthodoxy which had shaped the previous 13 years of EMU (Blackstone and Walker 2012; 
Micossi 2015, p.19). The bank effectively reinterpreted its own mandate to include 
responsibility for preserving the euro as well as price stability (Matthijs 2016, p.380): 
 
In contrast to both the initial purchases of government bonds and possible 
quantitative easing, the programme of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) is 
aimed at a very specific risk, namely the so-called tail risk of the Euroarea falling 
apart 
 
(Draghi 2014[d], no page) 
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OMT required a significant degree of conceptual stretching (Cox 2004, p.216) to encompass 
the policy within the ECBs price stability framework as it shifted sovereign risk onto the 
banks’ balance sheet – mutualising potential losses, weakening market discipline and 
diluting the distinction between monetary and fiscal policy (Sinn 2014, p.2). Such a step was 
made possible largely because of the strict operational independence handed to the ECB, 
coupled with low-levels of structural accountability (Claeys et al. 2014). This allowed the 
bank to manoeuvre more freely than other European institutions (Schmidt 2016, p.1034), 
empowering it to move to the margins of its mandate with little recourse available for those 
holding alternative views (Gros 2015, p.13; Lombardi and Moschella 2016, p.858).  
 
Although coming much later than other internationally renowned central banks, these ECB 
interventions targeting specific market segments overtly acknowledged that the ‘neo-liberal 
consensus’ around pre-crisis philosophical ideas no longer holds (Dyson 2002[a], p.14, 
Kaelberer 2003, p.368, McNamara 1998, p.170). Indeed, in some respects, pre-crisis ECB 
thinking has been turned on its head. Whereas before the crisis the bank argued price 
stability was the most effective policy a central bank could pursue to ensure financial 
stability (Duisenberg 2003; Issing 1999[a]), it now also argues the reverse: that financial 
stability is necessary for a functioning interest rate transmission mechanism and the 
maintenance of price stability254 (ECB 2011[b], p.83; Papademos 2009; Trichet 2010[a]).  
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 ‘The ECB does believe that, and does stand on the fact that price and financial stability complement each 
other, meaning that price stability helps to improve financial stability and vis-a-versa.  Not least because a 
more stable financial system helps the transmission of monetary policy signals and thereby helps anchor 
inflation expectations and control inflation – so this complementarity exists’ (ECB: interview #4, 2015). 
Yet the commitment to price stability has remained constant. As the quote below from a 
former ECB Economist makes clear, traditional programmatic ideas have not dissolved 
entirely and orthodox monetary tools are still preferred: 
 
I think what has really changed is the way people are trying to think... I think 
people are looking at financial variables and financial analysis much more than 
they did before… But I wouldn’t say there has been any shifting [in monetary 
policy]… Why? Because they believed they had the right model, and they still 
believe they have the right model for deciding upon monetary policy in the 
Euroarea 
(ECB: interview #2, 2015) 
 
 
Indeed, whilst significant structural and ideational change took place to address the 
contradictions of the Maastricht framework, many of these changes were implemented with 
a view to maintaining path-dependence in monetary policy (Draghi 2012[b]; 2014[d]; Issing 
2008, p.86; Yiangou et al. 2013, p.231). To accurately grasp why institutional change at the 
EU-level evolved as it did, it is therefore necessary to understand how Europe’s integrated 
and market-based financial environment developed in response to ECB and Commission 
attempts improve monetary transmission. This then gave rise to financial policy ideas which 
aimed to address Maastricht’s incongruities, while simultaneously preserving traditional 
monetarist programmatic ideas in the field of monetary policy. Policies adopted at the EU-
level throughout this period should therefore be viewed as an attempt to incorporate both 
sets of ideas into the structure of EMU, without fundamentally reconstructing the 
institutional fabric of the Eurosystem which would have damaged the ECBs credibility and 
necessitated a change to the treaties255.  
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 Something few were willing to countenance (Commission: interview #18, 2015). 
BANKING UNION 
In September 2012, just over 3 months after the collapse of Bankia, the Commission 
unveiled proposals for a European Banking Union (BU) in a further effort to break the doom 
loop between weak banks and sovereigns (van Rompuy et al. 2012[a]). This was to consist of 
a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for banks, handing the ECB ‘ultimate responsibility 
for banking supervision’ (van Rompuy et al. 2012[a], p.6); a Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) for resolving insolvent banks, backed up with a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) to help 
finance resolutions; a common Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS); a common fiscal backstop  
 
Figure 7.6: Illustration of Eurosystem Banking Union 
 
Source: Bank of Austria (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 2017) 
https://www.oenb.at/en/financial-market/three-pillars-banking-union.html 
 
of temporary support to act as LOLR for banks (handed to ESM); and a Single European 
Rulebook to apply to all EU states (Constâncio 2013; Schild 2015, p.4; van Rompuy et al. 
2012[b]). 
 
The report stated in its conclusions that the ECB should be handed micro-prudential 
supervisory authority as well as responsibility for MPR (van Rompuy et al. 2012[a], p.2256), 
marking a huge turnaround from recommendations made just three years earlier in the de 
Larosière Report (2009). That report had claimed handing the ECB direct supervisory power 
over financial institutions would result in political pressure that could jeopardise the banks’ 
independence and ultimately endanger price stability (de Larosière 2009, p.43).  
 
Placing the bank in charge of financial supervision made monetarists distinctly uneasy 
because it increased the risk of monetary and financial policy decisions coming into conflict 
(DB: interview #5, 2015). If, for example, it was felt interest rates should be raised to protect 
price stability, but doing so would increase funding costs for banks and therefore exacerbate 
the risk of financial instability, the ECB may face a significant regulatory dilemma (Claeys et 
al. 2014, p.11; Copelovitch and Singer 2008, p.663). Indeed, the view of the DB on this point 
could hardly be clearer257: 
 
This is very clear.  Banking supervision should be in a separate institution to the 
ECB. This should have been done when setting up European banking supervision… 
This is a danger and this needs to be managed. It is a flaw in the European 
institutional framework. The Bundesbank has always been very clear, and it is 
also my personal view, that this is absolutely necessary to get banking 
supervision out of the ECB 
(DB: interview #5) 
 
Nevertheless, despite these objections, the ECB was handed supervisory authority over 
SSM. But to try to neutralise concerns about operational conflicts and threats to its 
independence, the bank maintained a clear distinction between its monetary and 
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supervisory commitments (Mersch 2013). Indeed, the separation principle is now no longer 
viewed as a separation between monetary policy objectives and liquidity operations used to 
steer short-term interest rates (which have become virtually indistinguishable), but as a 
separation between monetary policy and micro-prudential supervision (ECB 2014[b]; ECB: 
interview #2, 2015258). This is a further example of a trend visible throughout EMU whereby 
the ECB has attempted to create new instruments to tackle financial instability whilst aiming 
to maintain path-dependence in pursuit of price stability (figure 7.7). 
 
Figure 7.7: ECB attempts to integrate financial stability policy ideas with its path- 
                    dependent commitment to price stability 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
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Yet the ECBs involvement in micro-prudential supervision is evidence nonetheless that 
orthodox monetarist programmatic ideas have been eroded significantly. While it was 
originally argued the manipulation of interest rates was all that was required to maintain 
price stability (Hämäläinen 2002; Noyer 1999[a]), and that central banks should not target 
financial objectives (Issing 1999[a]; Noyer 1999[b]), the ECB now argues it is necessary to 
tackle financial instability through both micro- and macro-prudential regulation to uphold its 
primary objective: 
 
This combining of monetary and supervisory functions reflects the fact that, for 
monetary policy authorities, financial stability is obviously key. A stable financial 
system with sound and solvent banks supports the smooth transmission of 
monetary policy and ultimately contributes to macroeconomic stability… 
Conversely, financial imbalances can be a genuine threat to price stability 
 
(Mersch 2013, no page) 
 
While insights from DI concerning the strength of ideas and how they are communicated 
help conceptualise the process of ideational and institutional change throughout EMU, the 
overall objective of maintaining price stability has remained constant and is best explained 
using insights from HI. From the pre-crisis monitoring of financial data to the formation of a 
mission statement on financial stability (Trichet 2005[a]), to the post-crisis creation of ECSP, 
CBPP, SMP, OMT, and the establishment of BU, the ECB has progressively obtained ever 
greater responsibility for protecting financial stability. But at every turn, policies have been 
justified on the grounds of defending price stability, and the legitimacy and credibility of the 
bank remains tied to its preservation (ECB 2011[b], p.91; Högenauer and Howarth 2016; 
Hughes and Kesting 2014, p.333). This institutional evolution occurred not as a response to 
one financial trauma, but advanced incrementally through financial policy ideas which were 
developed to manage the structural paradoxes of EMU259.  
 
BU nevertheless remains incomplete (Commission 2012[a]; Howarth and Quaglia 2015, 
p.476; Véron 2015, p.5). National governments have retained vetoes over whether or not 
resolution processes should be triggered for banks within their jurisdiction (Gabor 2014[b], 
p.3), and the creation of a common DGS has been shelved due to member-states reluctance 
to risk-share and establish fiscal transfers which may generate moral hazard (Donnelly 2014; 
Feldstein 2011, p.7; Lagarde 2013; Sibert 2009, p.7).  Many European nations remain 
strongly opposed to initiatives that would see domestic bank deposits being used to rescue 
savers in other countries, and which would shift EMU irrevocably from its siloed institutional 
structure (Strupczewski and Heinrich 2015; Yiangou et al. 2013, p.231).  
 
7.3 Conclusion 
 
Why has the ECB become increasingly attentive to financial stability 
concerns? 
 
Using process tracing, this chapter analysed the process through which institutional change 
has taken place at the EU-level since the 2007-8 financial crisis. It established causality 
between ideational and structural imperatives which have both enabled and constrained 
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the advance of Europe’s financial stability agenda, and improved our understanding of how 
and why institutional change takes place. Since 2007-8, EMUs original Maastricht framework 
has been substantially weakened. The old distinctions between financial, monetary and 
fiscal policy have become blurred (Bibow 2015, p.26; Borio 2010, p.11), and the ECB no 
longer holds non-interventionist policy ideas in relation to financial stability. It is no longer 
true to say that the ECB believes the best thing a central bank can do to aid financial stability 
is to ensure price stability. Consequently, the ECB can no longer meaningfully be described 
as ‘the Bundesbank writ large’ (Dyson 2002[b], p.186), not least because of the DB’s 
relentless post-crisis disapproval of its actions (Blackstone and Walker 2012; Hesse et al. 
2016). 
 
Yet this transition should not be viewed as a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (Krasner 1988) 
enabled solely as a result of critical junctures (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p.341; Thelen 
1999, p.388). Change evolved gradually, beginning, as chapter 5 showed, with closer 
financial integration and the subsequent weakening of market discipline in the sovereign 
bond markets. This unfolded as a result of traditional monetarist ideas aiming to improve 
the transmission of monetary policy by promoting capital market integration (Gabor and 
Ban 2016, p.618; Issing 2008, p.214; Tumpel-Gugerell 2005). Change was then accelerated 
by the financial crisis as the EU and ECB became increasingly interventionist in the pursuit of 
financial stability. Institutional innovation developed through the creation of the ESFS, and 
by the ECB evoking interventionist policy ideas in the form of the ECSP, LTROs and CBPP, 
which further weakened Maastricht’s original architecture.  
 
The critical juncture of the sovereign debt crisis later exposed the incompatibility of 
attaining each of Maastricht’s three original policy objectives: of maintaining a harmonised 
monetary transmission channel in the pursuit of price stability; of encouraging market 
discipline in the sovereign bond markets; and of maintaining a separation between 
monetary, financial and fiscal policy - within an integrated and market-based financial 
system. This realisation lead the ECB to exploit its institutional independence, implement 
further interventionist measures and to begin operating at the limits of its mandate 
(Lombardi and Moschella 2016, p.858; Gros 2015, p.13) by reinterpreting its objectives to 
include preserving the euro as well as price stability (Matthijs 2016, p.380; Schmidt 2016, 
p.1049). This conceptual stretching (Cox 2004, p.216) facilitated ventures into policy areas 
the ECB would never have countenanced before the crisis, and culminated with the bank 
acting as the ‘market-maker of last resort’ by purchasing EU government bonds (Gabor and 
Vestergaard 2018; Le Maux 2017), and by becoming the financial supervisor to the entire 
Eurozone. 
 
But crucially, many of these policies were intended to facilitate path-dependence in the field 
of monetary policy. The ECSP attempted to outsource financial stability to financial 
institutions (Buiter and Rahbari 2012, p.28; Gabor 2014[a], p.200), CBPP targeted covered 
bonds specifically because the ECB believed purchasing these assets specifically would not 
constitute fiscal policy by transferring risk between member-states (Trichet 2009[b]), and 
MPR was adopted as a tool to help tackle financial instability whilst allowing monetary 
policy to remain focused on price stability (Papademos 2009). Therefore despite developing 
interventionist policy ideas which weakened traditional neo-liberal philosophical ideas and 
the siloed institutional framework of EMU, the ECB attempted to uphold its programmatic 
ideas in the field of monetary policy where it derived the lion’s share of its credibility and 
legitimacy (ECB 2011[b], p.91; Högenauer and Howarth 2016; Hughes and Kesting 2014, 
p.333). 
 
Indeed, despite the structural and ideational changes which have taken place since the 
financial crisis, the bank still operates and communicates distinctively from other major 
central banks (Constâncio 2014; Draghi 2014[c]). The ECB was founded upon monetarist 
programmatic ideas, which, despite changing circumstances and new and evolving policy 
ideas, it has found impossible to secede from entirely. It continues to assert that its 
traditional monetary stance is appropriate (ECB: interview #1, 2015; ECB 2011[b], p.83), and 
to justify ‘extraordinary’ policies in terms of protecting price stability. A full picture of the 
ECBs institutional evolution and growing concern for financial stability can therefore only be 
fully appreciated by using insights from HI and DI concurrently, allowing analysis to account 
for the impact of both ideas and institutional structures on the process of institutional 
change through time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
To what extent can changing ideas and intuitional structures explain 
the evolution of the Europe’s financial stability agenda?  
 
This thesis enhanced the analysis of the Euroarea’s financial system and advanced our 
understanding of institutional change in a number of ways. Although not the first study to 
explore the importance of ideas and structures, it is the only research to date to have 
combined insights from Historical (HI) and Discursive Institutionalism (DI) to examine the 
Eurosystem. Moreover, whereas most research on the Eurosystem tends to focus on either 
the national or supranational levels (Bulmer and Paterson 2013; Hardie and Howarth 2005; 
Royo 2013[a,b,c]), this thesis examined both to provide a more rounded picture of 
institutional change.  
 
Whilst there has been a good deal of research produced since the 2007-8 financial crisis on 
the European Central Banks’ (ECBs) response to the turmoil, and on national (although 
chiefly German) preferences relating to European Union (EU) policies aimed at reducing 
financial instability (Bibow 2017; 2013; Bulmer 2014), the vast majority of such work has 
focused on economic, rational-choice, or liberal intergovernmental260 explanations (Bulmer 
and Paterson 2013; Jones et al. 2016; Schild 2015). There has been relatively little examining 
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the importance of ideas on post-crisis financial policy formation261 (Hughes and Kesting 
2014, p.336). Because institutions are often founded on an ideational premise (Dyson 
2002[a]; McNamara 1998), with ideas constantly evoked as justification by policymakers 
(Jabko 2006; Schmidt 2016, 2014) or even regarded as the primary drivers of policy action 
[Matthijs 2016], the neglect of ideas and the way they interact with organisational 
structures to help enable and constrain institutional change is a serious omission. 
 
Most studies concentrating on the supranational level have tended to emphasise ECB path-
dependence, downplaying the significance of ideational, structural and policy alterations 
(Hardie and Howarth 2005; Quaglia 2008; Salines et al. 2011). In contrast, this research 
examined continuity and change in equal measure. It provided explanations for the gradual 
elevation in importance attached to financial stability, and for the incremental transfer of 
responsibility for its preservation away from member-states towards the EU-level.  
 
The remainder of this conclusion provides an answer to the main research question by 
demonstrating instances where ideas and structures have influenced the evolution of 
Europe’s financial stability agenda. Using the matrix below (which has been referenced 
throughout this thesis), it shows how examples of institutional change may be categorised 
to better understand the relationship between ideas, structures and institutional change. 
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Table 8.1: Ideational versus structural matrix (revisited) 
A) ideas trump structures    ->  institutional change 
 
B) structures trump ideas    ->  institutional continuity 
 
C) new ideas in old institutions   ->  accelerate policy change 
 
i) new philosophical ideas   -> strongest institutional   
       resistance 
ii) new programmatic ideas  -> strong institutional resistance 
iii) new policy ideas   -> least institutional resistance 
D) established ideas in new institutions  ->  hinder policy change 
 
i) established philosophical ideas  -> strongest institutional   
       resistance 
ii) established programmatic ideas -> strong institutional resistance 
iii) established policy ideas  -> least institutional resistance 
 
E) new ideas in new institutions   ->  rapid policy change 
 
F) established ideas in old institutions  ->  sluggish policy change 
 
G) ideational contradictions or failures -> gradual policy / institutional change 
 
H) ‘critical juncture’    -> rapid policy / institutional change 
 
I) ridged legal structure   -> hinders policy / institutional change 
 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
IDEAS AS AGENTS OF CHANGE 
One of the key findings of this research is that, in line with DI, ideas are particularly adept at 
helping transform institutions progressively through time (Schmidt 2008, p.316). It 
unearthed several instances where this could be proved. The gradual dominance of neo-
liberal philosophical ideas and monetarist programmatic ideas resulting from the 
discrediting of post-war Keynesianism led to a steady liberalisation of economic practices 
across the developed world. This gave rise to structural change in the form of market-based 
banking and price stability policy ideas becoming adopted by the majority of the world’s 
advanced central banks (Deeg 2010; McNamara 1998, p.50; Padoa-Schioppa 1999[b]).  
 
 
G) ideational contradictions or failures -> gradual policy / institutional  
change 
 
 
Inflation and poor economic performance in the 1970s discredited Keynesian 
ideas which were gradually replaced with neo-liberal philosophical and 
monetarist programmatic ideas. 
Illustration 8.1 
 
Within Europe, these ideas and policies were activity promoted by the European 
Commission and imported with varying degrees of enthusiasm into the institutional 
character of member-states (Jabko 2006; Story and Walter 1997, p.254; Underhill 2002, 
p.36). Liberal ideas were embraced by the Deutsche Bundesbank (DB) and Banco de España 
(BdE). Although the DB was reluctant to liberalise short-term debt markets, neo-liberal ideas 
coalesced with traditional ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) concepts (Jabko 2006, p.20; Lutz 
2005, p.141) and were promoted by German state institutions. In Spain, liberalisation 
ensued the collapse of the Franco regime in 1975 and the neo-liberal reformist agenda 
within the Finance Ministry and BdE’s Research Service (Ban 2016; Brias 2002; Lukauskas 
1997, p.97-8). Advancing neo-liberal policies was also seen as a way of modernising Spain’s 
centralised clientelist economy and better aligning the country with contemporary 
European practices262 (López 2014, p.76; Menéndez-Alarcón 2000, p.334; Zapatero 2010). 
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 C) new ideas in old institutions   ->  accelerate policy change 
 
 
Neo-liberal ideas were adopted by Spanish and German NCBs and finance 
ministries, accelerating the processes of liberalisation and market-based 
financing. 
Illustration 8.2 
 
Further gradual ideational change took place through the growth of financial policy ideas at 
the EU-level. At the euro’s founding, it was widely believed the only contribution a central 
bank could make to help preserve financial stability was to ensure price stability by 
manipulating interest rates (Bernanke and Gertler 2000, p.46; Blanchard and Galí 2007, 
p.36; Noyer 1999[b]). Competence over the supervision of banks and responsibility for fiscal 
policy was left to member-states, with a strict separation maintained between the three 
policy areas (Bibow 2015; Dermine 2002, p.4). Yet chapter 5 showed how financial policy 
ideas – particularly with respect to financial integration and financial stability – grew in 
importance throughout the pre-crisis era.  
 
Under EMU, ECB monetarist ideas professed that a truly single monetary policy required a 
harmonisation of European capital markets (Issing 2008, p.214; Tumpel-Gugerell 2005). This 
led to closer financial integration, greater risk of financial contagion and a growing 
awareness that the EU needed to become involved in efforts to maintain financial 
stability263 (Commission 2007[b], p.37; Trichet 2004[a]). During the pre-crisis period, 
measures taken to this effect included: producing a mission statement on financial stability 
in 2005; increasing transparency; producing an assessment of financial market liquidity in 
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monetary analysis; price stability analysis being conducted over a longer-term; and the 
publication of regular Financial Stability Reviews from 2004 onwards (Papademos 2007[a]). 
 
 
E) new ideas in new institutions   ->  rapid policy change 
 
 
New financial policy ideas rapidly gained traction within EMU, particularly 
after Jean-Claude Trichet became ECB President. Yet due to the strength 
of ‘programmatic’ monetarist ideas, radical change was avoided until after 
the 2007-8 crisis. 
Illustration 8.3 
 
In Spain and Germany too, the gradual liberalisation of financial markets and the advance of 
market-based finance began to generate important changes, weakening their respective 
bank-based three-pillar financial systems (Dixon 2012, p.591; Grossman 2006; Lütz 2004). In 
Germany, due to the DB and Ministry of Finance’s desire to maintain Germany as a key 
European financial centre, and to preserve the country as a benchmark issuer of European 
debt, its repo and commercial paper markets were liberalised (despite DB hesitancy) during 
the 1990s (McCauley 1999; DB 1996, p.29). Partly as a consequence of this liberalisation, 
and the bottom-up, non-interventionist policy ideas pursued by the DB264, financial 
institutions accumulated huge amounts of risk on the asset-side of their balance sheets. 
 
In Spain meanwhile, despite an early liberalisation of interbank markets, banks primarily 
complied risk on the liabilities-side (Royo 2013[a], p.154). As a result of the BdE’s particular 
interpretation of monetarism (Ban 2016, p.46), it developed interventionist financial policy 
ideas and implemented important countercyclical regulatory and accounting practices (BdE 
2001, p.43; Fernández de Lis et al. 2000). This meant Spanish banks were forced to set aside 
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additional provisions, were largely prevented from originating synthetic securitisations, and 
did not rely on repo markets for funding. Instead, public banks in particular over-lent to the 
housing and construction sectors which struggled to repay loans once the financial crisis 
struck (Garicano 2012[b]; Royo 2013[a], p.637; 2013[b] p.153).  These different ideas within 
the DB and BdE had a significant bearing on the severity and timing of the crisis in each 
country, with Germany impacted almost immediately in 2007 and Spain much later in 2010. 
 
 
A) ideas trump structures    ->  institutional change 
 
 
NCB financial policy ideas had a direct impact on the way financial 
institutions adapted to market-based practices before 2007. 
Illustration 8.4 
 
Within the ECB, the financial crisis acted as a catalyst for ideational change already 
underway (Posner 2007, p.145). European financial integration and market-based banking 
meant contagion effects across the Eurozone became amplified from 2007 onwards. This 
increased the need for financial policy ideas which began to further weaken traditional 
monetarist programmatic ideas. The Enhanced Credit Support Program (ECSP) (2008) and 
Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP) (2009) used monetary policy to support financial 
institutions and target asset markets (Trichet 2008[f]). These financially focused programs 
carried implications for fiscal redistribution and therefore also for the ECBs traditional 
independence and price stability orientation (Beirne et al. 2011; Borio 2010, p.11; Kirshner 
2003). 
 
Once the critical juncture of the 2010-12 sovereign debt crisis began to envelop the 
continent, financial ideas evolved more quickly. The ECB realised that in an integrated 
market-based financial system, it became necessary not only to manipulate traditional 
monetary policy, but to pursue financial stability too to deliver a financial environment in 
which price stability could be maintained. Consequently, in 2010, the bank became the 
market-maker of last resort (Gabor 2016; Le Maux 2017; Mehrling 2016) by purchasing 
Eurozone government bonds through the Securities Markets Program (SMP) and later 
through the Outright Monetary Transactions Program (OMT). These policies represented 
significant deviations away from traditional monetarist principles (Blackstone and Walker 
2012; Micossi 2015, p.19) and towards greater intervention. Whereas before the crisis price 
stability was seen as a necessary condition to achieve financial stability (Duisenberg 2003; 
Issing 1999[a]), post-crisis the ECB executives argued the reverse: that action was required 
to stabilise financial markets in order to guarantee long-term price stability (ECB 2011[b], 
p.83; Papademos 2009; Trichet 2010[a]). This represents a fundamental reorientation of 
pre-crisis thinking. 
 
OMT was particularly important because not only did the policy significantly alter the ECBs 
previous discursive approach which sought to play down the significance of heterodox 
policies, it also encompassed a conceptual stretching of the banks’ mandate to include 
preserving EMU (Cox 2004, p.216; Matthijs 2016, p.380; Schmidt 2016, p.1049). The ECB 
understood that under strained financial conditions, unless it was prepared to stand behind 
the currency and support Eurozone sovereigns, there was a real danger peripheral states 
would be forced to redenominate their debt (Draghi 2014[d]), causing very significant 
transaction costs, particularly for creditor states. At this critical juncture, the sunk costs 
involved in such a failure catalysed further ideational and discursive change. This reality 
demonstrates how insights from DI and HI are both required to provide a more rounded 
understanding of institutional change. 
 
 
G) ideational contradictions or failures -> gradual policy / institutional  
change 
 
 
The twin crises of 2007-8 and 2010-12 exposed the inherent contradictions of the 
Maastricht framework265. This led to a realisation that if the ECB was to maintain 
price stability within an integrated, market-based financial system, 
interventionist financial policy ideas would be unavoidable.  
Illustration 8.5 
 
Ideational concerns were also crucial in the creation of Banking Union (BU) (Howarth and 
Quaglia 2016, p.89). Chapter 7 showed that after the collapse of Bankia, the Spanish 
government became unable to recapitalise its financial system, necessitating a request for 
assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Although Germany was at first 
reluctant to agree BU and to see its Landesbanken submit to European supervision (Fox 
2012), Germany and other states eventually agreed to a common fiscal backstop for 
European banks on the proviso that harmonised European supervision was introduced to 
limit moral hazard and regulatory arbitrage (Finnish Finance Minister 2012). These 
philosophical ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) moral hazard concerns led directly to the 
creation of BU.  
 
The more interventionist approach of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) to the 
regulation of banks also aligned closely to Spanish financial policy ideas, partly helping to 
explain Spain’s enthusiasm for the project. In Spain, memories of previous banking crises 
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crafted a desire for more intrusive state involvement in the monitoring of bank operations 
(Molina and Rhodes 2007, p.234; Lukauskas 1997, p.167). These interventions became more 
advanced throughout EMU in the form of dynamic provisions and consolidated shadow 
banking regulation (Brañanova 2012, p.6; Saurina 2009[b]). Post-crisis, the shift towards 
European macro-prudential regulation (MPR) therefore corresponded well with traditional 
Spanish ideas. However, in the Spanish case, inclusion in BU also provided much needed 
supervisory credibility in the wake of the crisis in the cajas, and this also played a very 
significant role in generating Spanish enthusiasm for the project (BdE: interview #6, 2015; 
Spanish Foreign Ministry: interview #14, 2015). 
 
 
A) ideas trump structures    ->  institutional change 
 
 
German ordo-liberal moral hazard concerns overrode structural resistance 
from public banks and facilitated institutional change through the creation 
of ESM and BU. In Spain, BdE policy ideas aligned closely to supranational 
financial ideas, and the caja crisis meant minimal structural opposition to 
ESM and BU. 
Illustration 8.6 
 
 
IDEAS AS CONSTRAINTS 
DI suggests that ideas may be used to promote institutional continuity as well as change 
(Schmidt 2010, p.4; 2008, p.312; Lieberman 2002, p.698) while HI also points to policy 
paradigms as an important explanation of institutional path-dependence (Braun 2015; 
Immergut and Anderson 2008; Streek and Thelen 2005). Another important finding of this 
research is that ideas are most likely to exert such influences when they become rooted 
within institutional frameworks (Blyth et al. 2016, p.151).  
Monetarist programmatic ideas became enshrined at the institutional formation of EMU 
(Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p.342; Yiangou et al. 2013, p.230), becoming embedded 
within the treaties and in the minds of European central bankers (Hall 1993; McNamara 
1998, p.144). These ideas suggest that if central banks limit themselves to preserving price 
stability then financial stability and economic growth naturally follow (Bernanke and Gertler 
2000, p.46; Blanchard and Galí 2007, p.36; Noyer 1999[b]). The ECBs legitimacy and 
credibility became entwined with the successful implementation of such policies (ECB 
2011[b], p.91; González-Páramo 2005; Sibert 2009, p.7). Therefore whilst European financial 
integration, market-based banking and collateralised finance (encouraged by monetarist 
and neo-liberal ideas) altered the structure of the Eurosystem, the ECB was limited prior to 
the crisis in the extent to which it felt able to promote policy ideas pertaining to financial 
stability. 
 
Even during the crisis, the ECB attempted to uphold the distinction between monetary, 
fiscal and financial policy. In 2008, it outsourced financial stability to financial institutions 
through the ECSP (Buiter and Rahbari 2012, p.28; Gabor 2013, p.20). In 2009, it tried to 
restrict the fiscal policy ramifications of bond buying by limiting its purchases to covered 
bonds266. After publication of the de Larosière Report (2009), it also sought to establish a 
distinct set of MPR instruments to tackle threats to financial stability while preserving 
monetary policy to fight threats to price stability (Papademos 2009; ECB: interview #4, 
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2015)267. Even once the critical juncture of the sovereign debt crisis struck in 2010, it often 
tried to pull back from interventionist measures as early as possible and to revert to 
traditional monetarist instruments (Bibow 2015, p.6; Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.322; 
Micossi 2015, p.19). In 2010, instead of stepping up SMP as the crisis worsened, the ECB 
tried to exit the use of extraordinary monetary policy (Gabor 2012; Pisani-Ferry and Wolff 
2012, p.3) resulting in SMP being reinstated in 2011268. 
 
Whereas Quantitative Easing (QE) was used to inject central bank liquidity into the global 
economy and help stimulate growth elsewhere (Benford et al. 2009, p.90), ECB policy only 
committed to repairing the interest rate transmission mechanism in the pursuit of price 
stability (Cœuré 2013[b];González-Páramo 2011). The ECB even raised interest rates in 
2007, 2008 and 2011 despite providing huge amounts of liquidity to the financial system 
and presiding over weak economic growth (Farrell and Finnemore 2016, p.585; Pisani-Ferry 
and Wolff 2012, p.3; Schmidt 2014). The constraining influence of monetarist ideas on ECB 
action was therefore irrefutable, particularly until the launch of OMT and the agreement of 
BU in 2012. 
 
Throughout the period under study, the ECB also maintained a discursive path-dependent 
commitment to price stability (Cœuré 2013[a]; Trichet 2011). Even when the ECBs 
communicative discourse altered in recognition that the bank had assumed responsibility 
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for saving the euro as well as preserving price stability269 (Schmidt 2014, p.202), it still 
justified its actions by making price stability arguments (Constâncio 2014; Draghi 2012[b]). 
Programmatic monetarist ideas therefore acted as a discursive foundation throughout the 
duration of this research and remain important in maintaining the banks legitimacy and 
credibility.  
 
D) established ideas in new institutions  ->  hinder policy change 
 
 
ii) established    -> strong structural  
programmatic ideas    resistance 
 
 
The ECB relied upon monetarist ideas for credibility and legitimacy. 
Although the bank became increasingly interventionist during the crisis, 
such policies were implemented reluctantly, delaying more radical policy 
decisions and constraining institutional change. 
Illustration 8.7 
 
At the national level too, ideas were shown to exert path-dependent forces on 
policymaking. This was particularly true in Germany where philosophical ordo-liberal 
(Ordnungspolitik) ideas had a very strong institutional foundation (Jacoby 2014, p.75; 
Nedergaard and Snaith 2015, p.1097; Schmidt 2014, p.194). Due to concerns about moral 
hazard and shared liability, Germany often sought to prevent European measures which 
advanced greater risk-sharing and initially attempted to prevent the creation of ESM due to 
unease about distributing capital across borders (Brunnermeier et al. 2016, p.218; Schäuble 
2011[a]).  
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 As a result of President Draghi’s speech in which he declared the ECB would do ‘whatever it takes’ to save 
the euro (Draghi 2014[d]). 
At the behest of Germany (amongst others), ESM support was made conditional upon 
acceptance of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), monitoring by the Troika, debt 
seniority and implementation of the Fiscal Compact (Barroso 2011; ESM 2011, Art.13). ESM 
remained an intergovernmental body and its actions subject to unanimous agreement by all 
signature states (Dyson 2013, p.216). Although material interests inevitably played a role in 
German decision-making (German Finance Ministry: interview #12, 2015; Schild 2015, p.15), 
ordo-liberal (Ordnungspolitik) ideas were shown to have exercised a significant influence 
over German actions and policy preferences. 
 
 
F) established ideas in old institutions  ->  sluggish policy change 
 
 
DB ordo-liberal concerns regarding moral hazard and liability sharing made 
Germany reluctant to accept ESM. It only did so once mitigating provisions 
were included in the Treaty. Similar concerns also prevented Germany 
signing up to all elements of BU270. 
Illustration 8.8 
 
 
THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE (2010-12) 
This research also revealed that, true to insights from HI, institutional change occurs most 
rapidly during critical junctures (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p.348). Such a juncture 
occurred at the supranational level during the European sovereign debt crisis. 
 
At the institutional formation of EMU (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p.342), monetarist 
programmatic ideas were enshrined which sought to separate monetary policy from 
economic, fiscal and financial policies. The ridged legal structure of EMU included a ban on 
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 Particularly the common Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS). 
monetary financing271; a prohibition on privileged access to financial institutions272; and a 
no-bail-out clause for governments273. Fiscal restraints were initiated through the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP, 1997) to cap borrowing and maintain price stability. Although 
chapter 5 confirmed an ideational evolution taking place within the ECB before the crisis 
(Padoa-Schioppa 2003; Trichet 2003), the banks’ ability to take action on financial stability 
was largely restricted by the ridged legal structure of EMU and the dominance of monetarist 
ideas.  
 
However, once the sovereign debt crisis arrived274, these ideational and structural restraints 
became less resilient. The crisis created a doom loop between weak banks and sovereigns, 
forcing the ECB to intervene in financial markets to improve monetary policy transmission 
(ECB 2010[a], p.105; 2010[b], p.24; 2011[d], p.100). The ECBs independence enabled the 
bank to operate at the margins of its mandate (Schmidt 2016, p.1034), eventually becoming 
the market-maker of last resort by purchasing private and public sector debt. While these 
extraordinary measures resulted in the distinctions between fiscal, monetary and financial 
policy becoming blurred275 (Bibow 2015, p.26; Borio 2010, p.11; Braun 2015, p.435; De 
Grauwe 2012[a], p.263), the sunk costs associated with a collapse of EMU were considered 
too great to prevent the ECB taking unorthodox action.  
 
After the collapse of Bankia in Spain, structural demarcation between the different realms 
of economic policy weakened further as the ECB was placed in charge of European financial 
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 Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
272
 Article 124 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
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 Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
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 Which began in 2010 with the Greek bailout and culminated with the collapse of Bankia in Spain. 
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 And therefore weakening EMUs Maastricht framework. 
supervision (Bibow 2015, p.26; Micossi 2015, p.19; Blackstone and Walker 2012). This meant 
the ECB became directly responsible for both price and financial stability, despite objections 
from monetarist individuals and institutions, including the DB and its President, Jens 
Weidmann (Weidmann 2013; DB: interview #5, 2015). EMU therefore experienced 
significant ideational and structural change after this critical juncture, in spite of 
conservative attempts to maintain the Maastricht settlement. 
 
At the national level too, despite pre-crisis calls to reform Spanish cajas, the country’s public 
banking sector proved stubbornly resistant to change (Caruana 2003; 2001; Martín 2000). 
Once crisis struck, the BdE initially tried to resolve problems in cajas by encouraging them to 
merge with one another, but this often led to problems becoming exacerbated (Garicano 
2012[a]). As Bankia276 collapsed, Spanish bond yields reached 7 percent, and the country 
had no choice but to accept an ESM bailout which came with strict MoU protocols, including 
a commitment to restructure the cajas (IMF 2012[b], p.12). Unlike Germany, Spain was 
therefore unable to contain its financial crisis unilaterally, resulting in significant structural 
change. 
 
A further example of where a critical juncture delivered institutional change was in relation 
to ESM. By the end of 2010 when ESM was agreed, there was a real risk Euroarea debt could 
be redenominated into national currencies. The likely large and damaging transaction costs 
resulting to Germany and other creditor states pushed them to accept the creation of ESM, 
despite weakening the no-bailout clause (Howarth and Quaglia 2015, p.473) and further 
wilting of EMUs monetarist principles (Beck and Prinz 2012, p.82; Henerlein 2015, p.21). 
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 A conglomeration of 7 smaller Spanish cajas. 
Here again, the sunk costs associated with a collapse of the existing structure was enough to 
assuage German ideational concerns (leading to path-dependence in the continued 
existence of EMU), but further weakened EMUs original monetarist framework (Gocaj and 
Meunier 2013, p.248). 
 
 
H) critical juncture   -> rapid institutional change  
 
 
The critical juncture of the sovereign debt crisis (2010-12) hastened 
interventionist ECB policy change. It also facilitated institutional change 
at the supranational level through ESM and BU. In Spain, it forced 
further institutional change by obliging the government to disband cajas 
altogether. 
Illustration 8.9 
 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF STRUCTURES 
This thesis also found ideas seem to be less important, and structural path-dependence 
more important, where political vested interests are capable of blocking reform in spite of 
ideational clamour for change (Bulmer 2009, p.310; Posner 2007, p.145). This was found to 
be most prevalent at the national level. Chapter 4 showed how despite supervisors and 
regulators in both countries favouring a modernisation of their respective public banking 
sectors (Ayadi et al. 2009, p.41; Caruana 2003, p.3-4; Hardie and Howarth 2009, p.1020), 
vested interests in the form of regional politicians strongly resisted reform efforts277 
(Cardinas 2013, p.16; Döring 2003, p.97; Lütz 2004, p.188; Villoria et al. 2013).  Indeed, such 
was the resistance to change that the only significant alterations forthcoming before the 
crash came in response to EU competition policy (Commission 2002; Lütz 2005, p.143): 
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 The chapter included critical case studies of Bayerische Landesbank (BayernLB) and Caja de Ahorros del 
Mediterráneo (CAM) to highlight structural issues and the politicised nature of Spanish and German public 
banks. 
capping political representation in the cajas at 50 percent, and forcing Landesbanken to 
renounce their state liability guarantees.  
 
 
B) structures trump ideas   ->  institutional continuity 
 
 
Path-dependence and the vested interests of regional politicians 
prevented public bank restructuring in Spain and Germany before the 
crash, despite philosophical ideas within their NCBs pressing reform.  
Illustration 8.10 
 
The legal structure of EMU, which rested on the three pillars of monetary financing 
prohibition, central bank independence and price stability (Issing 2008, p.54), helped slow 
the advance of financial policy ideas at the European level. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) 
created a siloed economic architecture in which monetary policy was transferred to the 
supranational level, while fiscal policy and financial policy remained under national control 
(Bibow 2015). Treaty articles were inserted which aimed to prevent the ECB venturing into 
alternative policy fields (Sandberg 2015, p.3). Even post-crisis, ECB policies which extended 
its authority into areas of fiscal and financial policy278 were met with legal challenges279, 
acting as restraints on institutional change (ECJ 2012; Roland 2013). 
 
The three pillar structure of German finance also generated structural resistance to BU. 
Although the country’s large banks supported BU to create a harmonised European 
regulatory system (Howarth and Quaglia 2016, p 53; Speyer 2013), Landesbanken, 
Sparkassen and the cooperatives remained opposed EU oversight which they believed could 
impede their traditional framework (Howarth and Quaglia 2015, p.468; Münchau 2015; 
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 In Germany and in the European Courts of Justice (ECJ). 
Strupczewski and Heinrich 2015; Zimmermann 2014, p.497). The DBs self-regulatory 
approach and German joint liability schemes (Haftungsverbund) could not easily be 
replicated at the supranational level (Hassan 2014; Howarth and Quaglia 2016, p.76; Howat 
and Theodore 2016, p.4; Zimmermann 2014, p.495), producing strong local resistance to 
change. Indeed, BU remains incomplete (Commission 2012[a]; Howarth and Quaglia 2015, 
p.476; Véron 2015, p.5). Proposals for a common DGS have been shelved (Donnelly 2014; 
Feldstein 2011, p.7; Lagarde 2013; Sibert 2009, p.7) and, partly as a consequence of German 
resistance, the ECB has only gained direct responsibility for Europe’s systemically important 
banks, meaning smaller German banks have yet to fall under direct ECB supervision 
(Donnelly 2014, p.993; Karkagiannis 2012). 
 
 
I) ridged legal structure  -> hinders policy /  
institutional change 
 
 
The Maastricht framework and German three pillar system each exerted 
path-dependent forces which hindered institutional change, particularly 
prior to the sovereign debt crisis. 
Illustration 8.11 
 
Structural factors also help to explain why financial institutions in each country accumulated 
risk on the opposite sides of their balance sheets before the crisis.  In Germany, banks 
enjoyed ample liquidity pre-crisis, largely due to the inclination of Germans to save large 
portions of their earnings. This, coupled with the low profitability of the domestic market 
(Commission (2014[c], p.40; Hardie and Howarth 2009, p.1019), meant banks increasingly 
looked abroad for investment opportunities280. Landesbanken also benefitted from 
government guarantees until 2005, allowing them to raise huge amounts of cheap capital on 
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 This was particularly true of Landesbanken, which tended not to compete too strongly with Sparkassen due 
to their mutual ownership (Ross 2014[a]). 
the wholesale markets, which they then invested in foreign ABSs (DB 2006[c], p.61; 
Economist 2012[b]; Hassan 2014). Moreover, while the BdE was able to implement 
regulation which prevented a build-up of asset-side risk in Spain, the decentralised structure 
of German supervision meant the DB had less capacity to employ interventionist measures 
(Deeg 2001, p.17; Lütz 2004, p.173; 2005, p.142). 
 
In Spain, structural dynamics partially expound why banks and cajas tended not to invest in 
complex foreign assets, but instead amassed risk on the liabilities-side. The low interest rate 
environment under EMU, coupled with the banks willingness to securitise and sell mortgage 
loans to foreign investors, meant Spanish banks enjoyed abundant liquidity pre-crisis (BdE 
2006[b]; Cardenas 2013, p.7; De Barron 2011). As a consequence of cajas control by regional 
politicians who simultaneously exercised authority over local planning laws, this capital was 
used predominantly to stoke a huge domestic housing and construction boom281 (Molinas 
2013).  
 
 
LESSONS 
These findings have important ramifications for policymakers as they demonstrate that both 
ideas and structures matter when it comes to institutional reform and that ideational 
principles can be equally as prescriptive as quantifiable measures. Greater engagement with 
ideational concerns and structural dynamics may therefore lead to greater understanding 
between parties, particularly during negotiations within international fora. It also showed 
that while actors are better able to reach compromise during periods of crisis, ideational 
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 This liabilities-side risk was realised once the sovereign debt crisis took hold and mortgage borrowers 
became unable to repay their loans. 
priorities continue to be advanced and remain important in justifying policy decisions (ECB 
2010[a], p.105; Trichet 2009[b]; Schäuble 2011[b]; Weidmann 2015). 
 
The thesis also provides assistance to academics seeking to better understand and theorise 
when and how ideas and structures matter in political economy. Rather than continuing 
with the dichotomy between HI and DI, scholars may be advised to combine insights from 
each to provide fuller explanations of institutional continuity and change; illuminating why 
as well as how events unfold as they do (Schmidt 2016, p.1036). 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The first limitation of this research was interview sampling. Although a thorough, valid and 
reliable piece of research may have been produced on this topic without conducting elite 
interviews (See Rosenhek 2013, p.256), this project aimed to deepen knowledge of 
institutional ideas by talking directly to individuals within institutions themselves (Lilleker 
2003, p.208). Two departments, however, refused to partake in the research: the BdE’s 
Financial Stability Department and the DB’s Monetary Policy Department.  
 
In the case of the BdE, the reason for this is likely to be that post-Bankia, its Financial 
Stability Department came in for particular criticism. As a consequence, interviews 
conducted with other BdE divisions suggest that the department’s director, Jesús Saurina, 
blocked members of his team participating in external research which may produce results 
critical of its performance (BdE: interview #6 #10, 2015). In the case of the DB’s Monetary 
Policy Department, the DB has perhaps been more critical of post-crisis ECB monetary policy 
than any other European central bank (Wolf 2013). The reason it refused to participate is 
therefore likely to be that any unguarded criticisms of the ECB from staff may have further 
exacerbated tensions between the two institutions, as well as threatened the ECBs 
independence which the DB fought so hard to establish (Howarth and Loedel 2005, p.18). 
 
One important factor this research paid only scant attention to was the significance of 
leadership (Schmidt 2016, p.1043). Presidents Trichet and Draghi were both responsible for 
a significant shifting of ECB attitudes towards financial stability in 2003 and 2011 
respectively. Within his first month of taking office, Trichet began to speak much more 
openly about financial stability and how the EU should respond to prevent future problems 
(Trichet 2003). Within just 8 months of President Draghi assuming the role, he broke with 
erstwhile ECB discourse by promising to do whatever it takes (Draghi 2012[a]) to save the 
euro, reinterpreting the ECBs mandate to include preserving EMU (Matthijs 2016, p.380). 
 
The research also neglected other important leaders, including Chancellor Merkel, Prime 
Minister Rajoy and President Sarkozy, as well as the effects of interest groups, think tanks, 
rating agencies and investors, all of which help determine national and supranational policy 
objectives (Schmidt 2014, p.189). Indeed, Matthijs (2016) claims to have identified four 
episodes where German policy statements by crucial players were shown to have impacted 
directly on financial market activity (Matthijs 2016, p.385). Leadership and the influence of 
powerful individuals and organisations could therefore provide another fascinating area of 
research and help to deliver further insights into the way institutions evolve.  
 
In an attempt to focus on the ideational and structural reasons behind Spain and Germany 
acting as they have under EMU, the thesis also largely ignored important material 
considerations which may be better analysed using a Rational Choice Institutionalist 
framework. While this research touched upon the contention that bailouts of peripheral 
nations were also implicit bailouts of the German and French financial systems (Bloomberg 
2012; Fuhrmans and Moffett 2010), more focused analysis on such material considerations 
may reveal further insights into why some European countries post-crisis preferences took 
the form they did, and how important such considerations were in determining each 
nation’s stance on ESM and BU.  
 
The research also paid scant attention to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus, as well as 
influential northern member-states, all of which helped shape the nature of the crisis. 
Greece in particular was the catalyst for the sovereign debt crisis and the history of EMU 
cannot be properly understood without knowledge of the Greek disaster. However, this 
thesis has intended to provide neither a comprehensive history of the Euroarea nor of the 
euro-crisis. It has instead tried to discover how ideas have evolved throughout EMU and 
why financial stability concerns transitioned from a fringe anxiety during the creation of 
EMU towards becoming a central preoccupation. To do this at the national level, a most 
similar structural comparison between countries provided more valid results than examining 
Greece, which was unequalled in its pre-crisis fiscal profligacy and economic 
mismanagement (Lynn 2011, ch.6).  
 
This research was not an attempt to provide any deep analysis of BU, ESM or EMUs 
increasingly stringent fiscal architecture. It did not attempt to argue whether these 
institutional changes were and are positive or negative, nor give any prediction about their 
success or failure. Where these institutions have been referenced is solely in relation to the 
ideational and structural dimensions required to bring them to fruition. 
 
Finally, an important post-crisis development this thesis did not discuss was the ECBs policy 
of forward guidance. This effectively involves talking to markets to manage expectations 
about future interest rates (Cœuré 2013[a]). Future research may combine DI and HI with 
quantitative research techniques to discover how ECB discourse impacts financial market 
movements across different Eurozone countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix I 
Critical Case Study: BayernLB 
 
Corruption and politicisation have been widespread in Germany’s Landesbanken over a 
number of years (Scally 2013[b]). Even before the financial crisis, Bankgesellschaft Berlin, 
the then Landesbanken for the region of Berlin, almost bankrupted the city in 2001 when it 
attempted to conceal £500 million in losses relating to the sale of part of its investment 
business in the Cayman Islands (Paterson 2001). A more recent example, however, is 
Bayerische Landesbank (BayernLB), which implemented a significant number of high-risk 
investments that yielded huge sums for large investors and politicians, including the late 
populist and anti-immigration Austrian politician, Jörg Haider (Bryant 2010; Telegraph 
2010).  
 
Whilst being supervised by a number of Christian Social Union (CSU) politicians, including 
Edmund Stoiber282 (the then President of the Bavarian free-state), BayernLB bought a €1.6 
billion, 67.08 percent stake in the Austrian based bank Hypo Group Alpe Adria (HGAA) 
before the crisis in 2007 (BayernLB 2009; Detter and Fölster 2015). Stoiber played a critical 
role in this process, stating publically when the Croatian National Bank tried to resist 
BayernLB's takeover HGAA’s Croatian arm, that the decision was ‘unacceptable’ and placed 
a ‘severe strain’ on Bavaria’s relations with Croatia (Radosavljevic 2007). 
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 Others included Kurt Faltlhauser (former minister of finance), Erwin Huber (former Minister of Economics), 
Günter Beckstein (former Minister of the Interior) and Georg Schmid (former Secretary within the Ministry of 
the Interior). 
HGAA conducted high-risk operations in the Balkans and Eastern Europe which soon 
became ‘toxic’ once crisis struck. This resulted in Bavarian taxpayers being forced to bailout 
BayernLB and a criminal investigation being launched (Ewing 2010). Several of BayernLB’s 
former managers were placed under investigation for insider trading and later faced trial 
(Schäfer 2008). Many CSU politicians, including Stoiber and former CSU party leader, Erwin 
Huber, gave evidence as part of the enquiry (Ziet Online 2010). Although in 2014 Munich 
courts ruled that there was insufficient evidence to convict the men, out of court 
settlements were reached, with Michael Kemmer, BayernLB’s former Chief Executive 
between 2008-2009, fined €20,000 (Ross 2014[b]). 
 
In further controversy at the bank, Bernie Ecclestone, former Chief Executive of Formula 
One (F1), was also connected to a $44 million bribe said to have been paid to BayernLB’s 
former Chief Risk Officer, Gerhard Gribkowsky, to ease the sale of the bank's shares in a 
holding company that had guaranteed to keep Ecclestone as F1 Chief Executive in 2006 (Le 
Blond 2014). Gribkowsky later served over 5 years in prison for corruption over the scandal.  
 
Yet despite these controversies and huge losses, regional politicians continue to have a 
vested interest in maintaining the current structure of Germany’s public banking system.  
 
I think there are still a lot of vested interests in maintaining the status quo, 
especially in the public sector where politicians see Landesbanken and savings 
banks as ways of influencing economic policy 
(Rawcliffe 2007283) 
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 Managing Director for Financial Institutions at Fitch Ratings. Quoted in Hurst and Gould (2007). 
Local politicians have therefore been unwilling to allow the bank to collapse or become 
swallowed up by rivals (New York Times 2008). BayernLB was handed a €10 billion bailout 
by Bavarian taxpayers in November 2008 (Schäfer 2008), the banks Supervisory Board 
continues to operate with regional politicians in prominent positions, and the Board remains 
the setter of remunerations (BayernLB 2016, p.11).  
 
This case study helps show that path-dependence is strongest when political vested 
interests maintain a central position in any institutional structure. Landesbanken were able 
to repel reform efforts by federal authorities, including the DB, due to their political 
connections and the desire of local politicians to maintain their patronage networks 
(German Economics Ministry: interview #11, 2015; Hurst and Gould 2007). Despite state 
bailouts running directly counter to ordo-liberal philosophy284, taxpayers were still asked to 
pick up the bill for Landesbanken failure across Germany to maintain the integrity of the 
country’s three-pillar structure (Röper 2017; Schäfer 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
284
 Bailouts create ‘moral hazard’ by allowing firms to amass profits during good times while socialising losses 
in bad times (Dam and Koetter 2012; DB 2014, p.77; Pies and Sass 2010). 
Appendix II 
Critical Case Study: CAM 
 
While most cajas experienced governance problems and political capture, Caja de Ahorros 
del Mediterráneo (CAM) was described as ‘the worst of the worst’ by BdE Governor, Miguel 
Ángel Fernández Ordóñez (Biot 2012), and its case neatly encapsulates the relationship 
between regional governments and cajas (Cardenas 2013, p.16).  
 
In 1997 the autonomous community of Valencia (comunidad autónomas de Valencia) 
changed the law relating to cajas, allowing the ceiling for direct political appointees 
permitted to serve on cajas governing boards to rise to 28 percent. This, together with other 
municipal appointments (another 28 percent), ensured politicians were able to decisively 
control caja activity in the region (Santos 2014, p.19). 
 
The law also transferred supervision of the three regional cajas to the Instituto Valenciano 
de Finanzas, a body with no previous experience in banking supervision (Santos 2014, p.19). 
The president of CAM, Modesto Crespo, was handpicked by Francisco Camps, a Popular 
Party (PP) politician and President of Valencia’s regional government. Crespo and CAM’s 
Director General, Roberto López Abad, then proceeded to fill the board with appointees 
who were incapable of scrutinising the banks activity. Such individuals included a checkout 
worker, a sociologist, a designer, a dance teacher, an artist and a university psychologist 
(Tremlett 2012). 
 
Over six years, board members, senior executives and their families received €161m in 
loans, in some cases at zero percent interest (Biot 2012). Their wages were also boosted by 
being handed well-paid positions on the boards of companies owned or part-owned by CAM 
(Tremlett 2012). Like other Spanish regions where political control over planning laws and 
caja activity created huge construction booms (Royo 2013[c], p.25; Molinas 2013), Crespo 
and Abad helped finance many regional pet projects, including a Sydney-style opera house 
and the biggest aquarium in Europe (Cardenas 2013, p.17). Furthermore, just two days 
before the bank’s collapse in July 2011, CAM lent €200 million to the Valencian government, 
administered by the PP, who then proceeded to block any investigation into the activities of 
cajas (Tremlett 2012). 
 
Despite collapsing the bank and forcing the national government to provide CAM with an 
injection of €2.8 billion to meet its capital requirements, and a liquidity line of €3 billion to 
ease its sale to Banco Sabadell for the sum of €1 (Commission 2012[b]), senior executives 
still reportedly received a total of €13 million in early retirement packages (Cardenas 2013, 
p.18). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix III 
Example Interview Questions 
 
Spanish Finance Ministry, Treasury and Foreign Ministry 
 Can tell me a little about some of the things you are currently working on? And what 
your main responsibilities are day-to-day? 
 Would you say that the role of the Ministry and it’s interaction with European 
institutions changed since the 2008 crisis? 
 Within Germany, much is made of the counties belief in ‘ordo-liberalism’ and 
‘stability culture’.  Are there any comparably dominant ideas in Spain? 
 What specific measures has the Ministry been pushing at the European level to try to 
aid Spain’s economic and financial position? How receptive has Europe been to these 
calls? 
 How closely do you work with the BdE?  And how is policy coordinated at the 
European level between the two? 
 Do you think the objectives of the Ministry within Europe will alter if Spain were to 
elect a more left-wing Government in the upcoming elections? 
 Many argue German-centric price stability ideas provided the underlying economic 
ideology within pre-crisis EMU. Do you agree with this analysis? Has this changed 
post-crisis? 
 Do you think disagreements between ‘northern’ European states, including 
Germany, and some of the ‘southern’ states are due largely to political or genuine 
economic differences?  
 To what extent are Germany and other creditor states responsible for the Eurozone’s 
poor economic performance since the crisis? 
 How has the more ‘interventionist’ approach of the ECB post-crisis been received in 
Spain? 
 How involved are you with the Fondo de Restructuración Ordenado Bancaria (FROB) 
bank recapitalisation fund? 
 Do you think the creation of SAREB has been a success? 
 In April 2012 the BdE began forcing banks to re-evaluate and disclose their 
refinanced loan books.  Was this in response to European pressure and/or the ECB’s 
Comprehensive Assessment (Oct 2013)? 
 Given the different levels of financial health within the Eurozone, the different 
lending constraints within each state, and a single European monetary policy, how 
important is it to retain some control over financial policy at the national level? 
 How has regulation of the caja’s changed since the crisis? 
 Before the crisis, Spain came in for much criticism regarding its ‘dynamic 
provisioning’ methods.  What were policy-makers at the European level saying at 
that time? 
 How hard did Spain push for the introduction of MPR at the European level, both 
before and after the crisis? 
 Do you think what happened in Spain played an important role in Europe becoming 
more comfortable with MPR? 
 Do you think ‘consolidated’ financial regulation worked well in Spain? Do you think 
the rest of Europe could learn from the Spanish example? 
 Do you see a potential conflict between micro and macro-prudential regulation? 
 
 
Banco de España 
 Can you begin by telling tell me a little about some of the things you are currently 
working on? And what your main responsibilities are day-to-day? 
 Generally, how do you think the role and importance of national central banks within 
the ECSB has changed since the 2008 crisis? 
 Were Spanish central bankers reluctant to see financial oversight move away from 
Spain and towards the European level post-crisis? 
 Within Germany, much is made of the counties believe in ‘ordo-liberalism’ and 
‘stability culture’.  Are there any comparable theories and ideas within Spain? 
 What specific measures have the BdE been pushing at the European level to try to 
aid Spain’s economic and financial situation? How receptive has Europe been to 
these calls? 
 Do you think Spain maintained a different attitude towards monetary policy than the 
pre-crisis consensus? Did Spain push for a different approach at the European level? 
 Does the BdE see a role for monetary policy in assisting financial stability? 
 Do you see a potential conflict between the objectives of price stability and financial 
stability? 
 How has the more ‘interventionist’ approach of the ECB post-crisis been received in 
Spain? 
 Do you see a potential for conflict between increased ECB interventionism, bond 
purchases and central bank independence? 
 How has the regulation of cajas changed since the crisis? 
 Before the crisis, Spain came in for much criticism regarding its ‘dynamic 
provisioning’ methods.  What were policy-makers at the European level saying at 
that time? 
 Did Spain push for the introduction of MPR at the European level, before and after 
the crisis? 
 Do you think what happened in Spain played an important role in Europe becoming 
more comfortable with MPR? 
 Do you see a potential conflict between macro and micro-prudential regulation? 
 How involved are you with the Fondo de Restructuración Ordenado Bancaria (FROB) 
bank recapitalisation fund? 
 Why did it take until April 2012 for the BdE to begin forcing banks to re-evaluate and 
disclose their refinanced loan books? 
 How important was the ESM in helping the Spanish banking system to recover?   
 How influential was Spain in pressuring the ECB to publish the Comprehensive 
Assessment (Oct 2013)? 
 Do you think the creation of SAREB been a success? 
 Given the different levels of financial health within the Eurozone, the different 
lending constraints within each state, and single European monetary policy, how 
important is it to retain some financial policy at the national level? 
 To what extent has financial stability replaced price stability as the primary macro-
economic policy concern within the Eurosystem? 
 Do you see any potential conflict between the objectives of price and financial 
stability? 
 Do you think ‘consolidated’ financial regulation worked well in Spain? Do you think 
the rest of Europe could learn from the Spanish example? 
 Do you see a potential conflict between micro and macro-prudential regulation? 
 Many argue German ordo-liberal ideas were foundational to EMU. Do you agree 
with this analysis? Do you think Europe is beginning to move away from this German 
model?   
 Do you think disagreements between ‘northern’ European states, including 
Germany, and some of the ‘southern’ states are due largely to politics, or genuine 
economic differences?  
 To what extent do you think Germany and other creditor states approaches to the 
crisis are responsible for Europe’s poor post-crisis economic performance? 
 Do you think the objectives of the BdE within Europe would alter if were Spain to 
elect a more left-wing Government in the upcoming elections? 
 
German Finance Ministry and Economics Ministry 
 What are you are currently working on? And what your main responsibilities are day-
to-day? 
 What specific measures has the Ministry been pushing at the European level? How 
receptive has the EU been to these calls? 
 How closely do you work with the Bundesbank?  And how is policy coordinated at 
the European level between the two? 
 How important is ‘ordo-liberalism’ (Ordnungspolitik) and ‘stability culture’ within the 
Ministry and to Germany more widely? Do these ideas affect the decisions, aims and 
objectives of the Ministry? 
 Would you say Germany is pursuing an ordo-liberal agenda at the EU level? 
 What reforms are being pursued in Germany, and at the European level, to improve 
competitiveness and make public finances sustainable? 
 Is there room for economic investment and stimulus in these reforms? 
 To what extent has advancing a ‘Stability Culture’ across the EU been pursued by the 
Ministry? Do you think it has worked? 
 What measures did Germany requesting the Spanish to take in exchange for ESM? 
 Do you think ECB monetary policy was too loose on the lead up to the crisis? 
 Do you think disagreements between ‘northern’ European states, including 
Germany, and some of the ‘southern’ states, including France and Spain, are due 
largely to political or genuine economic differences? 
 Why has the more ‘interventionist’ approach of the ECB post-crisis been so heavily 
criticised in Germany? 
 Why has Germany been resistant to implementing Basel III fully into CRD IV? 
 Why has Germany been reluctant to see the completion of Banking Union with a 
common bank deposit insurance scheme? 
 Why has Germany been seeking to implement an amendment to the Banking Act? 
 Do you think the close relationship between politicians and Landesbanks has created 
problems?  
 Why has the Landesbank sector been so difficult to reform? 
 Overall, what would you say have been the main changes within the Finance 
Ministry since the 2007-8 crisis? 
 Would you say there been any change in terms of economic ideas within the 
Ministry, and Germany more widely? 
 
Deuteche Bundesbank 
 How has the role of the DB and of national central banks within the ECSB changed 
since the 2008 crisis? 
 What powers still remain with the DB in terms of monetary and financial stability 
policy?   
 What are you currently working on? 
 What specific measures have the DB been pushing for at the European level in 
response to the crisis? How receptive has Europe been to these calls? 
 Do you believe that the ECB has neglected it’s ‘price stability’ approach to monetary 
policy post-crisis? 
 Why is the more ‘interventionist’ approach of the ECB so unpopular in Germany? 
 Do you see a potential for conflict between increased ECB interventionism, bond 
purchases and central bank independence? 
 Do you think disagreements between ‘northern’ European states, including 
Germany, and some of the ‘southern’ states are due largely to politics, or genuine 
economic differences?  
 To what extent do you think financial stability has replaced price stability as the 
primary macro-economic policy concern in the Eurosystem? 
 Do you see any potential conflict between the objectives of price and financial 
stability?  
 What are the DBs views on Macro-Prudential Policy? 
 Do you consider there could be a potential for conflict between micro and macro-
prudential policy? 
 How important do you think the Spanish ‘dynamic provisioning’ experiments were in 
Europe becoming more comfortable with MPR? 
 Why was Germany so reluctant to see the SSM handed responsibility for smaller 
German lenders and to see financial regulatory oversight move away from Germany 
towards the European level? 
 How important are ordo-liberal ideas within the DB today? 
 Is price stability so important because of Weimar hyperinflation?  
 Do you believe German price stability ideas were incorporated into the ECB before 
the crisis? Do you believe these ideas have been retained? 
 Do you think ‘consolidated’ financial regulation could work for the rest of Europe? 
 
European Commission 
 Can you tell me a little about how the Commission operates and outline the specific 
responsibilities of your division? 
 How are policy disagreements within the Commission resolved? And how are final 
decisions about what to present to ‘trilogue’ made? 
 What contact does your department, and the Commission in general, have with 
representatives of individual member-states and member-state institutions? 
 Were national central banks and regulators reluctant to see financial oversight move 
away from nation states and towards the ECB and EBA? 
 How has the crisis changed the role and importance of national central banks and 
regulators within the ECSB? 
 How does your department interact with the ECB?  What contact do you have? 
 In what ways has the department changed in response to the 2008 financial crash? 
 To what extent has financial stability become an objective for the Commission? 
 How important do you consider macro-prudential regulation to be? Is it seen as the 
Commission’s main tool in combatting financial instability? 
 How important were the Spanish ‘dynamic provisioning’ experiments in Europe 
becoming more comfortable with MPR? 
 Do you believe that the Spanish approach to securitisation and the regulation of 
shadow banking could become implemented at a European level? 
 Why has the ECB been primarily charged with bringing financial stability to the 
Euroarea, as opposed to another institution like such as the EBA? 
 Do you see any potential conflict between the objectives of price and financial 
stability? 
 Could SSM dilute the ECB’s price stability objective? 
 Why was it decided to put the SSM in charge of only 130 of the EUs largest banks, 
whilst nearly 6,000 other banks remain supervised by national regulators? 
 Given the different levels of financial health within the Eurozone and the different 
lending constraints within each state, how sensible is it to impose homogeneous 
regulation across the Euroarea? 
 Do you think disagreements between ‘northern’ European states, including 
Germany, and some of the ‘southern’ states, including France and Spain, are due 
largely to political or genuine economic differences? 
 How important do you consider the ESM has been in helping Europe (and 
particularly Spain) recover from the financial crisis? 
 What further steps do you believe are necessary to create what Mr Van Rompuy 
called ‘a genuine economic and monetary union’?  
 What challenges do you see lying ahead for the Euro and for European financial 
stability? 
 
European Central Bank 
 How would you describe the ECBs monetary policy stance before the 2008 crash? 
 Has any of the models or underlying assumptions used in helping to generate ECB 
monetary policy changed since 2008? 
 How important have financial stability concerns become in the policy decision-
making process? Does this constitute a substantial shift from past thinking? 
 How strictly is the ‘separation principle’ between financial and price stability policy 
observed? How do you view the ECBs mandate in this regard? 
 Do you see any potential for conflict between a central bank pursuing both price and 
financial stability objectives? 
 How far is the issue of credibility linked to the objective of price stability for the ECB, 
and for the Eurozone as a whole? 
 Do you regard asset purchases as a challenge to central bank independence? How 
does the ECB square QE with Article 123, TFEU which forbids monetary financing, 
and Article 125 which forbids governmental bail-outs? 
 Do you consider the rift between the ECB and DB in terms of expansionary monetary 
policy to be down to political pressure from within Germany, or due to a genuine 
difference of economic ideas? 
 Do you think the ECB is moving away from its origins as the ‘Bundesbank writ-large’? 
 How important were the Spanish ‘dynamic provisioning’ experiments in the ECB 
becoming more comfortable with macro-prudential regulation? 
 Do you see a potential conflict between micro and macro-prudential regulation? 
 Do you believe that the Spanish approach to (consolidated) securitisation and the 
regulation of shadow banking could become implemented at a European level? 
 Now that the ECB has oversight of the SSM, SRM, uses ‘extraordinary’ monetary 
policy and is becoming increasingly interventionist, do you consider the current 
‘Monetary Dialogue’ arrangements provide sufficient democratic oversight? 
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